D. M. PATNAIK, J. ( 1 ) THIS A. H. O. is against the judgment of the learned single Judge dismissing the appeal of the defendants thereby upholding the judgment of the court below decreeing the plaintiff's suit for partition. The present appellant happens to be the widow of defendant Tarakanta who died during the pendency of the first appeal. ( 2 ) ONE Mandhata was the father of the present parties. The property relates to village Themra which fell to the share of Mandhata in a partition among his co-sharers, other taking their respective shares in other villages. Plaintiff, the youngest son of Mandhata filed the suit against his immediate elder brother Tarakanta (defendant No. 1) for partition. Plaintiff's case is, Mandhata died in the year 1935 in a State of jointness when the plaintiff was nine years and defendant No. 1, the Karta of the family, managed its affairs. The plaintiff served in the police department from the year 1938 onwards and remained outside being posted at different places. After retirement from government service when the plaintiff demanded his share in the property, the defendant denied the claim on the plea that there was a partition in the year 1938 in the family. The plaintiff collected various records relating to the properties in question and found the defendant to have been entered into sale transactions without authority and knowledge of the plaintiff. It was also discovered that while managing the joint family affairs the defendant had acquired properties in his own name though such acquisition was from the joint family fund. The defendant in the written statement pleaded a full-fledged partition in 1938 between the plaintiff and the defendant, which was, according to him evidenced by a document. He denied that the plaintiff and the defendants lived jointly while plaintiff was serving outside. He denied the properties in his name having been purchased from the joint family fund during the jointness. ( 3 ) THE lower court on the issue of previous partition held that there was no such partition by metes and bounds and decreed the suit. With regard to issue No. 4, i. e. whether the 'e-II' schedule property was the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1, it held the issue against the defendants and directed partition of the same. With regard to issue No. 4, i. e. whether the 'e-II' schedule property was the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1, it held the issue against the defendants and directed partition of the same. In the first appeal before this Court, the learned single Judge upheld the decision for partition by metes and bounds. ( 4 ) MR. S. N. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant, reiterated the same issue of previous partition and alternatively submitted that the learned single Judge committed an error in not holding the property under schedule 'e-II' as the self-acquired property of the appellant and thereby misdirected himself in not applying the proposition of law laid down in the case of M. N. Aryamurthi v. M. L. Subbaraya Setty, AIR 1972 SC 1279 , which fully supported the case of the appellant with regard to such self-acquisition. ( 5 ) AS regards previous partition the learned counsel submitted that this Court in an A. H. O. is competent to reappraise the evidence on record, to which proposition we would not disagree, and having gone through the evidence of the witnesses examined for the appellant-defendant, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sinha that the defendant has been able to successfully discharge the onus of proving a previous partition. Besides examining D. Ws. 2 to 7 and D. W. 12, defendant No. 1 examined himself as D. W. 14. The evidence of these witnesses do not bring out a case of partition by metes and bounds. Though they do establish that the brothers got themselves separated amicably in mess and property but without any partition by metes the bounds. D. W. 3 without stating anything about partition by metes and bounds merely stated that the properties were divided into two shares. D. Ws. 4, 7 and 12 merely stated about the separate possession of the ancestral house in sundargarh i. e. western side of the house falling to the share of the defendant and the eastern side to that of the plaintiff. D. W. 12 further stated that such partition was effected by measurement with a stick. D. Ws. 5 and 6 only stated that the defendant was possessing the land in village Gasarajapur of which they were the tenants. From the evidence of these witnesses no previous partition by metes and bounds has been proved. D. W. 12 further stated that such partition was effected by measurement with a stick. D. Ws. 5 and 6 only stated that the defendant was possessing the land in village Gasarajapur of which they were the tenants. From the evidence of these witnesses no previous partition by metes and bounds has been proved. But we are satisfied that such evidence sufficiently proved a severance of the joint family status as well as mutual separation in mess and property for the sake of convenience. ( 6 ) MR. Sinha, however, took us to the recitals in Exts. 6 and 8 to prove previous partition. We have carefully gone through the above two documents. In the worst case they do prove certain admission of the plaintiff with regard to separate possession of the property but in any case they do not prove partition by metes and bounds. We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sinha that this document in any way has helped the defendant to prove his cases of previous partition. It is settled law that though admissions are substantive evidence against the person making the same, it is not the conclusive proof of the facts admitted. These documents only proved the admission of the plaintiff that there was a partition by amicable arrangement and parties possessed the lands separately for the sake of convenience without any partition by metes and bounds. ( 7 ) MR. Sinha was critical about the finding of the lower court and accepted by the learned single Judge that the alleged partition deed (marked 'z') was not admissible in evidence in proving previous partition. Admittedly this document is not a registered one, but it amply proves that both the parties were signatories to the said document. The apex Court in the case of Nani Bai v. Gita Bai, AIR 1958 SC 706 , authoritatively laid down as to how a document purported to evidence a previous partition, but not registered though compulsorily registerable under S. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act, should be interpreted and its bearing on the issue of previous partition. The apex Court in the case of Nani Bai v. Gita Bai, AIR 1958 SC 706 , authoritatively laid down as to how a document purported to evidence a previous partition, but not registered though compulsorily registerable under S. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act, should be interpreted and its bearing on the issue of previous partition. Their Lordships held that partition in a Mitakshra sense may either be only a severance of the joint status without properties being partitioned by metes and bounds or partition may also mean in the ordinary sense, a partition amongst the co-sharers by way of division of the properties in question by metes and bounds. In the case of a partition of a former nature, the document is not compulsorily required to be registered, but in a latter case of' partition, because the document evidence allotment of specific properties or parcels of properties to individual coparceners and this is necessarily because of an agreement amongst all the coparceners, such a partition may be effected orally, but if the parties reduce the transaction to a formal document and this document is intended to be the evidence of partition by metes and bound it has the effect of declaring exclusive title of the coparcener in respect of that property which falls to his share and in such a case the document has to be compulsorily registered under Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act and in the absence of any such registration the document cannot be admissible in evidence. ( 8 ) KEEPING in view the above principle, we have examined the document. The lower court found the document to be inadmissible for want of registration holding that the document evidenced a partition in praesenti. This reasoning also has been accepted by the learned single Judge. But with great respect I would say that on examination of the document itself, I do not find it mentioning any Khata No. plot No. , or any specific area or parcel of land falling to the share of either of the parties. To clarify there is no particulars with regard to partition by metes and bounds. Therefore, in my view, this should not have been considered as a deed of partition, but it merely evidenced a severance of the joint status and accordingly the same did not require any registration and would, therefore, be admissible in evidence. To clarify there is no particulars with regard to partition by metes and bounds. Therefore, in my view, this should not have been considered as a deed of partition, but it merely evidenced a severance of the joint status and accordingly the same did not require any registration and would, therefore, be admissible in evidence. Disagreeing with the contention of Miss Panda, learned counsel for the respondent, and accepting the argument of Mr. Sinha, I hold that the document marked '-' is admissible in evidence and having gone through the recitals of the document there is no hesitation to hold that there was a severance of the joint status between the two in the year 1938. ( 9 ) MR. Sinha then submitted relying on the decision in the case of M. N. Aryamurthi (supra) that once this Court comes to a finding that there was a severance of the Hindu joint family properties in the year 1938, the 'e-II' schedule property having been acquired in the name of defendant in the year 1962 even though with the joint fund, the said property became self-acquired property of the defendant and, therefore, cannot be the subject matter of a suit for partition. There is great force in the submission of Mr. Sinha and thus we have no hesitation to hold that the property covered under 'e-II' schedule is a self-acquired property of defendant No-1 and, therefore, has to be excluded from the partition. ( 10 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed, but in part. The properties under Schedule 'ezii' is the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1 and, therefore, has to be excluded from the partition. Parties to bear their own cost. . G. B. PATNAIK, J. :- I agree. Appeal allowed in part. .