Honble MADAN, J. – Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the judgments of the Courts below. The only question which survives for the consideration of this Court is regarding the bonafide requirement of the landlord in occupying the suit premises in question which, admittedly, is a shop and the appellants son wants to run this shop. In my considered opinion no ground is made out for interference by this Court with the findings of the first appellate Court. In my opinion the first appellate Court has very rightly reversed the findings of the trial Court on the question of bonafide requirement of the landlord since it has come in evidence that there is no other shop available for the use of his son Ramesh Chandra except the shop in question. The bona- fide requirement by all standards has to be objectively considered and the owner is the best Judge of his bonofide need. The first appellate court has dealt with the matter at great length and has examined case and every aspect of the matter by a thorough appreciation of evidence on the record with regard to the bonofide need of the landlord to occupy the shop premises in question for the use of his son Ramesh Chandra. (2). I am further of the opinion that the learned trial Court has arrived at an imaginary findings that the landlord has got several shops available to him whereas as per the evidence on the record, it has been discussed by the first appellate court that the shop which was already in occupation of Ramesh Chandra was a small shop taken on rent which is not sufficient to meet his bonafide need. The appellate court has also placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Mohd. Hussain & Anr. vs. Abdul Rahim through his L.Rs. Abdul Karim, (1). The question which had arisen before this Court was regarding the bonafide need of the landlord who was residing in a rental pre- mises and paying higher rent than that being paid to her by the tenant. Hussain & Anr. vs. Abdul Rahim through his L.Rs. Abdul Karim, (1). The question which had arisen before this Court was regarding the bonafide need of the landlord who was residing in a rental pre- mises and paying higher rent than that being paid to her by the tenant. It was held by this Court that the landlords personal necessity was reasonable and bonafide and since comparative hardship was also in favour of the landlord, this Court held that the landlord was entitled to succeed and the decree of eviction passed against the tenant was upheld keeping in view the bonafide need of the landlord which was considered objectively on the basis of the material on record. (3). In support of his contention Mr. K.K. Agrawal has vehemently contended that even on the question of partial eviction the appellant was entitled to succeed. So far as commercial eviction is concerned, the partial eviction can be given. In support of his contention, Shri Agrawal has placed reliance on the decision of Krishna Murari Prasad vs. Kitar Singh (2), wherein the question which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was as to whether where the landlord proves his requirement of premises for obtaining eviction of the tenant, proviso to clause (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11 of the Bihar Rent Act requires the Court to consider whether the landlords reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only and allowing the tenant to continue the occupation of the rest of the premises and the tenant agrees to such occupation. If so the Court shall pass a decree accordingly and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant. (4). Since the said aspect was over looked by the High Court it was held by the Apex Court that since the appellant-tenant had already indicated his agreement in this regard and the respondent-landlord had disagreed to the suggestion of deviding the premises into two equal halves for being shared between the parties, the matter was, therefore, remanded back to the trial Court for examining the matter afresh in the light of the requirement of proviso to clause (a) of Sub-sec (1) of Sec. 11 of the said Act treating the landlords need to be proved. In my humble opinion, the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court is neither attracted nor applicable to this case since in the case in hand before the Apex Court, the question was altogether different. It was regarding agreement between the parties which was disregarded by the landlord regarding division of the suit premises in question which obviously is not a case here. Since there is no agreement between the parties regarding division of the property in question, the question of its division does not arise. (5). Mr. Agrawal has next contended that the provisions of the Bihar Act is in pari-materia akin to Sub-sec. (2) Sec. 14 of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short `the Act), which provides as under :– ``14. (1) . . . . . . (2) No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. (6). Even on the anology of sub-section (2) of Sec. 14 of the Act, no case has been made out by the appellant for interference by this Court in the findings of the learned first appellate court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. (7). At this stage learned counsel for the appellant requests that some time may be granted to the appellant to get the alternative accommodation and to vacate the premises. As agreed by both the parties the appellant shall vacate and hand over the peaceful possession of the shop premises in question to the respondent within 3 months from today and undertaking in this regard will be furnished by the appellant to this Court within one week from the date of the receipt of the copy of this judgment, failing which the decree shall be executable forthwith.