R. B. MEHROTRA, J. Once again the employer has successfully stalled the proceedings of a labour Court nearly for a period of six years, in a reference made under Section 4kof the Industrial Disputes Act by the State Government at the instance of workmen-respondent No. 2, Sri Chandra Pal in the present writ petition. 2. On 12. 12. 1989, the State Govern ment made a reference under Section 4kof the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ( here in after referred to as the Act), to the Labour Court-II at Meerut for deciding the following industrial dispute: "whether the termination of the services of the workman, Sri Chandra Pal s/o Sri Sohan Lal, Head Moulder by order dated 13. 1. 86 passed by the employer was just and legal If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to and all other connected matters. " 3. On notice issued to the parties, the employer M/s Swarup Vegetable Products Industries Ltd. filed a written statement on 3-4-1989 wherein they contended that dis missal of workman from service was as con sequence to fair and proper enquiry and the report of the Enquiry Officer which is based on evidence recorded in domestic enquiry. However, if this Honble Court at any Stage comes to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry conducted by the employer was not fair and proper of stood vitiated on any other ground, the employer in accordance with the settled principles of law, may kindly afford opportunity to prove the charges afresh before this Honble Court. " 4. On pleadings of the parties, the Labour Court framed as many as four issues. The issues framed by the labour court are reproduced below: " (1) Whether the domestic enquiry con ducted in the matter was not fair and proper. If so, its effect. (ii) Whether the punishment inflicted on the workman was justified considering past conduct of the workman, in case the enquiry is found to be proper and whether the punishing authority was legally bound to punish the workman before pass ing the final order. (iii) Whether the punishing authority acted in violation of principle of natural justice in relying on the inquiry report without notice to workman. (iv) Whether the termination of the services of the workman concerned is an act of victimisa tion unfair labour practice. 5. On 1. 1. (iii) Whether the punishing authority acted in violation of principle of natural justice in relying on the inquiry report without notice to workman. (iv) Whether the termination of the services of the workman concerned is an act of victimisa tion unfair labour practice. 5. On 1. 1. 1991 an application was again moved on behalf of the employer before the labour court, praying there in that issue No. 1. may be decided as preliminary issue and further prayed that in case issue No. 1 is decided against the employer then they may be afforded opportunity to lead evidence before the labour court. On. 11. 1. 1991, the Labour Court rejected the application of the employer-petitioner in the present writ petition rely ing on a decision of this Court in Vikram Cotton Mills case 1. (1) Vikram Cotton Mills v. Presiding Officer [ 1989 (59) FLR 386 ]. 6. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. This Court issued notice directing the writ petition, to come up for admission on 11. 4. 1991 and further directed that meanwhile the proceedings in adjudication case No. 161 of 1990, pending before the respondent No. 1 shall remain stayed. The order-sheet of the case discloses that thereafter the matter was taken up only on 28. 8. 92and the matter was adjourned on the ground that the number of writ petition and the name of counsel have been wrongly printed. Thereafter the matter for the first time was taken up on 13. 2. 1995 and the learned counsel for the petitioner got the case adjourned to 23. 2. 1995. The matter was again lost and was taken up only on 9. 8. 1995, when I heard the counsel for the parties and reserved the judgment. I am not in a position to comment, as to whether the case was listed as per direction of this Court or it was arranged in the office that the case may not be listed despite direction of the Court. Most of the time of office comes with flimsy explanation that the mat ter was listed but was not taken up and the Bench Secretary has not noticed in the order-sheet regarding listing of the matter. The Bench Secreataries are also not in posi tion to explain this situation. Most of the time of office comes with flimsy explanation that the mat ter was listed but was not taken up and the Bench Secretary has not noticed in the order-sheet regarding listing of the matter. The Bench Secreataries are also not in posi tion to explain this situation. All this is being stated just to emphasise that the sys tem is failing and despite Courts solemn desire to expeditiously decide the issues, the matter remain pending for years, as the mat ter is never brought before the court either due to over listing of cases or due to wrong listing of cases or many times due to ad journments sought by the counsel. The ul timate sufferer is the poor and helpless man who is knocking the doors of justice to fight the mighty one. 7. In the present case the alarming fea ture which is also to be noticed is that the respondent-workman filed a stay vacating application on 19. 4. 1991 and also filed a counter affidavit in the matter. The stay vacating application also never came up for orders before the Court and the petitioner continued to enjoy the fruit of limited stay order which only meant that the interim order passed by the Court was to continue till 11. 