JUDGMENT (ORAL) Ashok Agarwal, J. - Petitioner is the father of one Rajiv Kumar Tandon who has been detained vide order dated 5th of September, 1992 issued by the Principal Secretary (preventive Detention) to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department under Section 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity "COFEPOSA Act). By the present petition, he seeks a writ of habeas corpus and prays for release of the detenu on several grounds which have been taken in the petition. 2. The incident which h as led to the filing of the present petition is as follows: On 11th of February, 1992 Customs Officers at the Sahar Airport intercepted the detenu when he arrived by Air India flights No. AI 401 from Singapore via Madras. When he was about to pass through exit gate Customs Officers apprehended him and inquired whether he was carrying any contraband goods on his person or in his baggage. To this the detenu replied in the negative. The detenu was asked to pass through the metal detector door frame which gave a positive signal. The detenu was, thereafter, interrogated. In the presence of Panchas the detenu admitted that he had swallowed seven capsules containing gold in his stomach and concealed two packets containing gold in his rectum. He ejected two bundles wrapped in blue coloured adhesive tape from his rectum in a toilet and in the presence of Panchas. On opening, it was found to contain six gold bars of foreign markings, totally weighing 699.6 Gms. valued at Rs. 2,09,880/- I.M.V. and Rs. 3,37,906.80 L.M.V. On 12.2.1992 the detenu ejected three capsules containing three pieces of gold totally weighing 84 gms. valued at Rs. 25,116/- I.M.V. and Rs. 40,740/- L.M.V. which was also seized. On 13th February, 1992 he ejected four capsules containing four pieces of gold collectively weighing 122 gms. valued at Rs. 35,600/- I.M.V. and Rs. 57,584/-I.M.V. which was also seized. Thus, in all 905.6 gms. of Gold valued at Rs. 2,71,596/- I.M.V. and Rs. 4,36,260.80 L.M.V. were recovered and seized from the detenu. The detenu was arrested on the 13th of February 1992 and was produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 14th February, 1992 with a prayer for remand. 35,600/- I.M.V. and Rs. 57,584/-I.M.V. which was also seized. Thus, in all 905.6 gms. of Gold valued at Rs. 2,71,596/- I.M.V. and Rs. 4,36,260.80 L.M.V. were recovered and seized from the detenu. The detenu was arrested on the 13th of February 1992 and was produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 14th February, 1992 with a prayer for remand. On the same day the detenu was ordered to be released on bail and the detenu was accordingly enlarged on bail on the 14th of February, 1992. 3. On the 5th of September, 1992 the impugned order was passed and the same was served on the detenu on the 15th of July, 1994 and the detenu was taken in custody. 4. Though several grounds have been urged by way of challenge to the order of detention we will deal with only one as in our view the same is sufficient to vitiate the order of detention. We do not, therefore, think that it is necessary to deal with the other contentions raised in the petition. 5. It is pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the order of detention in the present case has been passed on the 5th of September, 1992, whereas the same has been served on the detenu belatedly on the 15th of July, 1994 i.e. after a lapse of about twenty three months. It is the contention of the petitioner that the long and unexplained delay will have the effect of snapping the live link between the prejudicial activities of the detenu and the need to detain him in order to prevent-him from indulging in similar activities in future, rendering the order of detention invalid. It is pointed out that, during the interval between the passing of the detention order and its service on the detenu the Sponsoring Authority, on the 13th of November, 1992 had lodged a complaint against the detenu in respect of the offence in question. In the complaint process was issued by issue of warrants against the detenu. The detenu, on the 10th of March, 1993, appeared in Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on which date an order was passed releasing the detenu on bail. In the complaint process was issued by issue of warrants against the detenu. The detenu, on the 10th of March, 1993, appeared in Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on which date an order was passed releasing the detenu on bail. Despite this no efforts were made to serve the detention order on the detenu even though the detenu was available in Court for being served with the order, even though the detenu had secured an order for bail and was thereafter set at liberty. Not only this but the detenu had also attended the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on subsequent dates viz. 4th of March, 1994 and 15th of April, 1994 and yet no steps were taken to serve detention order on the detenu. It was only on the 15th of July, 1994 when the detenu had appeared in Court, that the detention order is served upon him. In the circumstances, it is submitted that the Detaining Authority was not serious in taking effective steps to prevent the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activities in future. Moreover, no action has been taken by the Detaining Authority against the detenu under the provisions of Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act. The delay, thus, caused, it is submitted, will render the detention order invalid. 6. The aforesaid dates and facts are not disputed. The delay, however, is sought to be explained in the affidavit of Shri M.F. Rathod, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department (Special), Mantralaya, in the following terms: "Besides the efforts made by the police, I say that the Sponsoring Authority had also sent telex message to the Collector of Customs, New Delhi on 8.9.1992 to make discreet inquiry regarding the whereabouts of the detenu, as the detenu's address available on record was that of Delhi. By reply letter dated 4.2.1993, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, New Delhi, informed the Sponsoring Authority that the detenu was not residing at the given address. I say that during this period the detenu did not attend the Court on several remand dates. By reply letter dated 4.2.1993, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, New Delhi, informed the Sponsoring Authority that the detenu was not residing at the given address. I say that during this period the detenu did not attend the Court on several remand dates. As the detenu was not available, the Assistant Collector of Customs, Prosecution Cell was informed by COFEPOSA Cell by letter dated 10.2.1993 that the detenu was not available at his address and therefore prosecution cell was requested to bring these facts to the notice of the Hon'ble Court and to get bail and surety bond cancelled and also to initiate appropriate action in that behalf. The Sponsoring Authority also by letter dated 10.2.1993 informed the State Government about non service of detention order on the detenu and non-availability of the detenu. I say that though the detenu attended the trial Court on the dates mentioned in the said para, it would (be) seen that the date 14.2.1992 was prior to issue of detention order and hence his presence on that date is not material as far as service of detention order is concerned. I say that during the period from the date of issue of detention order i.e. from 5.9.1992 to the end of February, 1994, the detenu attended the Court only on one solitary date i.e. on 10.3.1993. From the Roznama of the case produced by the Petitioner at Ex. 'D' it would be seen that the detenu was absent in Court on 14.5.1993, 17.6.1993, 10.9.1993 and 7.12.1993. The detenu started attending Court regularly from 4.3.1994 and thereafter the detention order was served on 14.7.1994. I, therefore, deny petitioner's allegation that on account of delay in serving the detention order, detention order is vitiated and liable to be quashed as alleged." 7. In addition to the above explanation, we have the following explanation in the affidavit of Shri P.Y. More, Sub-Inspector of Police who, at the relevant time, was attached to the P.C.B., C.I.D., Bombay: "I say that the impugned detention order dated 5.9.1992 was received in the office of P.C.B., C.I.D. Bombay on 7.9.1992. The detenu was not resident of Bombay. His local address was also not available on record. The only address available on record of the detenu was that of Delhi. The detenu was not resident of Bombay. His local address was also not available on record. The only address available on record of the detenu was that of Delhi. Therefore, Commissioner of Police, Delhi by wireless message dated 8.9.1992 was requested to ascertain the whereabouts of the detenu at the given address and inform accordingly by wireless message. However, no reply was received from the Commissioner of Police to the said wireless message. On 29.3.1993 two staff members of P.C.B., C.LD. i.e. H.C. No. 18707 and P.C. No. 25284 went to Delhi to find out the whereabouts of the detenu. The said staff members visited the residence of detenu at Delhi at about 21.00 hrs. on 31.3.1993 with assistance of local police officer P.S.I. Jaisinghji. However the detenu was not traced out at this address. The father of the detenu Shri Kailash Chander Tandon and mother Kantibai informed the P.C.B. staff that since six months prior to that day the detenu had left the said place and that since then he was not coming to them and that they were not aware of the whereabouts of the detenu. 3. I say that besides the aforesaid efforts, a watch was also maintained to apprehend the detenu in the court premises on remand dates. However, as the detenu was not attending the court on remand dates he could not be apprehended. As the detenu was not traceable, the file was returned to the State Government on 4.2.1993 for taking further action under Section 7(i) of COFEPOSA Act. I say that though file was returned to the State Government for taking further action under Section 7(i) of COFEPOSA Act, the P.C.B. continued their efforts to apprehend the detenu. They also continued their watch in the Court. On 15.7.1994 the detenu had come to attend the court -when he was noticed by staff of P.C.B. After the case was over the detenu was apprehended outside the court premises and was brought to the office of P.C.B., C.LD. where detention order, grounds of detention and material relied upon were served upon him. The contents of the said documents i.e. detention order, grounds of detention material were explained to him in Hindi. 