Honble SAXENA, J. – Accused-petitioners through this petition filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C. have assailed the order dated 5/7/1989 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kota rejecting their revision petition and confirming the order dated 4/11/87 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, No. 2, Kota whereby he framed charge for offences under Sections 420 and 120-B IPC against them. They have also challenged the order dated 24/1/90 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Kota whereby he rejected their application filed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India for alleged violation of their fundamental right of speedy trial. (2). Relevant facts, in brief, are that on 5/8/77 the Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd., (non-petitioner No.2) through S.S. Khanna the then agent of the Bank filed a criminal complaint against the petitioners and one S.N. Soral, the then agent of said Banks Industrial Area Branch Kota brand alleging that they had entered into criminal conspiracy to cheat the said Bank and that in pursuance of the said conspiracy petitioners submitted Hundis. MTRs. and RRs to the Bank during the period commencing from 5/5/76 to 8/6/76 dishonestly showing inflated values of their consignments, which were purchased by the said Bank, but those consignments were not accepted by the respective consignees. It was further alleged that the petitioners dishonestly submitted applications to the concerned authorities that their MTRs and RRs were lost and by executing indemnity bonds for much lower amounts got the deliveries of those consignments and thus cheated the Bank to the tune of rupees 1.84 lacs. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate after recording the statement of S.S.Khanna under Section 200 Cr.P.C. by his order dated 6/8/77 took cognizance against the petitioners for offences under Sections 420 and 120-B, IPC, but refused to take cognizance against S.N.Soral. Summons and bai- lable warrants were issued against petitioners and ultimately on 20/1/78 the petitioners and other co-accused persons appeared in the court and were bailed out. Thereafter, on 9/4/78 the petitioners filed an application that since S.S. Khanna the complainant was absent, the criminal complaint be dismissed and they be dischar- ged, that application was rejected by the learned Magistrate vide his order dated 15.4.78. The accused persons filed revision petition, against that order which was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kota by his order dated 9/11/79. (3). The accused persons filed revision petition, against that order which was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kota by his order dated 9/11/79. (3). Thereafter, petitioners sought adjournments for more than half a dozen times. On 26/8/82, statement of S.M. Agrawal (PW1) was recorded. On 1/2/84 pre- charge evidence was closed. Again, the petitioners sought adjournments on 10/1/85, 13/4/85, 17/5/85, 27/2/86, 30/5/86, 4/9/86 and 20/12/86 for arguments for framing the charges. (4). On 21/3/87, 15/5/87 and 30/10/87 arguments for framing the charge were heard and ultimately on 4/11/87 charge for offences under Sections 420 and 120-B, IPC was framed against the petitioners. On 4/12/87 petitioner Nemicand remained absent. The petitioners also filed revision petition against the charge order dated 4/11/87 before the learned Sessions Judge, which was rejected. On 8/6/88 and 19/12/88 PW 1 S.M. Agrawal was present for further cross-examination but adjournments were sought on behalf of the petitioners. Meanwhile the case was transferr- ed to the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Kota. (5). Thereafter, on 20/7/89 the petitioners filed an application to the effect that they have been facing trial for last 12 years and their right of speedy trial has been offended and as such, the proceedings against them be quashed and they be discharged. They also asserted that since no cognizance has been taken against S.N. Soral, offence under Section 120B, IPC was not made out against them. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by his order dated 24/1/90 dismissed their application. The petitioners have now filed this petition on 17/3/90 under Section 182, Cr.P.C. for quashing the criminal proceedings against them. (6). In this case, no stay order was passed by the Court. However, the peti- tioners sought many adjournments for one reason or the other before the trial court. Ultimately, the record of the lower court was sent for here. (7). I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and the learned Public Prosecutor at length and perused the record of the lower court in extenso. (8). Mr. However, the peti- tioners sought many adjournments for one reason or the other before the trial court. Ultimately, the record of the lower court was sent for here. (7). I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and the learned Public Prosecutor at length and perused the record of the lower court in extenso. (8). Mr. Khandelwal, the learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently contended that offences under Sections 420 and 120-B, IPC are not made out against the petitioners, who are facing trial in this case since January, 1978, that the respondent Bank has already filed civil suit against the petitioners for the recovery of the amount of those said Hundis, MTRs and RRs and that the trial has not been delayed at the instance of petitioners and as such, their fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been violated. He has convassed that since chances of conviction of petitioners in this case are bleak, hence proceedings against them pending before the trial Court be quashed. (9). On the other hand. Mrs. Sharda Pathak, the learned Public Prosecutor and Ms. Vidhu Bala for the respondent Bank have strenuously asserted that admittedly the petitioners did not challenge the order dated 5/7/89 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kota rejecting their revision petition and affirming the order dated 4/11/87 of the learned trial Magistrate, whereas charge against them was framed earlier. Therefore, this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. against the order for framing the charges at this belated stage is legally not maintainable. They have contended that in this case, the prosecution is not at all responsible for the delay in trial. On the other hand, the petitioners have been delaying the proceedings at every stage, and as such they cannot derive any benefit for their conduct. They have maintained that the factum of filing civil suits for the recovery of the amount by the Bank is not at all a valid ground for quashing criminal proceedings against the petitioners. (10). I have given my thoughtful consideration to rival submissions made before me. They have maintained that the factum of filing civil suits for the recovery of the amount by the Bank is not at all a valid ground for quashing criminal proceedings against the petitioners. (10). I have given my thoughtful consideration to rival submissions made before me. A close perusal of the record of lower court indicates that the petitioners challenged the order dated 4/11/87 passed by the learned trial Magistrate, whereby he had ordered for framing charge for offences under Sections 420 and 120-B, IPC against them before the learned Sessions Judge, Kota, who by his order dated 5/7/89 rejected the same. Thereafter, the