S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) FACING proceedings of domestic enquiry initiated by their employer with the submission of the charge-sheet dated July 19, 1993 accompanied by an order of their suspension with effect from that date, the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 filed an application under Section 11-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (Hereinafter referred to as the act) seeking an order in regard to the questions as to whether the certified standing order issued in the name of M/s Modipon Ltd. Modi Nagar was applicable to the Service Conditions and Terms of Employment and regulated the service conditions of the workmen, appointed by M/s. Modipon Ltd. falling in the category of the applicants who were working in the Modipon Fiber Co. , Modi Nagar - a unit of Modipon ltd. and in case the answer to the above question was in the negative praying in the alternative an interpretation as to whether the certified standing order of M/s. Modipon Fiber Co.- the unit of M/s Modipon Ltd. was applicable to them and regulated the service conditions of the aforesaid employees appointed by M/s Modipon Ltd. and whether the certified standing order of m/s Modipon Fiber Co. Ltd. had the over-riding effect on the certified standing order of M/s modipon Ltd. ( 2 ) ALONG with the aforesaid application the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 moved an application seeking an interim injunction restraining the opposite parties, which apart from M/s Modipon fiber Co. , Modi Nagar, a unit of M/s Modipon Ltd. included Modipon Ltd. , Modi Nagar also, from taking any action terminating the services of the aforesaid applicants or passing any order affecting their service interest in any manner during the pendency of the application under section 11-C of the Act. ( 3 ) THE Labour Court disposed of the aforesaid application vide its judgment and order dated June 4, 1994 clarifying that the certified standing orders of Modipon Fiber Co. Ltd. alone and not those of Modipon Ltd. were applicable, in the case of respondents No. 3 and 4 and regulated their service conditions and terms of employment. The Labour Court further held that it had no jurisdiction to grant any interim relief as prayed for and rejected the application for the purpose. Ltd. alone and not those of Modipon Ltd. were applicable, in the case of respondents No. 3 and 4 and regulated their service conditions and terms of employment. The Labour Court further held that it had no jurisdiction to grant any interim relief as prayed for and rejected the application for the purpose. ( 4 ) THE order dated June 4, 1994disposingof the applications referred to above passed by the labour Court attained finality. ( 5 ) IT appears that during the pendency of the aforesaid application the employer M/s Modipon fiber Co. , proceeded with the domestic enquiry into the charges of misconduct levelled against the respondents No. 3 and 4 and these proceedings culminated in the order dated May 24, 1994 whereunder the aforesaid respondents were dismissed from service. ( 6 ) SRI. Daya Ram Sharma and Sri. Satyapal, the respondents No. 3 and 4, thereafter filed a complaint before the Labour Court under Section 6-F of the Act impleading both, the Modipon ltd. as well as Modipon Fiber Co. , as opposite parties/employers, praying for the setting aside of the order terminating their services and seeking reinstatement with continuity in service along with full back wages and other benefits throughout treating the order of dismissal dated May 24, 1994 as nullity. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid application which was contested by the employers/opposite parties in the case, was allowed by the Labour Court vide the impugned award dated February 23, 1995 directing reinstatement of the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 on their original posts in the same scale of pay providing further that for the period elapsing between May 24, 1994 and their reinstatement the aforesaid respondents will be entitled to only 50% of their salary and other allowances. ( 8 ) FEELING aggrieved the employers have now approached this Court by means of the present writ petition seeking redress praying for the quashing of the impugned award dated February 23, 1995. ( 9 ) I have heard Sri. Vijay Bahadur Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Govind saran, learned Counsel representing respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and have carefully perused the record. ( 10 ) THE facts in brief, whereof details are necessary for the disposal of this writ petition lie in a narrow compass. The respondent No. 3 Daya Ram Sharma had been appointed on December 19, 1966 while Sri. Govind saran, learned Counsel representing respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and have carefully perused the record. ( 10 ) THE facts in brief, whereof details are necessary for the disposal of this writ petition lie in a narrow compass. The respondent No. 3 Daya Ram Sharma had been appointed on December 19, 1966 while Sri. Satya Pal respondent No. 4 had been appointed on October 26, 1983 M/s modipon Limited, a company registered under the Companies Act was engaged in the manufacture of nylon and polyester filament yarn. It had its own standing orders certified vide the certificate No. 1264/70 issued under the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1945. However, under a scheme of amalgamation and the merger of another company in the name and style of M/s Indofil Chemicals Limited, Bombay with the Modipon Limited after the requisite approval from all the concerned authorities, the Modipon company formed two divisions namely its chemical division and fiber division. The activities of erstwhile Indofil Chemicals Limited were carried on in the name and style of Indofil Chemicals Limited and the existing nylon and polyester filament yarn business of Modipon Limited was to be carried on in the name and style of Modipon Fibre Co. , which constituted fibre division of the Modipon Limited. In view of the changes in the names and styles of the two divisions of the company necessity was felt for changes in the certified standing orders and consequently in the proceedings under the Industrial employment and Standing Orders Act, 1946 after notice to all the unions existing in the establishment namely Sharamik Sangh Modipon, Modipon Employees Association and Janta mazdoor Sangh the competent authority after considering the relevant facts and circumstances including the objections raised by the unions granted certain amendments in the original certified standing order of Modipon Limited and the amended standing orders were certified in the name of M/s Modipon Fibre Company, a division of Modipon Limited, Modi Nagar, Ghaziabad with the result that the original certificate No. 1264 of 1970 issued in the name of M/s Modipon limited stood amended in the name of Modipon Fibre Company a division of Modipon Limited. This amendment appears to have been effected on December 19, 1988. ( 11 ) AS has already been noticed above Daya Ram Sharma had been appointed on December 19, 1966 while Satyapal had been appointed on October 26, 1983. This amendment appears to have been effected on December 19, 1988. ( 11 ) AS has already been noticed above Daya Ram Sharma had been appointed on December 19, 1966 while Satyapal had been appointed on October 26, 1983. At that time the certified standing orders of Modipon Limited were obviously applicable to these employees. However, in view of the amendments noticed hereinabove with effect from December 18, 1988 the standing orders certified in the name of Modipon Fibre Company a division of M/s Modipon Limited came into force. M/s Modipon Fibre Company which represented the fibres division and dealt with the business of the Modipon Company carried on by it prior to its merger with the Indofil Chemicals company, retained the services of the respondents No. 3 and 4 who continued to discharge their duties as before the merger. It appears that although the standing orders certified in the name of m/s Modipon Limited had been amended after notice to all the concerned workmens unions and were amended in the name of M/s Modipon Fibres Company yet respondents No. 3 and 4 in order to clarify their doubt initiated the proceedings under Section 11-C of the U. P. Industrial disputes Act to which a reference has been made above. ( 12 ) IN their application under Section 11-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, the respondents no. 3 and 4 had asserted that they had been appointed by M/s Modipon Limited and since the date of their appointment they had been working continuously. They also alleged that they had been working in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certified standing orders of modipon Limited and without their express knowledge and consent M/s Modipon Limited constituted a subsidiary unit in the name and style of M/s Modipon Fibre Company and acting in collusion with some pocket union representatives and authorities got the certified standing order in the name of Modipon Fibre company by mentioning it as a unit of Modipon Limited. These respondents challenged the amendments in the certified standing orders alleging that their services could not be affected by the amended standing orders which could not override in any manner, their service conditions as provided for in the certified standing orders applicable to M/s modipon Limited. These respondents challenged the amendments in the certified standing orders alleging that their services could not be affected by the amended standing orders which could not override in any manner, their service conditions as provided for in the certified standing orders applicable to M/s modipon Limited. In their application grievance sought to be redressed was to have a clarification as to which certified standing order could be deemed applicable so as to regulate the service conditions of the respondents No. 3 and 4. That is to say as to whether the certified standing orders issued in the name of M/s Modipon Limited or the certified standing orders issued after amendments in the year 1988 in the name of M/s Modipon Fibre Company Limited a division of Modipon Limited, was to regulate the service conditions of the aforesaid employees. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently urged that the proceedings under section 11-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act initiated by the respondents No. 3 and 4 which ultimately culminated in the order dated June 4, 1994 could not be deemed to be a proceeding in respect of any industrial dispute as contemplated under Section 6-E of the U. P. Industrial disputes Act which could give rise to any cause of action for initiating proceedings under section 6-F of the said Act. The contention is that in such a situation the entire proceedings initiated by respondents No. 3 and 4 giving rise to the impugned award including the said award stands vitiated in law being clearly without jurisdiction, inasmuch as in the absence of the condition precedent stipulated under the provisions contained in Section 6-E of the Act having been established and satisfied there could be no occasion to either entertain a complaint envisaged under Section 6-F of the said Act or to grant an award of reinstatement with back wages in full or part. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel for the contesting respondents had, however, urged that considering the provisions contained in Section 2 (1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act which defines the term industrial Dispute there could be no justification for treating the dispute raised by the respondents No. 3 and 4 in their application, under Section 6-E of the Act to be out of the ambit of industrial Dispute as envisaged under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The contention is that the employer had undoubtedly passed an order dismissing the respondents No. 3 and 4 during the pendency of the application filed by these respondents under Section 11-C and since it has not been disputed at any stage that the requisite express permission in writing from the Labour Court as required under the provisions contained in Section 6-E of the Act had not been obtained by the employer before passing the order of dismissal, the said order was a nullity and consequently the complaint filed under Section 6-F of the Act was not only entertainable but deserved to be allowed and the award in question given in favour of the respondents No. 3 and 4 does not require any interference by this court while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 15 ) THE principal question which, therefore, arises for consideration in this case is as to whether the proceedings initiated by the respondents No. 3 and 4 under Section 11-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act referred to hereinabove could be deemed to raise a dispute falling within the ambit of the term industrial Dispute as envisaged under Section 2 (1) of the Act. ( 16 ) THE provisions contained in Section 2 (1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act is to the following effect " (1) Industrial Dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the condition of labour, of any person; but does not include an industrial dispute concerning,. (i) any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Centra! Government or by a Railway company, or (ii) such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by Central Government, or (iii) banking and insurance companies as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or (iv) a mine or an oil field. " ( 17 ) THE dispute contemplated under Section 2 (1) of the Act must be such which involves a controversy in which the workman is directly and substantially interested. " ( 17 ) THE dispute contemplated under Section 2 (1) of the Act must be such which involves a controversy in which the workman is directly and substantially interested. Further the grievance of the workman should be such which could be remedied by the employer and inspite of being in a position to set it right it is not being so done by him. Both these conditions must be satisfied before a dispute can be deemed to be an industrial dispute as envisaged under the aforesaid provision. ( 18 ) THE use of the word connected with as contained in Section 2 (1) of the Act is quite significant and indicates the continuing character of the industrial dispute. Before a dispute can be deemed to be an industrial dispute, therefore, it must be established to be connected with the terms of employment or non- employment or the conditions of labour of any person. The connection of the dispute with the terms of employment/non-employment, condition of labour of the workman has to be treated as a condition precedent and if the dispute is so connected then alone can it partake the character of an industrial dispute. The expression term of employment is of a wide import. It covers the subjects of employment, non-employment and conditions of labour. It also refers to all matters covered by thecontract of employment of any person either express or implied. Ordinarily terms of employment include such straight-forward industrial disputes as bonus, wage rates in all forms including dearness allowance and other allowances, hours of work, over time, holidays with pay, sickness benefits, superannuation benefits, grading, promotion, dismissal and retrenchment. However, this term is a wide ranging phrase which also extends to less obvious aspects of labour relations than the aforesaid. The term presupposes the existence of a contract of employment and has reference to the terms contained in the contract of employment which when assented to or accepted settle the contract between the workmen and the employer. Where, therefore, there is in existence a contract of employment all that can form the subject matter of contract, that is, all the points of agreement between the parties relating to the employment which can legitimately be taken to be within the ambit of term of employment. Where, therefore, there is in existence a contract of employment all that can form the subject matter of contract, that is, all the points of agreement between the parties relating to the employment which can legitimately be taken to be within the ambit of term of employment. However, the terms and conditions of employment by virtue of the legal fiction contemplated under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1945 will have to be deemed to be the terms of the contract which by operation of law have to be read into the express contract of employment and all the terms and conditions contained in the certified standing order have to be deemed to be conditions relating to the employment of the workman and therefore, can also legitimately be taken to be within the ambit of the expression terms of employment. ( 19 ) IN the aforesaid connection it may be usefully noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna Kant and Ors. (1995-II-LLJ-728) had clarified that certified standing orders cannot be elevated to the status of having a statutory force of constituting statutory provisions. It was pointed out that it is one thing to say that they are statutorily imposed conditions of service and an altogether different thing to say that they constitute provisions themselves. It is, therefore, obvious that the standing orders containing the terms and conditions govern and regulate the relations between the parties and have to prevail over the terms of a contract which conflict with the standing orders. ( 20 ) IT may further be noticed that the provisions contained in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1945 cast a duty on the certifying officer or the appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of any standing order. The certifying officer has to be satisfied as to whether the standing orders are in consonance with the model standing orders and as to whether they are fair or reasonable. The workman concerned can raise an objection as to the reasonableness or fairness to the draft standing orders submitted for certification. The certifying officer has to be satisfied as to whether the standing orders are in consonance with the model standing orders and as to whether they are fair or reasonable. The workman concerned can raise an objection as to the reasonableness or fairness to the draft standing orders submitted for certification. The provisions contained in the aforesaid Act secure rights both in favour of the workman and the employer to apply for modification of the standing orders which has to be tested by the yard-stick of fairness and reasonableness. ( 21 ) THE provisions contained in Section 11-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act are to the following effect :" 11-C Interpretation, etc. , of standing orders. If any question arises as to the application or interpretation of a standing order certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders), act 1945, any employer or workman may refer the question to any one of the Labour Courts specified for the disposal of such proceeding by the State Government by notification in the official Gazette and the Labour Court to which the question is so referred shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide the question and such decision shall be final and binding on the parties". ( 22 ) THE Court in its decision in the case of Lord Krishna Sugar Mills, Ltd. v. Labour Court, meerut and Ors. , (1961-I-LLJ-211) (SC) had clarified that the provisions contained in Section 11-C of the U. P, Industrial Disputes Act could not be held applicable for deciding industrial disputes. It was observed that the aforesaid provisions did not provide a forum for deciding industrial disputes but only provided a procedure by which the Labour Court could decide doubtful questions relating to the conditions of employment and interpret standing orders so that the stage of industrial dispute may not be reached at all. It was emphasised that the aforesaid provision has got nothing to do with industrial disputes and while merely interpreting or deciding about the applicability of a standing order an industrial dispute cannot be adjudicated upon. It was emphasised that the aforesaid provision has got nothing to do with industrial disputes and while merely interpreting or deciding about the applicability of a standing order an industrial dispute cannot be adjudicated upon. It was observed that the Labour Court while proceeding under Section 11-C has no other or greater power than to decide about the application or interpretation of a standing order and the finding with regard to the interpretation or application of a standing order will be something in the nature of a decision on one of the issues in a case and cannot operate as a decision of the case itself. This Court was of the view that before an industrial dispute is decided, the Labour Court would, in addition to interpreting or deciding about the applicability of a standing order, also has to decide as to who had infringed the standing order and what are its consequences on the case of the parties and then to pass an order or make an award calling upon the parties to do particular acts or to act in a particular manner. It was further emphasised that the functions of the Labour court under that section do not extend to the decision of an industrial dispute. It was also noticed in the aforesaid decision that considering the definition of award which indicated any interim or final determination of any industrial dispute, the omission of the legislature to use the word award in Section 11-C clearly indicated that the legislative intent was that an industrial dispute could not be determined under Section 11-C of the Act. ( 23 ) THE Bombay High Court, however, in its decision in the case of Chipping and Painting employers Association Private Limited, Bombay v. A. T. Zambre and Anr. 1968 (17) FLR 323 held that the term industrial Dispute was wide enough to include within its ambit, the questions relating to applications and interpretation of standing orders. It also expressed the view that the labour Court while deciding the questions relating to interpretation or application of the standing order has ample jurisdiction to entertain applications for substantive or consequential reliefs or to grant such relief. It also expressed the view that the labour Court while deciding the questions relating to interpretation or application of the standing order has ample jurisdiction to entertain applications for substantive or consequential reliefs or to grant such relief. ( 24 ) THE question relating to the nature of the proceedings contemplated under Section 13-A of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which stands pari materia with the provisions contained in Section 11-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. (supra ). The Apex Court in its decision in the aforesaid case indicated in clear terms that the provisions contained in Section 13-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 did not create a parallel forum for the adjudication of the very question which the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal has been empowered to adjudicate under the Industrial Disputes Act and that too without the requirement of a reference by the Government. It was observed that the said provision cannot be understood as creating a forum for adjudication of industrial disputes involving the application and or interpretation of the standing orders which is the function of the Courts and the Tribunals constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. It was also emphasised that where a right or obligation is created by or under the Industrial Disputes Act, the disputes relating to such right or obligation can only be adjudicated by the forums created by the Act. It was also observed that if industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act then the only remedy available is to get an adjudication as provided for under the Act. ( 25 ) THE provisions contained in Section 11-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act provide a forum wherein any question raised by either a workman or an employer in regard to the application or interpretation of a certified standing order can be decided by the Labour Court. A finality is attached to such a decision which is binding on the parties. A finality is attached to such a decision which is binding on the parties. It seems to me that the interpretation stipulated under the aforesaid provision is meant for finding out the true sense of any form of words contained in any certified standing order so as to make explicit the sense and the idea which its author intended to convey enabling the workmen or the employer to derive from them the same idea or the true intention of the maker. The scope of interpretation referred to above is somewhat explanatory in nature. The Labour Court, therefore, can while exercising the jurisdiction under the above provision explain the meaning and remove doubts and if necessary even attribute a specified meaning to a word or set of words occurring in a certified standing order. It further seems to me that the application of a standing order certified under the industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1945 as envisaged under Section 11-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act refers to the removal of doubts in the matter of applying or putting into effect or bringing in or into use or action a particular standing order declaring it to be regulating the relations between the employer and its workmen. The decision of the Labour Court in the matter relating to interpretation or application of the standing order can result in the avoidance of raising an industrial Dispute as envisaged under Section 2 (1) of the Act. The issues which, therefore, can be raised in the proceedings under Section 11-C of the Act involve a dispute or controversy at a stage which has to be anterior to the stage of raising an industrial Dispute as contemplated under the provisions contained in Section 2 (1) of the Act. ( 26 ) IN the circumstances noticed hereinabove there can be no escape from the conclusion that the dispute raised by the respondents No. 3 and 4 in the proceedings under Section 11-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act could not be deemed to be a dispute regarding enforcement of any right or liability created under the terms of employment or connected with the employment or non-employment or with the condition of labour so as to fall within the ambit of the term industrial Dispute as envisaged under Section 2 (1) of the Act. I am further of the view that considering the observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Rajasthan state Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna kant and Anr. (supra), the decision of the bombay High Court in The Case of Chipping and Painting Employers Association Private limited. Bombay v. A. T. Zambre and Ors. (supra) heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents cannot be taken to have laid down the law correctly. I respectfully agree with the view expressed in the decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Lord Krishna Sugar mills Ltd. v. Labour Court, Meerut and Ors. (supra), the ratio whereof stands clearly approved by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and anr. v. Krishna Kant and Ors. (referred to hereinabove ). ( 27 ) THERE is yet another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. In the proceedings initiated under Section 6-F of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act if the Labour Court or Tribunal finds on a complaint by a workman, that an employer has contravened the provisions of Section 6-F during the pendency of the proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal as the case may be it has to adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it in accordance with the Act and has to submit its award to the State Government and the provisions of the Act apply to these proceedings accordingly. The aforesaid provision contained in Section 6-F of the Act is to the following effect :" 6-F. Special provision for adjudication as to whether the conditions of service, etc. changed during the pendency of proceedings.- Where an employer contravenes the provisions of Section 6-E during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal any workman aggrieved by such contravention may make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner, to the Labour Court or Tribunal as the case may be, and on receipt of such complaint that Labour court or Tribunal, as the case may be, shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with this Act and shall submit its award to the state Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly". As will be noticed from the aforesaid provision in order to attract the same it is necessary to establish that an employer has contravened the provisions of Section 6-E during the pendency of the proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal. This requirement of establishing of the contravention of the provisions contained in Section 6-E surely is a condition precedent for exercising the jurisdiction contemplated therein. The provisions contained in Section 6-E of the act is to the following effect : "6-E. Conditions of service, etc. , to remain unchanged in certain circumstances during the pendency of proceedings - (1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation Officer or a Board or of any proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal in respect of any industrial dispute no employer shall (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punishment whether by dismissal or otherwise any workman concerned in such dispute save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding, or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punishment, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman : provided that no such workman shall be discharged ordismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (2) no employer shall during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against any protected workman concerned in such dispute (a) by altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such preceding; or (b) by discharging or punishing, whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected workman, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. Explanation : For the purposes of this subsection, a protected workman in relation to an establishment, means a workman who, being an officer of a registered trade union connected with the establishment, is recognised as such in accordance with rules made in this behalf. " ( 28 ) IN view of the provisions contained in the aforesaid provisions, therefore, the respondents no. 3 and 4 had to establish that the employer had punished them for a misconduct connected with the industrial dispute referred to in Section 6-E (1) of the Act. It is, therefore, obvious that the misconduct referred to in Section 6-E (1) (b) of the Act for which the punishment of dismissal etc. is inflicted must be connected with a pending dispute and the punishment should have been awarded during the pendency of a proceeding in respect of any industrial dispute and further such a punishment must have been inflicted without the express permission in writing of the authority before which such proceeding is pending. It may further be noticed that the mere contravention of the provisions contained in Section 6-E of the Act is not sufficient by itself The adjudication referred to under Section 6-F has to be in regard to the merits of the claim of the affected workman who challenges the correctness or propriety of the order inflicting punishment or alteration of the conditions of service applicable to him to his prejudice. For the purpose of this adjudication the dispute is by operation of law and a legal fiction deemed to be a dispute referred to the said authority in accordance with the Act. In he circumstances, therefore, in the enquiry contemplated under Section 6-F of the Act two questions have to be considered. For the purpose of this adjudication the dispute is by operation of law and a legal fiction deemed to be a dispute referred to the said authority in accordance with the Act. In he circumstances, therefore, in the enquiry contemplated under Section 6-F of the Act two questions have to be considered. One is as to the fact of the contravention of the provisions of Section 6-E by the employer and if the answer to the said question is in the affirmative the consideration of the second question as to whether the order passed by the employer against the employee is justified on the merits and in case both these questions are answered in favour of the employee, the authority concerned becomes entitled to pass an appropriate order in favour of the employee. In fact even if the contravention envisaged under Section 6-E of the Act is proved it is still open to the employer to justify the impugned action including dismissal of the employee concerned on the merits. This part of the complaint has to be treated as a part of the dispute which has to be considered on merits as the complaint made by the employee on the answer of the first question in the affirmative has to be treated and disposed of as an industrial dispute duly referred for adjudication by the State Government as envisaged under Section 4-K of the Act. The answer in the affirmative to the first question relating to the contravention envisaged under Section 6-E of the Act, therefore, cannot per se without going any further entitle the employee concerned to get an order providing redress straightaway treating the order of punishment to be void - ab-initio. In case the employer insists upon the adjudication of this part of the dispute on merits then in such a case the Labour court or Tribunal would have to be satisfied that the allegations if any about want of good faith or victimization or unfair labour practice were baseless or that the domestic enquiry was not vitiated by any basic error or violation of any principles of natural justice or that the order of punishment imposed on the employee was otherwise perverse or without any foundation. The aforesaid view finds ample support from the ratio of the decision of the Apex court in the case of Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chandra and Anr. The aforesaid view finds ample support from the ratio of the decision of the Apex court in the case of Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chandra and Anr. (1978-II-LLJ-1 ). ( 29 ) IN the present case what I find is that in the defence submitted by the petitioners in the proceedings under Section 6-F of the Act it was specifically mentioned that the respondents No. 3 and 4 had not chosen to challenge the order of dismissal on merits and had moved the application only on the ground of alleged contravention of Section 6-E of the Act, However, it was further stated that the employers reserved their right to give their written statement and make submissions with regard to the merits of the order of dismissal passed against the workmen in question if and when the applicants i. e. respondents No. 3 and 4 chose to challenge the same on merits. ( 30 ) IT is, therefore, obvious that the employer was insisting upon the adjudication of the dispute regarding correctness or propriety of the order of dismissal passed against respondents No. 3 and 4 on merits and in the absence of any allegation in the complaint challenging the order of dismissal passed against respondents No. 3 and 4 on merits the occasion to file a detailed written statement in that connection had not arisen. The Labour Court having been apprised that the employer insisted upon the adjudication of the claim in regard to the correctness or otherwise of the impugned order of dismissal ought to have held the enquiry in this regard also affording an opportunity to the respondents No. 3 and 4 to place their case in this matter and prove the same. This was, however, not done. ( 31 ) A perusal of the impugned order passed by the Labour Court indicates that none of the parties had led either oral or documentary evidence and further none of the parties had disputed the correctness of the facts noticed in the proceeding under Section 11-C of the Act. The Labour court has observed that the only legal question which arose for consideration in the case was as to whether the dispute raised in the proceedings under Section 11-C of the Act fell within the ambit of industrial Dispute as envisaged under Section 2 (1) of the aforesaid Act. The Labour court has observed that the only legal question which arose for consideration in the case was as to whether the dispute raised in the proceedings under Section 11-C of the Act fell within the ambit of industrial Dispute as envisaged under Section 2 (1) of the aforesaid Act. The Labour court has chosen not to follow the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd v. The Labour Court, Meerut and Ors. (supra) and preferred to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Chipping and Painting Employers association Pvt. Ltd. , Bombay v. S. A. T. Zambre and Ors. (supra) merely on the ground that the said decision was of a date subsequent to the decision of this Court. ( 32 ) SO far as this aspect is concerned, apart from what has been indicated here in above, it may be observed that the High Court occupies the status of the highest and most-superior Court in the state and so it becomes incumbent on all persons and authorities within its jurisdiction to respect its orders and abide by well known principle fundamental to the courts of justice, that any disobedience or disregard to an order passed by the High Court will be on pain of committal for contempt. The Labour Court was, therefore, bound to follow the decision of this Court in the case of Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra) in the absence of anything to indicate that the ratio of the aforesaid decision had lost its binding effect in view of any decision by a larger bench of the said Court of any decision of the Apex Court. In no other contingency the said decision could be disregarded as attempted by the Labour Court in the present case specially when even a conflicting decision covering the controversy, rendered later in point of time by a bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction of the Court could not be pointed out to be in existence. In no other contingency the said decision could be disregarded as attempted by the Labour Court in the present case specially when even a conflicting decision covering the controversy, rendered later in point of time by a bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction of the Court could not be pointed out to be in existence. ( 33 ) IN view of my conclusions indicated hereinabove the finding of the Labour Court that the petitioner had contravened Section 6-E of the Act cannot be sustained as the dispute raised by the respondents No. 3 and 4 in the proceedings under Section 11-C of the Act could not betaken to be an industrial Dispute as envisaged under Section 2 (1) of the Act. Moreover in the facts and circumstances referred to hereinabove an award of reinstatement with back wages without any adjudication of the dispute relating to the correctness or propriety of the order of dismissal on merits could not have been submitted by the Labour Court as provided for in the provisions contained in Section 6-F of the Act merely on the sole ground of contravention of the provisions of Section 6-E which too cannot be said to have been established in the present case. ( 34 ) IN the aforesaid view of the matter, that being the only view possible I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the impugned order stands vitiated on account of manifest error of law and cannot be sustained. ( 35 ) IN the result, this writ petition succeeds. The impugned order passed by me Labour Court dated February 23, 1995 (a certified copy of which has been filed as Annexure 12) is hereby quashed. It is, how- ever, made clear that this order shall not come in the way or prejudice in any manner the contesting respondents proceeding with or pursuing any remedy against the impugned order of dismissal passed against them in accordance with law be- fore the appropriate forum provided for under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. ( 36 ) THERE shall, however, be no order as to costs. .