R. A. SHARMA, J. All these writ petitions except Writ Petition No. 12900 of 1981, have been filed challenging the order dated 4. 3. 1991 passed by the appellate authority modifying the order of the Prescribed Authority under U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)! Writ Petition No, 12900 of 1981 has been filed against the order dated 15. 10. 1981 passed by the Appellate Authority under the Act, dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioners therein against the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 28. 1. 1981, rejecting their applications for allotment of the surplus land under Section 27 (3) of the Act. As these writ petitions involve common questions of fact and law they are being disposed of by a common judgment. Necessary facts stated herein below have been taken from writ petitions No. 9760 of 1991 and 35613 of 1991. 2. Predecessors of Sri Satveer Singh, Sri Yashveer Singh and Sri Jagdish Pal Singh, who are respondents in these writ petitions and who will herein after be referred to as land-holders, had executed lease in 1936 of about 375 Bighas of their land in favour of Delhi Cloth and General Mills (hereinafter referred to as D. C. M.) for twenty-five years. After the enforcement of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as Z. A. Act) compensation statement was prepared under Chapter IX-A of the said Act showing D. C. M. as Adhiwasi of the land. Land-holders predecessors filed objection claiming rights of Bhumidhari over that land. Their objection was initially upheld by the Compensation Officer vide order dated 3. 1. 1957, but appeals filed by the D. C. M. against the above order, were allowed. Against the said appellate order second appeals, filed before the Board of Revenue, by predecessors of the land-holders, were dismissed. 3. After enforcement of the Act some of the land covered by the lease-deed was sought to be declared as surplus land in the hands of D. C. M. Objections were filed under the Act by the predecessors of the land-holders claiming Bhumidhari rights over the said land. Their objections were, however, rejected by the Prescribed Authority holding them not to be Bhumidhars of that land. But their appeals filed against the order of the Prescribed Authority were allowed holding TXC. M. as only Asami. Their objections were, however, rejected by the Prescribed Authority holding them not to be Bhumidhars of that land. But their appeals filed against the order of the Prescribed Authority were allowed holding TXC. M. as only Asami. The above orders were challenged by means of writ petitions before this Court, which were allowed on 22. 12. 1966 and the matter was remanded to the lower appellate court. Against the decision of lower appellate Court after remand, writ petitions were filed again before this Court which were decided vide judgment dated 28. 11. 1969, against which special appeals were filed, which were allowed holding that the predecessors of the land-holders are Bhumidhars of about 142 Bighas out of the total land, which was given on lease to D. C. M. Their claim regarding rest of the land was rejected. The predecessors thereafter filed Special Leave Petitions before Supreme Court against the judgment given in special appeals. Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to this court for fresh decision. This Court on 23. 9. 1987 decided the appeals afresh maintaining the same position, namely, holding the predecessors of the land-holders as Bhumidhars of 142-17-2 v Bighas land and for the rest of the land D. C. M. was declared as its Adhiwasis and Sirdars. Against this decision Special Leave Petition was filed only by the three land- holders who belong to one of the three branches of the predecessors. Before the Supreme Court learned counsel for all the parties have accepted the position that appellants (land-holders) are entitled to about 72 Bighas of the disputed land. Supreme Court after excluding 8-7-0 Bigha land, held that the appellants are entitled to 64 Bighas out of the land in dispute and directed for fresh determination of the surplus land. It was further held that the land-holder would be entitled to be put into possession of the land out of 64 Bighas, which would be within the ceiling limits. Supreme Court accordingly directed the Prescribed Authority to determine the surplus land of the land-holders, if any, afresh under the Act in accordance with law within three months and the competent authority under the Act was further directed to forward a copy of its order to the Supreme Court. Supreme Court accordingly directed the Prescribed Authority to determine the surplus land of the land-holders, if any, afresh under the Act in accordance with law within three months and the competent authority under the Act was further directed to forward a copy of its order to the Supreme Court. Relevant extracts from the judgment of the Supreme Court is as under : "this matter was taken up for hearing on several dates before us and ultimately counsel appearing for both sides have accepted the position that the claim of the appellants was confined to 72 bighas, 75 Biswas and 10 1/2 Biswansis only. It has been conceded in an affidavit filed by Jasbir Singh in this Court that 8 bighas and 7 biswas of land have been allotted to allottees who are in possession on the basis that the said land was surplus in the hands of the parties, these land have, therefore, to be excluded from the 72 bighas 75 biswas and 101/2 biswansis of land in which the appellants claim interest. The assertion of the State of Uttar Pradesh that most of the land in dispute have been taken over by the State as ceiling surplus land is not disputed. On account of the fact that ceiling surplus had been determined in hands of the respondent-company and our present order holding that the appellants have interest in regard to about 64 bighas of land out of the land in dispute afresh determination of the surplus has to be done. The appellant should be entitled to be put into possession of the lands out of 64 bighas which would be within the ceiling limit. We, therefore, direct that the competent authority shall proceed to determine the ceiling surplus under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, within three months from today and once that is done, the appellants shall be entitled to restoration of possession of the area coming within the ceiling limit and the balance shall vest in the Uttar Pradesh Government The competent authority shall forward a copy of his determination within two weeks after three months to the Registry of this Court. We make it clear on the basis of the statement made by counsel of the appellants and the respondent- company that there is no inter-se claim on either side against the other. We make it clear on the basis of the statement made by counsel of the appellants and the respondent- company that there is no inter-se claim on either side against the other. The matter shall be re-listed after four months from today. " 4. Prescribed Authority in pursuance of the direction of the Supreme Court, vide its order dated Oct. 11,1990, declared about 14 Bighas out of 64 Bighas land as surplus. In pursuance of the observations of the Supreme Court the land holders filed appeals before the appellate authority under the Act, who has modi fied the order of the Prescribed Authority by holding that only, about 2-2-104 Bighas of land belonging to Jagdish Pal Singh, one of the land-holders, is surplus. 