petitioners did not file any petition u/s 482 CrPC against that order. They have now challenged the said order in this petition filed as late as on 17/3/90. (11). In Dharampal vs. Ramshri (1) it has been held that it is now well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be utilised in exercise of the powers which are expressly barred by the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the instant case, since the learned Sessions Judge has rejected the petitioners revi- sion petition against the order dated 4/11/87 passed by the learned trial Magistrate for framing the charge, legally no second revision petition was maintainable being barred under Section 397(3), Cr.P.C. The petitioners kept silence for a pretty long period and have now filed this petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. challenging the said order circumventing express provisions of Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. Therefore, in such circumstances, this petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. challenging the order dated 4/11/87 for framing the charges does not deserve to be entertained. (12). Besides this, on merits also it is not a fit case for invoking inherent powers of this Court for quashing the order dated 4/11/87. From the averments contained in the criminal complainant as also from the statement of S.M. Agrawal recorded under Section 200, Cr.P.C. and the documents filed on behalf of the Bank offences under Section 420 and 120 B IPC are prima facie made out against the petitioners. Therefore, I do not find any valid and substantial ground for quashing the impugned order dated 4/11/87. (13). Therefore, I do not find any valid and substantial ground for quashing the impugned order dated 4/11/87. (13). From a close and careful perusal of the order sheets of the file of the trial court, it is abundantly clear that the delay in the trial of this case has occasioned mainly, due to the fact that the petitioners first filed revision petition against the order dated 9/4/78 passed by the learned trial Magistrate rejecting their application for discharging them for the absence of S.S. Khanna the then agent of the Bank. The said revision petition was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge by his order dated 9/11/79. Thereafter, the petitioners sought umpteen adjournments on one ground or the other after the pre charge evidence was closed on 1/2/1984. Ofcourse, on many occasions, the Presiding Officer was also out of station and some adjournments were also sought by the Bank because its witnesses did not turn up. But mainly the delay in trial has been caused by the conduct and at the instance of accused-petitioners. On many occasions. PW1 S.M. Agrawal was present for further cross examination, but petitioners sought adjournments. Ultimately on 12/2/91 further cross examination of the said witness was closed. It is also pertinent to note that in this petition, this Court did not stay the proceedings of the trial court and from 17/3/1990 till the record of the lower court was sent for by this Court, the peti- tioners for one reason or the other sought adjournments. (14). It is true that to get speedy trial in a criminal case is a fundamental right of the accused within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. But, the question whether such a fundamental right has been violated or alleged to have been violated on account of protracted trial depends on various relevant factors and no outer limit can be fixed for the disposal of a case as a rule of thumb. For considering the limit of the delay, the Court has to take in to account a garden variety of factors to wit the period consumed in the investigation of the case, actual proceedings in the court after filing the criminal complaint or the charge sheet, the working of judicial system, lack of satisfactory working conditions in subordinate judicial courts, including the large pendency and institution of cases, inadequacy of the Judge strength etc. The Court has also to take into consideration as to whether the delay has occasioned by the tactics or conduct of the accused him- self, whether the accused objected at any stage when such delay was caused, and whether the accused has been prejudiced in his defence on account of such delay. If the Court finds that the delay has been caused at the instance or by conduct of the accused, certainly he is not entitled to claim that his fundamental right of speedy trial has been violated or offended and to take benefit for his act. (15). In the case on hand, it is evident that delay in the trial of this case has been mainly occasioned and caused at the instance of the petitioners and the complainant Bank or prosecution has not been guilty for any dilatory tactics or latches. Therefore, it is not a fit case, wherein by invoking inherent powers of this Court, the proceedings should be quashed. (16). The petitioners have filed certified copies of plaints, a perusal whereof indicates that on 15/12/78 three suits have been filed by the Bank against petitioners and other partners of M/s Shah & Co., M/s Shah Agro Industries and M/s Shah Guwar Industries for rupees 40873.14p, 44,502.86p and 5,65,323.80p in the court of Additional District Judge, Kota, but as mentioned earlier prior to that cognizance against the petitioners for offences under Sections 420 and 120-B IPC had already been taken by the learned trial Magistrate by his order dated 6/8/78. In Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar (2) it has been held that the existence of alternate civil remedy would not bar the criminal jurisdiction. (17). Mr. Khandelwal has relied upon Suraj Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (3), wherein a civil suit had already been filed and the civil court was seized of the dispute and the controversy raised between the parties. Thereafter a criminal complaint was filed after 17 years of the alleged occurrence for offences under Sections 419, 420, 406, 120-B, 468 and 471, IPC and the court took cognizance. In such circumstances, it was held that the order taking cognizance of the said offen- ces after delay of 17 years in respect of the controversy already raised in the civil suit amounted to abuse of process of the court and, therefore, subsequent criminal proceedings were quashed. In such circumstances, it was held that the order taking cognizance of the said offen- ces after delay of 17 years in respect of the controversy already raised in the civil suit amounted to abuse of process of the court and, therefore, subsequent criminal proceedings were quashed. Admittedly, such are not the facts of the case on hand, where the cognizance of the offences was taken by the criminal court much earlier than filing of those three civil suits against petitioners and other partners of the different firms. In such circumstances, Suraj Singhs case (supra) does not come to the rescue of the petitioners and in view of the law laid down in Pratibha Ranis case (supra) by the Supreme Court, continuance of criminal proceedings against the petitioners are not barred. (18). Hence, refracted from any angle, this petition is devoid of any force and substance and the same is hereby dismissed. However, the learned trial Magistrate is directed to expedite the trial of this case and to ensure that this case is disposed of within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of this order and the record of the case. The parties are directed to appear before him on December 14, 1995.