Judgment :- Parted Pillay, C.J. Appellant is the petitioner in O.P.2620 of 1995. He filed the Original Petition to quasi the order of sale of his properties in E.P.54 of 1994 in O.S.200/90 of the Munsiff Court, Vaikom and also for a writ of mandamus commanding the first respondent not to sell the properties as they are not liable to be attached or sold as per law. 2. It is admitted case of the appellant that the first respondent (hank) had filed O.S.200 of 1994 before the Munsiff Court Vaikoin and obtained decree with charge on his properties. The judgment and decree in that suit have become final. The execution proceedings have been taken against the appellant. Appellant contended that the properties and the building cannot be sold as they are exempted from attachment under S.60(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. His contention is that the execution proceedings initiated against him by the first respondent is illegal and liable to be interfered by this Court by the issuance of writ of certiorari under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. Learned Single Judge dismissed the Original Petition holding that the decree has become final and that the appellant cannot put forward any contention which he did not choose to advance before the civil court. Learned Judge further held that there is no provision in the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 preventing the decree-holder from executing the decree validly obtained by him. It was also held by the learned judge that principle of constructive res judicial applies and hence the appellant cannot urge any contention against the judgment and decree of the civil court. 3. As the judgment and decree in O.S.200 of 1990 have become final appellant cannot validly raise any contention against the excitability of the decree. Appellant did not raise any contention in the suit that his building and properties are exempted from at aliment in view of S.60(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Having not raised it at the appropriate time he cannot belatedly do so in a later proceeding. Contention of the appellant that the principle of constructive res judicata cannot be attracted to the proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution is not tenable. Having not raised it at the appropriate time he cannot belatedly do so in a later proceeding. Contention of the appellant that the principle of constructive res judicata cannot be attracted to the proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution is not tenable. In Daryao v. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 SC 1457) the Supreme Court held that the argument that res judicata is a technical rule and as stack is irrelevant in dealing with petitions under Art.226 cannot be accepted. The Supreme Court observed thus: "Thus on general consideration of public policy there seems to be no reason why the rule of res judicata should be treated as inadmissible or irrelevant in dealing with petitions filed under Art.226 of the Constitution. It is true that the general rule can be invoked only in cases where a dispute between the piles has been referred to a court of competent jurisdiction, there has been a contest between the parties before the court, a fair opportunity has been given to both of them to prove their case, and at the end the court has pronounced its judgment or decision. Such a decision pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction is binding between the parties unless it is modified or reversed by adopting a procedure prescribed by the Constitution. In our opinion, therefore, the plea that the general rule of res judicata should not be allowed to be invoked cannot be sustained." The principle behind constructive res judicata is that final decision on matters directly and substantially in issue in the former proceedings between the same parties operates as conclusive in the later proceedings. The ground which might or ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence in the former suit but which was not so done operates as res judicata in a subsequent proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. It was perfectly open to the appellant to raise his defence in the civil suit. That was not obviously done. Having allowed the civil suit to be become final so far as he is concerned he cannot rake up the issue again for fresh consideration. Contention that principle of constructive res judicata will not apply when one of the two proceedings is not a suit is not legally sustainable in view of the settled legal position. Having allowed the civil suit to be become final so far as he is concerned he cannot rake up the issue again for fresh consideration. Contention that principle of constructive res judicata will not apply when one of the two proceedings is not a suit is not legally sustainable in view of the settled legal position. As it was perfectly open to the appellant to raise his contentions in the civil suit and as he did not do so he cannot be allowed to raise it in the proceedings under Art.226. As the decree against the appellant has become final and as execution proceedings are initiated against him on the strength of the decree he cannot invoke the entire extra ordinary powers of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution ld»quash the proceedings taken in execution pursuant to the decree. The learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the Original Petition. We see no merit in the writ appeal. Writ Appeal is dismissed.