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1995 DIGILAW 111 (GAU)

Laisram Udoi Singh v. State of Manipur

1995-06-12

N.G.DAS

body1995
By means of this application filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India the petitioners have sought for issuance of a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ for quashing the order of the Revenue Tribunal dated 8th September, 1983 contained in Annexure A/49. 2. I have heard Mr. T. Nandakumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. L. Shyamkishore Singh, the learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents. 3. Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts relevant for the purpose of the controversy raised in this writ petition may shortly be put as under : The case relates to two plots of land viz. CS Dag Nos. 1031 and 1232 situated in a village viz. Kongkham. Originally these two plots of land measured 19.39 acres. But out of this a plot measuring 8.77 acres was allotted to Nambol Sanoi College and the remaining land measuring 10.62 acres was left as grazing ground. The petitioners approached the Deputy Commissioner (Central) for de-reservation of the said land for agricultural purposes. Meanwhile a series of litigations were there in respect of the aforesaid land. But those facts are not necessary for the present purpose as those facts have been elaborately narrated by the learned Tribunal, 4. The Deputy Commissioner after due enquiry through his subordinate officer and also after personal inspection passed the order dereserving the aforesaid land measuring 10.62 acres for agricultural purposes. The order passed by the Deputy Commissioner reads as follows : “Government of Manipur Office of the Deputy Commissioner (Central) Manipur Orders of the Deputy Commissioner (C): Manipur Imphal, the 29th November, 1982. No. DC (C)/8/BRR/2/REV/82 : Whereas a notice inviting objection to the dereservation of 10.62 acres of land under CS Dag Nos. The order passed by the Deputy Commissioner reads as follows : “Government of Manipur Office of the Deputy Commissioner (Central) Manipur Orders of the Deputy Commissioner (C): Manipur Imphal, the 29th November, 1982. No. DC (C)/8/BRR/2/REV/82 : Whereas a notice inviting objection to the dereservation of 10.62 acres of land under CS Dag Nos. 031/1032 of village No. 21 Kongkhorn, BT from being grazing ground for agricultural purposes was issued vide this office notification of even number dated 20.7.82 and whereas the objection petitions received against the proposed dereservation have been examined; and Whereas I am satisfied that the dereservation of the lands for agricultural purposes will be more than justified and consonant with the new 20 P points Programme; Now, therefore, I, E. Kunjeswar Singh, Deputy Commissioner (Central), Manipur, in exercise of the powers vested in me under section 13 of the MLR & LR Act, 1960, do hereby order and declare that 10.62 acres of land under CS Dag Nos.1031/1232 of village No.21, Kongkham, BT is dereserved for agricultural purposes. Sd/- (E. Kunheswar Singh) Deputy Commissioner (Central): Manipur.” 5. Aggrieved by this order Shri Kongkham Tomchou Singh, a resident of the Kongkham Village filed an appeal before the learned Revenue Tribunal. The learned Revenue Tribunal after elaborate discussion of all the points raised before him set aside the aforesaid order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 29.11.82 (Annexure 13) and remanded the case to the file of learned Deputy Commissioner, Bishenpur for further enquiry according to law. This writ petition is against this order. 6. Mr. T. Nandkumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has at the very outset submitted that a writ of Certiorari may be issued by quashing the order of the learned Revenue Tribunal. Since Mr. Nandakumar made the submission for issuance of a writ Certiorari a question arose as to how it would help the petitioners if a writ of Certiorari is issued as issuance of a writ of Certiorari by quashing the order of Tribunal will also mean further enquiry into the matter. But Mr. Nandakumar submits that issuance of writ of Certiorari will not mean further enquiry. According to him by means of a writ of Certiorari only the order impugned can be set aside and no further order requiring further enquiry is needed to be issued. In support of his contention Mr. But Mr. Nandakumar submits that issuance of writ of Certiorari will not mean further enquiry. According to him by means of a writ of Certiorari only the order impugned can be set aside and no further order requiring further enquiry is needed to be issued. In support of his contention Mr. Nandakumar has placed reliance upon a decision rendered in the of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque & others reported in AIR 1955 SC 233 . Mr. Nandakumar particularly drew my attention to the 'Head Note D which reads : “The High Courts have power under Article 226 to issue writs of Certiorari for quashing the decisions of Election Tribunals, notwithstanding that they become 'functus officio' after pronouncing the decisions. The writ of Certiorari for quashing is directed against a record and as a record can be brought up only through human agency, it is issued to the persons or authority whose decision is to be reviewed. As it is the record of the decision that has to be removed by Certiorari, the fact that the tribunal has become' functus officio' subsequent to the decision can have no effect on the jurisdiction of the Court to remove the record.” I do not think that this decision is of any help to the question which is raised here in respect of issuance of a writ of Certiorari. 7. The next decision referred to by Mr. Nandakumar is a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Gian Prakash & another vs. KS Jagannathan & another reported in AIR 1987 SC 537 .1 have gone through the judgment, but I am of the view that this decision has no application to the question raised in the present case. 8. The third decision relied on by Mr. Nandakumar is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of UP & another vs. Raja Ram Jaiswal & another, AIR 1985 SC 1108 . Mr. Nandakumar has drawn my attention to the Head Note C and laid emphasis on two sentences of the Head Note which are: “The High Court could have quashed the order of remand if it was satisfied that the order suffered from an error apparent on the record. But there it jurisdiction comes to an end.” On reading these two sentences Mr. But there it jurisdiction comes to an end.” On reading these two sentences Mr. Nandakumar sought to mean that by the above sentences it would mean that while issuing writ of Certiorari the Court's jurisdiction comes to an end simply by quashing the order and it does not require any further direction for enquiry. This Head Note C has been extracted from the paragraph 16 of the judgment, a perusal of which will show that the Supreme Court observed that after quashing the order of remand the High Court cannot proceed to takeover the functions of the licensing authority and direct the licensing authority to grant a licence. I am, therefore, of opinion that the decision referred to above was mis-interpreted and this has no application to the question which been raised in respect of the meaning of Certiorari. By the observation quoted it was not meant that order for further enquiry should not be given. What is meant would be apparent from paragraph 16 of the judgment where their Lordships observed that by quashing the order the Court cannot direct the licensing authority to grant the licence instead of further enquiry into the matter. 9. In this context, it may be worthwhile to mention that a writ of Certiorari was so named in English Law because in its original form it required that the King should be 'certified of the proceedings to be investigated and the object was to secure by the authority of a superior Court, that the jurisdiction of the inferior Court should be properly exercised. What I mean to emphasise is that when an order is set aside and a writ of Certiorari is issued it will mean not only quashing of the order but it would also mean further investigation by the Court below as it is inherent in the declaration. 10. Coming now to the factual part of the case it is argued by Mr. Nandakumar that the order of the learned Tribunal is bad in law inasmuch as the learned Tribunal did not consider some important documents, namely, resolution of the Town Committee dated 14.6.82 contained in Annexure A/7 and another document contained in Annexure A/6. But on perusal of the judgment of the learned Tribunal 1 find that learned Tribunal elaborately discussed all the documents and made the finding as to why the aforesaid order of the Deputy Commissioner is not acceptable. But on perusal of the judgment of the learned Tribunal 1 find that learned Tribunal elaborately discussed all the documents and made the finding as to why the aforesaid order of the Deputy Commissioner is not acceptable. Learned Tribunal has given sufficient reasons for non-acceptance of the order of the Deputy Commissioner and as such I find no infirmity in his findings. 11. Mr. Nandakumar at last faintly argued that even though the private respondents did not file their objection in time before the appropriate authority the learned Tribunal discussed the objection of those persons. But it is clear from the record that no one raised any objection in respect of the acceptance of the objection of the private respondents. Mr. L. Shyamkishore Singh the learned Government Advocate has submitted that the Revenue Tribunal did not commit any jurisdictional error calling for the interference by this Court. It is submitted by Mr. Shyamkishore that the impugned order does not show that there is any error apparent. In drawing my attention to the provisions laid down under Rules 9 and 11 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules, 1961 it is submitted by Mr. Shyamkishore that the Deputy Commissioner rejected the objections filed by 151 villagers of Kongkham Village without making any formal enquiry as per the provisions of Rule 9 and as such the order of the learned Tribunal was just in remanding the matter to the Deputy Commissioner for holding fresh enquiry according to law. On perusal of the order of the Deputy Commissioner and other records I also find that the Deputy Commissioner passed the order without holding the formal enquiry as required by the Rules. 12. Learned Tribunal passed the order requiring the Deputy Commissioner for further enquiry into the matter in the light of the observation he made in the judgment. I therefore, find no infirmity in the judgment of the learned Tribunal. 13. For the reasons stated above this writ petition is dismissed with costs.