JUDGMENT : P. Ray, J. - The plaintiff-appellant has filed a suit for declaration of right, title and confirmation of possession over the suit land and for declaration that the provisions of Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act do not apply to the suit property. The trial Court decreed the suit which has been reversed by the first appellate Court. The plaintiff-appellant has filed the present appeal. 2. The material question that arises for consideration in the present case is whether the vendor of the plaintiff or the plaintiff thereafter was an intermediary in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff has claimed that his vendor was a raiyat and was holding the right of occupancy according to the Tenancy Law in respect of the suit land. The trial Court upon consideration of the materials on record came to the finding that neither the vendor of the plaintiff nor the plaintiff was an Intermediary and as such the suit land could not vest in the State. The first appellate Court while reversing the finding did not at all consider the vital and material documents. On record. it has proceeded merely on the basis of the orders passed in the. land encroachment case under the provisions of the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act. 3. The first appellate Court clearly adopted an erroneous approach and failed to appreciate the material issue for determination. In order to determine the status of the vendor of the plaintiff or the plaintiff, he should have considered the material documents, particularly Ext. 1/A and the Hamid Settlement Record of right, Ext. B. Post-vesting administrative orders cannot be decisive in determining the dispute regarding pre-vesting status. Moreover, if it is found that the vendor of the plaintiff or the plaintiff was not an intermediary within the meaning of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951, the provisions of Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act would not apply at all. As the first appellate Court has not considered the relevant and important evidence on record, the judgment is vitiated and cannot be sustained. 4. In course of hearing of the second appeal, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to two decisions reported in Kumar Bimal Chandra Sinha Vs. State of Orissa, and 36 (1978) CLT 1108 (Srimati A. Kameswaramma v. State of Orissa and Anr.) on the question who can be held to be an intermediary. 4. In course of hearing of the second appeal, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to two decisions reported in Kumar Bimal Chandra Sinha Vs. State of Orissa, and 36 (1978) CLT 1108 (Srimati A. Kameswaramma v. State of Orissa and Anr.) on the question who can be held to be an intermediary. The principles decided in the said cases are to be kept in mind while determining the, main issue-involved in the case. 5. In that view of the matter, I think it appropriate to remit back the case to the first appellate Court for re-hearing upon consideration of the materials on record including Ext. A/1 and Ext. B and keeping the principles enunciated in the aforesaid decisions in mind. As the suit is of the year 1977, the first appellate Court should dispose of the appeal within four months from the date of receipt of the record 6. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court is set aside. The first appellate Court is directed to rehear the case and dispose of the same in the light of the observations made in this judgment, within four months from the date of receipt of the records. There shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed