R. R. K. TRIVEDI, J. In both the aforesaid appeals questions of law and facts involved are common and both the appeals can be conveniently decided by a common judgment. Special Appeal No. 807 of 1994 shall be the leading case. 2. Facts giving rise to the aforesaid appeals are that the office of the institution Nagar Palika Inter College, Jaunpur, hereinafter referred to college, fell vacant. The vacancy was duly notified to the Uttar Pradesh Secondary education Service Commission, hereinafter referred to commis sion. Commission notified a panel of selected candidates on 24th October, 1985. In this panel names of Sri Devi Prasad Singh and Dr. Havildar Singh were shown at first and second place respectively in order of merit. On an intimation received from the District Inspector of Schools the management issued the order of appointment in favour of Sri Devi Prasad Singh on 23rd December, 1985 calling upon him to join as Principal of the college within ten days from the date of the receipt of the order. However, Devi Prasad Singh could not join on account of an interim order dated 21st December, 1985 passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No, 17085, of 1985, filed by Sri Pyare Mohan Verma, senior most teacher of the college. In this writ petition, entire Selection proceedings, were questioned. It appears that Dr. Havildar Singh, whose name was shown at the second place in the panel, also made efforts for his appointment during pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, consequently he was also impleaded as respondent and an interim order dated 30th September, 1986 was passed by this Court staying his appoint ment. This writ petition was however dismissed on 5th January, 1980. 3. After the dismissal of the aforesaid writ petition, it appears that for a considerable period no steps were taken either by the management to compel Devi Prasad Singh to join in pursuance of order of appointment as Principal, nor he himself took any initiative. Even the authorities of the Education Department failed to take any prompt action. Dr. Havildar Singh, however, made a representation on 1st June, J 988 before the Adminstrator/ Manager of the College that the candidate mentioned at serial No. 1 has not joined and therefore, he should be given chance. Even the authorities of the Education Department failed to take any prompt action. Dr. Havildar Singh, however, made a representation on 1st June, J 988 before the Adminstrator/ Manager of the College that the candidate mentioned at serial No. 1 has not joined and therefore, he should be given chance. However, as no action was taken on this representation, he moved an application before the Deputy Director of Education under Section 17 (1) of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Service Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982, hereinafter referred to act. In this representation mention of application moved on 1st June, 1988 before the management of college, and fact of dismissal of the writ petition on 5th January, 1988, was specifically made. In this connection, another application by way of reminder was filed by him before the Deputy Director of Education 29th September, 1988. It was after these applications that the District Inspector of Schools passed an order on 27th October, 1988 directing the management to take immediate steps to hand over charge to Devi Prasad Singh and if he fails to assume charge by 15th November, 1988, it shall be inferred that he is not interested to join and order of appointment should be issued in favour of second candidate in the panel, In view of these developments, it appears, Devi Prasad Singh wrote a letter on 14th November, 1988 to the management and another letter dated 15th November, 1988 addressed to the District Inspector of Schools, seeking time to join by 15th December, 1988, He also requested the management to issue a fresh order to appointment. The Executive Officer/manager of the college vide order dated 29th November, 1988 intimated Devi Prasad Singh that he may join as Principal of the college upto 15th December, 1988. In this letter, it was also mentioned that this extension of time for joining the post is being granted with the condition that no further time shall be allowed. It was also stated to that the order of appointment already issued on 23rd December, 1985 is still effective and no fresh order is required. Devi Prasad Singh, however, failed to join as Princi pal on or before 15th December, 1988. By an application dated 14th December 1988, which appears to have been received by the management on 16th December, 1988, he sought further time upto 31st December, 1988. Devi Prasad Singh, however, failed to join as Princi pal on or before 15th December, 1988. By an application dated 14th December 1988, which appears to have been received by the management on 16th December, 1988, he sought further time upto 31st December, 1988. During this period Deputy Director of Education by his order dated 2ist December, 1988 directed to appoint Dr. Havildar Singh, the candidate mentioned at the second place in the panel, if Devi Prasad Singh has failed to join by 15th December, 1988. Dr. Havildar Singh also approached and moved an appli cation on 23rd December, 1988 for his appointment as Devi Prasad Singh failed to join upto 15th December, 1988. The management, however, by an order dated 29th December, 1938 further extended time upto 31st December, 1988. It is alleged that Devi Prasad Singh joined as Principal on 3jst December, 1988. On 23rd February, 1989, however, he proceeded on leave which was granted by the management vide order dated 22nd February, 1989. This leave was further extended on 15th May, 1989 for the period 1st May 1989 to 30th June, 1989. By another order dated 16th June, 1989 leave was granted for period 1st July, 1989 to 30th July, 1991. In this order dated 16th September, 1989 it was also directed that during the leave of Devi Prasad Singh, Jai Nath Singh Yadav, officiating Principal, shall continue as Principal as before. 4. It may be mentioned that during this period of leave Devi Prasad Singh continued as Principal of Sri Krishan Geeta Rastriya Inter College Lalganj, Azamgarh. He resigned from this post on 29th June. 1989 and joined as Principal of Navodaya Vidyalaya, Vindhawal, Jaipur Pali, Rajasthan on 1st July, 1989. Admittedly, he has been confirmed as Principal of Novodayas Vidyaiaya in Rajasthan. 5. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, Dr. Havildar Singh filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19956 of 1989 for a Writ of mandamus directing respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in the writ petition to appoint him on the post of Principal of the College and in the alternative he has also claimed a direction against respondent No. 2 to exercise powers under Section 17 of Act for the aforesaid purpose. In this writ petition, Devi Prasad Singh was impleaded as respondent No. 1 vide order dated 11th November, 1991. In this writ petition, Devi Prasad Singh was impleaded as respondent No. 1 vide order dated 11th November, 1991. Writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 4th October, 1994 aggrieved by which Nagar Palika Inter College, Jaunpur through Manager/ Officer Incharge, Nagar Palika has filed Special Appeal No. 807 of 1994. In this appeal Dr. Havildar Singh is respondent No 1 and Devi Prasad Singh is respondent No 6. 6. Jai Nath Singh Yadav, who was allowed the continue as officiating Principal, filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2029 of 1992 claiming direction for payment of arrears of salary payable to Principal of the College w. e. f. 19th July, 1989 and also his regularisation as Principal. This writ petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 4th October, 1994 aggrieved by which Jai Nath Yadav has filed Special Appeal No. 804 of 1994. 7. We have heard Sri T. P. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant in Special Appeal No. 804 of 1994 and Sri Shashi Nandan, learned counsel appealing for the appellant in Special Appeal No. t07 of 1994 and Sri Ram Niwas Singh, learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondents. Learned counsel for the appellants have submitted that as per finding recorded by the learned Single Judge as one years period during which the panel notified by the Commission could be given effect, had already expired, no relief could be granted to respondent No. 1 Dr. Havildar Singh. It has been further submitted that as Devi Prasad Singh Joined as Principal on 31st December, 1938 and worked up to 22nd February, 1989, the panel notified by the Com mission stood exhausted and respondent No. I could not be legally appointed on that post on basis of this panel. A fresh vacancy came in existence and to fill up this vacancy fresh selection proceedings should have been initiated. It has also been submitted that as Jai Nath Yadav was throughout working as ad Hoc Principal, he was entitled to be regularised under Section 33-A of the Act. It has also been submitted that in. the facts and circumstances of the case, learned Single Judge was not legally justified in directing the Deputy Director of Education, Varanasi to determine the liability of the appel lant college to pay the amount to respondent No. 1 under Section 17 of the Act. It has also been submitted that in. the facts and circumstances of the case, learned Single Judge was not legally justified in directing the Deputy Director of Education, Varanasi to determine the liability of the appel lant college to pay the amount to respondent No. 1 under Section 17 of the Act. It has been submitted that the management of the college cannot be blamed in any way for not appointing respondent No. I and it cannot be fastened with any monetary liability. . 8. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has sub mitted that in fact respondent No. 6 Devi Prasad Singh never joined as Princi pal of the college and has never worked on the post as alleged. The papers have been forged and concocted showing his joining on the post in order to defeat the claim of the respondent No. 1 and to continue Jai-Math Yadav as officiating Principal. It has also been submitted that as Devi Prasad Singh failed to join after dismissal of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 17085 of 1985 on 5th January, 1988 within reasonable time, the petitioner, respon dent No. 1 herein, rightly, claimed his appointment on the post by moving an application on 1st June, 1988. The management was, however, willing to appoint him. When the authorities pressurized the management for appointing respondent No. 1, they got a letter from Devi Prasad Singh expres sing his willingness to join by 15th December, 1988 in order to defeat the claim of respondent No. 1. When Devi Prasad Singh failed to join even during this extended time, the management further extended time upto 31st Decem ber, 1988 for which the management had no authority. The order extending further time was wholly arbitrary and illegal action and contrary to order of Deputy Director of Education dated 21st December, 1988. It has been submitted that Devi Prasad Singh neither obtained any leave nor resigned from Sri Krishan Geeta Rastriya Inter College, Lalganj, Azamgarh and he continue as Principal of that college. He resigned only on 29th June, 1989 for joining as Principal in Navodaya Vidyalaya in Rajasthan on 1st July, 1989. The entire maneuvering and manipulations had been done to defeat the rightful claim of respondent No. 1, the candidate selected by the Com mission for the post. He resigned only on 29th June, 1989 for joining as Principal in Navodaya Vidyalaya in Rajasthan on 1st July, 1989. The entire maneuvering and manipulations had been done to defeat the rightful claim of respondent No. 1, the candidate selected by the Com mission for the post. But he has not been allowed to join the post for this long period of ten years in arbitrary and illegal manner out for which he is entitled to be compensated. 9. We have considered the rival contentions advanced by the learned. counsel for the parties and perused the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge and other materials on record. In our opinion, the following questions are involved for determination of the dispute in the present appeals : (a) What is the extent of the authority of the management to grant extension to the candidate selected by the Commission to join the post under Section 11 of the Act read with Rules 7 and 8 of the Rules framed thereunder ? (b) Whether once order of appointment is issued but the candidate could not join on account of stay order passed by this Court, the panel could expire after the period of one year contemplated under Rule 7 (2) of the Rules ? (c) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, could it be deemed that the candidate mentioned at serial No. 1 was not available for appointment and the petitioner, respondent No. 1 could be appointed as Principal ? (d) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the management could be saddled with the responsibility to compensate respondent No. 1 for the loss occasioned to him on account of in action or omission on the part of the management in not appointing him as Principal ? (e) Whether any relief could be granted to appellant Jai Nath Yadav who functioned as officiating Principal ? 10. Sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act provide that the manage ment shall, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the inti mation from the authorities, issue appointment letter to the candidate whose name has been intimated under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act. 10. Sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act provide that the manage ment shall, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the inti mation from the authorities, issue appointment letter to the candidate whose name has been intimated under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act. Rule 8 of U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission Rules, 1983, here in-after referred to as rules prescribes a (time frame within which the authorities namely Deputy Director of Education and the District Inspector of Schools shall take steps for implementation of the panel notified by the Commission. Clause (ii) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 of the Rules provides that the order of appointment shall be issued in proforma given in Appendix b within one month of the receipt of the order and also intimating him that on his failure to join within the specified time his appointment will be liable to be cancelled. From perusal of Section 11 of the Act and Rule 8 the Intention of the legislative authority is clear that after the panel of the selected candidate is notified the prompt action is required to be taken at each steps. The management has been required to give ten days time to the candidate, whose name is intimated by the District Inspector of Schools, to join as Principal. However, this period may be extended as clear from sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act and sub-rule (5) of Rule 8 of the Rules. However, the authority conferred on the management to extend time to join post has to be interpreted in the