Judgment :- Janarthanam, J. One Kandaswami, (petitioner) is the father of the detenu, Ravi alias Gundu Ravi. The detenu, it is said, is an immoral traffic offender. Apart from the ground case, as set out in the grounds of detention, he had come to adverse notice in two other cases. The District Magistrate and District Collector, Salem (second respondent) in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.3 of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, clamped upon the detenu the impugned order of detention in his proceedings C.M.P. No.27/ I.T.O./ 94/ (C2). dated 14. 1994, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and health. 2. Mr.S. Rajasekar, learned counsel for the petitioner would press into service the following points for consideration: (1) There is inordinate delay in considering the representation dated 15. 1994 of the detenu and consequently the right of representation inhering in his favour under Art.22 (5) of the Constitution of India had been greatly affected. (2) The family members of the detenu had not been intimated within areasonable time about the place of detention of the detenu, and (3) The instructions given by the sponsoring authority to the Public Prosecutor that proceedings for the detention of the detenu under Act 14 of 1982 are pending before the competent authority getting reflected in the copy of the bail order dated 4. 1994 of the Court of Session, Salem, in Crl.M.P.Nos. 2136 to 2138 of 1994 would tantamount to pre-conception of the passing of the impugned order of detention on the mind of the second respondent- Detaining Authority. 3. Mr.R. Raghupathy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, would, however, repel such submissions and produce the relevant file for perusal and consideration of this Court. .4. From a perusal of the file, we are able to find that the representation dated 15. 1994 had been received by the first respondent-Government on 15. 1994 on 15. 1994 remarks had been called for and despatch had been effected on the same date. The remarks, so called for, had been received by the second respondent Detaining Authority on 20.5.1994 and on the same day remarks had been called for from the sponsoring authority. The remarks so called for had been submitted to the second respondent on 25. 1994 and he, in turn, despatched the same to the first respondent-Government on 25. 1994. The remarks, so called for, had been received by the second respondent Detaining Authority on 20.5.1994 and on the same day remarks had been called for from the sponsoring authority. The remarks so called for had been submitted to the second respondent on 25. 1994 and he, in turn, despatched the same to the first respondent-Government on 25. 1994. The same had been received by the Government on 6. 1994 and on the same day, the file had been circulated for consideration of the Under Secretary and Joint Secretary. After the processing of the file, the same had been submitted to the Minister for Law on 6. 1994 and the Minister for Law in turn, on a consideration of the relevant materials available on the file, however, rejected the representation on 6. 1994. It is thus clear from the chronology of the events that took place from the date of the receipt of the representation that the same had been disposed of within a period of 17 days without causing any unreasonable delay in the movement of the file from one place to another. 5. What is getting revealed by the perusal of the file is that one Kavitha, wife of the detenu had been served on.14. 1994, with a copy of the intimation dated 14. 1994 as respects the place of detention of the detenu and such service had been effected in the presence of two witnesses. There is no pale of controversy that the order of detention had been passed on 14. 1994 and the same had been served upon the detenu on 14. 1994. In such circumstances, it cannot be stated that there is any delay at all in informing the family members of the detenu as respects the place of detention of the detenu. .6. In the booklet of documents supplied to the detenu, a copy of the bail order of the court of Session in Crl. M.P. Nos.2136 to 2138 of 1994 is available. A perusal of the said order indicates that the detenu is one of the petitioners, who moved for bail for his release. .6. In the booklet of documents supplied to the detenu, a copy of the bail order of the court of Session in Crl. M.P. Nos.2136 to 2138 of 1994 is available. A perusal of the said order indicates that the detenu is one of the petitioners, who moved for bail for his release. During the course of hearing arguments in the said bail applications, a representation appears to have been made that proceedings had been initiated for detaining them under Act 14 of 1982 and the representation so made had formed part of the reasons for the rejection of bail to the detenu and the other petitioners. We are unable to appreciate as to how such a representation would ever tantamount to a preconception in the mind of the second respondent-Detaining Authority in clamping upon the detenu an order of detention. The sponsoring authority, being the wearer of the shoes alone knows where the shoe pinches. He, being in such a position, is entitled to instruct the Public Prosecutor all facts about the case so as to see that effective representation is made by the Public Prosecutor in opposing the bail application before the court. The sponsoring authority, who fully possessed of all the relevant materials about the detenu, could have very well anticipated the passing of the impugned order of detention by the second respondent-Detaining Authority on consideration of the materials as placed by him before the second respondent. The second respondent-Detaining Authority formulates the grounds of detention only on the basis of the materials supplied by the sponsoring authority and not otherwise and if the second respondent- Detaining Authority formulates the grounds of detention on materials not placed before him, then it would tantamount to passing of the impugned order of detention on extraneous materials. For the sake of emphasis it may be stated that the anticipation and expectation of the sponsoring authority that there was every likelihood of passing of the order of detention by the second respondent-Detaining Authority even at the time when the bail application had been made before the Court of Session, Salem, can by no stretch of imagination be stated to be a pre-conception on the part of the second respondent- Detaining Authority for clamping the impugned order of detention. 7. For the above reasons, the petition deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed.