Judgment : S.R. Singh 1. SINCE common questions of law are involved in the aforesaid two petitions, hence they are being disposed of by a common judgment with the consent of the parties' learned counsel. 2. PROCEEDINGS were initiated under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (in short the Act) for determination of excess vacant land held by the petitioner. According to ceiling statements, the petitioner was shown to be possessed of certain land in excess of ceiling limit which are proposed to be declared as such. The petitioner filed objection, inter alia, on the ground that the land shown in the draft statement prepared under Section 8 of the Act included certain plots of land which were used mainly for agricultural purpose and hence the same were not liable to be taken into consideration while determining the excess vacant land. The competent' authority, it seems, rejected the objection filed by the petitioner on the ground that the land recorded as agricultural one was specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture and accordingly, it declared certain land held by the petitioner to be in excess of the ceiling limit. The petitioner, however, preferred appeal which was allowed by the District Judge vide judgment and order dated 25.7.1986 on the ground that there was no valid master plan for the development of the municipal area of Saharanpur and, therefore, the land recorded in the revenue papers as agricultural land would not be treated as 'vacant land'. It appears that subsequently on 29.9.1987, a master plan was enforced in the municipal area of Saharanpur, whereupon the petitioner was called upon, by means of the impugned notice dated 8.3.1988, to submit statement under Section 6 (1) of the Act regarding vacant land held by him in excess of the ceiling limit. It is the validity of this notice which is under challenge here in these writ petitions. I have heard Sri R. K. Pandey for the petitioner and the standing counsel appearing for the State authorities. 3. ON and from the commencement of the Act, no person is entitled, except as provided under the Act, to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, in the territories to which this Act applies. I have heard Sri R. K. Pandey for the petitioner and the standing counsel appearing for the State authorities. 3. ON and from the commencement of the Act, no person is entitled, except as provided under the Act, to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, in the territories to which this Act applies. Ceiling limits for various urban agglomerations of categories A, B, C and D specified in Schedule I to the Act have been specified in Section 4 of the Act. Section 6 (1) of the Act enjoins a duty on every person holding vacant land in excess of the celling limit at the commencement of the Act to file a statement before the competent authority, within such period as may be prescribed, of all the vacant land and of any other land on which there is a building, held by him and also specifying the vacant lands within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain. "Vacant land" as defined in Section 2 (q) of the Act, "means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an urban agglomeration but does not include : (i) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated ; (ii) in any area where there are building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before or is being constructed on the appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building ; and (iii) in an area where there are no building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before or is being constructed on the appointed day and the land appurtenant to such building." Proviso to Section 2 (q) being not relevant needs not to be quoted. "Urban Land", as per Section 2 (o), "means- (i) any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan ; or (ii) in case where there is no master plan, or where the master plan does not refer to any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the local limits of a municipality, a notified area committee, a town area committee, a city and town committee, a small town committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat. But does not include any such land which is mainly used for the purposes of agriculture." 4. IT is thus evident that any land which is mainly used for purpose of agriculture is treated neither as "urban land" nor "vacant land" for the purpose of determination of excess vacant land under the Act. However, notwithstanding the fact that any land is entered in the revenue or land records as for agriculture and is mainly used as such, it would not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture within the meaning of clauses (o) and (q) of Section 2 of the Act if it has been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture (See Explanation (c) of Section 2 (o) of the Act. In other words, land specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture has to be treated both as "urban land" and "vacant land" for the purpose of determination of excess land under the provisions of the Act notwithstanding its main user being for agriculture purpose. Vacant land in excess of the ceiling limits is to be determined as provided in Section 6 (1), with reference to the land held "at the commencement of this Act." The commencement of this Act in relation to State of Uttar Pradesh is 17.2.1976. But Explanation (ii) to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act creates a fiction and defines "commencement of this Act" in relation to any land, not being vacant land, situated in a State in which, this Act is in force, to mean the date when such land becomes vacant land by any reason whatsoever. But Explanation (ii) to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act creates a fiction and defines "commencement of this Act" in relation to any land, not being vacant land, situated in a State in which, this Act is in force, to mean the date when such land becomes vacant land by any reason whatsoever. As held by the learned District Judge in his judgment and order dated 25.7.1986, there was no valid master plan for the development of the municipal area of Saharanpur but as stated in the impugned notice, a valid master plan has since been enforced for the municipal area of Saharanpur w.e.f., 29.9.1987 and in the master plan so prepared, the land recorded in the revenue paper as agricultural one has been specified for a purpose other than agriculture. Consequently, the land used mainly for agricultural purpose but not treated as vacant land would now be deemed, by virtue of Explanation (c) to Section 2 (o) read with Explanation (ii) to Section 6(1) to be "urban land" and 'Vacant land" as defined in Sections 2 (o) and 2 (q) respectively and the Act with reference to such land would be deemed to have commenced w.e.f. the date of enforcement of the master plan specifying such land for a purpose other than agriculture and that being the position, no exception ought to be taken to the Impugned notice. 5. BUT in Atia Mohammadi Begum v. State of U. P. and others, 1993 All U 1132 : AIR 1993 SC 2465 , the Supreme Court has held, while construing the provision of Sections 2 (o) and 2 (q) that "the scheme of the Act supports the construction that the aforesaid Explanation (c) means that if the land has been specified in the master plan existing at the time of commencement of the Act for a purpose other than agriculture, then the land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture by virtue of Explanation and not if the land is specified in a master plan prepared after the commencement of the Act." 17.2.1976 has been taken by the Apex Court as the date of the commencement of the Act. True, the provision of Explanation (ii) to Section 6 (1) of the Act which creates a legal fiction and postulates "commencement of this Act" on a date different from 17.2.1976, was not brought to the notice of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, but the view expressed (Dy Lordships in Atia Mohammadi Begum (supra) was intended to harmonise Explanation (c) to Section 2 (o)" with the other provisions and scheme of the Act." Therefore, it is not open to this court to say that Explanation to Section 6 (1) was not in the notice of the Apex Court and as held by the Supreme Court in B. M. Lakhani v. Malkapur Municipality, AIR 1970 SC 1002 and as postulated by Article 141 of the Constitution, a decision rendered by the Apex Court is binding on High Courts and cannot he ignored on the ground that relevant provision was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. 6. ACCORDINGLY, albeit I am of the view that any land which has been mainly used for agricultural purpose upto 17.2.1976 and for that reason stood excluded from the purview of "urban land" and "vacant land" as defined in Sections 2 (o) and 2 (q) respectively, would be deemed to have been brought within the purview of the afore stated expressions with effect from the date when a master plan is prepared for the municipal area (29.9.1987 for the municipal area of Saharanpur) and such land is specified therein for a purpose other than agriculture inasmuch as the Act in relation to such land shall be deemed to have commenced not on 17.2.1976 but on the date of preparation of the master plan (29.9.1987 is the instant case), yet following the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum (supra). I hold that the land which was recorded as agricultural land and used as such up to 17.2.1976 cannot be treated to be "vacant land" on the basis of a subsequently prepared master plan. Therefore, the impugned notice cannot be sustained. In the result, the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The notices impugned therein are quashed.