JUDGMENT 1. - The main grievance of the petitioner is that he is not being allowed to join duty inspite of the fact that the execution of sentence of imprisonment has been suspended during pendency of appeal. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in this petition necessary facts may be stated. 2. The petitioner was working as L.D.C. under the employment of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board (for short the R.S.E.B.). He was prosecuted on a criminal charge under Section 307 IPC before the Special Court, S.C./S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Kota and ultimately, he was found guilty and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- vide judgment dated, 21st December, 1994. On filing an appeal against the order of conviction before the High Court, the sentence of imprisonment he approached to the concerned authority to allow him to join duty, but he was not permitted to do so and this act, according to the petitioner, is illegal. 3. The only submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the conviction of the petitioner for the offence under Section 307 IPC was not final and he is entitled to join his duty after the sentence of imprisonment stood suspended by the Appellate Court as his dismissal order was based on his conviction. Learned counsel contended that the matter is still sub judice and the petitioner has a right to work till his conviction is final. It was also contended that the R.S.E.B. is competent to initiate departmental enquiry and he could be dismissed or removed from service if the petitioner's misconduct is proved. 4. In my view, the above argument has no substance. Under Section 389(1) Cr.PC the appellate Court is empowered to suspend the execution of the sentence or order during the pendency of appeal and by such order, the conviction does not cease to be operative. This aspect has been considered recently by the Apex Court of the country in the case of Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang, (1995) 2 SCC 513 and Dy. Director of Collegiate Education (Adorn.) Madras v. S. Nagoor Meera (1995) SCC (Labour & Service) 686. In Dy. Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) v. S. Nagoor Meera (supra) it has been observed under:-. "This clause, it is relevant to notice, speaks of `conduct which has led his conviction on a criminal charge'. Director of Collegiate Education (Adorn.) Madras v. S. Nagoor Meera (1995) SCC (Labour & Service) 686. In Dy. Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) v. S. Nagoor Meera (supra) it has been observed under:-. "This clause, it is relevant to notice, speaks of `conduct which has led his conviction on a criminal charge'. It does not speak of sentence or punishment awarded. Merely because the sentence is suspended and/or the accused is released on bail, the conviction does not cease to be operative. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 empowers the Appellate Court to order that pending the appeal `the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond'. Section 389(1), it may be noted, speaks of suspending `the execution of the sentence or order', it does not expressly speak of suspension of conviction. Even so, it may be possible to say that in certain situations, the appellate court may also have the power to suspend the conviction an aspect dealt with recently in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang, (1995) 2 SCC 513 . At pages 524 and 525, the position under Section 389 is stated thus : "Section 389(1) empowers the Appellate Court to order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended pending the appeal. What can be suspended under this provision is the execution of the sentence or the execution of the order. Does `order' in Section 389(1) mean order of conviction or an order similar to the one under Section 357 or Section 360 of the Code? Obviously the order referred to in Section 389(1) must he an order capable of execution. An order of conviction by itself is not capable of execution under the Code. It is the order of sentence or an order awarding -compensation or imposing fine or release on probation which are capable of execution and which, if not suspended, would be required to be executed by the authorities. In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. In such situations the attention of the Appellate Court must be specifically invited to the consequence that is likely to fall to enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under section 389(1) it is under an obligation to support its order `for reasons to be recorded by it in writing'. If the attention of the Court is not invited to this specific consequence which is likely to fall upon conviction how can it be expected to assign reasons relevant thereto ? .... If such a precise request was made to the Court pointing out the consequences likely to fall on the continuance of the conviction order, the Court would have applied its mind to the specific question and if it thought that case was made out for grant of interim stay of the conviction order, with or without conditions attached thereto, it may have granted an order to that effect." 5. In view of this, the argument made by the learned counsel has no substance. The petitioner has been found guilty of the criminal charge of attempting to commit murder and in the opinion of the employer, his conduct which has led to his conviction is such as to render his further retention in service undesirable. Until the said conviction is set aside by the appellate or other higher Court, it may not be advisable to retain such person in service. In case, he succeeds in appeal or other proceedings, the matter can always be reviewed in such matter as provided by the Circular produced by the petitioner. 6. The order of dismissal of the petitioner does not stand suspended by the pendency of appeal and as such, no direction can be given by this Court to allow the petitioner to join his duty till his conviction is made final by the appellate or other higher Court.The petition is wholly devoid of merit and it is dismissed summarily.Writ petition dismissed. *******