4. 1991 only. Aggrieved by the pen dency of the aforesaid case, the respondent-workman again filed an application in this Court on 28. 5. 1993 along with an affidavit submitting there in that the respondent workman is not only un-employed but is also having a brain tumor and he may die at any time. This application was also directed to come up on 13. 7. 1993. I am not in a position to ascertain as to whether the ap plication was listed on 13. 7. 1993 or on any near date thereafter. This also establishes that the judicial system has become insensi tive to serious human problems. 8. All this has been stated to demonstrate that when the Courts entertain petitions at interlocutory stages, particular ly in a matter where the dispute is relating to a workman and the Legislature has en visaged expeditious disposal of industrial disputes, it results not only in an enormous agony to the poor workman but also results in frustrating the legislative intent of ex peditious disposal of industrial disputes. 9. 9. For emphasising the point that all industrial disputes are to be decided with utmost expedition, according to the Legisla tive intent I refer to the Rules framed under U. P. Industrial Act (Rules) which are para materia with the Rules framed under In dustrial Disputes Act (Central) made by the Parliament with particular reference to Rule 10b, which is paramateria with Rule-12 of the Rules framed under U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 10. Rule-12 of the Rules framed under U. P. Industrial Disputes Act in the year 1957, as amended in the year 1978 amply demonstrate that the Legislature has in tended hearing of labour and industrial dis putes with utmost expedition. For Con venience Sub-rules 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of Rule-12 are reproduced below: " (4) The hearing shall ordinarily be con tinued from day todayand arguments shall follow immediately after the closing of evidence, (5) The Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, shall not ordinarily grant an adjourment for a period exceeding on week at a timeand not more than three adjournments at the instance of anyone of the parties to the dispute shall be granted. Provided that in every special case only the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, may for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant an adjournment exceeding a week, or more than three adjournment at the instance of any one of the parties to the dispute. (6) At the first hearing of the Labour Court or the Tribunal, the Presiding Officer may call upon the parties to state their case in such order as it may think fit. (7) Where reference is pending before the Labour Court or the Tribunal, the Labour Court or the Tribunal shall proceed to decide such dis pute on priority basis in which it has been brought to the notice of the said Court or the Tribunal that a strike or lockout is pending or threatened in the establishment concerned. (8) The written statement filed by the union or the workmen shall state the grounds on which the claim of the concerned workman is based and the written statement shall be accompanied by an affidavit in which the contents of the written state ment are sworn to. (8) The written statement filed by the union or the workmen shall state the grounds on which the claim of the concerned workman is based and the written statement shall be accompanied by an affidavit in which the contents of the written state ment are sworn to. (9) If the affidavit accompanying the written statement of the union or the workmen is not rebutted by the employers, the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, shall presume the contents of the affidavit to be true and make an award accepting the facts stated in the written statement. " 11. The entire procedure con templated by Rule-12 for deciding the in dustrial disputes by the Labour Court or the Tribunal does not conceive of any decision on a preliminary issue. A bare reading of the Rule shows that whatever be the dispute it should be decided with utmost expedition and the hearing should continue from day to day basis. The conception of getting a preliminary issue decided first is contrary to the Legislative mandate of sub-rule (4) of Rule-12. 12. Infact in view of two later decisions of this Court, the controversy stood resolved. This Court in Vikram Cotton Mills case (supra) following the observa tions of the Supreme Court in D. P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and others (1983 (4) S. C. C. page -293), has rejected the writ petition filed by Vikram Cotton Mills against the decision of Labour Court refus ing to decide the issue whether the domestic enquiry conducted by the employer was fair and proper as a preliminary issue. 13. In Upper India Sugar Mills v. Presiding Officer, 1994 (68) F. LR. 482 case, in a well considered dicision, this Court again re-af firmed the decision of M/s Vikram Cotton Mills (supra) and held that in view of the law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in D. P. Maheshwari case (supra), the earlier decision of the Court in the case of Star Paper Mills v. Labour Court, 1987 (54) Fac tory and Labour Reports 779 stands over ruled. The relevant portion of the judgment holding that the decision of this Court in Star Paper Mills case (supra) stands over ruled is as under: "from the above observation it is ob vious that the Supreme Court has changed the earlier view by making observation that now the time has come that the Tribunals needs not decide any issue with preference as preliminary issue. In the case of Star Paper Mills (supra), just a sweeping remark was made about the dictum laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in D. P. Maheshwaris case (supra ). But keeping in view the nature of legislation i. e. social benefit legislation, I am of the considered opinion that a purposive approach has to be made by the Court so as to attain the objects envisaged by the Legislature. In order to render substantial social justice to the workman, who is to be treated as human beings and care may be taken that his agonies in prolonging the litigation has to be minimised and curtailed. In Sadhu Ram Bansal v. P. B. Sarkar, it was observed as follows: "we must remember that in administering justice-social or legal- jurisprudence has shifted away from fine spun technicalities and abstract rules to recongnition of human beings as human beings and human needs as human needs and if these can be fulfilled without deprivation of exist ing legal rights of any party concerned, courts must lean towards that. " Before quoting the decision of D. P. Maheshwari case (supra) it will be fair to notice the con tention of the petitioners counsel who has placed strong reliance on a decision of this Court in Star Paper Mills case (supra ). 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in the matter of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Company v Ludh Budh Singh, 1972 Factory & Labour Reports, Vol. 25, p. 1. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills case, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines for the purposes of decid ing preliminary issues raised by the parties in industrial disputes. 25, p. 1. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills case, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines for the purposes of decid ing preliminary issues raised by the parties in industrial disputes. The guidelines for mulated in the aforesaid decision, Which are relevant for the purpose of the debate with which this matter is concerned, are reproduced below: " (4) When a domestic enquiry has been hela by the management and the management relies on the same, it is open to the latter to request the Tribunal to try the validity of the domestic enquiry as preliminary issue and also ask for an oppor tunity to adduce evidence before the Tribunal, if the finding on the preliminary issue is against the management. However, elaborate and cumber some the procedure may be, under such cir cumstances, it is open to the Tribunal to deal, in the first instance, as a preliminary issue the validity of the domestic enquiry. If its finding on the preliminary issue is in favour of the management, then no additional evidence need be cited by the management. But if the finding on the prelimi nary issue is against the management, the Tribunal will have to give the employer an opportunity to cite additional evidence and also give a similar opportunity to the employee to lead evidence con tra, as the request to adduce evidence had been made by the management to the Tribunal during the course of the proceedings and, before the trial has come to end. When the preliminary issue is decided against the management and the latter leads evidence before the Tribunal, the position, under such circumstances, will be, that the management is deprived of the benefit of having the finding of the domestic Tribunal being ac cepted as prima facie proof of alleged misconduct. On the other hand, the management will have to prove, by adducing proper evidence, that the workman is guilty of misconduct and that the action taken by it is proper. It will not be just and fair either to the management or to the workman that the Tribunal should refuse to take evidence and thereby ask the management to make a fur ther application, after holding a proper enquiryand deprive the workman of the benefit of the Tribunal itself being satisfied, on evidence ad duced before it, that he was or was not guilty by of the alleged misconduct. (5) The management has got a right to at tempt to sustain its order by adducing inde pendent evidence before the Tribunal. But the management should avail itself of the said oppor tunity by making a suitable request to the Tribunal before the proceedings are closed. If no such opportunity has been availed of, or asked for by the management, before the proceedings are closed, the employer can make no grievance that the Tribunal did not provide such an opportunity. The Tribunal will have before it only the enquiry proceedings and it has to decide whether the proceedings have been held properly and the find ings recorded there in are also proper. (6) If the employer relies only on the domes tic enquiry and does not simultaneoulsy lead addi tional evidence or ask or an opportunity during the pendency of the proceedings to adduce such evidence, the duty of the Tribunal is only to con sider the validity of the domestic enquiry as well as the finding recorded there in and decide the mat ter. If the Tribunal decides that the domestic en quiry has not been held properly, it is not its function to invite suomotu the employer to ad duce evidence before it to justify the action taken by it. " 3. U. India Sugar Mills v. Presiding Officer (1994 (68) F. L. R. page 482 ). 