ORDER 1. The short facts relating to civil appeal are as under : The 5th respondent, Union of India (Eastern Railway) owns a cinema building forming part of the civil appeal which is situated in Mughal Sarai. It has an auditorium and other equipments used for films for the entertainment of railway officers and employees. The management of the club building including auditorium, machinery etc. had been entrusted by the 5th respondent (Eastern Railway Administration) to the 3rd respondent (the Railway Cinema Club) in the year 1982. The auditorium of railway cinema was hired to in favour of the appellant for a period of 5 years for screening feature films. On expiry of this period the 2nd respondent, the estate officer, Eastern Railway, Mughal Sarai initiated proceedings for the eviction of the appellant that on expiry of the contract period he had become an unauthorised occupant. The proceedings were taken under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act of 1971, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The estate officer directed eviction after observing due procedure under Section 5 of the Act. Aggrieved by that order of eviction an appeal was preferred to the first respondent (6th Additional District Judge, Varanasi). That appeal was dismissed. Thereafter the appellant challenged the same in Civil Misc. WP No. 15313 of 1988 before the High Court of Allahabad. The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition and upheld the order of eviction. Questioning the correctness of the said judgment the present civil appeal has been preferred. The learned counsel for the appellant raises the following points for our consideration: (1) Insofar as the privity of contract is between the appellant and the Railway Cinema Club it will be a contract between two private individuals. In such a case, for evicting the appellant the provisions of the Act cannot be invoked. (2) Section 2(e) of the Act defines public premises. When it says "belonging to" it should mean the Central Government must have control over the property. Where it has handed over the property to the Railway Cinema Club which alone had licensed the appellant, it cannot be said that the Government of India (the Railway administration) has control over the property. The meaning of the words "belonging to" had come up for discussion in Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur AIR 1965 SCJ 923. The meaning of the words "belonging to" had come up for discussion in Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur AIR 1965 SCJ 923. Even though these words may not convey the meaning of ownership, yet Government must have effective control. This is fortified when the definition under Section 2(ii) in relation to company is looked at. 2. In All India Rly. Institute Employees Assn. v. Union of India (1990) 2 SCC 542 , this Court held the employees of such cinema houses are not employees of the Railway. It should follow that the Central Government will have nothing to do with the licence in favour of the appellant. 3. In Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank (1990) 4 SCC 406 (On SCC pp. 415, in upholding the validity of these Acts this Court took the view that the Central Government will not behave as a private landlord. This is one of the grounds on which the validity was upheld. 4. Hence the judgment under appeal cannot be sustained. It is true that the appellant had been evicted pursuant to the impugned judgment. Nevertheless these questions need to be gone into because there are proceedings against the appellant instituted by the Railway Club under Section 7 of the Act. Should the appellant succeed, the same will be rendered otiose. 5. We have given our careful consideration to each of the submissions made above. We find not one of them tenable. We have already narrated the facts. If admittedly the property belongs to the Union of India, the Railway Cinema Club had been entrusted with the running of the cinema house together with the equipments. It found its running was not a profitable venture. Therefore, by inviting tenders, the offer of the appellant came to be accepted and that was how he became the licensee for a period of five years from 1982 from the Railway Club. After the expiry of the period, the estate officer invoked the provisions of the Act for evicting the appellant. We are clearly of the view that merely because the Railway Club invited tenders the property did not cease to belong to the Union of India (the Eastern Railway Department). It still had dominion over the property. Advisedly under Section 2(e) Parliament has used the words "belonging to" and not ownership. We are clearly of the view that merely because the Railway Club invited tenders the property did not cease to belong to the Union of India (the Eastern Railway Department). It still had dominion over the property. Advisedly under Section 2(e) Parliament has used the words "belonging to" and not ownership. If, therefore, the Union of India has dominion over the property and if the said property had been entrusted to the Railway Club, by such mere entrustment it does not cease to belong to the Union of India. Therefore, the definition under Section 2(e) will apply. 6. Raja Mohd. Amir Ahmed Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur AIR 1965 SC 1923 construed the words "belonging to" in a document while deciding the question whether the lessee had denied the title of the landlord. The construction of a document is wholly different from construing a statutory definition as under Section 2(e). Therefore, that case has no application. 7. Merely because in All India Rly. Institute Employees Assn. v. Union of India (1990) 2 SCC 542 , it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that the employees of railway institute and clubs are not railway employees, it does not follow that the property in dispute here does not belong to the Railways. That ruling again does not advance the case of the appellant. 8. We are unable to see as to how the appellant could derive any assistance from Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank (1990) 4 SCC 406 . This is not a case of the Union of India invoking the provisions as a private landlord would do. On the contrary, it is invoking the provisions of the Act to evict the appellant who is an unauthorised occupant from a public premises which belongs to it. For all these reasons, we dismiss the civil appeal. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim order for stay stands vacated. For Citation: 1995 Supp(2) SCC 579