JUDGMENT 1. S. R. Singh, J. Defendants to Suit No. 385 of 1991 have challenged the appointment of Receiver made on an application moved on behalf of the plaintiff-Respondent Anguri Devi under Order XL, Rule 1, C. P. C. The suit was instituted essentially for the relief of accounting and winding up of "m/s. Goyal Brothers" which according to the plaintiff was a partnership firm. The partnership, according to her, was at Will. The relief was founded on the plaint allegations that the plaintiff was the owner of a shop situate at Holi Gate, Mohalla Tilakdwar in the town of Mathura; that she agreed to launching business in the said shop in partnership with the defendants on terms" and conditions encapsulated in the partnership deed dated 1.2.1973 executed with the consent of all the partners and that no rent would be payable to the plaintiff for the shop but she would get 10% of the net profit accruing from the business without sharing the losses incurred therein. It was further alleged in the plaint that the defendants who according to the agreement were actually managing and carrying on the business failed to furnish proper accounts thereof whereupon the partnership was terminated vide notice dated 25.2.1988 and the firm dissolved vide notice dated 10.8.1991 and since the defendants failed to render Accounts despite termination of the partnership and dissolution of the Firm hence the suit. 2. The plaintiff-respondent moved an application for interim injunction restraining the defendants from selling any goods from the shop in question and from removing the goods either from the shop or from the godown and an application for appointment of Receiver to take possession of the entire business including the shop and the godown thereof and to prepare an inventory of the entire goods, books of accounts, bills, vounchers, returns, Raseed Bahi, pass books, sales files relating to Sales-tax etc. The trail court granted ex parte injunction vide order dated 3,9. 1991 which was set aside in appeal and a modified version of injunction order was issued to the effect that the petitioners would furnish security to the tune of Rs. 1 lac half of which would be cash security in order to ensure speedy disposal of injunction application and the application for appointment of Receiver. 1991 which was set aside in appeal and a modified version of injunction order was issued to the effect that the petitioners would furnish security to the tune of Rs. 1 lac half of which would be cash security in order to ensure speedy disposal of injunction application and the application for appointment of Receiver. The appellate order dated 3.10.91 was impugned in a writ petition which was dismissed by order dated 22.10.91 subject to certain observations/directions as embodied therein. It is not within the domain of dispute that the petitioners have since furnished adequate/requisite security to the extent of Rs. 1 lac before the trial court and the same was accepted on 16.11.91. 3. The application for appointment of Receiver was resisted by the petitioners on grounds inter alia that the plaintiff was not a partner of the Firm namely, M/s. Goyal Brothers and in fact she had let out her shop' on consideration of 10% profits in lieu of rent accruing from the business. The deed dated 1.2.73 was albeit, ostensibly a partnership but in practical terms, it was an agreement for letting out the shop which was within the purview of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Rent, Letting and Eviction) Act No. 13 of 1972. According to the petitioners, they scrupled making investment in the business because of the reasons that under the agreement dated 1.2.73, the plaintiff had a right to terminate the agreement and take possession of the shop and hence, an amended deed dated 23. 11. 1978 was executed with the consent of the parties, according to which, if the plaintiff wanted to dissociate herself from the partnership she would be entitled to get l/12th of 10% of the last three years' profit by way of rent and the shop and other goods etc. would remain in possession of the petitioners. 4. The trial court appointed, vide order dated 5. 8. 1995, Sri R. K. Agarwal Advocate as a Receiver investing him with the authority to take possession of the goods, bills, vouchers, Raseed Bahi and other papers pertaining to business and to prepare inventory thereof and produce the same before the court. The appellate court, vide order dated 5.9.95, modified the order passed by the trial court and appointed Joint Receivers comprising a nominee of the plaintiff and the three defendants. The appellate court, vide order dated 5.9.95, modified the order passed by the trial court and appointed Joint Receivers comprising a nominee of the plaintiff and the three defendants. The joint Receivers were directed to maintain proper account of the assets of the partnership, both capital and liquid, including the income from the business and submit quarterly returns to the trial court pending conclusion of the suit. The nominee of the plaintiff, proceeds the order, would get Rs. 2,500 per month as remuneration which was to be borne equally by the plaintiff and defendants subject to the ultimate adjustment at the time of final accounting pursuant to the decree that may be passed in the suit. Aggrieved, the defendants tiled the instant petition. I have heard Sri K. N. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri R. P. Goyal, appearing for the respondent No. 3. 5. As already stated hereinabove, the partnership, according to the plaintiff, was a partnership at Will and that being so, the firm was liable to be dissolved by any partner by giving notice in writing to all the other partners of his intention to dissolve the firm as provided in Section 43 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The partnership if at all it was the one of which the plaintiff was a partner was terminated, according to paragraph 9 of the plaint by notice dated 25.2.1988. The notice dated 25.2.1988 may amount to dissolution of the firm but according to paragraph 12 of the plaint, the firm is said to have been dissolved by notice dated 10.8.1991 receipt of which is disputed by the petitioners. Whether the firm would be deemed to have been dissolved by notice dated 25.2.1988 or by means of the latter notice dated 10.8.1991 is a question to be analytically examined by the trial court but what is beyond the pale of controversy is that the firm, on the own showing of the plaintiff, stood dissolved before the institution of the suit and that is why the suit is for the accounting of the business of the firm and its winding up. The rights which a partner has, after the dissolution of the firm are to have the property of the firm applied in payment of the debts and liabilities of the firm and to have the surplus distributed amongst the partners or their representatives according to their rights/shares as visualised by Section 46 of the Partnership Act. It is these rights which may be enforced at the behest of the plaintiff-respondent after the dissolution of the firm. It is true that after the dissolution of the firm, the authorities of each partner to bind the firm and other mutual rights and obligations of the partners, continue notwithstanding the dissolution but this is so only in so far as it is necessary to wind up the affairs of the firm and to complete transaction, if any, begun but unfinished at the time of its dissolution, but not otherwise as would be evident from Section 47 of the Act. The firm having been dissolved, the plaintiff- respondent can have no right in relation to the running-business after the dissolution of partnership inasmuch as her rights would be restricted to assets and other properties of the firm as on date of dissolution except to the extent visualised by Section 47. Therefore, if at all it is found necessary to appoint a Receiver in a suit like the one on hand i.e. a suit which is essentially one for enforcement of rights conferred by Section 46 of the Act, regards will have to be had to the rights and obligations of the parties visualised in terms of the agreement and Sections 46 and 47 of the Act. It may be observed that in the peculiar facts of this case, it would be of no vital moment if the plaintiff was really a partner in the business as alleged by her or she was not, as alleged by defendant-petitioner. Questions that may arise at the trial of the (sic) and answer to which questions one way or the other may have a pivotal hearing on the question of appointment of Receiver in the present case are these ; (i) whether the plaintiff had made any contribution to the capital invested in the business? Questions that may arise at the trial of the (sic) and answer to which questions one way or the other may have a pivotal hearing on the question of appointment of Receiver in the present case are these ; (i) whether the plaintiff had made any contribution to the capital invested in the business? If so what was the extent of contribution uptill the date of dissolution of the firm?; (ii) whether the plaintiff had any right or interest in the goods and other properties or assets of the firm besides the right to get 10% share in the net profit accruing from the business ? and (in) whether the original partnership deed was amended as alleged by the petitioners? 6. It is no doubt true that the property of the firm includes all property and rights and interests in property originally brought into stock of the firm, or acquired by purchase or otherwise by or for the firm or for the purposes and in the course of business of the firm and includes also the good-will of the business and unless the contrary intention appears, the property or rights and interests in the property acquired with money belonging to the firm are deemed to have been acquired for the firm but all this is subject to the contracts between the partners. The question as to whether the plaintiff-respondent had contributed to the investments originally made in the business is of significant moment vis-a-vis the desirability of appointment of Receiver studded with the power to prepare inventory of the entire goods and take control over the business even after the plaintiff has withdrawn herself from the business and dissolved the firm long ago particularly in view of clause (ii) of the Partnership-deed dated 1.2.1973 which provides in no uncertain language that in case the plaintiff withdraws herself from the business, she would not lay her claim in respect of the goods belonging to the firm, apart from cash corresponding to her share of profit and investment. IT cannot be repudiated that if the original partnership-deed dated 1.2.1973 stood amended as alleged by the petitioners with effect from 23.11.1978, then the petitioners may be entitled, subject of course, to the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 13 of 1972 to continue their business in the shop subject to payment of monthly rent calculated on the basis of average annual income that might have accrued during three years immediately preceding the date the plaintiff from the business. On the other hand, if the partnership remained unamended as alleged by the plaintiff, then she would be entitled to take possession of the shop in question immediately and the petitioners would have no right to continue their business in the shop, but what is of pivotal moment is that even according to the original deed of partnership, the plaintiff is not entitled to lay any claim in respect of the goods belonging to the firm. The appointment of Receiver in a case like one at hand, would get vitiated if it is made without proper self-direction to the questions aforestated and analytical examination of the affidavit and other materials including the agreement in juxtaposition with the pleadings of the parties. Such a defect if any, would be one of manifest error of law going deep to the very root of the decision-making process itself and, if found, would warrant interference in certiorari jurisdiction. The question that emerges is whether the courts below have ordered appointment of Receiver on a proper self-direction to the relevant questions involved in the case. I find no specific averments made in the plaint, if the plaintiff-respondent had made any contribution at any point of time to the investments made in the business of the firm. The trial Judge as would be seen from the order dated 5. 8. 95 did not go into the questions aforestated. He ordered appointment of Receiver prayed for by the plaintiff as he was of the view that the plaintiff was not a party to the alleged amendment to the original deed of partnership by the so-called amended deed of partnership dated 23.11.1978 and she had reasonable apprehension of the goods being misappropriated or removed by the defendants and further that accounting as to investment and profits would be possible only if a Receiver was appointed in the matter. The appellate court though held "that the plaintiff had no concern with the assets or liabilities or other goods or articles of the business of the firm" and "her claim is confined to her share in profits" and further-more that "at this stage, keeping in view the supplementary deed, it cannot be finally concluded that the firm has no right to continue the business in that shop. " Yet it maintained the appointment of Receiver with certain modifications in the order passed by the trial Judge. Reasons given by the appellate court inter-alia are these: (i) "the defendants got the assets of the said partnership business increased day by day but they did not take into account these assets while determining the share of the plaintiff in the said business" ; and (ii), the property has to be "preserved by the appointment of Receiver because there have been the allegations of the plaintiff in ner suit that the defendants are making fraudulent disposal of the properties with a view to adversely affect the interest of the plaintiff in her share in the profits. " This Court is of the view that if in the opinion of the appellate Court "the plaintiff had no concern with the assets or liabilities or other goods or articles of the business of the firm", then the object of appointing Receiver i.e. preservation of the property of the firm as given in the appellate order becomes irrelevant. The appellate Court's conclusion that "it cannot be finally concluded that the firm has no right to continue the business in that shop", is reasonably based upon its conclusion that "at this stage, the existence or genuineness of this supplementary deed cannot be adjudicated unless parties are permitted to adduce evidence" but then, it proceeded to record incongruous opinion that "all the parties to the suit have actually no lawful authority to do business in the said firm". It was upon this non-sequitur conclusion that the appellate court held that no harm can be done to any one by taking out and preserving for the benefit of the legitimate which may prove successful". It was upon this non-sequitur conclusion that the appellate court held that no harm can be done to any one by taking out and preserving for the benefit of the legitimate which may prove successful". Term "property of the firm" may have wide connotation as would be evident from Section 14 of the Partnership Act but that provision is "subject to the contract between the partners" and the words used in paragraph 11 of the original partnership-deed as well as supplementary deed of partnership coupled with the absence of any categorical averment in the plaint that the plaintiff had contributed anything towards the investment made in the business, may reasonably suggest that plaintiff had no concern with the assets and goods apart from her share of profits and that too till the date of dissolution of the firm. Appointment of a Receiver for the limited purposes of ascertaining the profits which may have accrued during three years immediately preceding the date of dissolution of the firm by the plaintiff may be understandable but the courts below did not arrear to have addressed themselves to the question from this angle. It is true, as comprehended by Section 47 of the Partnership Act, that the partnership continues even after dissolution of the firm but such continuance is only in so far as it is necessary to wind up the affairs of the firm and to complete the transaction unfinished at the time of dissolution and not otherwise. While appointing the Receiver in the instant case, the courts below have not reckoned with this aspect of the matter as well. It is well-high settled that ordinarily an order appointing Receiver ought not to be made "where it has the effect of depriving a defendant of de-facto possession since it might cause irreparable wrong. " The approach of the appellate court that since "all the parties to the suit have actually no lawful authority to do business in the said firm and so no ha,a can be done to anyone by taking out and preserving for the benefit of the legitimate which may prove successful" cannot be appreciated as it runs counter to the view expressed earlier by the appellate court to the effect that "at this stage keeping in view the supplementary deed, it cannot be finally concluded that the firm has no right to continue business in that shop. " 7. " 7. I am of the considered view that appointment of Receiver or comity of Receivers invested with the power "to maintain proper accounts of the assets of the partnership-both capital and liquid including the income deriving/derived from the business" cannot be maintained. If at all Receiver or a comity of Receivers is to be appointed, then its power, in the facts and circumstances of the case, has to be circumscribed only to finding out the assets in the hands of the partnership at the time of its dissolution and the share of investment if any made by the plaintiff in such assets as well as three years' profit that may have accrued immediately preceding the date of dissolution. 8. I am of the considered view that the order appointing Receiver in the instant case, stands vitiated and the matter has to be re-examined in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned orders are quashed. The learned trial Judge shall dispose of the application for appointment of Receiver afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. Petition partly allowed.