5. When the appeals were pending before the appellate authority against the order dated October 11, 1990 of the Prescribed Authority two person, viz. , Pramod Kumar and Vinod Kumar, who were two out of four persons who had filed writ petition No. 12900 of 1981, applied for impleadment before the appellate authority. Their applications were allowed an they were impleaded as parties to the appeals filed by the landholders. Being dissatisfied with the order of appellate authority Pramod Kumar and Vinod Kumar have filed writ petition No. 35613 of 1991. Meerut Development Authority also was not a party to the proceeding before the Prescribed Authority, but as it has occupied some of the land in dispute of D. C. M. , which were declared surplus, without any order of allotment under Section 27 or/and without any permission under Section 25 of the Act, it was also impleaded as a party in the appeal pending before the appellate authority as the appellate authority modified the order of the Prescribed Authority by reducing surplus area of the landholders, Meerut Development Authority has filed three writ petitions, numbers being 17522, 17523 and 17524 of 1991. 6. State of Uttar Pradesh, has also filed three writ petitions viz. Nos. 9758, 9759 and 9760 of 1991. Two other persons namely, Smt. Omwati and Shastri Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. have also challenged same orders by two separate writ petitions, being Writ Petitions No. 17525 and 11578 of 1991, respectively. 7. After the land in the hands of D. C. M. were declared surplus the Collector had taken over its possession in 1973. Two other persons namely, Smt. Omwati and Shastri Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. have also challenged same orders by two separate writ petitions, being Writ Petitions No. 17525 and 11578 of 1991, respectively. 7. After the land in the hands of D. C. M. were declared surplus the Collector had taken over its possession in 1973. Part of the land so declared surplus was allotted to four petitioners in Writ Petition No. 12900 of 1981. However, Additional Commissioner, Meerut, vide its order dated 17. 7. 1975 cancelled the allotment of the land by way of lease executed in their favour. Petitioners challenged that order by means of Writ Petitions, the leading case being writ petition No. 8829 of 1975, before this Court, which were allowed vide judgment dated 23. 4. 1979 by which the cancellation of the lease executed in their favour was upheld, but the matter was remanded to the Prescribed Authority for considering their applications for grant of fresh allotment in accordance with law. After the remand, enquiry was made and a report was submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Meerut, mentioning therein that the petitioners are not unemployed persons and further they are not eligible for allotment of the surplus land. Additional District Magistrate vide his order dated 28. 1. 1981 rejected the applications of the petitioners for fresh allotment, on the ground that they are neither entitled to allotment on the basis of preference nor are they eligible for such allotment. The order of Prescribed Authority was challenged by the petitioners by means of appeal before the learned Additional Commissioner, who had dismissed it on 15-10-1981. Being aggrieved by these orders four persons have filed this writ petition in 1981. 8. Sri S. P. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in writ petitions No. 35613 of 1991 and 12900 of 1981 has made the following four submissions in support of the writ petitions: " (i) the date with reference to which the ceiling area of the land-holders has to be determined, is 8. 6. 1973 and not 23. 11. 1989 ; (ii) while determining the ceiling area under the Act the total land of the land-holders i. e. land acquired or came to be held by them after 8. 6. 6. 1973 and not 23. 11. 1989 ; (ii) while determining the ceiling area under the Act the total land of the land-holders i. e. land acquired or came to be held by them after 8. 6. 1973 together with land already held by them on that date, have to be taken into account; (iii) when the Prescribed Authority has protected the land of some of the allottees, the petitioners were also entitled to the same treatment, because they were also original allottees; and (iv) the order of the appellate authority rejecting the appeal of the petitioner, which has been impugned in the writ petition No. 12900 of 1981, is based on erroneous assumptions and is, therefore, liable to be set-aside. " The first two submissions have been adopted by the learned counsel for Meerut Development Authority and the learned Standing Counsel who appeared for the State Government. Two other writ petitions, namely, 11578 of 1991 and 17525 of 1991, although filed against the same order, but they involve different controversy and, therefore will be dealt with separately. 9. Sri J. N. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the three landholders viz. Satveer Singh, Yashveer Singh and Jagdish Pal Singh, apart from disputing the above contentions, has raised the following submissions: (i) the petitioners in Writ Petitions No. 12900 of 1981 and 35613 of 1991, have been held to be neither entitled to preferential treatment nor are eligible for allotment of the surplus land under Section 27 (3) of the Act. They, therefore, have no locus standi to file these writ petitions challenging the orders passed by the authorities under the Act determining the ceiling area of the landholders; (ii) the right of the allottees depend on the order of the Collector allotting the land which has been declared surplus under the Act. If the order declaring the land as surplus is set-aside by any Court or authority the allotment made in their favour, fails to the ground automatically and thereafter they are not entitled to continue to occupy the land allotted to them and land-holders are entitled to be given the possession of such land ; (iii) Meerut Development Authority was neither allottee of the land in question under Section 27 (3) nor was it granted any permission for use of the land under Section 25 of the Act. It occupied the land after it was initially declared surplus unauthorisedly, it is, therefore, a trespasser and has no locus standing to file the writ petitions, challenging the impugned orders; and (iv) in view of the decisions of Supreme Court specially the one dated 12. 7. 1991 which was passed after the impugned order of the appellate authority, rule of res judicata and estoppel operates against the State Government and it is not open to it to challenge those orders by means of the writ petitions. 10. The Act was enacted by the State Legislature for imposing ceiling on the land holdings of tenure- holders. Sub-section (1) of Section 5, which is quoted below, has provided that no tenure-holder can hold the land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him: "5. Imposition of ceiling- (1) On and from the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972, no tenure-holder shall be entitled to hold in the aggregate throughout Uttar Pradesh, any land in excess of- the ceiling area applicable to him. " The Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972, referred to in sub- section (1) of Section 5, was enforced on 8. 6. 1973. 11. Sub-section (3) of Section 5, relevant extracts of which is reproduced below, has fixed the ceiling area of tenure-holder at 7. 30 hectares irrigated land plus some additional land depending on number of members of the family of the tenure-holder: "5. (3 ). Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4), (5), (6) and (7) the ceiling area for purposes of sub- section (1) shall be- (a) in the case of a tenure-holder having a family of not more than five members, 7. 30 hectares of irrigated land (including land held by other members of his family) plus two additional hectares of irrigated land or such additional land which together with the land held by him aggregates to two hectares, for each of his adult sons, who are either not themselves tenure-holders or who held less than two hectares of irrigated land, subject to a maximum of six hectares of such additional land; (b) in the case of a tenure-holder having family of more than five members, 7. 30 hectares of irrigated land (including land held by other members of his family), besides, each of the members exceeding five and for each of his adult sons who are not themselves tenure-holders or who hold less than two hectares of irrigated land, two additional hectares of irrigated land or such additional land which together with the land held by such adult son aggregates to two hectares, subject to a maximum of six hectares of such additional land. " 12. As the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 18 of 1973) which has been referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 5, was enforced with effect from 8. 6. 1973, it is this date with reference to which ceiling area of a tenure-holder has to be determined. If a tenure- holder was holding any land in excess of the ceiling area on 8. 6. 1973, it has to be declared surplus. Sections 29 and 30 of the Act provide for declaration of any land which has been acquired or came to be held by a tenure-holder subsequent to 8. 6. 1973, as surplus. These two sections are reproduced below : "29. Subsequent declaration of further land as surplus land:-Where after the date of enforcement of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972- (a) any land has come to be held by a tenure-holder under a decree or order of any court, or as a result of a succession or transfer, or by prescription in consequence of adverse possession, and such land together with the land already held by him exceeds the ceiling area applicable to him; or (b) any unirrigated land becomes irrigated land as a result of irrigation from a State irrigation work or any grove-land loses its character as grove-land or any land exempted under this Act ceases to fall under any of the categories exempted the ceiling area shall be liable to be re-determined (and accordingly the provisions of this Act, except Section 16, shall mutatis mutandis apply ). 30. 30. Determination of surplus land regarding future acquisition:- (1) Where any land has become liable to be treated as surplus land under Section 29, the tenure-holder shall, within such period as may be prescribed, submit a statement to the Prescribed Authority in the form and in the manner laid down under Section 9 indicating in the statement the plot or plots which he would like to retain as a part of his ceiling area. (2) (a) Where the statement submitted under sub-section (1) is accepted by the Prescribed Authority, it shall proceed to determine the surplus land accordingly. (b) Where a tenure-holder fails to submit a statement required to be submitted under sub-section (1) or submits an incomplete or incorrect statement the Prescribed Authority shall proceed in the manner laid down under Section 10. (c) The provisions of this Act in respect of declaration acquisition, disposal and settlement of surplus land, shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to surplus land covered by this section. " It is thus apparent that no tenure-holder can have land in excess of the ceiling area fixed by sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act, not only as on 8. 6. 1973, but also thereafter and if he acquires or comes to hold any land in future in excess of ceiling limit it is liable to be declared surplus under Sections 29j and 30. For the purpose of determining the ceiling area of a tenure- holder on the enforcement of U. P. Act No. 18 of 1973, 8. 6. 1973 is relevant date with reference to which it has to be determined. But as regards the land acquired or came to be held by a tenure- holder after 8. 6. 1973 the relevant date with reference to which ceiling area has to be determined is the date on which he acquired the land or came to hold it. Although Sections 29 and 30 do not deal with or refers to the members of the family of a tenure-holder, but in view of provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 5, members of his family as on the date on which he acquires the land or came to hold it after 8. 6. 1973, have to be taken into account, while determining his ceiling area, under those sections. The object of Legislature is that at no point of time on or after 8. 6. 6. 1973, have to be taken into account, while determining his ceiling area, under those sections. The object of Legislature is that at no point of time on or after 8. 6. 1973 a tenure-holder should be allowed to hold more than 7. 30 hectares land plus some such additional land as may be permissible under the Act depending on the number of members of family. 13. In the instant case the Prescribed Authority determined the ceiling area of the land-holders with reference to 24. 1. 1971, and on that basis declared about 14 bighas of their land as surplus. Here it may be mentioned that in view of Section 5 (1), 8. 6. 1973 is the date with reference to which ceiling area has been determined. 24. 1. 1971 is not relevant date for this purpose. 24. 1. 1971 is, however, relevant for the purpose of Explanation 2 to sub-section (1) and sub-sections (6) and (7) of Section 5. Explanation 2 deals with a case when person was holding the land on or before 24. 1. 1971 and he continues to be in its actual possession even though name of some other person has been recorded in annual register after the said date. Sub-sections (6) and (7) of the same section provide for ignoring transfer and partition of the land after 24. 1. 1971, unless conditions laid down therein are satisfied. Appellate Court reversed the above finding of the Prescribed Authority by holding that the land-holders were neither owners nor were they in possession of the land which was given to them by order dated 23. 11. 1989 of the Supreme Court. It accordingly held that 23. 11. 1989, which is the date of decision of the Supreme Court, is the relevant date, with reference to which ceiling, area of land-holders has to be determined. The Appellate Authority accordingly held that two land-holders, namely, Satveer Singh and Yashveer Singh do not have any surplus land and their appeals were, therefore, allowed Appellate Authority, however, partly allowed the appeal of third land-holder, Jagdish Pal Singh, by declaring his 2-2-10 1/3 Bighas land as surplus. 14. Which is the correct date as between the two dates, viz. 8. 6. 1973 and 23. 11. 1989, with reference to which the ceiling area of the land-holders, in the instant case, has to be determined. According to the petitioners it is 8. 6. 14. Which is the correct date as between the two dates, viz. 8. 6. 1973 and 23. 11. 1989, with reference to which the ceiling area of the land-holders, in the instant case, has to be determined. According to the petitioners it is 8. 6. 1973, but according to land-holders it is 23. 11. 1989, with reference to which ceiling area has to be determined. Answer of the above question depends on the date on which the land- holders can be deemed to be holders of the land, which was given to them by the Supreme Court on 23. 11. 1989. If they were holding that land on 8. 6. 1973, ceiling area has to be determined with reference to that date. But if they came to hold that land on 23. 11. 1989, the date on which Supreme Court passed the order, their ceiling area has to be determined with reference to the fatter date. 15. Section 3 of the Act has defined the ceiling area, holdings, surplus land and tenure-holders, as under : "3. (2) ceiling area means the area of land not being land exempted under this Act, determined as such in accordance with the provisions of Section 5; (9) holding means the land or lands held by a person as bhumidhar, sirdar, asami of Gaon Sabha or an asami mentioned in Section 11 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, or as a tenant under the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, other than a sub-tenant, or as a Government lessee, or as a sub-lessee of a Government lessee, where the period of the sub- lease is co-extensive with the period of the lease; (16) surplus land means land held by a tenure-holder in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, and includes any buildings, wells and trees existing thereon ; (17) tenure-holder means a person who is the holder of a holding, but (except Chapter III) does not include- (a) a woman whose husband is a tenure-holder; (b) a minor child whose father or mother is a tenure-holder;" 16. According to sub-section (1) of Section 5 a tenure-holder is not entitled to holds the land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. Tenure-holder means holder of the holdings. Expression holding has been defined as the land held by a person as bhumidhar etc. According to sub-section (1) of Section 5 a tenure-holder is not entitled to holds the land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. Tenure-holder means holder of the holdings. Expression holding has been defined as the land held by a person as bhumidhar etc. In order to determine ceiling area of a person the total land held by him has to be determined first. According to learned counsel for the petitioners if the tenure-holder has raised his claim regarding certain land before 8. 6. 1973 he shall be deemed to hold the land on 8. 6. 1973, even if the case is decided thereafter. It is further contended that possession is not a condition precedent for holding the land. Learned Counsel for the land-holder, on the other hand, contended that a person cannot be said to be holding land unless he has both, the title and the possession over it. 17. The word holds has come up for interpretation before the Court from time to time. In K. K. Handique v. The Member Board of Agricultural Income Tax, AIR 1966 SC 1191 , Supreme Court has held that: "the expression holds includes a two-fold idea of actual possession of a thing and also of being invested with a legal title. Some times it is used only to mean the actual possession. " In Budhan Singh v. Babi Bux, AIR 1970 SC 1880 , the expression held used in Section 9 of Z. A. Act, was interpreted by Supreme Court as lawfully held. In this connection it was laid down as under: "it is true that the Legislature could have used the word lawfully held in place of the word held in Section 9 but as mentioned earlier, one of the dictionary meanings given to the word held is lawfully held. In Websters New Twentieth Century Dictionary (2nd Edn.), it is stated that in legal parlance the word held means to possess the legal title. In other words, the word held is technically understood to mean to possess by legal title. Therefore, by interpreting the word held as lawfully held, we are not adding any word to the section. We are merely spelling out the meaning of that word. In other words, the word held is technically understood to mean to possess by legal title. Therefore, by interpreting the word held as lawfully held, we are not adding any word to the section. We are merely spelling out the meaning of that word. " In Kailash Rai v. Jai Jai Ram, AIR 1973 SC 893 , the question before the Court was about the conferment of Bhumidhari right under Section 18 (1) (a) of the Z. A. Act, which provided that the land in possession of or held or deemed to be held by an intermediary, shall be deemed to have been settled by the State Government with him, who will be entitled to take or retain possession as Bhumidhar thereof, it was held therein that: "the expression held can only be taken to connote existence of right or title in a person. The appellants right and title as holder of the land has been declared in Suit No. 918 of 1945. It can also be held that the land can be considered to be deemed to be held by the appellant. The expression deemed to be held has been used by Legislature to treat persons like appellant Bhumidhar by creating fiction. " In this case the appellant therein was not in possession, although he was entitled to the property. The Supreme Court held that his case is covered by the expression deemed to be held and is, therefore, entitled to be given the Bhumidhari right. Again in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd. Ashraf Uddin, AIR 1982 SC 913 , Supreme Court held that the expression held connotes both the ownership as well as possession. In this connection it was laid down as under: "the word held is not defined in the Act. We have, therefore, to go by the dictionary meaning of the term. According to Oxford Dictionary held means: to possess; to be the owner or holder or tenant of; keep possession of; occupy. Thus, held connotes both ownership as well as possession. And in the context of the definition it is not possible to interpret the term held only in the sense of possession. " The expression held takes in both title and possession. As observed by Honble Supreme Court it means to possess by legal title. Thus, held connotes both ownership as well as possession. And in the context of the definition it is not possible to interpret the term held only in the sense of possession. " The expression held takes in both title and possession. As observed by Honble Supreme Court it means to possess by legal title. What is, therefore, necessary is that the person apart from having title to the land should also have its possession either actual or notional. If a person is not having both title and actual or notional possession of the land, he cannot be said to be holder of the holdings and, therefore, cannot be treated as a tenure-holder. Mere possession, without a title, cannot make a person holder of the holding, unless he has perfected his right by prescription in consequence of adverse possession or his case falls within one of the two explanations appended to the Section 5 (1) of the Act. Similarly mere title without possession, actual or notional, may not make a man tenure-holder, unless he also has a right to regain possession. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in State of U. P. v. District Judge, 1980 AWC 439, wherein after considering large number of authorities, it was laid down as under: "a significant aspect of the matter which has to be emphasised is that in Section 5 (1) the requirement laid down is not only that there should be subsisting title in the tenure-holder but a additionally that he should be holding the land. As a reference to the aforesaid cases will show, the word held has been used in different contexts and some times the aspect of title has been emphasised and some times the aspect of possession. As Subba Rao, J. laid down in AIR 1966 SC 1191 , the expression holds includes a two-fold idea of the actual possession as also of legal title, but some times the said expression is used only to mean actual possession. From the aforesaid pronouncement, of the Supreme Court, it is clear that if a tenure-holder has permanently lost possession he cannot be said to be holding the property merely on the basis of his subsisting title. From the aforesaid pronouncement, of the Supreme Court, it is clear that if a tenure-holder has permanently lost possession he cannot be said to be holding the property merely on the basis of his subsisting title. In some of the cases, which have been noticed above, for example the cases decided under Section 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960 and the cases decided under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the courts emphasised that possession must be legal and should not be that of a trespasser. The learned Standing Counsel could not cite any case where it might be held that a person can be said to be holding the property merely on the basis of his title and when such a person has permanently lost his right to recover possession of such property. Title should be coupled with possession. It is true that it is not necessary that the title-holder should also have present possession of his property. If such property is in possession of a trespasser then the title- holder can still be said to be holding the property because in law he is entitled to get back the possession of such property. In the same manner, when the Government is in temporary occupation of some land under the Land Acquisition Act, then the owner of the property can be said to be holding the property because his right to get back possession is not denied. In such cases, the trespasser and the Government cannot be said to be holding the property because they have no right to a permanent possession in law; they are bound and can be compelled to part with the possession of the property in favour of the title-holder. However, the position is different in a case to which Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable. In such a case, the title-holder cannot dispossess the proposed transferee in view of the prohibition contained in Section 53-A of the Act. In such a circumstance, despite the subsisting title, the tenure-holder cannot be said to be holding the land in question. In Section 5 (1) of the Ceiling Act if the legislative intention were only to emphasise the aspect of title, then two expressions would not have been used. In such a circumstance, despite the subsisting title, the tenure-holder cannot be said to be holding the land in question. In Section 5 (1) of the Ceiling Act if the legislative intention were only to emphasise the aspect of title, then two expressions would not have been used. The aspect of title is emphasised by the expression tenure- holder, which is defined in Section 3 (17) read with the definition of holding in Section 3 (9) of the Ceiling Act. The tenure-holder, in brief, means a Bhumidhar, Sirdar or an Asami of the two varieties mentioned in Section 3 (9) or a tenant under the U. P. Tenancy Act other than a sub-tenant or Government lessee. It is, therefore, clear that when Section 5 (1) uses the expression tenure-holder it means a person who belongs to any of the aforesaid categories and who has subsisting title in his favour, but the additional requirement laid down in Section 5 (1) is that such tenure-holder should be holding the land of which he is the tenure-holder. I believe that here the expression hold has been used to emphasise the aspect of possession as against the aspect of title which has been emphasised by the use of the expression tenure-holder. As reference to C. L. H. Form 3, which is the statement prepared under Section 10 (1) of the Act, will disclose that in Parts A and C the expression used is statement of the total area or area of land held by the tenure-holder. Neither under Section 5 (1) nor in C. L. H. Form 3, the expression used in land of which the person concerned is the tenure-holder. By using the expression hold or held, the Legislature has emphasised the aspect of possession also alongwith the aspect of title which has been emphasised by using the expression tenure-holder. " Therefore, in order to declare a person as tenure-holder he must be holder of the holding i. e. he must have both the title and possession, actual or constructive. Even if possession of the land owned by a person is with somebody else, the owner will continue to hold the land, if his right to retake its possession has not been lost. 18. The ceiling area of a tenure-holder has to be determined initially with reference to 8. 6. Even if possession of the land owned by a person is with somebody else, the owner will continue to hold the land, if his right to retake its possession has not been lost. 18. The ceiling area of a tenure-holder has to be determined initially with reference to 8. 6. 1973 on which date U. P. Act No. 18 of 1973 was enforced except in case of subsequent acquisition of land to which Section 29 is applicable. It is so even if process of determination has taken time. The liability of the tenure-holder to retain the land within the ceiling area does not depend on the date of judgment of the Authority or the Court. It is the date which is fixed by sub-section (1) of Section 5 (8. 6. 1973) which reference to which ceiling area has to be determined, unless case falls under Section 29 of the Act. 19. Section 29 deals with "the subsequent declaration of further land as surplus land". It mentions that if, after the date of enforcement of U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 18 of 1973), any tenure-holder comes to hold a land in any of the following contingencies his ceiling area is liable to be re-determined in accordance with provisions of the Act : (i) under a decree or order of any court ; (ii) as a result of succession ; (iii) by transfer ; (iv) by prescription in consequence of adverse possession ; (v) any unirrigated land becoming irrigated land as a result of irrigation from the State Irrigation Works ; (vi) any grove land looses its character as grove land ; and (vii) any land exempted under the Act ceases to fall under any of the catagories exempted. This section makes it clear that even if the land has come to be held by tenure-holder under a decree or order of any court after 8. 6. 1973 his ceiling area is liable to be redetermined and the excess land is liable to be declared as surplus land under Sections 29 and 30. Therefore, if a person was not a tenure-holder of a land on 8. 6. 6. 1973 his ceiling area is liable to be redetermined and the excess land is liable to be declared as surplus land under Sections 29 and 30. Therefore, if a person was not a tenure-holder of a land on 8. 6. 1973 by virtue of not having both title and actual or notional possession of such land, he can be held to be its tenure-holder subsequently under a decree or order of any court and in such a case his ceiling area has to be re-determined with reference to the date of decree or order of the Court, which were passed after the date of enforcement of U. P. Act No. 18 of 1973 (8. 6. 1973 ). 20. In the instant case the predecessors of the land holders executed lease of vast area including the land in dispute in 1936 in favour of D. C. M. for a period of 25 years and since then the D. C. M. was in its possession. After the enforcement of the Z. A. Act the claim of the land-holders predecessors to the disputed land was negatived in 1957 at the time of the preparation of the compensation statement under Chapter IX of the Z. A. Act and the second appeals filed by them were dismissed. After the initiation of proceeding under the Act for declaring the disputed land in the hands of the D. C. M. as surplus, although land-holders predecessors laid their claim to the said land again, but their plea was turned down. Even in special appeals which were filed before this Court against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, predecessors of the land-holders were declared to be entitled to about 142 Bighas of land as their Bhumidhari. It is not disputed that it is not this land on the basis of which the land of the land-holders, has been declared as surplus. Supreme Court decided the appeal of the land-holders on the basis of statements of learned Counsel for both the parties, giving 64 Bighas extra land to them. It is because of 64 Bighas of land which was given to them by Supreme Court on 23. 11. 1989, that necessity for redetermination of ceiling area arose. It is true that the land-holders raised their claim to the land in dispute before 1973, which came to be decided by the Supreme Court on 23. 11. 1989. It is because of 64 Bighas of land which was given to them by Supreme Court on 23. 11. 1989, that necessity for redetermination of ceiling area arose. It is true that the land-holders raised their claim to the land in dispute before 1973, which came to be decided by the Supreme Court on 23. 11. 1989. But prior to 23. 11. 1989 the land-holders were neither the owners of this extra land nor were they in its possession. They, therefore, cannot be held to be its tenure-holders. It is on 23. 11. 89 that the land-holders became tenure-holders of 64 Bighas of land, because it is on this date that they got title to it and also the right to get its possession. It is for such cases i. e. becoming tenure-holder under the order or decree of the Court that Section 29 has been enacted. Therefore, their ceiling area has to be determined with reference to 23. 11. 1989. Lower Appellate Court was, therefore, fully justified to determine their ceiling area with reference to 23. 11. 1989. 21. As regards the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners there is no dispute about it in principle, because while determining the ceiling area under Sections 29 and 30 of the Act total holdings of the land holders i. e. the land acquired or came to be held by them after 8. 6. 1973 together with the land held by them on 8. 6. 1973, has to be taken into account. This is clear from Section 29 itself. Both, Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority, have calculated the ceiling area of the tenure-holders, taking into account the total land held by them. The learned counsel for the land- holders has placed before us the relevant passages from the orders of both prescribed and appellate authorities from which it is clear that ceiling area of the land-holders has been determined after taking into account the total land held by them. Learned counsel for the petitioners, at the time of argument in rejoinder, has not disputed this position. Therefore, we are not reproducing, in this judgment, relevant passages from the orders of prescribed and appellate authorities. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners also, therefore, has to be rejected. 22. For the reasons given above, three writ petitions, namely, Nos. Therefore, we are not reproducing, in this judgment, relevant passages from the orders of prescribed and appellate authorities. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners also, therefore, has to be rejected. 22. For the reasons given above, three writ petitions, namely, Nos. 9760, 9758 and 9759 of 1991, filed by the State of U. P. against the order of the appellate authority, have to be dismissed. For the same reasons the three writ petitions filed by Meerut Development Authority, namely, Nos. 17522, 17523 and 524 of 1991 are also liable to be dismissed, although there are other ground also for dismissing these writ petitions, which will be dealt with in latter part of this judgment. Similarly writ petition No. 35613 of 1991 has also to be dismissed. There are other reasons also for dismissing this writ petition which will be discussed while dealing with writ petition No. 12900 of 1981. 23. As regards the three writ petitions filed by Meerut Development Authority are concerned, it may be mentioned that neither any surplus land was allotted to them under Section 27 (3) nor any permission for its use was given to them under Section 25 of the Act. The above authority although did apply before the Prescribed Authority for allotment of part of the land in dispute, which was declared surplus in the hands of D. C. M. , but it has taken its possession in anticipation of allotment, although till date no such allotment has been made in Us favour. Meerut Development Authority is, therefore, a rank trespasser. It has taken possession of the land unauthorisedly. It was not party before the Prescribed Authority, but as the part of the land in dispute has been occupied by this Authority unauthorisedly, it was given an opportunity by the appellate authority to have its say. A party to the proceeding has a right to challenge the adverse order passed therein against it by means of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. A party to the proceeding has a right to challenge the adverse order passed therein against it by means of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Being a party to the proceeding before the appellate authority, although it has a right to challenge its order before this court under Article 226 of the Constitution, but the question still remains whether this Court should exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of a person who has taken possession of the land unauthorisedly, specially if such a person is statutory authority which is expected to set an example of good and fair conduct. We have already held that all the three writ petitions filed by the Authority are liable to be dismissed on merits. That apart, it is a fit case where this court should not interfere with the orders passed by the lower authorities at the instance of a person who is not only a rank trespasser, but has taken possession of the land in defiance of the provisions of Section 27 (3) of the Act, although it is a public undertaking being statutory authority. The contention of the learned counsel for Meerut Development Authority is that it has made constructions over the land in dispute. If it is so, it must suffer. However, as the Development Authority has been created for development of the land within the local limits and also for providing residential accommodations, we give option to this Authority to retain the land in dispute, which is already in its possession provided it gives land of equal value and area to the land-holders within the same or neighbouring locality or within such other locality which may be agreed to by them. If it does so, it shall not be dispossessed from the land in dispute. But if the Authority does not give land of equal area and value to the land-holders within three months from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order before it, it has to be dispossessed by force by the District Magistrate Meerut, from the land in dispute and its Possession will be given to landholders. 24. Writ petition No. 12900 of 1981 has been filed by four Persons namely, Sri S. C Mathur, Sri Pramod Kumar, Sri Vinod Kumar and Sri Bhagwan Das These four persons. 24. Writ petition No. 12900 of 1981 has been filed by four Persons namely, Sri S. C Mathur, Sri Pramod Kumar, Sri Vinod Kumar and Sri Bhagwan Das These four persons. were Allotted part of the land which was declared as surplus in the hands of D. C. M. by the Prescribed Authority and was taken possession of by the Collector in the 1973. This allotment was made under subjection (3) of section 27, which is reproduced below: "27. (3) Any remaining surplus land shall be settled by the Collector in accordance with the order of preference and subject to the limits specified respectively in sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 198 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. " Their lease was, however, cancelled by the Additional Commissioner, vide order dated 17. 7. 1975, which order was set aside by this Court in writ petition No. 8829 of 1975, although cancellation of the lease, executed in favour of the petitioners, was upheld. This Court, however, directed the concerned authority to consider afresh the petitioners application for allotment under sub-section (3) of Section 27 in accordance with law. In pursuance of this Courts order inquiry was conducted by the Sub-Divisional Officer who held that these petitioners are not eligible for allotment of the surplus land under sub- section (3) of Section 27 read with Section 198 of the Z. A. Act, which has laid down the order of preference and eligibility of persons to whom the land has to be allotted. In this connection the Sub- Divisional Officer has held that one of the petitioners is employed as a teacher in a college and the other is serving in Indian Navy and they are engaged in agriculture and none of them is eligible for allotment of the land, in view of the provisions contained in Section 198 of Z. A Act. The Additional District Magistrate accepted that report and rejected the applications for allotment of these four petitioners on the ground that they are neither entitled for preference nor are they eligible for allotment of the surplus land. It was further held that there are Other eligible persons who are available in the village. The Additional District Magistrate accepted that report and rejected the applications for allotment of these four petitioners on the ground that they are neither entitled for preference nor are they eligible for allotment of the surplus land. It was further held that there are Other eligible persons who are available in the village. Petitioners have admitted in para 25 of the writ petition No. 12900 of 1981 that Sri Pramod Kumr is serving in Navy, Employment of Sri S. C. Mathur as a teacher, is also admitted. But in this connection it has been stated that he was not employed when the land was initially allotted to him. It has, however, not been stated that petitioners are entitled to preference under Section 198 of the Z. A. Act. On the other hand, it has been mentioned in the report that there are five other persons who are eligible for preferential allotment. If the persons eligible under Section 198, Z. A. Act are available the surplus land cannot be allotted to the petitioners, unless they are entitled to preferential right. The fact that they are not entitled to such preference, is not disputed. Therefore, the surplus land cannot be allotted to them. Learned counsel for the petitioners have, however, contended that as this court has declared that the petitioners are entitled to the lease, it was not open to the respondents to reject their applications on any ground. In support of their submissions learned counsel have placed reliance on the following passage from the judgment of this Court : "it is not disputed and it cannot be disputed that the petitioner was entitled to a lease which will make him a Government lessee under Section 133-A of the Act. In other words, he was not entitled to a sirdari lease. The lease granted to him conferred sirdari rights. The Sub-Divisional Officer has no jurisdiction to create sirdari rights in anyone. On this short ground the lease was liable to be cancelled and was rightly quashed. The petitioner had made an application for the grant of lease under the Ceiling Act and the Rules. He was entitled to be considered for that purpose on the merits of the case. This has not yet been done. The Additional Commissioner was not justified in directing eviction of the petitioner from the plots in dispute merely because the lease had been cancelled. He was entitled to be considered for that purpose on the merits of the case. This has not yet been done. The Additional Commissioner was not justified in directing eviction of the petitioner from the plots in dispute merely because the lease had been cancelled. He should have directed the relevant authority entitled to grant a lease to consider the petitioners case on merits and in accordance with law. By use of word entitled in the above passage it cannot be inferred that this court has decided the claim of the petitioners for grant of lease under Section 27 (3 ). Judgment as a whole has to be read in order to ascertain its meaning. In latter part of the judgment this Court held. that petitioners are entitled to be considered for the purpose of grant of lease under the Act. Only right given to the petitioner was for getting their application for fresh lease considered in accordance with law. This Court has neither considered their claim in accordance with Section 198 of Z. A. Act nor was there any occasion to do so. If it is taken that this Court has held that petitioners are entitled for such lease, there was no occasion to remand the case for considering their applications in accordance with law. 25. Both the writ petitions namely, Nos. 12900 of 1981 and 35613 of 1991 are, therefore, liable to DC dismissed on merits as well as on the ground that they are not entitled to allotment, because they do not belong to preferential category, specified by sub-section (1) of Section 198, when the persons who fall within the preferential categories are available. It may further be mentioned that applications for allotment have to be considered with reference to the date when they are decided. It is on this date that question of preference and eligibility has to be considered. If a person was eligible earlier but has ceased to be so on the date of consideration of application, no allotment can be made in his favour. That apart, right of allotment under Section 27 (3) of the Act depends on surplus land which has been so declared under the Act. If a person was eligible earlier but has ceased to be so on the date of consideration of application, no allotment can be made in his favour. That apart, right of allotment under Section 27 (3) of the Act depends on surplus land which has been so declared under the Act. Even if allotment of the land is made after initial declaration of the land as surplus land, it will fall to the ground automatically, if the order declaring the land as surplus, has been set-aside by the Court or the authority. In such a case the tenure-holder is entitled to restitution of possession. As we are upholding the order of the appellate authority there is no surplus land for allotment to the petitioners. For these reasons also their writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 26. For the reasons given above, it is not necessary to go into third submission of Sri S. P. Gupta. It is also not necessary to decide his fourth contention because if the order of the appellate authority was wrong, then the matter has to be remanded to it for fresh decision. But no purpose win be served by such a remand, because there is neither any surplus land for allotment to the petitioners nor do they have preferential claim u/s 198 (1) of the Z. A. Act. 27. It may be that the allottees of surplus land have no locus standi to challenge the orders of the authorities determining the ceiling area under the Act and, therefore, may not file writ petition against such orders. But if they were parties to the proceeding under the Act in which ceiling area was determined, they can challenge any adverse order passed against them in those proceedings, because a party to the proceeding has a right to challenge any adverse order passed against him by means of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The first contention of Sri J. N. Tiwari has, therefore, to be rejected. As regards the second contention of Sri Tiwari we have already upheld it hereinbefore, while dealing with the case of petitioners in writ petition No. 35613 of 1991. While dealing with the cases of Meerut Development Authority we have accepted the third contention of Sri Tiwari and have declined to exercise discretion in favour of Meerut Development Authority. As regards the second contention of Sri Tiwari we have already upheld it hereinbefore, while dealing with the case of petitioners in writ petition No. 35613 of 1991. While dealing with the cases of Meerut Development Authority we have accepted the third contention of Sri Tiwari and have declined to exercise discretion in favour of Meerut Development Authority. As the order of the appellate authority, impugned in these writ petitions, is being upheld by us, it is not necessary to go into fourth contention raised by Sri J. N. Tiwari. 28. Writ Petition No. 17525 of 1991 has been filed by Smt. Omwati, who was allotted about five Bighas of surplus land, from plots No. 139 and 141, in 1973 under Section 27 (3) of the Act. After decision dated 23. 11. 1989 of the Supreme Court the Prescribed Authority vide its order dated 11. 10. 1990 has taken away about 2-18-17 Bighas land of plot No. 139, which was allotted to the petitioners. The appellate authority has confirmed this order. Being aggrieved by these orders, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 29. It has been stated in para 7 of writ petition that the plots No. 139/1 area 0-4-0 and 139/2, area 0-0- 13] were in dispute before the Supreme Court and in the order of the Prescribed Authority it has been mentioned that areas of the aforesaid plots have been wrongly shown in Form No. 5. In para 7 of the counter-affidavit filed by land-holders, it has been admitted that me area shown in the order of Prescribed Authority is incorrect. The claim of the petitioner to 5 Biswas and 13 Biswansis of the aforesaid plot has also been admitted. Sri J. N. Tiwari, learned counsel for the land-holders has stated at bar that there is no justification for the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority to take away 2- 18-17 Bighas of land from the petitioner which was allotted to her long-long ago, because claim of the land-holder was confined to 5 Biswas and 13 Biswansis land of the said plots. Sri Tiwari has, therefore, contended that only 5 Biswas and 13 Biswansis or land could have been taken from the land allotted to the petitioner. 30. Sri Tiwari has, therefore, contended that only 5 Biswas and 13 Biswansis or land could have been taken from the land allotted to the petitioner. 30. Prescribed Authority has rejected the claim of this petitioner on the assumption that the area which was allotted to her, has been allocated to the land-holder by the Supreme Court. The appellate authority also rejected her claim on the same assumption. Both the authorities have proceeded on the unwarranted assumption. The total area which have been taken away from the allotted land of the petitioner does not appear to have been given to the land holders by the Supreme Court. Even the land- holder, in the counter-affidavit, has partially admitted the claim of the petitioner and has stated that the orders of the authorities under the Act do not contain the correct picture. 31. For the reasons given above this writ petition has to be allowed. 32. Writ petition No. 11578 of 1991 has been filed by Shastri Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. , challenging the same order of the Prescribed Authority and the order dated 4. 3. 1991 passed by the appellate authority. This society has laid its claim before the Prescribed Authority for about 5 Biswas of land or Khasra No. 47 for Rasta (road) and about 4 Biswas of land of the same Khasra number for temple. Prescribed Authority has held that there was no temple, although an attempt has been made to construct it. There was also no Rasta (road) and the land in dispute was in fact allotted to Sri S. C. Mathur, which was, however, cancelled, but his dispossession was stayed by this Court. This order has been affirmed by the appellate authority by which its claim has been negatived. The plea based on the agreement to sell has also been rejected. 33. It is not disputed that the Society is neither owner of the land in dispute, nor was it allotted to it under Section 27 (3) of the Act. Its claim has been rejected by both prescribed and the appellate authorities for good reasons and no exception can be taken to these orders. This writ petition has, therefore, to be dismissed. 34. All the writ petitions, except writ petition No. 17525 of 1991--Omwati v. State of U. P. , are dismissed with costs. Its claim has been rejected by both prescribed and the appellate authorities for good reasons and no exception can be taken to these orders. This writ petition has, therefore, to be dismissed. 34. All the writ petitions, except writ petition No. 17525 of 1991--Omwati v. State of U. P. , are dismissed with costs. Writ petition No. 17525 of 1991 is allowed with costs and the impugned orders of the Prescribed Authority, so far as it relates to the case of the petitioner in this writ petition as well as that of the appellate authority, are quashed. Her case is remanded to the Prescribed Authority for considering it afresh in accordance with law. Till the matter is decided she will not be dispossessed, if not already dispossessed, from the land in dispute. Decided accordingly. .