JUDGEMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J. :---Admit. By consent heard forthwith. 2. The petitioner who is the accused in Criminal Case No. 63/P/1991 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, F.C., Sattari has filed this petition under section 397 of Cr.P.C. 3. The petitioner on receipt of summons from the Magistrate filed a petition requesting the Magistrate to discharge him from the case mentioned above. The Magistrate refused his prayer by his Order dated 7-12-1994. Against that order the petitioner approached this Court by filing this revision petition. 4. The facts of the case in short is as follows :--- The petitioner is a Range Forest Officer at Sattari at the relevant time. He had to book a case against the first respondent along with eight other persons suspecting them to have committed some offences under the Indian Forest Act. In the process of the investigation of that forest case the petitioner had to call the respondent to his office on 14-9-1991 at 10.30 a.m. and arrested him and released him after necessary interrogation on bail at 10.00 a.m. on the next day. The first respondent thereupon filed a complaint under section 200 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner alleging that the petitioner had called him to his office and made him to remain in his office unnecessarily for 24 hours without permitting him to go anywhere and thus alleged to have committed offences under sections 341, 342, 348 and 349 of I.P.C. The Magistrate after taking cognizance of the offences, issued process to the petitioner. On his appearance, the petitioner filed a petition before the Magistrate on 8-7-1994, which is at page 11 of the paper book, praying that he may be discharged as no offence has been disclosed to have been committed by him. He also pleaded that no sanction has been obtained under section 197 of Cr.P.C. before launching prosecution against him and therefore he is entitled to be discharged. The Magistrate by the impugned order declined to discharge the petitioner, holding that there is enough evidence on record against the accused/petitioner to issue process. The Magistrate seems to have disposed of the plea of the petitioner under section 197 Cr.P.C. on the premises that the offences alleged against him were purportedly not committed by him in his official capacity. 5. The Magistrate seems to have disposed of the plea of the petitioner under section 197 Cr.P.C. on the premises that the offences alleged against him were purportedly not committed by him in his official capacity. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner mainly based his argument on two grounds, namely (i) no offence has been disclosed against him in the complaint; and (ii) no sanction has been obtained under section 197 Cr.P.C. Elaborating his argument, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that being a Range Forest Officer, he is vested with the powers of seizure, arrest and release in respect of persons and property involved in the offence. He took me through the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 particularly sections 50, 52, 62, 64 and also 65. These provisions make it amply clear that those powers of a Range Forest Officer like the petitioner are to be exercised under the Act in discharging his official duty. Section 54 of the Indian Forest Act gives power to a forest officer to arrest a person without a warrant. So also section 65 gives power to the forest officer to release on bond a person arrested and section 68 gives a forest officer power to compound an offence. Before the Magistrate the petitioner categorically stated that he was doing his official duty in calling the first respondent to his office as he was suspected to have committed a forest offence and a case has been registered as Criminal Case No. 22/N/91 against the respondent and eight others. In fact the complaint filed by the respondent before the Magistrate clearly states that on 14-9-1991 at 10.30 a.m. the petitioner called the respondent No. 1 in his office and he further alleged that after attending his office the respondent warned him not to leave the office without allowing him to inform his family members and ultimately he alleges that he was released on 15-9-1991 at 10.00 a.m. and the complainant styled the petitioner in the complaint as a Range Forest Officer at Sanguem. From these facts there were sufficient material for the Magistrate to infer that the petitioner was alleged to have committed an offence while he was functioning as a Range Forest Officer and therefore necessarily the Magistrate should have looked into the fact whether sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. is necessary or has to be obtained before taking cognizance of the offence. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted before me by taking me through the relevant contentions taken by the respondent No. 1 in his complaint and argued that no offence under sections 341, 342, 348 and 349 has been disclosed. Whatever that may be, this aspect need not detain me very much because the second ground taken by the petitioner will be sufficient for me to dispose of this petition. 6. Admittedly, as I pointed out earlier, the complaint itself disclosed that the petitioner was a Range Forest Officer. He was impleaded in the complaint as a Government Official and he was alleged to have committed the offence while discharging his official duty. Therefore the complaint filed before the Magistrate by the respondent will disclose that the petitioner is a Government servant and the offence alleged to have been committed by him was committed during the course of his official duty. Therefore, essentially and naturally, the Magistrate's attention should have been focussed to section 197 of Cr.P.C. even at the time of entertaining the complaint. 7. Needless to say section 197 of Cr.P.C. is mandatory. The conditions prescribed under that section is a pre-requisite for taking cognizance of a criminal complaint against a Government servant. If at all, while discharging his official duty a Government servant commits an offence, in all probability the Government servant in such circumstances would have committed the offence or do some excesses, even then prosecution will lie only if prior sanction from appropriate authority is obtained. The legislative object of this section is not only to safeguard the interest of the Government servant from vexatious litigation or other harassments, but also to safeguard the interest of the State itself. Obtaining sanction from the Government to prosecute its servant under section 197 amounts to a notice to the Government about the alleged offence committed by its servant and gives the Government an opportunity to take corrective steps or appropriate action deemed fit in the circumstances in the public interest. Obtaining sanction from the Government to prosecute its servant under section 197 amounts to a notice to the Government about the alleged offence committed by its servant and gives the Government an opportunity to take corrective steps or appropriate action deemed fit in the circumstances in the public interest. Therefore, the sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. is mandatory, without which the complaint against a Government servant becomes ab initio liable to be dismissed. The same view has been expressed by another learned Judge of this Court in a recent decision in (Shri Devu Benaulekar v. Shri Menino Rodriques and another)1, 1995(1) Goa L.T. 52. Relying on the Supreme Court decision, the learned Judge in that case even went to the extent of holding that even if in the discharge of his duties or official function an officer of the Government has done any excesses, does not itself dispense with the legal requirements to obtain sanction of the Government before prosecuting that officer. Therefore, it is clear in this case the order under Revision is liable to be set aside for no offence could have been taken cognizance of by the learned Magistrate without the sanction of the Government. Admittedly no such sanction has been obtained before filing the complaint before the Magistrate. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that no revision will lie against the impugned order as it is an interlocutory order under section 397 Cr.P.C. I am afraid if such a ground is sustainable, in view of the fact that the plea of discharge of the petitioner was dismissed by the Court and cannot be treated as an interlocutory order. In this context the decision of the Supreme Court in (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra)2, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 47, in its para 15 of the said decision reads as follows :--- "..... Yet, for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, after due consideration, that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2)." In view of the above decision the nature of the relief sought by the petitioner becomes a decisive factor to determine as to whether the order passed by the Court is interlocutory or not. If, the Magistrate had accepted the plea of the petitioner the entire proceedings against the petitioner would be deemed to have been closed and the order would become final as far that Court is concerned. Order of rejection of the petitioner's plea by the Magistrate cannot be treated as interlocutory. 9. However, assuming for argument sake that, it is an interlocutory order, even then this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this case using the inherent power of this Court under section 482 of Cr.P.C. As discussed earlier by me, I feel that it is a clear case of abuse of process while the complaint of the respondent No. 1 discloses that the Government servant alleged to have committed the offence and he is styled as an accused in the complaint, the Magistrate without applying his mind has taken cognizance of the complaint which will definitely rope in the term of the abuses of the process of Court. This Court in such circumstances has got every power to interfere with such an order even if it is termed as an interlocutory order. 10. Another argument advanced by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 is that the entire facts are not now before the Magistrate, therefore at this stage it is premature for this Court to interfere. A very interesting but strange argument has been advanced by the counsel for the respondent No. 1 that there was no material before the Magistrate at this stage to show that the petitioner was discharging his official duty. There was no proof that the day on which he called the respondent to his office the officer was on his actual duty and unless that fact has been established by the Court below, at this stage, the interference by this Court is not called for, argues the counsel. In fact it is a matter of proof. I am really not concerned with that aspect in this case. Main concern in this case is whether the plea of the petitioner was rejected by the Magistrate rightly or not. The revisional power of this Court, either under section 397 or section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised to prevent any abuse of the process and through such abuse any innocent person being dragged into a Court of law to face trial unnecessarily. That is the only circumstance to justify this Court to interfere in this matter. The revisional power of this Court, either under section 397 or section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised to prevent any abuse of the process and through such abuse any innocent person being dragged into a Court of law to face trial unnecessarily. That is the only circumstance to justify this Court to interfere in this matter. In this context, as observed by the Supreme Court in (Punjab National Bank and others v. Surendra Prasad Sinha)3, 1993 Bank. J. 172 (S.C.) a very thought provoking passage has to be extracted here as mentioned in paragraph 5 of that judgment which reads thus :--- "It is also salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The complaint was laid impleading the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by name and a host of officers. There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistrate to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for. Only on satisfying that the law casts liability or creates offence against the juristic person or the persons impleaded then only process would be issued. At that stage the Court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complaint as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. Vindication of majesty of justice and maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of criminal justice but would not be the means to wreck personal vengeance. Considered from any angle we find that the respondent had abused the process and laid complaint against all the appellants without any prima facie case to harass them for vendetta." Therefore the courts must be very alert for preventing innocent persons in being dragged unnecessarily into a Court of law especially in a criminal trial and while taking cognizance of the offence, the Criminal Court should be more alert and more careful in evaluating the facts disclosed by the complainant before the Court and take cognizance of any offence against innocent persons. 11. In view of the above discussions, I have no hesitation to hold that the order of the Magistrate is not sustainable in law. I therefore, allow the revision petition and set aside the Order under revision. 11. In view of the above discussions, I have no hesitation to hold that the order of the Magistrate is not sustainable in law. I therefore, allow the revision petition and set aside the Order under revision. Consequently the process issued against the petitioner is quashed and he stands discharged. Petition allowed.