JUDGMENT A. L, Vaidya, J. —The present appellant Sh. Raj Kumar preferred a suit for recovery of Rs. 46,992-56 paise against the present respondent-defendant Plaintiffs case as pleaded had been that he was sole proprietor of an Industry, known as H. P. Industrial Corporation, which was located at Barotiwala, in District Solan The plaintiff used to buy steel and iron and their products from the defendant Corporation and he deposited a sum of Rs. 12,000 (Rs. Twelve Thousand) by way of security in the year 1971 with the defendant Corporation Plaintiff also pleaded that he used to pay the price of the steel and iron or their products to the defendant Corporation in advance and thereafter the said Corporation used to issue delivery order in his favour authorising him to collect the supplies from its Kalka or Dharampur depots. According to the plaintiff, accounts were gone into on 29th June, 1972 and a sum of Rs. 13,631-36 paise, inclusive of security money were found due to the plaintiff from the defendant. It was also pleaded that on 5th July, 1972 plaintiff deposited a sum of Rs. 22,500 with the defendant Corporation for supply of iron and steel but the defendant did not make any supply of iron and steel against the said advance of Rs, 22,500. According to the plaintiff, various letters, were written in this behalf to the defendant Corporation to return the advance price of the steel and iron amounting to Rs. 22,500 and also to pay Rs. 13,631-36 paise found due to him on 5th July, 1972 at the time of the settlement of the accounts, but to no avail. Plaintiff, as such, filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 36,131-36 paise on account of principal and Rs. 10,861-20 paise on account of interest. The suit was filed on 24th May, 1977. 2. The defendant contested the suit and one of the pleas raised was that suit was barred by limitation, as according to the defendant, suit had been filed after three years when the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff. Plaintiffs status as Proprietor of the concern was denied. According to the defendant-Corporation, they had only dealings with the H. P. Industrial Corporation, Barotiwala and not with the plaintiff. It was pleaded that steel and iron worth Rs 23,520-22 paise had been delivered to the plaintiff against advance of Rs. Plaintiffs status as Proprietor of the concern was denied. According to the defendant-Corporation, they had only dealings with the H. P. Industrial Corporation, Barotiwala and not with the plaintiff. It was pleaded that steel and iron worth Rs 23,520-22 paise had been delivered to the plaintiff against advance of Rs. 22,500 in the year 1972 itself and as such his claim for Rs. 22,500 was liable to be dismissed. Liability to pay interest was not admitted. 3. The trial Court, framed the following issues, on the pleadings of the parties :— 1. Whether the suit is within limitation ? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is a sole proprietor of H. P Industrial Corporation Barotiwala and had dealings with defendant, as such? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 12,000 on account, of earnest money from the defendant as alleged? OPP. 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 24,131-36 paise on account of money paid as price of goods, goods against which not supplied as alleged ? OPP. 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover interest ? If so at what rate and how much ? OPP. 6. Relief. The trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit, 4. The aforesaid judgment and decree were assailed in an appeal before the First Appellate Court on various pleas. However, the First Appellate Court, formulated the following points of determination in the appeal: 1. Whether the suit was within limitation ? 2. Whether the plaintiff had a locus standi to institute the suit ? 3. Whether the defendant Corporation owed a sum of Rs. 36,131-36 to the plaintiff ? 4. Final Order. The First Appellate Court decided point No. 1 in the negative while point Nos. 2 and 3 were disposed of in the affirmative, as the Court came to the conclusion that suit was without limitation and accordingly appeal was accepted and suit of the plaintiff was dismissed, being barred by limitation. 5. The aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court have been assailed in the present appeal on various grounds, the main being that lower Appellate Court acted illegally in coming to the conclusion that suit was without limitation, 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have minutely scrutinised the relevant record. 7. 5. The aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court have been assailed in the present appeal on various grounds, the main being that lower Appellate Court acted illegally in coming to the conclusion that suit was without limitation, 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have minutely scrutinised the relevant record. 7. The sole point stressed on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff has been with respect to the limitation. It has been contended that on the basis of the pleadings as well as evidence examined by the parties, the present case fell within the ambit of Article 26 of the Limitation Act and on the basis of the same, limitation of three years, for filing the present suit, would start from 12-12-1974, vide Ex. P-8, when the accounts were stated ill writing signed by the defendant The suit was filed on 24-5-1977. In case the Aforesaid contention is favourably considered, definitely suit would be within the period of prescribed limitation. Whatever has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant, requires appreciation of facts and law covering this aspect of the matter. 8. Para 9 of the plaint deals with the plea regarding cause of action, which arose to the plaintiff. This para is reproduced hereunder for the sake of convenience: “That the cause of action arose to the plaintiff firstly on 15-5-1971 when Rs. 12,000 were deposited with the defendant as earnest money, secondly on various dates of transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant. Secondly on 5th of July, 1972 when Rs 22,500 were again deposited with the defendant Corporation and thirdly on various dates when the plaintiff requested the defendant for the refund of the aforesaid balance and also on various dates when the defendant has been acknowledging its liability." There is no allegation in the plaint except as referred in para 9 above as to how suit was within limitation. The plaint is silent that cause of action arose on 12-12-1974 when the accounts were stated in writing vide Ex. P-8 by the defendant to the plaintiff, as was the requirement of Article 26 of the Limitation Act. In a way the fact remains allegations made in the plaint does not lead to any inference. However, the evidence brought on record can definitely be taken note of to appreciate this aspect of the matter. 9. P-8 by the defendant to the plaintiff, as was the requirement of Article 26 of the Limitation Act. In a way the fact remains allegations made in the plaint does not lead to any inference. However, the evidence brought on record can definitely be taken note of to appreciate this aspect of the matter. 9. Ex P-8 is the sole document, which has been referred by the learned Counsel for the appellant to support his contention. This Ex P-8 is a letter addressed to M/s. H. P. Industrial Corporation Barotiwala with reference to their application dated 11-12-1974. This letter is signed by the Development Officer of the defendant Corporation. This letter is being reproduced hereunder, in its original form, in order to correctly appreciate the matter in issue: “With reference to your application dated 11-12-1974, we are giving below your business account with us for the year 1971-72 and 1972-73:— Month and Date Particulars Folio Debit Credit 1971-72 May 15 By R. No. 957 26 12000-00 Jan. 15 By R. No. A-347 193 700000 Jan. 16 By R. No. A-350 194 4300-00 Jan. 28 By R. No. A-367 202 4100-00 Feb. 16 By R. No. A-391 216 4200-00 Feb. 21 By R. No. A-298 220 4800-00 Feb. 24 By R. No. A-417 223 2610 00 Mar. 8 By R. No. A-436 231 15000-00 Mar. 13 By R. No. A-463 234 15000-00 Mar. 23 By R. No. A-488 243 21100-00 Mar. 31 By Amt. deposited with IISCO 252 11000-00 Mar. 31 To Amt. of Inv. No. 1113 and 1149 254 78362.10 Mar. 31 To invoice No. 1230 261 9636.54 1972-73 June 17 By R. No. A-1044 55 13320-00 July 5 By R. No. A-1137 69 22050-00 Sep. 7 To amount of Invoice No. 1397 130 13320.00 Mar. 8 To Amt. of Invoice No. 1835 307 23520-22 Yours faithfully, Sd/- (M. L. Aggarwal) Development Officer, for MANAGING DIRECTOR.” It has been very forcibly contended that this letter come within the ambit of Article 26 of the Limitation Act and as this was issued on 12-12-1974, therefore cause of action accrued under Article 26 of the Limitation Act, to the plaintiff on 12-12-1974 and from that point of time, suit was filed within three years of the prescribed period of limitation. It is not so simple a matter as has been contended on behalf of the appellant. 10. It is not so simple a matter as has been contended on behalf of the appellant. 10. There is no dispute to the proposition that in case this Ex P-8 is held to be a document, which contains account stated in writing, signed by the defendant, as was the requirement of Article 26, some favourable inferences can be drawn in favour of the plaintiff. There are two kinds of account stated. The first refers to a claim to payment made by one party and admitted by the other; the second refers to a striking of a balance after adjusting the several items of credit and debit making the account. The first constitutes a mere admission or acknowledgment of a debt. The second kind is an account containing items both on the credit and debit sides and the figures on both sides are adjusted between the parties and a balance struck. It is this second kind which is the real account stated. 11. In the present case, as Ex P-8 reveals the account so referred in this document were supplied to the plaintiff, on the basis of his application dated 11-12-1974 for the year 1971-72 and 1972-73. That means, this Ex. P-8 was sent to the plaintiff when he required copy of those accounts in the year 1974. Plaintiff put in an application dated 11-12-1974 which was replied through Ex. P-8 dated 12-12-1974. Whether in the aforesaid background Ex. P-8 would amount to account stated, I think answer would be in the negative. 12. The account stated means when the defendant has submitted those accounts on regular intervals and without asking of the plaintiff. In the present case, admittedly, Ex. P-8 was not voluntarily submitted by the defendant but only copy of the accounts for the year 1971-72 and 1972-73, asked for by the plaintiff had been supplied to him. If this interpretation being given on behalf of the plaintiff is favourably considered, it would imply that period of limitation always remains in the hand of the plaintiff and as and when he desires, even after many years, he can ask for the accounts and when those copies are supplied, from that date he can file the suit within three years. I, think such an interpretation will not be available to the plaintiff at all. This is not the intention of Article 26 of the Limitation Act. 13. I, think such an interpretation will not be available to the plaintiff at all. This is not the intention of Article 26 of the Limitation Act. 13. Learned Counsel for the appellant has tried to take support from Gordon Woodroffe and Co. (Madras) v. Shaik M. A, Majid and Co., AIR 1967 SC 181, wherein it has been held that accounts are settled or stated if they are submitted and accepted as correct by the other side to whom the accounts have been rendered. Such a statement of accounts need not be in writing, nor is it necessary that before the accounts are settled, they should be gone into by the parties and scrutinised and supported by vouchers. It was further held that it was sufficient if the accounts are accepted and such acceptance may be inferred by the conduct. 14. On the basis of the aforesaid decision, it has been contended that accounts stated in Ex. P-8, signed by the defendant have been accepted by the plaintiff and therefore suit comes within limitation. 15. It may not be out of place to mention here that under what factual circumstance, the aforesaid decision was made in AIR 1967 SC 181 (supra). The facts involved there were as under:— "A used to send statements of account to B giving full particulars of the amount due to him together with the deduction and showing the net balance due to him and enclosing a cheque for such balance or giving credit to him for the sum in the accounts B admitted receipt of such statements of account and payments by cheques and raised no objection whatever to such statements of account sent to him. Further, on one occasion B accepted the correctness of the balance struck by A and signed a memorandum to that effect. It was held, on the basis of the aforesaid fact that account between the parties was a settled or stated one and to an account of this description equitable doctrine of "settled account" has to be considered." 16. Needless to say, in the aforesaid reported case, a party used to send statements of account to the other party giving full particulars of the amount due to him, together with deduction and showing net balance due to him. In the present case, Ex. Needless to say, in the aforesaid reported case, a party used to send statements of account to the other party giving full particulars of the amount due to him, together with deduction and showing net balance due to him. In the present case, Ex. P-8 as referred earlier was not sent to the defendant in routine but the information was supplied to the plaintiff on his application. Definitely in case accounts are stated or supplied by a party signed by it, same can be made use of for extending limitation as per Article 26 of the Limitation Act. Here in the present case, this Ex. P-8 will not come within the ambit of Article 26 and therefore that benefit cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiff as has been argued in this appeal. 17. Last but not the least, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that Public institution like defendant Corporation generally are debarred to take such type of technical objection pertaining to limitation and such practice has not been appreciated by the courts. There is no dispute that generally such type of objections should not be raised by the Public Corporation or by the State Government but in case those are raised, those have to be disposed of in accordance with law. It cannot be said that Limitation Act applies only to private individual and not to State or Public Institutions. As referred earlier, State or Public Institutions which are serving for the public at large have been advised not to raise such type of objections because State or Public Institutions in itself has nothing to gain or lose but it is the interest of public which is to be kept in mind in proceeding with day to day activities of State or Public Institutions. In this view of the matter, as the point of limitation has been raised by the defendant, the Court has to dispose of the same, on the basis of the material on record. No other point has been stressed. 18. In view of the foregoing reasons, present appeal being devoid of any merit, is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, are maintained. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.