JUDGMENT 1. - This civil miscellaneous appeal has been filed in this court by the above-named appellants under Sec. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894) hereinafter referred to as Act of 1894 against the order dated 28-7-1992 passed by Civil Judge-cum-Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur District, Jaipur in reference case No. 17/83 whereby the reference preferred by the -respondent under Section 18 of the Act against the award dated 29/30-6-1983 of the Officer on Special Duty, Urban Development and Housing Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur in case No. 1/82 was accepted. Agrrieved by the impugned order of the Civil Judge-cum-Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur District, Jaipur, the State of Rajasthan as well as the Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur have preferred this civil misc. appeal before this court. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the filling of this appeal are that the State Government acquired the land forming part of khasra No. 177 measuring 50 bighas situated in village Jhalana Ghod which in the revenue records was in the khatedari of Raghuveer Singh claimant-respondent for Rajasthan Housing Board for Mansarover Housing Scheme. On 12-1-1982 a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 by the State Government which was published in Rajasthan Gazette dated 13-1-1982 and the land comprising of six villages was acquired which also included the land measuring 933.3 bighas situated in village Jhalana Chod out of which the land measuring 50 bighas belonging to the respondent Raghuveer Singh forming part of khasra No. 177 was also acquired. Pursuant to the publication of the notification the State Government keeping in view the public purposes of acquisition of the land in question in exercise of its power under Section 17 (4) of the Act possession of the land was taken on 24-5-1982. The claimant-respondent filed an application for compensation before the Land Acquisition Officer, i.e. O.S.D. Urban Development and Housing Department, Jaipur in which he claimed the compensation of the land at the rate of Rs. 30,000/- per bigha. Apart from compensation of the land the respondent also claimed a sum of Rs. 1,00,000.00 for well, Rs. 10,000/- for labour quarters which were situated on the land, Rs. 15,000/- for cement drains, Rs.3000/- on account of cattle fodder (Pule). The respondent also claimed Rs. 70,000/- towards development of the land. 30,000/- per bigha. Apart from compensation of the land the respondent also claimed a sum of Rs. 1,00,000.00 for well, Rs. 10,000/- for labour quarters which were situated on the land, Rs. 15,000/- for cement drains, Rs.3000/- on account of cattle fodder (Pule). The respondent also claimed Rs. 70,000/- towards development of the land. Amount at the rate of 10% on account of compulsory acquisition and interest was also claimed. The O.S.D. did not pass award as claimed by the respondent and awarded only compensation of the land at the rate of Rs. 20,000/- per bigha in view of the potentiality value of the land. So far as amount on account of other heads is concerned, he awarded Rs. 1,00,000/- for well, Rs.1012/- for electric room, Rs. 6166.90 on account of sandwall, Rs.982/- for huts, Rs.570/- for small water-tank and Rs. 9200/- for trees. He further awarded interest at the rate of Rs. 4% per annum for the period from 24-5-83 to 29-6-83. Thus, the O.S.D. awarded total amount of Rs. 10,94,036/- only. Being dissatisfied with the award passed by the O.S.D. the respondent Raghuveer Singh filed a reference application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. 3. It was submitted by the respondent-claimant that claim awarded by the O.S.D. was low and tie claimed that full compensation as claimed should have been awarded. It was submitted that although the land was barani land in revenue records but it was developed and was being cultivated by the respondent as he had spent substantial amount for its development. i.e., rupees two lakhs for development of this land, for well and other purposes and, therefore, the land was irrigated land. He further prayed that as per market value of the irrigated land compensation should be awarded at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per bigha, although he has claimed only Rs. 30,000/- per bigha. The respondent has placed on record the various copies of the sale deeds of various khatedar-tenants who sold their land in the year 1971, 1972, 1980 and 1981 for the purpose of determination of the land value of the present case. The O.S.D. without giving any reasons did not agree to award compensation as per the market value of the land as mentioned in these documents. The O.S.D. without giving any reasons did not agree to award compensation as per the market value of the land as mentioned in these documents. The respondent had also submitted a statement prepared by *he retired engineer (valuer) and engineer consultant and his statement was also recorded before the O.S.D. who did not believe the same. 4. On the other hand Rajasthan Housing Board filed its reply before Civil Judge-cum-Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur and submitted that the amount awarded by the O.S.D. as compensation in lieu of acquisition of land to the tune of Rs. 10,94,036.48 and further supported the award passed by the O.S.D. It was further submitted that the land cannot be treated as irrigated as the same is not entered in he revenue records as irrigated land. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the partiesleamed court below framed six issues which are repmduced in the order of learned Civil Judge-cum-Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, dated 28 7-1992. The claimant-respondent examineii himself as AW1, Shri K. C. Mittal, valuer and engineer as AW2 and Jagdish Narain Sharma as AW3. The respondent also placed on record the copies of the agreement, sale deeds of the land which are within the close proximity of the present land for the purpose of assessing its market value. With regard to appellant No. 2 i.e., Raj. Housing Board no evidence was adduced in spite of several opportunities. Learned Civil Judge in his order under appeal, has discussed the evidence in detail and has referred to various documents, i.e., the copies of sale-deeds placed on the record. By the claimant-respondent as a supporting evidence regarding compensation awarded by O.S.D. in respect of similar lands situated in the vicinity of the claimant's land. He has referred to Ex. 2, a copy of award of village Bambala, Tonk Road, Jaipur, five kilo-meters away from the claimant's land, and in respect of which compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs.45,000/- per bigha in 1983 itself. He has also referred to Ex. 3, a copy of the award of village Gajsinghpura which is 12 kms. away from the land in dispute and compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs. 39,000/- per bigha in 1982 itself. Vide Ex. 4 the land in village Keshavpura 12 kms. away from Jaipur was also sold at the rate of Rs. 40,000/- per bigha on 31-5-1988. 3, a copy of the award of village Gajsinghpura which is 12 kms. away from the land in dispute and compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs. 39,000/- per bigha in 1982 itself. Vide Ex. 4 the land in village Keshavpura 12 kms. away from Jaipur was also sold at the rate of Rs. 40,000/- per bigha on 31-5-1988. Ex.5is also a sale-deed dated 9-6-1983 of the land situated in Keshavpura was sold at the rate of Rs. 40,000/- per bigha in 1983 itself. The respondent also placed on record copy of an agreement Ex. 11 dated 15-4-1981, i.e. one year prior to the date of the notification in the gazette in the present case. Vide this agreement Ex.11 Rajasthan Gausewa Sangh had sold the land to Madhav Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti at the rate of Rs 30,351/- per bigha which is adjacent to the land in question. Ex. 3 is a sale-deed of a similar land situated in Triveni Nagar which was auctioned by the J.D.A. at the rate of Rs.998/- per square meter which is also adjacent to the present Mansarover Scheme. This evidence adduced by the claimant-respondent has not been controverted by the appellants as observed by learned Civil Judge in his order. 6. After discussing the entire evidence on the record learned Civil Judge has further observed that the market value of the land in question at the relevant time was more than Rs. 30,000/- per bigha but the claimant-respondent has claimed compensation only at the rate of Rs. 30,000/- per bigha Therefore, the market value of the land was determined at the rate of Rs. 30,000/- per bigha and the claimant was held entitled at the same rate. Learned Civil Judge- has also discussed the evidence of Shri K. C. Mittal AW 2 who is valuer and engineer and who prepared the statement showing the value of well, labour quarter etc. over the land of the claimant. He has appeared before the court and his statement was also recorded. His evidence has also not been controverted by the Rajasthan Housing Board. The learned Civil Judge accepted the reference under Section 23A of the Act on account of additional compensation at the rate of Rs. 10% and the same was allowed. He passed the order as under:- Labour quarter 10 x 12' = Rs. 10, 000/- Cement Drains = Rs. His evidence has also not been controverted by the Rajasthan Housing Board. The learned Civil Judge accepted the reference under Section 23A of the Act on account of additional compensation at the rate of Rs. 10% and the same was allowed. He passed the order as under:- Labour quarter 10 x 12' = Rs. 10, 000/- Cement Drains = Rs. 15,000/- Cost of cattle fodder = Rs. 3,000/- 50 bighas of land at the rate of Rs. 30,000/- per bigha = Rs. 15,00,000/- 10% on addl. amount of Rs. 15,00,000/- = Rs. 1,50,000/- The learned Civil Judge thus allowed the reference preferred by the claimant by enhancing the claim amount to Rupees 18,67,800/- as against Rs. 10,94,036/- as awarded by the O.S.D. with the direction that the claimant-respondent is entitled to get the remaining amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. 7,73,764/- with interest from Rajasthan Housing Board vide his order dated 28-7-1992. 7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned Civil Judge dated 28-7-1992 the present appellants, i.e., the State of Rajasthan as well as Rajasthan Housing Board preferred two separate appeals before this court. The appeal filed by the Rajasthan Housing Board was registered as S. B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 402/93. The said appeal tilted Rajasthan Housing Board v. Raj Singh came for hearing before this court on 4-10-93 when it was dismissed with the observation that there was no case for exercising the powers vested in this court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on account of latches. Consequently the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also dismissed. The State of Rajasthan did not contest those proceedings which were opposed by the Board; whereas in the present case both, the State of Rajasthan as well as Rajasthan Housing Board have come up in appeal. 