content and reference this authority has been conferred. The extension can be granted by the committee of management only in such circumstances where the candidate had the real difficulty in joining the post within the period of ten days mentioned in the order of appointment. The extension granted can also not be for indefinite period. It can be only for a reasonable time which is considered necessary in the facts and circumstances of the given case. It may be remembered that the life of panel under Rule 7 (2) of the Rules is only one year, from the date it is notified by the Commission. The extension granted can also not be for indefinite period. It can be only for a reasonable time which is considered necessary in the facts and circumstances of the given case. It may be remembered that the life of panel under Rule 7 (2) of the Rules is only one year, from the date it is notified by the Commission. Keeping this period of one year in mind it can be inferred reasonably that the management cannot extend the time for joining the post beyond a reasonable period, normally for more than four to six weeks as within this period of one year, other candidates shown in the panel also have to be given chance to join the post, in case the candidates mentioned with higher preference in order or merit failed to join or otherwise not available for appointment. In our opinion, the period of six weeks shall be normally taken to be the reasonable period, unless exceptional circumstances otherwise warrant to the extent to which the extension may be granted by the management. The Act and the Rules are silent on this aspect of the matter, it has been left to the discretion of the management, reposing a trust that it will grant extension for joining the post only for a reasonable time according to the facts of the case. However in most of the cases coming before the courts it has been experienced that the managements of the private colleges do not generally feel comfortable in appointing candidates selected and intimated by the Commission, and particularly those coming from the different places or colleges. In the prevalent circumstances and in order to prevent the management this authority, we feel it expedient and necessary to hold that normally the management shall not have power to extend time after expiry of initial period of 10 days for joining in pursuance of the order of appointment issued by it, for more than six weeks. However, extra time may be granted only in very exceptional cases and for the very strong reasons placed on record, and after obtaining prior approval of Deputy Director of Education. 11. Now coming to the present case, if the action of the management is judged in the light of the aforesaid reasonings it may be seen that the management was not at all interested in implementing the panel notified by the commission. 11. Now coming to the present case, if the action of the management is judged in the light of the aforesaid reasonings it may be seen that the management was not at all interested in implementing the panel notified by the commission. The writ Petition No 17085 of 1985 was admittedly dismissed on 5th January, 1988. We do not find any reasonable explanation on record as to why the management did not take suitable steps to compel Devi Prasad Singh to join as Principal of the Collage within reasonable time. A com plete silence was maintained upto 20th November, 19s8 i. e. for a period of more than 10 months. It appears that it was only on account of the steps taken by the respondent No. 1, that the management was compelled to take steps to ask Devi Prasad Singh to join on or before 15th December, 1988. In our opinion, he was already granted sufficient time after dismissal of writ petition, however, as the facts and circumstances of the case indicate, he was not interested to join the post. He was already serving as Principal of Sri Krishna Geeta Rastriya Inter College, Lalganj, Azamgarh for which post be was selected by the Commission in the year 1984. Prior to that he was serving as lecturer in the present college since 17th July, 1973. The manage ment while granting extension vide its letter dated 29th November, 1988 made it clear that the extension is being granted subject to condition that no further time shall be allowed, If in spite of this letter Devi Prasad Singh failed to join on or before 15th December, 1988 the management was not justified in granting further extension. Orders in this regard were already passed by the Deputy Director of Education on 21st December, 1988 to appoint respon dent No 1 Dr. Havildar Singh. In our considered opinion, the extension granted after 15th December, 1988 was wholly unreasonable, illegal and with out authority, The management bad already granted sufficient time and further extension of time to join amounted abuse of the authority conferred by law. The learned Single Judge has taken the correct view (though for the different reasons) that the management could not appoint Devi Prasad Singh on 31st December, 1988. The order of learned Single Judge in the facts and circumstances, is justified and does not call for any interference. 