M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS application which has been presented by the original applicant No. 2 in RFA. 115/94 raises certain issues of some consequence with regard to the conduct of proceedings before Courts and the finality or otherwise that has to be attached to the actions of parties to those proceedings. The appeal came to be dismissed by me by order dated 10-1-95 and the reason for this was because the two appellants filed a joint memo dated 1-2-95 (sic) requesting the court for permission to withdraw the R. F. A. in question. The appellants have been duly identified by their learned advocate apart from which the memo in question has been affirmed before an advocate and notary by the name of B. S. Padma Prasad. Subsequent this, it appears that applicant No. 1 was no longer interested in the litigation and the second applicant thereafter presented one more memo to the Court which is on record dated 3-3-94 duly signed by him requesting that the appeal may be dismissed as withdrawn in view of the compromise decree passed in O. S. 488/90 which is the subject-matter of this appeal. On 10-1-95, this Court dismissed the appeal on the basis of these documents. Thereafter the present application has been filed on 13-1-95 wherein a lengthy history of the proceedings has been set out and an application has been made for restoration of the appeal. The basic ground that is canvassed in the affidavit is that the compromise decree pertains to a family partition of various family assets and it is the grievance of the applicant that despite certain shares having come to him, he has not got as valuable a share as the others have. He, therefore, contends that he is interested in prosecuting the appeal which is for setting aside the compromise decree. ( 2 ) IT is necessary for me to briefly recount the significant background of the applicant who was one of the plaintiffs i0n the suit before the City Court and whose prayer was that the Court should pass a decree partitioning the various family assets. A composite compromise application was prepared, drafted out, finalised, signed by the parties including the present applicant and filed before the Court on 12-4-90. At that time the various parties who are all businessmen were represented by their respective lawyers. A composite compromise application was prepared, drafted out, finalised, signed by the parties including the present applicant and filed before the Court on 12-4-90. At that time the various parties who are all businessmen were represented by their respective lawyers. Nothing happened hurriedly and as late as on 4-1-91 which is after about nine months, the Court disposed of the suit passing a decree in terms of the compromise petition. This time period is of some significance because learned advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant before me has submitted that the applicant No. 2 has been a victim of a fraud and that he has been deprived of valuable property by his brothers through such a fraud. Admittedly, the applicant is a businessman and he was a party to the preparation,finalisation and signing of the compromise petition which recorded the manner in which the properties were to be sub-divided, nine months after the petition was signed and filed in the Court. He did not raise any grievance about the fraud that is alleged to have been played on him even after the Court passed orders on 4-1-91 and the sub-division had taken place. No such grievance of fraud was made nor was any application filed to the City Court recording that the decree had been obtained by fraud and that it will have to be recalled or set aside. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, on 24-2-92 which is 131/2 months after the decree was passed, the present appeal has been filed wherein the contention raised was that the compromise decree should be reconsidered and set aside. This matter has been pending before the Court for quite sometime and, thereafter, on 1-2-93 the appellant No. 2 filed the memo duly sworn before the Notary Public asking that he be permitted to withdraw the appeal. Fortunately, he admits having signed the memo and does not dispute at least his signature. This is not all because on 3-3-94, which is after the lapse of another 13 months, one more memo is filed duly signed by him wherein he admits his signature, wherein he states again that the appeal should be dismissed as withdrawn because he accepts the compromise decree passed by the City Court. These two memos are on record and it is on the basis of these two memos that the appeal has been disposed of. These two memos are on record and it is on the basis of these two memos that the appeal has been disposed of. Original appellant No. 1 has no grievance about the order passed by the Court but it is only the 2nd appellant who has thereafter once again made an application to set aside the order dated 10-1-95 and restore the appeal for hearing. ( 4 ) APPELLANTS' learned advocate has advanced a strong plea to the effect that the appellant No. 2 should be given an opportunity of agitating the matter on merits and that under these circumstances the order dated 10-1-95 should be set aside. The record of this case shows that this appeal was dismissed earlier by the Division Bench on the basis of these memos and the appellant got it restored on the ground that he desires to agitate the matter on merits and, therefore, having noted the inconsistency which the appellant No. 2 has displayed, the Division Bench passed an order that the parties should be asked to remain present before the Court. The order sheet shows that they did not (remain) present before the Court thereafter. Even on 10-1-95 the parties were not present before this Court when the matter was listed. It is in this background that a speaking order was passed and the appeal was disposed of acting on the memos in question. The short issue before me is as to whether the memos in question bind the applicant, whether those actions are irrevocable and whether this Court is going to dance to the tune and whims and fancies of the present applicant who, as the record will indicate, desires to change his stand from time to time on the ground that he wants a larger share of the property. ( 5 ) THE appellants' learned advocate submitted that he is entitled to ask for the order to be set aside as a matter of right. The submission canvassed was that even though it might be a compromise decree, that the Courts have held that in certain circumstances such a decree can be challenged. I do not dispute this proposition of law at all but the Court will have to go into the grounds on which the challenge is present and above all, the bona fides of the parties and the manner in which the challenge is presented. I do not dispute this proposition of law at all but the Court will have to go into the grounds on which the challenge is present and above all, the bona fides of the parties and the manner in which the challenge is presented. As far as the ground is concerned, the applicant does not dispute that he was a party to the compromise all through but he seeks to rely on the story that there was some understanding that he will receive some jewellery and property that was (sic) given to him and this is the ground on which the compromise decree must be set aside. This in fact is the truth of the matter. It clearly indicates that as an after-thought the litigant in question who desires to try and see to it that he gets something more out of the property desires to have the case reopened on this ground and it is something which the law totally prohibits. ( 6 ) THE learned advocate places reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court, reported in ILR 1994 (2) Kant 1264, in support of his submission that a compromise decree can be challenged. The decision in question does envisage a situation where a compromise decree was challenged and the ground on which it was challenged was that a manifestly unfair, improper compromise had been presented to the trial Court, that the trial Court mechanically accepted it and passed a decree to that effect and the principle of law laid down by the Division Bench was that in the face of a situation of that type interference was called for because it is the duty of the Court to ascertain whether the compromise in question suffers from any legal infirmities. The decision in question has nothing to do with the facts of the present case which concerns a family compromise wherein the brothers have (sic) an apportionment of the assets among themselves. They are all well placed (sic) businessmen and under these circumstances the City Court was fully justified in having passed a decree in terms of that compromise. ( 7 ) RELIANCE was thereafter placed on another decision of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1139 : (1993 AIR SCW 354), wherein, the issue was as to whether a compromise decree can be recalled. ( 7 ) RELIANCE was thereafter placed on another decision of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1139 : (1993 AIR SCW 354), wherein, the issue was as to whether a compromise decree can be recalled. The validity of the decree was called into question and the point that arose was as to whether it is open to a party where such a compromise is vitiated by fraud to apply to the Court for recalling of the decree. There can be no dispute about the fact that a decree which is still born by virtue of its being vitiated by fraud can certainly be recalled by a Court. In the present case, the status of the parties, the time factor and the surrounding circumstances are eloquent to indicate that the decision in question has nothing to do with the facts of the present case. ( 8 ) ON behalf of the respondents, Mr. Shetty has raised another aspect of the matter which to my mind deserves serious consideration. Learned advocate points out to the Court, and perhaps very rightly, that the two memos on the basis of which the proceeding has been disposed of have admittedly been signed by the present applicant and even though he seeks to make some sort of a grievance with regard to what had transpired at an earlier point of time and the circumstances relating to his having agreed to the compromise on the ground that he was misled by his brothers, that there is not even a whisper at any stage that the applicant was defrauded into applying to this Court on two occasions for the disposal of the appeal. This aspect of the matter is of some significance because the signature being admitted and the action being accepted, the applicant No. 2 is irrevocably bound by that action and cannot under any circumstances thereafter assume that the High Court will pass and recall orders depending on when and how he chooses to make application. There is a sort of finality and sanctity to the manner in which the High Court functions and the orders that are passed and such applications cannot and will not be entertained by this judicial forum. ( 9 ) THE facts of this case and the circumstances are eloquent with regard to the conduct of the present applicant. There is a sort of finality and sanctity to the manner in which the High Court functions and the orders that are passed and such applications cannot and will not be entertained by this judicial forum. ( 9 ) THE facts of this case and the circumstances are eloquent with regard to the conduct of the present applicant. A Court will always come to the assistance of a litigant who has been an unfortunate victim of circumstances, a handicapped or a poor litigant or any litigant for that matter who has found himself in a difficulty. A Court will, however, not come to the assistance of a litigant who has demonstrated a dishonest background of this type both before the City Court and before this Court, because any such indulgence will seriously undermine the administration of justice and there will be no finality to any orders that are passed. ( 10 ) IT is in these circumstances that the present application is rejected. The order dated 10-1-95 cannot be recalled and stands confirmed. The I. A. in question accordingly stands disposed of. Application dismissed. --- *** --- .