8. The present appeal is also directed against the same impugned award dated 28-7-1992 against which the appeal filed by the State titled State v. Raj Singh was dismissed by this court vide order dated 4-10-1993, as referred to above. The appeal suffers from inordinate delay of 147 days for which no satisfactory explanation has come forward by the learned Addl. Advocate General appearing for the appellants. The appeal suffers from inordinate delay of 147 days for which no satisfactory explanation has come forward by the learned Addl. Advocate General appearing for the appellants. The appeal is supported by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the learned counsel for the appellants has tried hard to explain the delay in filing the present appeal. Reply to the said application has also been filed by the respondent who has controverted the contentions of the appellant for condonation of delay. In the additional affidavit filed in support of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act of Shri Rakesh Kumar Bhatt, resident engineer, Rajasthan Housing Board, Division No. 10, Jaipur, it has been contended that since the land in question was being acquired for Rajasthan Housing Board which was represented by a counsel, no counsel was engaged on behalf of the State of Rajasthan and for this reason the proceedings before the Civil Judge against the State were ex-parte. In my opinion this approach on the part of the Housing Board is to be strongly depricated, since there was no justification for withholding the instructions to the counsel who was representing the Rajasthan Housing Board before the Civil Judge and who could as well have been instructed to appear on behalf of the State. In view of this matter it cannot be said that the proceedings before the Civil Judge against the State were ex-parte, since the State of Rajasthan despite sufficient opportunity did not contest the reference before the learned Civil Judge. It has been further stated in the said affidavit that 'no copy of the order was sent to the State of Rajasthan by learned Civil Judge and as such the State of Rajasthan was never aware of the said order'. In my opinion when the Housing Board itself was duly represented by a counsel it was the paramount duty of the Housing Board to have apprised the State Government and it was not the duty of the Civil Judge to send the copy of the order to the State Government. From the perusal of additional affidavit as well as the contentions advanced by Shri Bhandari, I am of the considered opinion that the appellants have failed to make out a case for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. 9. From the perusal of additional affidavit as well as the contentions advanced by Shri Bhandari, I am of the considered opinion that the appellants have failed to make out a case for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. 9. It has been contended by Shri Bhandari, learned counsel for the appellant that this court vide its order dated 6-10-93 had directed the appellants to file a certified copy of the decree since the appeal was not accompanied by the same as it was a mandatory requirement under O. 41 R. 1 CPC which I requires that every memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment and decree. Under the said provision the memorandum of the appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from "unless the trial court dispenses therewith" of the judgment on which it is founded. In my opinion there is no scope for relaxation of this provision since the word used is 'shall' and not may' and in this case since the appeal was not accompanied by the certified copy of the decree appealed from, the appeal itself was not maintainable when the same was filed in this court. Besides the appeal was also time barred by 147 days as referred to above and for which no sufficient cause has been satisfactorily explained by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is a settled law that the court cannot dispense with the said requirement of the rule which is imperative. The law has been well settled by the Apex Court in the matter of Jagatdheesh v. Jawaharlal, 1961 (2) SCR 918 : AIR 1961 SC 832 that it is imperative duty of the appellant to file a copy of the decree alongwith the appeal which obviously means and implies that in absence of sufficient cause there is no scope for relaxation of the requirement of the provision. The same rule applies where an appeal is preferred from an order. I am further of the opinion that from perusal of the additional affidavit of Shri Rakesh Bhatt in support of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act it is apparent that the certified copy of the judgment and decree dated 28-7-92 was applied by the appellant, Rajasthan Housing Board with inordinate delay of about 8 months and there is no explanation on the record for the inordinate delay. 10. Faced with this situation it was contended by Shri Bhandari, learned counsel for the appellants, that the delay was on the part of the Court in issuing the certified copy and it does not affect the rights of the parties. In my opinion this is not the correct approach to the matter, since the court cannot be blamed for the inaction, latches and negligence of the party concerned which here is the State and that the Rajasthan Housing Board which is an instrumentality of the State is supposed to be more vigilant in exercise of its duties than the ordinary citizen. 11. Shri Bhandari, learned counsel for the appellants in support of his contentions advanced at the bar, has placed reliance upon the following decisions:- M/s Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674 . In this case it was held by the Apex Court that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by the Apex Court merely for the purpose of re-hearing and a fresh decision of the case. Normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the court is final and the departure from that principle is justified unless when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. In my opinion the ratio of this decision is not applicable to this case, since the orders dated 6-10-93 and 11-1-95 passed by this court are neither the judgments nor the final decisions of this court by deciding the appeal on merits and since they are of interlocutory nature nothing prevents this court from exercising its inherent powers to re-call the said orders when the facts and circumstances of the case justify the same. I am further of the opinion that the appeal itself is time-barred and even on merits the appellants are not entitled to succeed in view of the well reasoned findings of the learned Civil Judge. I am further of the opinion that the appeal itself is time-barred and even on merits the appellants are not entitled to succeed in view of the well reasoned findings of the learned Civil Judge. The appellants have further failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of O. 41 R. 1 CPC by filing the certified copy of the impugned decree along with the memorandum of appeal when the same was presented and since certain valuable rights have accrued in favour of the claimant-respondent the same cannot be divested for the reason that the appellants have now filed the copy of the decree and that the delay should be condoned. In Devaraji Pillai v. Sellayya Pillai, AIR 1987 SC 1160 it was held by the Apex Court that if a party is aggrieved by a judgment of a Single Judge sitting in Second Appeal, appropriate remedy for the party is to file an appeal against that judgment and remedy by way of an application for review is entirely misconceived. In my opinion the ratio of this decision is also not attracted to this case, in view of the fact that orders dated 6-10-93 and 14-1-95 which are sought to be re-called do not tantamount to a decision of this court on merits and nothing prevents this court from exercising its inherent powers to re-call the said orders at any stage of the proceedings. Since the connected appeal titled State of Rajasthan v. Raj Singh has already been dismissed by this court and the ratio of the said decision is fully applicable to this case, this appeal too is devoid of merit and the same deserves to be dismissed. The award in the case of Raj Singh claimant was also passed by learned Civil Judge on 28-7-1992 itself in reference case No. 18/93 and the present appeal also is directed against the same award passed by learned Civil Judge in Land Acquisition Reference No. 17/93.In Mubarka Ali Shah v. Secretary of State, AIR 1925 Lahore 438 it was held by the High Court that where distinct appeals are filed from one common judgment it is absolutely essential that a copy of the award should accompany each memorandum of appeal and the appellate court has no power to dispense with such a copy. In my view the ratio of this decision helps in advancing the case of the respondent-claimant rather than the appellants, since based on the same analogy, the appellate court has no power to dispense with filing of a certified copy of the decree when the appeal is not accompanied by the same.Likewise the decision of Goa High Court in Dy. Collector Northern Sub-Division Panaji v. A Comunidade de Bambolim, AIR 1978 Goa, Daman & Diu 42 also does not help in advancing the case of the appellants in any manner. 12. Shri N. K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent has contended at the bar that when the above said orders were passed by this court, the learned counsel for the appellants did not refer to the provisions of Section 26(2) of the Act of 1894 which envisages that every award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of grounds of every such award is a judgment within the meaning of Section 2 (2) & 2 (9) respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Placing reliance on the said provisions it was contended by Shri Jain that since the Act of 1894 is a special enactment, this court need not have resort to the provisions of O.41 R. 1 CPC. It was further contended by learned counsel for the respondent that since the present appeal is accompanied by the award which itself is a decree, there was no requirement of framing decree in the present case. He has also placed reliance upon Section 54 of the Act of 1894 which provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award and in view of this provision, since the appeal lies to the High Court only against the award of the Collector/OSD and, therefore, no decree is required to be framed. In this respect, I am of the opinion that notwithstanding the fact that in view of Section 26 (2) and Section 54 of the Act of 1894 which stipulate that the award itself is a decree, yet the mandatory requirement of O.41 R. 1 CPC must be complied with at the first instance since there is no scope for relaxation of the rule. 13. 13. In support of his contentions Shri Jain, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the judgment of Madras High Court reported in Balakrishna Industrial Works v. Venkatachari, AIR 1954 Madras 883. In this case it was held by the High Court that since the appeal was not accompanied by decretal order and in view of the mandatory requirements of O.41 R. 1 CPC the appeal itself was not maintainable and the appeal was dismissed by the court. 14. Likewise in the matter of State of Bombay v. Vinayaka, AIR 1953 SC 244 it was held by the Apex Court that when a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which infact was not done, the court is bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried towards logical conclusion. Applying the ratio of this decision to this case in the context of' interpretation to the provisions of Section 26 (2) and Section 54 of the Act of 1894 the meaning conveyed by the said provisions should be carried to its logical conclusion i.e. the award shall be deemed to be a decree. 15. As a result of the above discussion the orders dated 6-10-93 and 11-1-1995 passed by this court are re-called. Since the appeal suffers from undue laches and even on merits also no case has been made out by the learned counsel for the appellants for interfering with the impugned order dated 28-7-1992 passed by the learned Civil Judge-cum-Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur in reference Case No. 17/1983, the same is affirmed and the appeal is consequently dismissed. As a result, the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is also rejected. It is accordingly directed that the respondent-claimant shall be entitled to the payment of balance of decretal amount as per the award. The appellants are directed to pay the balance of decretal amount to the respondent within four weeks from today. The parties are left to bear their own costs.> Appeal dismissed. *******