4. I say that though efforts were made to trace out the detenu to serve the detention order upon him. However, detenu had himself scare in order to avoid service of detention order. The contents of the said documents i.e. detention order, grounds of detention material were explained to him in Hindi. 4. I say that though efforts were made to trace out the detenu to serve the detention order upon him. However, detenu had himself scare in order to avoid service of detention order. As stated hereinabove all possible efforts were made by the police but since the detenu had again in abscontion the detention order could not be served upon him. Hence the delay has been caused in serving the detention order, however, the detenu cannot be entitled to claim benefit of the said delay." 8. Before considering whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained, it may be useful to refer to certain decisions which are relied upon by Smt. Manjula Rao who appears for the petitioner. In the case of "T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and others1", the- Supreme-Court has observed, as under: "The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus. The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order- of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the Court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer  and further the Court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case." "Similarly when there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay between the date of order of detention and the date of securing the arrest of the detenu, such a delay would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner." 9. In the case of "K.P.M. Basheer v. State of Karnataka and another" with "K.P.M. Basheer v. Union of India and others2", this is what the Supreme Court has observed: "In paragraph 17 of the Writ Petition filed before the High Court, the appellant has asserted that he appeared before the Asst. Collector of Customs, Marine Lines, Bombay on 6.2.1991 and 20.2.1991 but no attempt was made to arrest and detain him. This specific averment is not at all denied in the counter. This indicates that the arresting officers did not take any real and genuine effort to secure and detain the appellant. Collector of Customs, Marine Lines, Bombay on 6.2.1991 and 20.2.1991 but no attempt was made to arrest and detain him. This specific averment is not at all denied in the counter. This indicates that the arresting officers did not take any real and genuine effort to secure and detain the appellant. The explanation now offered stating that the appellant was fugitive, eluding the drag-net of the detention order cannot be accepted, because during the alleged period of search he has appeared before the Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay on two occasions during Feb., 1991, that is after passing of the detention order." ………………………… “Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the order of detention cannot be sustained since the 'live and proximate link' between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped on account of the undue and unreasonable delay in securing the appellant/detenu and detaining him. As we have now come to the conclusion that the order of detention is liable to be set aside on this ground alone, we are not dealing with other contentions raised in the Memorandum of Appeal as well as in the Writ Petition." 10. In the case of "P.U. Iqbal v. Union of India and others3", the Supreme Court has observed, thus: "It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of the above decisions of this Court, that the law promulgated on this aspect is that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention and the date of arrest of the detenu, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the 'live and proximate link' between the grounds of the detention al1d the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case." 11. As against these authorities, Smt. Ranjana Desai, the learned Public Prosecutor, has submitted that the facts of the case show that the detenu in the instant case has received training in the matter of smuggling. The detenu is found to have attempted to smuggle goods by carrying the same in his rectum and his stomach. As against these authorities, Smt. Ranjana Desai, the learned Public Prosecutor, has submitted that the facts of the case show that the detenu in the instant case has received training in the matter of smuggling. The detenu is found to have attempted to smuggle goods by carrying the same in his rectum and his stomach. This, he has done, by creating cavities in his body after receiving training. He is not an ordinary carrier. He is one who has prepared himself for long term smuggling programme. The Smuggling activities of the detenu has large scale ramification. Hence, the order of detention should not be set aside merely on the ground of delay in service of the order of detention. In support of her contention, she has placed reliance on the case of "Kamrunnisa v. Union of India and another" with "Badhrunissa v. Union of India and another" with "Sithy Aysha v. Union of India and another4", where the Supreme Court has observed, as follows: "Counsel for the detenus, however, vehemently argued that since the detenus were in custody, there was no compelling necessity to pass the detention orders for the obvious reason that while in custody they were not likely to indulge in any prejudicial activity such as smuggling. In support of this contention reliance was placed on a host of decisions of this Court beginning with the case of Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 S.C.C.14; (l984 Cr. L.J. 909) and ending with the case of Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India; (1990) 1 S.C.C. 746 : (1990 Cri. L.J. 1232). It is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the grounds of detention clearly reveal that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenus were apprehended while they were about to board the flights to Hongkong and Dubai on 5th October, 1989. He was also aware that the detenu M.M. Shahul Hameed had secreted diamonds and precious stones in his rectum while the other two detenus had swallowed 100 capsules each containing foreign currency notes. He was also aware of the fact that all the three detenus were produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Espalanade, Bombay and two of them had applied for bail. He was also conscious of the fact that the hearing of the bail application was postponed because investigation was in progress. He was also aware of the fact that all the three detenus were produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Espalanade, Bombay and two of them had applied for bail. He was also conscious of the fact that the hearing of the bail application was postponed because investigation was in progress. His past experience was also to the effect that in such cases courts ordinarily enlarge the accused on bail. He was also aware of the fact that the detenu M.M. Shahul Hameed had not applied for bail. Conscious of the fact that all the three detenus were in custody, he passed the impugned orders of detention on 10th Nov., 1989 as he had reason to believe that the detenus would in all probability secure bail and if they are at large, they would indulge in the same prejudicial activity. This inference of the concerned officer cannot be described as bald and not based on existing material since the manner in which the three detenus were in the process of smuggling diamonds and currency notes was itself indicative of they having received training in this behalf. Even the detenus in their statements recorded on 5th October, 1989 admitted that they had embarked on this activity after receiving training. The fact that one of them secreted diamonds and precious stones in two ballon rolls in his rectum speaks for itself. Similarly the fact that the other two detenus had created cavities for secreting as many as 100 capsules each in their bodies was indicative of the fact that this was not to be a solitary instance. All the three detenus had prepared themselves for indulging in smuggling by creating cavities in their bodies after receiving training. These were not ordinary carriers. These were persons who had prepared themselves for a long term smuggling programme and, therefore, the officer passing the detention orders was justified in inferring that they would indulge in similar activity in future because they were otherwise incapable of earning such substantial amounts in ordinary life. Therefore, the criticism that the officer had jumped to the conclusion that the detenus would indulge in similar prejudicial activity without there being any material on record is not justified. Therefore, the criticism that the officer had jumped to the conclusion that the detenus would indulge in similar prejudicial activity without there being any material on record is not justified. It is in this backdrop of facts that we must consider the contention of the learned counsel for the detenus whether or not there existed compelling circumstances to pass the impugned orders of detention. We are inclined to think, keeping in view the manner in which these detenus received training before they indulged in the smuggling activity, this was not a solitary effort, they had in fact prepared themselves for a long term programme." 12. Smt. Desai has further placed reliance on the case of "M. Mohammed Sultan v. The Joint Secretary to Govt. of India, Finance Deptt. and others5, where the Supreme Court has observed, as under: "Shri Karthikeyan has next contended that there was no necessity to pass an order for the detention of the petitioner because except the solitary, incident mentioned in the grounds of detention involving the recovery of seven gold bars from the person of the petitioner there is no reference in the grounds of detention to any antecedent activity involving smuggling of goods by the petitioner. It is urged that a single incident could not afford the basis for arriving at the satisfaction that the petitioner might repeat such acts in the future and it was necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from doing so. We are unable to agree with this contention. An order for preventive detention is founded on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Such past conduct may consist of one single act or of a series of acts. It must be of such a nature that an inference can reasonably be drawn from it that the person concerned would be likely to repeat such acts as to warrant his detention. (Debu Mehto v. The State of West Bengal, (1974) 4 S.C.C. 1 35 : (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 816)). The question which, therefore, needs to-be considered is whether from the past conduct of the petitioner as set out in the grounds of detention it could reasonably be inferred that the petitioner would be likely to repeat such acts in the future. (Debu Mehto v. The State of West Bengal, (1974) 4 S.C.C. 1 35 : (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 816)). The question which, therefore, needs to-be considered is whether from the past conduct of the petitioner as set out in the grounds of detention it could reasonably be inferred that the petitioner would be likely to repeat such acts in the future. From the grounds of detention it appears that on September 30, 1989 the petitioner arrived at Madras International Airport from Singapore and he was found carrying seven gold bars weighing 70 tolas in two bundles concealed in his body which were ejected by the petitioner through the rectum and the petitioner had traveled from Singapore to Madras on the basis of a passport issued in the name of Mohammed Ali son of Madharsa Rowther resident of Nagapattinam though the real name of the petitioner is Mohamed Sulthan son of Mohamed Sherif resident of Punganur. In the grounds of detention reference has been made to the statements dated September 30, 1989 and October 1, 1989, made by the petitioner before the Customs Officer wherein the petitioner had stated that his income was not adequate for his maintenance and in order to earn money he had gone to Singapore after obtaining a passport in a false name and at Singapore the petitioner developed friendship with one Majeed and on assurance given by Majeed that he would bear the cost of the air ticket of the petitioner amounting to Rupees 5,200/- and would also pay to the petitioner a sum of Rs. 2,000/- The petitioner agreed to carry gold bars and other goods and to hand over the same to the son of Majeed in India and accordingly the petitioner brought seven gold bars concealed in his body for the purpose of handing over the same to the son of Majeed. This would show that the petitioner was 'indulging in the activity of smuggling of gold as a carrier for monetary consideration. This was a deliberate act on the part of the petitioner and he had prepared himself for it by obtaining a passport in a false name and acquiring requisite skill to conceal such a large quantity of gold in his body. This was a deliberate act on the part of the petitioner and he had prepared himself for it by obtaining a passport in a false name and acquiring requisite skill to conceal such a large quantity of gold in his body. Taking into consideration the circumstances referred to above an inference could reasonably be drawn that unless detained the petitioner would 'be likely to indulge in smuggling of goods in future and, therefore, there was a reasonable basis for the detaining authority to arrive at the requisite satisfaction." 13. On the point of delay Smt. Desai has placed reliance on the case of "Abdul Salam alias Thiyyan v. Union of India and other6'', where, the Supreme Court has observed, as under: "The next submission of the learned counsel is that the date of search was 17.9.1987 and the detention order was passed on 21.5.1988 after a long time and therefore there is no nexus between the alleged incident and the detention order and therefore there is no genuine satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority. The learned counsel submits that there was no live existing connection between the incident and the detention. In Lakshman Khatik v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 4 S.C.C. 1 : (A.I.R. 1974 S.C 1264) it is observed that mere delay in passing a detention order is not conclusive but the type of grounds given have to be seen and then consider whether such grounds could really weigh with an officer after such delay in coming to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the detenu. In Rajendra Kumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, (1988) 3 S.C.C. 153 : (A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1255) it is held that the mere delay in passing the detention order is not fatal unless the Court finds that the grounds are stale or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the detention. In Abdul Rahman's case (A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 225) seizure of the gold biscuits was on 30.11.1986 and the detention order was passed 11 months thereafter. On the ground that there was a satisfactory explanation for this undue, unreasonable and unexplained delay, it was held that the delay throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the concerning authority. On the ground that there was a satisfactory explanation for this undue, unreasonable and unexplained delay, it was held that the delay throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the concerning authority. " “In the counter-affidavit, in the instant case, filed on behalf of the detaining authority it is stated that the case records relating to the petitioner were received at the office of the sponsoring authority on 1.2.1988 and they were processed in the office and the show cause notice under the Customs Act was issued on 9.2.1988 and the proposals were sent for COFEPOSA section on 24.3.1988 and they were received by the State Government on 2.4.1988. The matter was considered by the Screening Committee which met on 28.4.1988 and thereafter submitted the proposals to the detaining authority. On 2.5.1988 the detaining authority ordered to ascertain the reasons for the delay in sponsoring the case and accordingly the sponsoring authority at Cochin was addressed on 2.5.1988. He was reminded on 7.5.1988 and 12.5.1988. His reply was received on 16.5.1988 and thereafter the order was passed on 21.5.1988. In our view, the delay has been reasonably explained. The Courts have not laid down that on mere such delay the detention has to be struck down. In Yogendra Murari v. State of U.P., (1988) 4 S.C.C. 559 : (A.I.R 1988 S.C. 1835) it is held that (at p. 1837 of A.I.R.): "It is not right to assume that an order of detention has to be mechanically struck down if passed after some delay. It is necessary to consider the circumstances in each individual case to find out whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained or not" "That apart, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that because of this delay the necessary nexus got severed and that the grounds have become stale and illusory. In appreciating such a contention, the Court also has to bear in mind the nature of the prejudicial activities indulged by the detenu and the likelihood of his repeating the same. It is this potentiality in him that has to be taken into consideration and if the detaining authority is satisfied on the available material then on mere delay as long as it is not highly unreasonable and undue the Court should not normally strike down the attention on that ground. It is this potentiality in him that has to be taken into consideration and if the detaining authority is satisfied on the available material then on mere delay as long as it is not highly unreasonable and undue the Court should not normally strike down the attention on that ground. In Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 4 S.C.C. 647 : (A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 8) it is held that delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention after an incident is not fatal to the detention of a person. For these reasons we are of the view that in this case the delay by itself does not invalidate the detention but even otherwise it has been reasonably explained." "Yet another ground urged by the learned counsel is that there was delay in arresting the detenu after the detention order was passed and therefore there is no genuineness in the detention order. In the counter-affidavit it is stated that after the detention order was passed, it was sent to the Superintendent of Police, Malappuram on 23.5.1988 for immediate execution and they were passed on to Circle Inspector, Malappuram. On 29.6.1988, it was reported that theCirc1e Inspector had made due enquiries but the detenu could not be apprehended. Thereupon a special squad was deputed as per the directions of the Superintendent of Police and thereafter he was detained on 6.8.1988. It is further submitted in the counter-affidavit that the delay in execution of the order is caused due to detenu's deliberate attempt to make himself scare. That apart there is no decision where a Court has gone to the extent of holding that a mere delay in arresting the accused renders the detention invalid. In the instant case, the delay, if at all, is only about 2½ months and the explanation offered for the delay is reasonable. The learned counsel, however, relied on Abdul Rahman's case (A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 225). In that case the detention order was passed on 7.10.1987 and the detenu was arrested on 18.1.1988. The Court found that there was no reasonable explanation for the delay in the counter-affidavit at all. This ground was taken into consideration alongwith the other important grounds in quashing the detention. In SK. In that case the detention order was passed on 7.10.1987 and the detenu was arrested on 18.1.1988. The Court found that there was no reasonable explanation for the delay in the counter-affidavit at all. This ground was taken into consideration alongwith the other important grounds in quashing the detention. In SK. Serajul v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 S.C.C. 78 : (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1517) it is observed that: "There was delay, both at the stage of passing the order of the detention and in arresting him, and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction. ... ......But this must not be misunderstood to mean that whenever there is delay in making an order of detention or in arresting the detenu pursuant to the order of detention, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must be held to be not genuine or colourable. Each case must depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. The detaining authority may have a reasonable explanation for the delay and that might be sufficient to dispel the inference that its satisfaction was not genuine." "It can therefore be seen that on the mere delay in arresting the detenu pursuant to the order of detention the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority can not be held to be not genuine. Each case depends on its own facts and circumstances. The Court has to see whether the delay is explained reasonably." 14. Further reliance is placed by Smt. Desai on the case of "Syed Farooq Mohammad v. Union of India and another7, wherein the Supreme Court has observed, as under: The last of challenge is that there has been inordinate delay in arresting the detenu and in serving the detention order i.e. all February 15, 1990 after a lapse of 1 month and 25 days and no serious attempt was made to arrest the petitioner and to serve the order of detention on him in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the said Act which specially provides for enforcing the provisions of, Sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been urged in this connection that this unusual delay in arresting the petitioner shows that there was no real and genuine apprehension in the mind of the detaining authority regarding the necessity of detention of the petitioner and as such continued detention of the petitioner is illegal and contrary to law. It is apropos to refer in this connection to the averments made on behalf of the respondents in para 7 of the counter-affidavit. It has been stated therein that the Department served two notices, one of which was accepted by his mother and the second by his brother, Nizamuddin for handing over the same to the petitioner, as the petitioner was not available in the house. It has been submitted that the petitioner deliberately avoided making himself available to the Department and thus delayed completion of investigation of the case. Instead of appearing before the Department, the petitioner applied to the Sessions Judge for anticipatory bail which was rejected on 5.1.1990. Thereafter, the petitioner approached this Court for anticipatory bail, which was granted on 22.1.1990. It is, therefore, evident that the petitioner absconded and tried to evade arrest pursuant to the order of detention even though he knew the passing of such an order by the detaining authority. It is relevant to mention here the observations of this Court in Shafiq Ahmad v. District Magistrate, Meerut, (1989) 4 S.C.C. 556 : (A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 220) to the following effect (at p. 223 of A.I.R.) ".…We are, however, unable to accept this contention. If in a situation the person concerned is not available or cannot be served then the mere fact that the action under Section 7 of the Act has not been taken, would not be a ground to say that the detention order was bad." "In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu, (197) 2 S.C.R. 633: (A.I.R 199 S.C. 541) an order of detention was made against the appellant under S. 3 (I) of COFEPOSA Act in December, 1975. It could not be executed because the detenu was absconding and could not be apprehended despite a proclamation made under Section 7 of the Act. More than three proclamations were made under Section 7 of the Act. More than three years after the order was passed, the appellant surrendered in February, 1978. It could not be executed because the detenu was absconding and could not be apprehended despite a proclamation made under Section 7 of the Act. More than three proclamations were made under Section 7 of the Act. More than three years after the order was passed, the appellant surrendered in February, 1978. It was held that there must be a 'live and proximate link' between the grounds of detention and the avoid purpose of detention. But in appropriate cases the Court can assume that the link is 'snapped' if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. Where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the detenu's recalcitrant or refractory conduct in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the 'link' not snapped but strengthened. It was, therefore, held that the delay in serving the order of detention on the detenu does not vitiate the order." 14. Smt. Desai lastly relied upon the case of "Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v. L. Himingliana and another8, where the Supreme Court observed thus: "Mr. Jethmalani lastly submitted that having regard to the fact that the order of detention was passed as far back as in 1990 and the maximum period of detention, which the appellant would have to undergo under the order was two years, was long over, his detention at this distant point of time would be punitive and not preventive. It is undoubtedly true that an unusual delay in execution of an order of detention if not satisfactorily explained, may persuade the Court to draw such an inference. There is, however, no scope for drawing such an inference in this case as the delay here has been occasioned not by any omission or commission on the part of the detaining authority. On the contrary, it is the .appellant who has delayed the execution by first moving the Bombay High Court and then this Court. That apart, the respondents have asserted that though this Court had not passed any interim order against execution of the order, it could not be served as the appellant was absconding. It is pertinent to point out here that an identical contention raised by Mr. That apart, the respondents have asserted that though this Court had not passed any interim order against execution of the order, it could not be served as the appellant was absconding. It is pertinent to point out here that an identical contention raised by Mr. Jethmalani on similar facts was negatived by this Court in Bhawarlal v. State of T.N., (1979) 1 S.C.C. 465 : (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 541)." 15. The above cases, it would appear, lay down that no hard and fast rule can be laid down, there can be no straight jacket formula and each case will have to be decided on the facts of each case. In the case of "Abdul Salman" (A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1446) (Supra) the explanation for the delay for issuing the order of detention was, in the facts of that case, found to have been reasonably explained. In the case of "Sayed Farooq Mohamad v. Union of India and another" (A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1597) (Supra) the denue was found guilty of avoiding arrest and delayed" investigation and it was found that the delay was satisfactorily explained. As far as the case of "Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v. L. Himangliana" 1994 A.I.R. S.C.W. 4975 (Supra) the detenu was found responsible for delaying the proceedings by moving the High Court and the Supreme Court. He was further found to be absconding. In the circumstances, it was found that the order of detention was not vitiated. As far a the case at hand is concerned, we no doubt find that the manner in which the detenu has attempted to smuggle gold is no doubt heinous. This does not appear to be a solitary case of an attempt to smuggle. Though the incident alleged against the detenu is a single incident, the manner in which the detenu has sought to smuggle the gold shows that he has educated himself in the art of smuggling for the purpose of long term smuggling. The seriousness of the crime, however, should not lead us to gloss over the delay if the same has not been satisfactorily explained. In the instant case, we find that not only has the delay not been satisfactorily explained but there is in fact no explanation at all for the delay caused. The seriousness of the crime, however, should not lead us to gloss over the delay if the same has not been satisfactorily explained. In the instant case, we find that not only has the delay not been satisfactorily explained but there is in fact no explanation at all for the delay caused. In the instant case, the prosecution agency who is none other than the sponsoring authority, has lodged a complaint in respect of the incident in question on the 13th of November, 1992. In the complaint, process is issued against the detenu. In response to the warrants the detenu has appeared in Court on the 10th of March, 1993. On that day, the detenu appears to have made an application for bail. After securing an order he has been enlarged on bail. The prosecuting agency was aware of the passing of the detention order on the 5th of September, 1992. They have suffered an order of bail being passed and the detenu being enlarged to liberty without bothering to serve the order of detention upon him. If the sponsoring authority or the detaining authority were serious about preventing the detenu from once again indulging in smuggling activities they would not have let the detenu at large but would have certainly served the order of detention and taken the detenu in custody. This is not all. The detenu has appeared in Court on two further occasions namely on the 4th of March, 1994 and 15th of April, 1994 which were the adjourned dates in respect of the complaint. On neither of the two occasions any efforts have been made to serve the detenu and to take him in custody. It is only on the 15th of July, 1994 that the order has been served and the detenu has been detained. For the inaction on three occasions during the period 10th of March, 1993 and 15th of April, 1994 no explanation whatsoever is forthcoming. This is, therefore, not a case where an explanation is offered and the same, on facts and circumstances of the case, can be said to be a reasonable explanation for the delay. This is a case of no explanation whatsoever. This is, therefore, not a case where an explanation is offered and the same, on facts and circumstances of the case, can be said to be a reasonable explanation for the delay. This is a case of no explanation whatsoever. In the circumstances we are constrained to hold that the delay called in serving the order of detention has snapped the nexus between the prejudicial activities of the detenu and the need to detain him for the purpose of preventing him from further indulging in smuggling activities. This would naturally invalidate the order of detention as also the continued detention of the detenu. 16. For the foregoing reasons the impugned order of detention dated the 5th of September, 1992 bearing No. SPL 3(A)/PSA 0192/194, issued by the Principal Secretary (Preventive Detention) to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, is set aside. The detenu is directed to be released forthwith unless required in some other case. Rule is accordingly made absolute. Petition allowed. 1. A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 225. 2. 1992 Cri. L.J. 1927 (S.C.) 3. A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1900. 4.1991 Cri. L.J. 2058 (S.C.) 5. A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 2222 6. A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1446. 7. A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1597. 8. A.I.R. 1994 S.C.W. 4975.