Aparna Sachan v. Chancellor, Kanpur University — 1995 DIGILAW 1085 (ALL)

Judgment : D. S. Sinha, J. 1. HEARD Shri Ashok Khare, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. No body appears for the respondents though the case has been taken on the revision of the cause-list. 2. THE appointment of the petitioner as Lecturer In the Department of Drawing and Painting of Guru Narak Girls Degree College, Kanpur was disapproved by the Vice-Chancellor, Kanpur University, Kanpur and it was conveyed to the Principal of the College by the communication dated 22nd April, 1985, a copy whereof is Annexure 'II' to the petition. THE reference petition of the petitioner under Section 68 of the Uttar Pradesh Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter called the Act), against the: disapproval of her appointment was rejected by the Chancellor of Kanpur University. THE rejection was communicated to the petitioner by the letter dated 13th January, 1986, a copy whereof is Annexure 'VI' to the petition. THE disapproval by the Vice Chancellor and rejection of the reference by the Chancellor are under challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The reference of the petitioner has been rejected as barred by time. 3. SHRI Khare contends that the Chancellor committed an error of law in rejecting the reference of the petitioner as barred by time inasmuch as he did not act in conformity with the provisions of Clause (a) of second proviso to Section 68 of the Act. He submits that the Chancellor was statutorily obliged to entertain the reference notwithstanding the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed by the first proviso to the Section. 4. SECTION 68 of the Act and the two provisos thereto are as under : "68. He submits that the Chancellor was statutorily obliged to entertain the reference notwithstanding the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed by the first proviso to the Section. 4. SECTION 68 of the Act and the two provisos thereto are as under : "68. Reference to the Chancellar.-If any question arises whether any person has been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be, member of any authority or other body of the University, or whether any decision of any authority or officer of the University (Including any question as to the validity of a Statute, Ordinance or Regulation, not being a Statute or Ordinance made or approved by the State Government or by the Chancellor) is in conformity with this Act or the Statutes or the Ordinance made thereunder, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor and the decision of the Chancellor thereon shall be final : Provided that no reference under this section shall be made- (a) more than three months after the date when the question could have been raised for the first time ; (b) by any person other than an authority or officer of the University or a person aggrieved : Provided further that the Chancellor may in exceptional circumstances.- (a) act suo motu or entertain a reference after the expiry of the period mentioned in the preceding proviso ; (b) where the matter referred relates to a dispute about the election, and the eligibility of the person so elected is in doubt, pass such orders of stay as he thinks Just and expedient; (c) {** *** ***)." The provisions contained in Section 68 of the Act arm and confer right upon the person aggrieved by decision of any authority or officer of the University to make a reference to the Chancellor. However, the right bestowed upon the aggrieved person is not without fetter. First proviso to the section shackles it and ordains that no reference shall be made more than three months after the date when decision could have been impugned for the first time. 5. IN this case, disapproval of the appointment of the petitioner furnishing her cause of action for making a reference under Section 68 of the Act arose on 22nd April, 1985. This position has been, very fairly, conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. IN this case, disapproval of the appointment of the petitioner furnishing her cause of action for making a reference under Section 68 of the Act arose on 22nd April, 1985. This position has been, very fairly, conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Three months' period for making reference under Section 68 of the Act has, therefore, to be computed from 22nd April, 1985. Thus reckoned, the limitation for making reference expired on 21st July, 1985. Indisputably, the reference by the petitioner to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the Act was made on 24th September, 1985. It was, therefore, clearly beyond the prescribed limitation. The Chancellor, Kanpur University, therefore, did not commit any legally cognisable error in rejecting the reference of the petitioner as barred by time. 6. RELIANCE upon the second proviso to Section 68 of the Act by the learned counsel for the petitioner for impeaching the validity of the impugned order is misplaced. Second proviso to Section 68 of the Act clothes and invests the Chancellor with the power to act ex mero motu or accept for consideration of a reference even after expiry of the limitation stipulated in the first proviso to the Section in exceptional circumstances. It does not create in favour of or confer upon the person aggrieved any legally enforceable right. Otherwise also, existence of exceptional circumstance is sine qua non for exercise of power under second proviso to Section 68 of the Act. Neither in her reference nor in the petition before this court, the petitioner has pleaded any exceptional circumstance justifying exercise of power under second proviso to Section 68 of the Act. In the preamble of her reference, it is stated that she had filed appeal to the Vice Chancellor against the disapproval of her appointment on 16th May, 1985 ; that she sent reminder on 19th August, 1985, and that no decision was taken on the appeal. These factors, in the opinion of the court, cannot be categorised, either jointly or severally, as exceptional circumstance contemplated by the second proviso to Section 68 of the Act. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard cannot be sustained. 7. ON the facts and circumstances, and for the reasons given above, the petition fails. It is dismissed accordingly. The interim order shall stand discharged. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard cannot be sustained. 7. ON the facts and circumstances, and for the reasons given above, the petition fails. It is dismissed accordingly. The interim order shall stand discharged. As no body has appeared to oppose the petition, there is no order as to costs.