Research › Browse › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

1995 DIGILAW 112 (GAU)

H. Dwijamani Dev Sharma v. Hidangmayum Dwijasekhar Sharma

1995-06-12

N.G.DAS

body1995
This application in revision under section 115 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the order of learned Munsiff, Imphal, Manipur dated 21.4.1992 whereby the learned Munsiff rejected the plaint of the petitioner. 2. I have heard Shri H. Dwijamani Dev Sharma, the petitioner in person assisted by Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, the learned senior counsel and Mr. HNK Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. 3. To appreciate the question involved in this revision petition the facts relevant for the purpose may, shortly, be stated as under : Shri H. Dwijamani Dev Shrama, the petitioner herein filed a suit as plaintiff being OS No. 10 of 1992 in the Court of learned Munsiff, Imphal, Manipur for recovery of possession of the suit land described in the Schedule B attached to the plaint after evicting the defendant who is his eldest son. The plaintiffs case is that he is the absolute owner of the suit land described in the Schedule B attached to the plaint and other lands. To facilitate construction of separate house for his sons, the plaintiff in or about the year 1962 ear marked the portion of his patta land into plots to be give on some future dates to each of his sons and also to a Hindu Deity 'Shri Shri Balmunkunda Dev' worshipped by him as its Seviat. The plaintiff also caused entry of the names of the said deity and his sons in the relevant record of the Reyenue Department but without any valid legal transfer. The plaintiff made the arrangements of demarcation of the plots with the sole object of facilitating the construction of separate houses for his sons inside their respective portions earmarked for them and not beyond that. But after some time of earmarked the portions to be distributed to his sons, the plaintiff became very much annoyed with the activities of the defendant who made a public declaration in the issue of Manipur Mail dated 12.11.1986 saying that plaintiff s right, title and interest in the property were extinguished. The plaintiff therefore filed the suit for the reliefs as stated above. 4. A similar suit being OS No.9 of 1992 was filed by the plaintiff against his another son named H.Chandrasekhar Sharma. The plaintiff therefore filed the suit for the reliefs as stated above. 4. A similar suit being OS No.9 of 1992 was filed by the plaintiff against his another son named H.Chandrasekhar Sharma. Both the sons resisted the suit by filing two separate applications under section 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Learned Munsiff numbered both the petitions as separate misc cases, namely, Judicial Misc Case No.29 of 1992 in respect of OS 10 of 1992 and Judicial Misc Case No.32 of 1992 in respect of OS No.9 of 1992 and disposed of both the misc cases by a common order dated 21.4.1992. By this order learned Munsiff held that the suit were barred under section 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and with this findings learned Munsiff allowed both the misc cases rejecting the original suits of the plaintiff. The present revision petition is however, in respect of Judicial Misc Case.No.29 of 1992 which has arisen in respect of OS No.10 of 1992. Aggrieved by the said order of the Court below the plaintiff has preferred.the above civil revision petition. 5. The question involved in this revision petition is whether High Court in exercise of its powers under section 115, CPC can vary or reverse such an order of the Munsiff. 6. Mr. HNK Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has at the very outset submitted that this revision petition is not maintainable in view of section 2 (2) of CPC. According to Mr. HNK Singh decree as defined under section 2 (2) of CPC will include the rejection of a plaint and learned Munsiff having rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC this order rejection is a decree and hence only an appeal lies against such order and not a revision. 7. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has in his reply submitted that the High Court under the powers vested in it in section 115 of CPC can always correct the errors committed by the trial Court as according to him in passing the impugned order the learned Munsiff not only committed jurisdictional error but she also passed the order with material irregularity. The learned senior counsel laid emphasis to the expression 'no appeal lies thereto' and contended that since no appeal will lie to the High Court against the impugned order there is no bar for this Court to entertain the revision petition under section 115 of CPC. 8. Both the learned counsel cited a number of decisions in support of their resepective contentions. The first decision referred to by Mr. HNK Singh in support of his contention is the case of Samsher Singh vs. Rajindra Prasad & others reported in AIR 1973 SC 2384 . A perusal of this judgment shows that the court fee having not been paid the plaint was rejected. The Supreme Court made an observation under para 3 of the judgment after discussing the judgment rendered in Rathnavarmaraja vs. Smti Vimla reported in AIR 1961 SC 1299 that the ratio in the decision in AIR 1961 SC 1299 was that no revision on a question of court fee lay where no question of jurisdiction was involved and also made an observation that "in the present case the plaint was rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. Such an order amounts to a decree under section 2 (2) and there is a right of appeal open to the plaintiff." 9. Relying this observation of the Supreme Court Mr. HNK Singh has argued that since the plaint was rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC and since such an order amounts to a decree under section 2 (2) only an appeal lies and as such 10. The second decision relied on by Mr. HNK Singh is the decision of Madras High Court in the case of R. Shanmughavelu Pillai vs. R. Karuppanna Ambalam reported in AIR 1976 Madras 289. In this case the learned Single Judge held that when an appeal lies to the High Court whether directly or indirectly from any order or decree the revision will not be maintainable and proper remedy is to go in appeal to the High Court. To hold this view learned Single Judge relied on a decision in AIR 1964 SC 497 . The decision referred to above appears to have been given before Amendment of 1976. That apart learned Single Judge also observed that no revision is maintainable if an appeal lies to the High Court directly or indirectly from any order or decree. To hold this view learned Single Judge relied on a decision in AIR 1964 SC 497 . The decision referred to above appears to have been given before Amendment of 1976. That apart learned Single Judge also observed that no revision is maintainable if an appeal lies to the High Court directly or indirectly from any order or decree. This decision therefore, appears to be of no help. Mr. HNK Singh also referred to a decision of this Court rendered in the case of Deo Narayan Goala (deceased by LR) & others vs. Jagadish Pandit, reported in AIR 1985 Gauhati 49. This case related to an execution proceeding where the execution case was once dismissed for default subsequently it was restored by the learned executing Court in exercise of its inherent powers as the decree holder filed such an application under section 151 of CPC instead of filing a second application for execution. It was therefore held that the discretion so exercised by the Courts below in setting aside the order of dismissal of execution petition in the interest of justice could not be interefered with. Hence, on facts this decision is of no help to the respondents as here the question is otherwise. 11. The next decision referred to by Mr. HNK Singh is a decision in the case of Lala Lalsingh vs. Seth Shobhagchand reported in AIR 1986 MP 140 . This decision was referred to by Mr. HNK Singh as Mr. A. Nilamani Singh the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that a revision will lie to the High Court if no appeal lies to the High Court. In support of his contention Mr. Nilamani Singh placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Smti Vidya Vati vs. Shri Devi Das reported in AIR 1977 SC 397 . In the case of Lalsingh (supra) learned Single Judge of MP High Court held the view that the decision in the case of Vidya Vati (supra) is of no help in view of 1976 Amendment. Learned Single Judge held that it was not the subject matter of consideration before the Supreme Court either in Vidya Vati's case (supra) or Major SS Khanna's AIR 1964 SC 497 as there was no occasion of it. 12. Learned Single Judge held that it was not the subject matter of consideration before the Supreme Court either in Vidya Vati's case (supra) or Major SS Khanna's AIR 1964 SC 497 as there was no occasion of it. 12. It may, therefore, be useful to reproduce the provisions of section 115 which are as under : "115. (l)The High Court may call for the records of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears....... (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto....". 13. Mr. HNK Singh's contention is that since sub-section (2) of section 115 envisages that the High Court shall not entertain any petition under this section to vary or reverse any order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto such a revision petition is not entertainable. The precise submission of Mr. HNK Singh is that since sub-section (2) of section 115 has clearly indicated that no petition under section 115 is entertainable by the High Court to vary or reverse any order against which no appeal lies to any Court subordinate thereto an application under section 115 is not maintainable. 14. But, Mr. Nilamani Singh's contention is that a careful perusal of the provisions laid down under sub-section (1) of section 115 of CPC will show that sub-section (1) of section 115 contradicts sub-section (2) of section 115 as while sub-section (1) says that a revision petition under section 115 will lies before the High Court from an order made by a subordinate Court if no appeal lies to the High Court, sub-section (2) says that no application under section 115 is entertainable to vary or reverse any order against which an appeal lies to a Court subordinate thereto. The contention of Mr. Nilamani Singh is that since both the sub-section were inserted by section 43 of CPC Amendment Act, 1976 the Supreme Court while passing the judgment in Vidya Vati (supra) must have in view the provisions of sub-section (2) and hence the law laid down by the Supreme Court cannot be ignored. Mr. The contention of Mr. Nilamani Singh is that since both the sub-section were inserted by section 43 of CPC Amendment Act, 1976 the Supreme Court while passing the judgment in Vidya Vati (supra) must have in view the provisions of sub-section (2) and hence the law laid down by the Supreme Court cannot be ignored. Mr. HNK Singh's contention in this regard is that the Supreme Court was actually not called upon to decide which of these sub-section will prevail and hence it cannot be interpreted that sub-section (2) of section 115 will not prevail upon sub-section (1) of section 115. 15. It is true that the judgment of Vidya Vati (supra) does not specifically indicate that their Lordships made any observation as to whether sub-section (2) of section 115 will prevail upon sub-section (1) of that section. But under para 7 of the judgment their Lordships held : "The words of limitation used in section 115 are 'in which no appeal lies thereto' and these words clearly mean that no appeal must lie to the High Court from the order sought to be revised. Where an order allowing a review application in a suit for possession is made by Sub Judge and an appeal against such an order lies to the District Court and not to the High Court a revision application filed against the said order before the High Court is maintainable and it cannot be rejected as incompetent." 16. So, in view of the above observation it has to be held that a revision lies as it cannot be said that their Lordships did not have sub-section (2) of section 115 in view at the time of making this observation. The decisions referred to by Mr. HNK Singh are therefore not acceptable. The decision of Satnseshar Singh (supra) is in view of facts not applicable in the present case. 17. In this context the next contention urged by Mr. Nilamani Singh is that Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC being qualified it has to be examined whether the order passed by the learned Munsiff rejecting the plaint falls under any of the four clauses. Mr. 17. In this context the next contention urged by Mr. Nilamani Singh is that Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC being qualified it has to be examined whether the order passed by the learned Munsiff rejecting the plaint falls under any of the four clauses. Mr. HNK Singh's contention in this regard is that the order of learned Munsiff rejecting the plaint falls under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) which reads : "Order 7, Rule 11 (d): Where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law." In the instant case it is an admitted fact that the defendant who is the respondent here did not file any written statement. He simply filed an application under section 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition)'Act, 1988. The contention of Mr. Nilamani is therefore that before an order can amount to such rejection as is contemplated by section 2 (2) of CPC it must be 'rejection' authorised by some provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is submitted by Mr. Nilamani Singh that if the plaint is rejected for a cause for which the Court is not empowered to do so it would not be a decree even though the Court may use the word 'reject' in disposing of the suit. 18. As already stated the defendant, namely, the present respondent did not file any written statement but filed a simple application under section 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 for dismissal of the suit. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner also took me to the plaint and submitted that on perusal of the plaint it can never be inferred that there was any statement where from it can be gathered that the suit was barred by any law and as such the order passed by the learned Munsiff rejecting the plaint cannot be considered to be an order passed under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) and accordingly it is not a decree. I find much substance in the submission of Mr. Nilamani Singh as a perusal of the plaint 1 also find no such statement there where from it can be inferred that the plaint was barred by any law. 20. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the question determined by the learned Munsiff is a question of law only or a mixed question of law and facts. Nilamani Singh as a perusal of the plaint 1 also find no such statement there where from it can be inferred that the plaint was barred by any law. 20. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the question determined by the learned Munsiff is a question of law only or a mixed question of law and facts. Learned counsel for the parties have however agreed that this is a mixed question of law and facts. Under Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC where issues both of law and facts arises in the same suit and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force and for that purpose may, if it thinks fir, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue. The jurisdiction to try issues on law apart from the issue of fact may be exercise only where in the opinion of the Court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but as would be apparent from the Order 14 Rule 2 (2) the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try the suit on mixed issues of law and facts as preliminary issue. 21. In the instant case, it would appear from the order of learned Munsiff that in arriving at the decision she took jamabandi of the land of co-pattadars, certified copy of the letter of Income Tax Officers, Manipur Circle B Ward, Income Tax return of the plaintiff etc in view although those documents were not proved before the Court in accordance with law. I am however, not expressing any opinion on the question whether the allegations made in the petition by the defendant are true or not but what I would like to emphasize is that this being a mixed question of law and facts it cannot be decided on the assumption that the allegations made by the defendant in his special petition are true and that those made by the plaintiff in his plaint are not true. 22. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that learned Munsiff was clearly denying a jurisdiction by holding that the suit was not maintainable and thus she acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of her jurisdiction. The impugned order of the learned Munsiff so far as the suit No. OS 10 of 1992 is concerned is set aside and the learned trial Court is directed to try the suit in accordance with law after service of notice upon both the parties. Send the record back to the Court of learned Munsiff alongh with a copy of this judgment immediately. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court.