4. Star Paper Mills v. Labour Court (1987 (54)F and L. R. page-779 ). 5. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company v. Ludh Budh Sing (1972 F. & L. R. , volume-25, page-l ). A close reading of the above decision shows" that the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case did not conceive of two innings for deciding as industrial dispute. The Supreme Court only gave a direction that in case the preliminary issue regarding holding of a domestic enquiry being proper, having been decided against the employer, the employer will cite addition evidence which means that the addi tional evidence justifying the dismissal should be given by the employer while leading his evidence in the industrial dispute. Some ambiguity can be attributed to the later words in the aforesaid decision where it was said" also give a similar opportunity to the employee to lead evidence con tra. Some ambiguity can be attributed to the later words in the aforesaid decision where it was said" also give a similar opportunity to the employee to lead evidence con tra. " but by reading whole judgment, it is clear that the industrial dispute is to be concluded in accord ance with the Rules, there is no conception of deciding only a preliminary issue and then giving opportunity to the parties to lead evidence. It may be that in case the preliminary issue is decided in favour of the employer and it is held that the domestic enquiry was just and proper then the Tribunal may not be required to consider the additional evidence given by the employer justify ing the dismissal on merits. 15. However, the ratio of the aforesaid decision is no more relevant for the decision of the present controversy in view of the subsequent decision of Honble Supreme Court. The decision in the case of Delhi Cloth Mills (spura) was given by a division Bench of Supreme Court consisting of two Honble Judges. After a decade thereafter it was realised that permitting two innings in industrial dispute is resulting in enormous agony to the workmen and the employers are successful in stalling the proceedings before the Labour Court by agitating a preliminary issue before High Court and Supreme Court which frustrates the Legis lative intent of resolving industrial disputes expeditiously. 16. In D. P. Maheshwaris case (supra) the Supreme Court constituting a Bench of three Honble Judges, Justice Chenappa Reddy speaking for the Bench, held: "it was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to a void decision of industrial disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have before us a case where a dispute oringnowinating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of dicision on a preliminary objection. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have before us a case where a dispute oringnowinating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of dicision on a preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of ad judicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopoardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary is sues. " This verdict of the Supreme Court still holds field and has been followed through out the Country by all High Courts. A refer ence of some of the decisions of other High Courts following the aforesaid verdict is being given below: 17. In Indian Cable Company Ltd. v. Fifth Industrial Tribunal and others, (198911 L. L. N. page 23) case the Calcutta High Court considering all the earlier decisions held: "the Tribunal which is created to decide disputes expeditiously cannot be compelled to decide preliminary issue first. It has a greater discretion in the matter of devising its own proce dure. Section 11 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, gives wide power to the Industrial Tribunals which provides as follows: "subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour-Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or the authority concerned may think fit. " "the change in the course of law as clearly pointed out in Maheshwari (D. P) case (1984-1 L. L. N. 1) (vide supra), is a change which the Court had to adopt to march in tune with the changed ideas and the ideologies of the changing society, that being the role of law in a society as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Corporation, Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another (1986-11 L. L. N. 382), wherein in para 29 at page 395, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "the Law exists to serve the needs of the society which is governed by it. If the law is to play its allotted role of serving the needs of the society, it must reflect the ideas and ideologies of that society. It must keep tune with the needs and aspirations of the people. As the Society changes, the law cannot remain immutable. The early nineteenth century essayist to wit Sydney Smith, said. When I hear any man talk of an unalterable law, I am convinced that he is an unalterable fool. " The law must, therefore, in a changing society march in tune with the changed ideas and ideologies. " 18. At another place in the same judg ment the Court relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujrat Steel Tubes v. Gujrat Steel Tubes Majdoor Sabha, 1980 (1) L. L. N. page-230 held that an order can be quashed only if it is vitiated by the fundamental flaws of gross miscarriage of justice, absence of legal evidence, perverse misreading of facts, serious errors of law on the face of the order, jurisdictional failure and the like. 19. On the aforesaid basis the Court refused to interfere in an order challenged before the Court where Industrial Tribunal refused to decide a preliminary issue. 