12. The learned Single Judge has taken the correct view (though for the different reasons) that the management could not appoint Devi Prasad Singh on 31st December, 1988. The order of learned Single Judge in the facts and circumstances, is justified and does not call for any interference. 12. Now coming to the second question, it may be noticed that Rule 7 (2) of the Rules provides that the panel prepared under sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 shall hold good for one year from the date of its notification by the Com mission. Thereafter Rule 8 provides that within 15 days of the receipt of the penal by him, the Deputy Director of Education shall notify it on his notice board and send two copies thereof to the District Inspector of Schools. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 then provides that within 10 days of the receipt of the penal by him, the District Inspector of Schools shall notify it on the notice board and intimate the name of selected candidates, standing first in order of merit to the manager of the concerned institution with the direction that the order of appointment in the proforma prescribed in Appendix b be issued to the candidate by registered post within one month of the receipt of the intimation, requiring him to join duty within 13 days of the receipt of the order. It has been further required that the District Inspector of Schools shall send intimation to the candidate, referred to in clause (ii) with directions to report to the Manager within ten days of the receipt of the order of appoint ment by him from the Manager. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 8 requires that the Manager shall comply with the directions, given under sub-rule (3), and report compliance to the Commission through Inspector. Thus from perusal of sub-rules (1), (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 8 it is clear that the Deputy Director Education, Inspector and the Manager are required under law only to issue the order of appointment in the prescribed form within the time fixed by law. It is no where provided that the compliance shall be deemed only when the candidate in whose favour the order of appointment has been issued, joined the post. The compliance upto stage of sub-rule (4) of Rule 8 only speaks about the issuance of the order of appointment. It is no where provided that the compliance shall be deemed only when the candidate in whose favour the order of appointment has been issued, joined the post. The compliance upto stage of sub-rule (4) of Rule 8 only speaks about the issuance of the order of appointment. In view of the provisions contained in the aforesaid sub-rules (1) to (4) of Rule 8 it is clear that once the order of appointment has been issued in favour of the candidate intimated by the Inspector the compliance is done and if the compliance is done within one year the panel notified by the Commission can not expire and it shall remain alive for the next candidate shown in the order of merit in case she candidate shown at serial No. 1 failed to join the post within the time allowed in the letter of appointment OF within such extended time as the management may allow in this behalf. In the present case as the order of appointment was already issued on 23rd December, 1985 well within period of one year, there was no question of expiry of the period of panel notified by the Com mission. The learned Single Judge has found that panel survived only upto 10th November, 1988. The aforesaid date has been worked out after exclud ing the period during which the interim order granted in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 17085 of 1985 remained in operation. There cannot be any dis pute about this legal position. However in our opinion in the present case as the action contemplated on the part of the Deputy Director of Education, Inspector and the Management was already taken within time fixed by law the panel could not expire. The candidate mentioned in the panel at next place in order of merit, could be given chance to join only when the candidate earlier intimated failed to join within time allowed. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that as the panel had expired the respon dent No. 1 Dr. Havildar Singh could not be appointed, has no merit and can not be accepted. In our opinion, the direction by the learned Single Judge to appoint respondent No. 1 as principal has rightly been given and the direction does not suffer from any error of law. 13. Havildar Singh could not be appointed, has no merit and can not be accepted. In our opinion, the direction by the learned Single Judge to appoint respondent No. 1 as principal has rightly been given and the direction does not suffer from any error of law. 13. The third question for determination in the present appeals is as to whether Devi Prasad Singh, candidate mentioned at serial No. 1 can be deemed otherwise to not available for appointment as Principal in the facts and circumstances of the present case as contemplated under Section 11 (S) of the Act. This Court in case of Kishori Raman Shikha Samiti and others v. Regional Deputy Director of Education, Agra and others, reported in 1994 (1) UPLBEC 248 while interpreting Section 11 (5) of the Act has held as under : "the scheme and object for which Section 11 of the Act exists in the Statute book, is to make available the selected candidate for appointment on the post of Principal or Teacher in educational institution. The aforesaid provision or sub-section (5) has to be interpreted in this context. In sub-section (5) the phrase "where such candidate is otherwise not available for appointment as such teacher" contains same words of very wide meaning and also some words of narrow meaning. The words "otherwise not available" have very wide meaning, covering all kinds of situation including death and other physical injury which may render candidate not available to the institution for appointment as teacher. However the word "appointment contains narrow meaning. The question is whether the word" appointment used in the aforesaid pharase should be given its plain meaning or it should also be given a wider meaning. The maxim "nocturne a socliis" will have to be applied in such circumstances to ascertain correct legislative intent, which means that the meaning of word should be judged by the company it keeps. It my opinion, in sub-section (5) as the word appointment denotes to make available for the work of teaching, and as it has been used with words otherwise not available, having for wide meaning it should also be given and understood, in wider sense so as to include situation where candidate is not available for work as teacher. It my opinion, in sub-section (5) as the word appointment denotes to make available for the work of teaching, and as it has been used with words otherwise not available, having for wide meaning it should also be given and understood, in wider sense so as to include situation where candidate is not available for work as teacher. This phrase thus may be interpre ted and construed so as to cover even the situation where the teacher is not available to work even after appointment and join in the post on account of death etc. Such interpretation can be given to the aforesaid phrase without causing any violence to the scheme and object of the Act and the context and reference in which it has been used. " The aforesaid view has been confirmed by the Division Bench in case of Kishori Raman Shiksha Samiti, Mathura v. Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, Agra, reported in 1994 (2) UPLBEC 1320. In the present case respondent No. 6 Devi Prasad Singh in paragraph No. 15 of his counter-affidavit had stated that he resigned from the post of Principal of Sri Krishna Geeta Rastriya Inter College, Lalganj, Azarogarh on 29th June, 1989 and he joined as Principal of Navodaya Vidyalaya, Vindhawal, Jaipur Pali, Rajasthan on 1st July, 1989. In paragraph No. 16 of the counter-affidavit, it has been admitted that he has been confirmed, as Principal of Nayodaya Vidyalaya. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear that he was not available tot appointment as Principal of the present college. Even for the sake of arguments if it is accepted that he joined in the college on 31st December, 1988 and worked there upto 22nd February, 1989, it makes no difference as he had no intention to serve the institution at any point of time. The formality of joining and serving for some time was done one to defeat the claim of respondent No. 1. If the reasonings adopted in the aforesaid case are applied, in our opinion, it can be reasonably deemed that the respondent No. 6 was not available for appointment as Principal and in the circumstances, the chance could be given to respondent No. 1 who was second candidate in the order of merit in the panel. If the reasonings adopted in the aforesaid case are applied, in our opinion, it can be reasonably deemed that the respondent No. 6 was not available for appointment as Principal and in the circumstances, the chance could be given to respondent No. 1 who was second candidate in the order of merit in the panel. The observa tions of the Division Bench are also important in this connection which run as under :- "it is common knowledge that almost the entire salary of teachers of an aided recognised institution run by private management is paid by the State Government. Ths service conditions of teachers in such colleges is also regulated by the provisions of U. P. Intermediate Education Act and also U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission and Selection Boards Act. It has come on the record that the permanent Principal Smt. Gayatri Rawat retired in 1981 and the Commission took nearly three years in forwarding the penal for filling the vacancy so caused. Sitting in this jurisdiction, we have coie across cases where the commission has not been able to recommend a penal for as long as 5-6 years. There is no denying of the fact that the Com mission is in fact taking several years to recommend a penal. It is also a fact that Smt. Kusum Srivastaya died within five days of her joining as