20. In Taj Services Ltd. v. Delhi Ad ministration and others, 1989 II C. L. R. page 278)the Delhi High Court following the dicta of D. P. Maheshwari case (supra) held: "it is time that the writ court ceased to exer cise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Con stitution at the very threshold of the reference. A special tribunal is set up where all questions can be decided and in this age of specialisation it is more appropriate that the specialised agency, namely, Industrial Tribunal, should first adjudicate and decide all the issues arising before it before the matter is agitated in the higher courts. " 21. Before dealing with the case of Star Paper Mills relied upon by the learned Advo cate appearing on behalf of the petitioner Sr. J. N. Tiwari, a reference is also to be made to the cases of Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. , AIR 1979 SC 1852 and Shambhu Nath Gael v. Bank of Baroda, AIR 1984 SC 289 . J. N. Tiwari, a reference is also to be made to the cases of Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. , AIR 1979 SC 1852 and Shambhu Nath Gael v. Bank of Baroda, AIR 1984 SC 289 . The aforesaid two decisions have been discussed in detial in the case of Vikram Cotton Mills case (supra), therefore, to avoid repetition, the relevant portion of the aforesaid decisions are not being quoted herein. It may, how ever, be stated in the aforesaid decisions, the Court held that it is the duty and obligation of the employer, if it so chooses to lead additional evidence to substantiate the charges of misconduct. The employers if they so desire can lead additional evidence to substantiate the dismissal of the workman on merits in case their prelimi nary objection fails that the domestic en quiry was fair and proper and the Labour Court should not interfere in the matter, then the employer can place reliance on additional evidence adduced by them before the Labour Court. 22. Shanker Chakravartis case was directly concerned with the issue involved in the present case. In that case also the procedure contemplated before the Labour Court was only to permit the employer to lead additional evidence in support of the merit of dismissal. 23. Considering the entire ratio of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of the High Court in the present context. The employer cannot be permitted to have two innings and thereby delay the decision in an industrial dispute, first by raising a prelimi nary issue and thereafter adjudicating the same in higher courts and then leading evidence to decide the issue on merits. This procedure is counter productive, defeasive of very concept of expeditious justice in the matters of industrial dispute and in any case if the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal refuses to decide any such issue as prelimi nary issue the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked. The petitioners counsel has placed strong reliance on the case of Star Paper Mills case (supra ). The petitioners counsel has placed strong reliance on the case of Star Paper Mills case (supra ). This Court in Star Paper Mills case has by-passed the dicta of D. P. Maheshwari case (supra) by interpreting it to mean only that the Labour dispute should be expeditiously decided and on the aforesaid basis gave a direction that the dispute should be decided with utmost speed and the employer will not be per mitted to agitate the decision on the preliminary issue in the higher courts. In Star Paper Mills case (supra) a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the Labour Court, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in law in refusing to treat the issue No. 1 as preliminary issue and to give its decision there on, as such, the order refusing to decide the issue as preliminary issue was held to be vitiated in law. 24. With all respect and humility, I say that the procedures contemplated by the Rules do not require framing and deciding of a preliminary issue first, there was no basis for the court to arrive at a conclusion that in case the Labour Court fails to decide preliminary issue, it will amount to failing in exercise of jurisdiction vested in it by law. The relevant portion of the decision of the Star Paper Mills case (Supra) case is quoted below: "section 11 (1) of the Central Act and Sec tion 5-C of the U. P. Act are analogous. The forums created under the two Acts are enjoined to follow such procedure as they think fit. Of course, such a procedure shall be subject to any Rules that may be made. No Rules have been framed either under the U. P. Act in the matter concerning the framing of issues. The. forums created under the two Act exercise quasi judicial powers. They are expected to adjudicate upon a list which is in the nature of a civil suit. They, therefore, exercise functions analogous to that of civil court. " " The order of the Labour Court refusing the request of the petitioner to treat the issue No. 1 as a preliminary issue and to give its decision there on has already been set out above. The pleadings of the petitioner have also been set out. No cogent reason has been given by the Labour Court in not accepting the application. The pleadings of the petitioner have also been set out. No cogent reason has been given by the Labour Court in not accepting the application. The case in the hand of the Labour Court was not an abnor mal one. It therefore, acted not only arbitrarily but has also failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law in not acceding to the request to decide the issue no. l as a preliminary issue. Its orders, therefore stand vitiated. " 25. The Court was labouring under a wrong impression that no Rules have been framed either under the Central Act or under the U. P. Act which provide a different procedure than contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure for deciding a dispute. Rules referred to earlier did provided pro cedure for decision of industrial dispute, they do not contemplate deciding any issue as preliminary issue. No fault can be found in the courts order refusing to decide any issue as preliminary issue. Reading such an obligation on the labour court for exercise of jurisdiction is without basis. Rules framed under the Act provides a procedure which impliedly rule out at least possibility of deciding any issue as preliminary issue firstand then decide rest of the issues after affording opportunity to the parties to lead evidence. the ratio of the aforesaid decision is in ignorance of legislative mandate incor porated in the forms of rules, as such, is held to be per incirium. 26. I have already referred to the decisions in Upper India Sugar Mills case wherein this Court has already given a weighty reason for not following the ratio of Star Paper Mills case. It is being made clear that it will be open to the employer to lead additional evidence justifying the dismissal of the workman on merits by leading addi tional evidence if they so desire. In the cir cumstances of the case I am of the view that the Labour Court should be directed to decide the industrial dispute resolution of which was hauled up by the interim order of this Court, with in three months from the date the certified copy of this order is presented before the Labour Court con cerned and the hearing of the matter be done on day to day basis without permitting any adjournment as contemplated by the Rules. 27. 27. On the basis of the aforesaid analysis I proposed to dismiss the writ peti tion with costs however, on the date, the petition was listed for delivery of judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice that a Division Bench of this Court as late as on 25-8-1995, in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 43683 of 1993 M/s. DCM Shriram Industries Ltd. Unit Daurala Sugar Works, Daurala, district, Meemt v. State of U. P. and others has held that the decision in M/s Vikram Cotton Mills case (supra) was not correctly decided and the decision in M/s. Star Paper Mills case (supra) was rightly decided. 28. I have carefully perused the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court. The case of Upper India Sugar Mills case (supra) was not placed before the Division Bench wherein on a detailed con sideration, the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that the law laid down in Star Paper Mills case (supra) does not hold field. The Division Bench has only relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P. P. Munde, AIR 1975 SC 1900 , case, a case decided in the year 1975. 29. In Cooper Engineering Ltd. case the Supreme Court has referred to and relied upon the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills case (supra) which has been referred to earlier in this judgment. 30. The Division Bench failed to notice the change of law brought in by the Legisla ture after the decision of Cooper Engineering Ltd. case (supra ). 31 Rule-12 of the Original Rules notified in gazette notification No. 1465 (ST)/xxxvia-102 (ST)-57 dated May 20, 1957 is reproduced below: 12. Procedure at the first sitting-At the first sitting of a Labour Court or Tribunal the Presiding Officer shall call upon the parties in such order as he may think fit to state their case. " 32. The Legislature intervened and Rule 12 was drastically amended in the year 1978, published in U. P. Gazette (extra ordi nary) dated 19. 1. 1978. The amended rule has already been reproduced in earlier part of this judgment. " 32. The Legislature intervened and Rule 12 was drastically amended in the year 1978, published in U. P. Gazette (extra ordi nary) dated 19. 1. 1978. The amended rule has already been reproduced in earlier part of this judgment. To undo the procedure of two innings, which was in all circumstances, likely to delay the decision of an industrial dispute, the Legislature provided a man datory procedure for expeditious disposal of the cases relating to the industrial disputes to maintain peace in the Industry and man dated that once the hearing begins in an industrial dispute, it must continue on day to day basis. In this regard Section-6 (2-A) of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, as amended by U. P. Act No. 34 of 1978, may also be noticed: " (2-A) An award in an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman may direct the setting aside of the dis charge or dismissal and reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as the authority making the award may think fit, or granting such other relief to the workman, includ ing the substitution of any lesser punishment for discharge or dismissal, as the circumstances of the case may require. " 33. The aforesaid section is paramateria with Section-11-A of the In dustrial Disputes Act. The aforesaid provision confers power on the Labour Court to examine the quantum of punish ment awarded by the employer. 34 Under Section 6 (2-A) of the Act, it is an obligation on the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal also to examine the quantum of punishment awarded to the workmen. The existing notion before the aforesaid amendment was that if the domes tic enquiry held by the employer was in ac cordance with the procedure prescribed, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to interfere in the punishment awarded, was undone by the aforesaid amendment. Even if the domestic enquiry was completed against the workman in accordance with the procedure provided, the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal was to examine the correctness of the quantum of punishment. 35. Even if the domestic enquiry was completed against the workman in accordance with the procedure provided, the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal was to examine the correctness of the quantum of punishment. 35. In case the Labour Court are driven by the mandate or the decision of the Division Bench (supra) to decide the preliminary issue i. e. whether the domestic enquiry was fair and proper the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal will have to permit the parties to lead evidence even for decision of the preliminary issue and in case after taking evidence the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal is satisfied that the domestic enquiry was completed in accord ance with the procedure prescribed even then the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal will have to examine the correct ness of the quantum of punishment. Even in that case the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal will have to decide issue in two innings. To undo this procedure, which was likely to cause delay, the Legislature has mandated day to day hearing, which does not contemplate decision of an industria dispute in two innings. The contrary view taken by the Division Bench negatives the Legislative mandate. 36. The law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the matter of Delhi Cloth and General Mills case (supra) and in the matter of Cooper Engineering Mills Ltd. case (supra) loses its relevance so far as the State of U. P. is concerned in view of the man datory rules having been brought into Statute book in the year 1978. These rules, according to my understanding, have been brought to undo the employers device to delay the matter by insisting on decision on a preliminary issue first and then permitting them to lead evidence. The procedure con templated by the decision of the Supreme Court envisaged two innings which proce dure was negatived by bringing into force the aforesaid Rules. 37. The decisions referred to in this judgment earlier of the other High Courts following D. P. Maheshwaris case (supra) were also not brought to the notice or the Division Bench which completely rules out any interference by the High Court in mat ter where the Labour Court has refused to decide a preliminary issue. 38. 37. The decisions referred to in this judgment earlier of the other High Courts following D. P. Maheshwaris case (supra) were also not brought to the notice or the Division Bench which completely rules out any interference by the High Court in mat ter where the Labour Court has refused to decide a preliminary issue. 38. The only ground insisted upon by the Division Bench for permitting two in nings to the employer is that before a decision on preliminary issue that the domestic enquiry was fair and proper, is given by the Labour Court, the employer would be prejudiced in giving evidence, one relief upon in the preliminary enquiry and the other relied upon before the Tribunal, which may be contradictory. 39. The apprehension expressed by the Division Bench that leading additional evidence justifying dismissal on merits of the workmen will prejudice that employer, is not supported by any reasoning. In the present case the Labour Court has framed issue as to whether the domestic enquiry was fair and proper and has also framed issue whether the dismissal of workman was justified in the circumstances of the case. Even in case the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry was just and proper, the Labour Court can al ways examine the question whether for the offence for which the workman has been punished, was just and proper in the cir cumstances of the case and was in accord ance with the Standing Orders. In case the Labour Court upholds the holding of the domestic enquiry and also upholds that the punishment awarded to the workman in the circumstances of the case were just and proper, there will be no occasion for the Labour Court to refer to the additional evidence given by the employer justifying the dismissal of the workman on merits. It cannot be conceived that the employer will be prejudiced in leading evidence justifying the punishment given to the workman on merits. It is always open to the employer to lead additional evidence simultaneously justifying the punishment given to the workman and refer to and rely upon the same in case the issue is decided against propriety of domestic enquiry against the employer. It is always open to the employer to lead additional evidence simultaneously justifying the punishment given to the workman and refer to and rely upon the same in case the issue is decided against propriety of domestic enquiry against the employer. Such a procedure will be in con sonance with the statutory rules and will avoid unnecessary delay in disposal of in dustrial disputes which require expeditious resolution of the industrial disputes and which contemplates resolution of industrial disputes on day to day basis. 40. The Division Bench has referred to and relied upon the decision of D. P. Maheshwari case (supra) and has quoted the following portion of D. P. Maheshawari case in its judgment:- "tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudica tion is really necessary. " 41. In case like the present one, the Labour Court refused to decide the prelimi nary issue on the question as to whether the domestic enquiry was fair and proper. It cannot be conceived that any fault can be found with the Labour Court for not decid ing the preliminary issue before proceeding with the case, particularly when the rules mandate to the contrary. 42. I have referred to and relied upon in my judgment earlier, a decision of Delhi High Court in Taj Services Limited case (supra) wherein the distinguished Judge, Justice B. N. Kripal, as he then was, has held that the time has reached that the writ court should cease to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 of the Constitution at the very threshold of the reference. 43. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the employer should not be allowed to have two innings in a industrial dispute, one at the time of getting a prelimi nary issue decided; and thereafter, leading the evidence to justify the dismissal of the workman. The employer can always lead additional evidence justifying the dismissal of the workman on merits and in case the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry was not fair and proper, it can always refer to and decide the dispute on merits. The employer can always lead additional evidence justifying the dismissal of the workman on merits and in case the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry was not fair and proper, it can always refer to and decide the dispute on merits. No prejudice will be caused to the employer by following the aforesaid procedure on the other hand it will expedite the disposal of the Industrial dispute and will lead to resolution of the industrial dispute with speed and despatch which is mandate of the statutory rules. 44. With all respect and humility, I am of the view that the Division Bench has not correctly laid down the law which is of vital importance for resolution of the industrial disputes. The matter needs be re- considered by a Larger Bench of this Court. However, before parting with the case I will like to observe that the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of DCM Sriram Industry Ltd. (Supra) clearly reveals that all aspect of the matters were not placed before the Division Bench. In labour disputes, the employers are most of the time represented by the counsel of eminence and the workman is most of the time not represented by the counsel to match the counsel of the employer. This is a fight between a powerful and a weak. The rule of law and court of justice are meant to defend the weak from the oppression of strong. In the circumstance whenever the court feels that the workman is not properly represented, the court should take assis tance of lawyers who could match the eminence and learning of the counsel engaged by the employer. 45. In the case before me, the counsel for the workman, has represented the case of workman very well. I put on record my appreciation for the assistance provided by him. 46. Since the question for decision in the present matter before the larger Bench is of vital importance for all the workmen, I am of the opinion that the court should appoint a counsel for workman who can match the eminence of the counsel for the employer. 47. I put on record my appreciation for the assistance provided by him. 46. Since the question for decision in the present matter before the larger Bench is of vital importance for all the workmen, I am of the opinion that the court should appoint a counsel for workman who can match the eminence of the counsel for the employer. 47. For the aforesaid reasons, follow ing issues deserve consideration by larger Bench: (1) Whether the Labour Court Industrial Tribunal have any statutory or legal obligation to decide any issue as preliminary issue while adjudicating an industrial dispute in accordance with procedure provided under Rules framed under U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. (2) Whether the High Court in exer cise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution man date a Court or Tribunal to follow a procedure contrary to statutory Rules. 48 I have expressed my anxiety in the body of this judgment that the workman has suffered immensely due to pendency of the present writ petition and he is suffering from brain tumor and is apprehending his death any moment, the Honble Chief Jus tice is requested to consider this matter for constituting a larger Bench at the earliest opportunity. 49. The Registrar of the Court is directed to place the file of this case before Honble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders with in a week from today. .