Principal of the institution and that the name of Smt. N. A. Zuhairi finds place at Serial No. 2 in the penal which was recommended by the Commission for making appointment on the post of Principal of the institution. It is in this background that we have to consider the contention raised by the parties" 14. The facts of the present case are almost identical. The candi date selected and recommended for appointment in the year 1985 has not been given chance to serve on the post though more than 10 years have passed. The endeavour on the part of the appellants and respondent No. 6 was to keep respondent No, 1 away from the institution so that Jai Nath Yadav could be continued as officiating Principal with whom the management felt comfortable. During all this period Jai Nath Yadav has been illegally allowed to function as officiating Principal as duly selected candidate namely respondent No. 1 was available for appointment. During all this period Jai Nath Yadav has been illegally allowed to function as officiating Principal as duly selected candidate namely respondent No. 1 was available for appointment. In our opinion, the direction has been rightly given in favour of respondent No. 1 for being appointed as Principal. In the facts and circumstances of the present case it become immaterial that the respondent No. 6 worked for a short period as Principal. 15. Last two questions can be answered jointly. The facts and circum stances of the present case have been narrated in details in the earlier part of this judgment. From the facts it is clear that the lot of manoeuvring was done by the committee of management to defeat the claim of respondent No. 1 somehow for the best reasons known to the management of institution they wanted to continue Jai Nath Yadav as officiating Principal. If such attitude and conduct adopted by the management is condoned the manage ments may feel encouraged in indulging in such activities which seriously prejudice the interest of the institution and the students and also amount to the abuse of the process of law. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge has rightly directed the Deputy Director of Education to determine the amount under Section 17 (1) of the Act which may be recovered from the management for payment to the respondent No. 1. 16. It is minimum which can be done to compensate respondent No. 1, who has been illegally deprived of the chance to serve as Principal for a long period of 10 years. However, we make it clear that the Deputy Director of Education shall decide the application of respondent No. 1 on its own merits and in accordance with law, with could being influenced by the observations made in this order which are only for deciding these appeals, or by the observations of learned Single Judge. The impugned order does not suffer from any error of law. 17. It may also be mentioned that as the candidates were already selected and recommended by the Commission for appointment as Principal of the College, the appellant Jai Nath Yadav could not claim regularisation against the same post. In fact the was illegally continued as officiating Principal at the cost of respondent No. 1. 17. It may also be mentioned that as the candidates were already selected and recommended by the Commission for appointment as Principal of the College, the appellant Jai Nath Yadav could not claim regularisation against the same post. In fact the was illegally continued as officiating Principal at the cost of respondent No. 1. Division Bench in case of Kishor Raman Shiksha Samiti, Mathura v Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, Agra, reported in 1994 (2) UPLBEC 1320, has held that the officiating Principal has no legal right to resist appointment of regular Principal. In the same way, the Division Bench of this Court in case of Johari Devi Girls Inter College, Kanpur v. U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission, Allahabad, reported in 1990 (1) UPLBEC 634, has held as under :- "in our opinion this petition can be disposed of on the short ground that the petitioners do not nave sufficient locus standi to maintain this petition on the ground on which it is being maintained in this Court. This is not the case of the petitioners, nor can it be, that the Commission selected the candidates without complying with the requisite rules. The selectees of the Com mission were not in any manner disqualified to appoint as Principal. There has to be a Principal of the Institution, and the management has got to appoint Principal upon the recommenda tion of the Commission. In this situation, we feel that the petitioners should not be allowed to frustrate the recommendations of the Commission on a mere technicality. " We are in respectful agreement with the view expressee by the aforesaid Division Benches. In our opinion, both the appellants have not been able to make out any case for interference with the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court and appeals are liable to be dismissed. 18. For the reasons stated above, the appeals are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .