B. M. LAL, J. Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Bharad Sapru, is heard for petitioner on the question of admission and stay. 2. Petitioner M/s Siel Ltd. is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and has a sugar manufacturing unit, named Titahi Sugar Complex in the district of Muzaffarnagar. 3. By this petition, the petitioner challenges a order dated 19. 10. 1995 passed by the respondent No. 2 Cane Commissioner, U. P. , Lucknow in exercise of his powers under Section 15 of the U. P. Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 read with clause 6 (1) (A) of the Sugar Cane Control Order, 1966 contained in Annexure-5 to this petitioner. 4. By the order impugned, the respondent No. 2 has reserved/assigned area for the petitioners sugar manufacturing unit enabling it to purchase the sugarcane required by it for the crushing season 1995-96. 5. The relief sought for in this petition is that by issuing a writ of certiorari that part of the order impugned may be quashed in so far as it relates to setting up of seven new cane centres at Kutabakuthi, Harsoli, Salempur, Karwada, Cnatela, Charoli Atali and Kedi and bifurcating the existing cane centres of Gate, Sonta and Rasulpur. 6. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for petition is that while issuing the order impugned guidelines formulated in this regard have not been adhered to. 7. To substantiate his submission, the learned counsel referred to Annexure-6, dated 20. 5. 1992 containing the guidelines. 8. In support of this submission, the learned counsel also cited a decision of the Apex Court rendered in Home Secretary, U. T. , Chandigarh and another v. Darshjit Singh Grewal & Ors. , JT 1993 (4) SC 387, wherein it is ruled that the policy guidelines are relatable to the executive power of Administration, and having enunciated a policy of general application and having communicated it to all concerned, the Administration is bound by it. It can, no doubt, change the policy but until it is done, it is bound to adhere to it. 9. The ratio laid down in Home Secretary, U. T. Chandigarh (supra) has no application to the instant case as the policy in question has been changed by the impugned order dated 19. 10. It can, no doubt, change the policy but until it is done, it is bound to adhere to it. 9. The ratio laid down in Home Secretary, U. T. Chandigarh (supra) has no application to the instant case as the policy in question has been changed by the impugned order dated 19. 10. 1995, and therefore the earlier policy being not in existence, the Cane Commissioner is not bound to adhere to it. 10. The submission made by the learned counsel has no force for the following reasons. Firstly, this position is not disputed that guidelines contained in Annexure-6 are in the nature of instructions and do not have statutory force of law, therefore, do not confer upon the petitioner a legally enforceable right. [see Union of India v. S. L. Abbas, JT 1993 (3) SC 678]. Secondly, it is also not disputed that policy or guidelines can always be changed by the appropriate authority. In the instant case, the guidelines referred to by the learned counsel and said to have been violated, as contained in Annexure-6 to this petition, dated 20. 5. 1992, are framed and issued by the Cane Commissioner, U. P. himself. But while issuing the order impugned dated 19. 10. 1995, the learned Cane Commissioner, U. P. very categorically In so many words in the order itself did mention that it is being issued in suppression of all previous orders/instructions. This being so, how the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Home Secretary case (supra) helps the petitioner, we fail to understand. At his juncture, the view expressed by the Apex Court in J. R. Raghupati v. State of A. p. & Ors. , Air 1988 SC 1681 , cannot be lost sight of wherein the Apex Court ruled that the Government decision to locate headquarter at a particular place, interference by the High Court with the same on the ground of breach of guidelines, is not warranted. Thirdly, vide its application dated 17. 8. 1995 contained in Annexure-2 sent to the Cane Commissioner, U. P. (respondent No. 2), the petitioner itself made request for opening new cane centres so as to meet its expanded capacity. Statement to this effect has also been made in para 20 of the petition. 11. Thirdly, vide its application dated 17. 8. 1995 contained in Annexure-2 sent to the Cane Commissioner, U. P. (respondent No. 2), the petitioner itself made request for opening new cane centres so as to meet its expanded capacity. Statement to this effect has also been made in para 20 of the petition. 11. This being so, on the face of these facts, it does not lie in its mouth to challenge the order impugned creating certain new cane centres. 12. Thus, the submission made by the learned counsel has no substance at all. 13. The second contention raised by the learned counsel is that order impugned has been made at the instance of local M. L. A. 14. On being suggested that there is no illegality if a representative of the public such as Member of Parliament or Member of Legislative Assembly, apprises public authority about the wishes and difficulties being faced by the public, the learned counsel took serious exception to it and stated that M. P. or M. L. A. cannot do that. We, however, do not agree with his above stand. 15. At this stage, while referring to paragraphs 22 and 23 of the petition, the learned counsel submitted that the local M. L. A. alongwith about 500 persons came to the petitioner unit on 9. 10. 1995 and duress was exercised and Additional General Manager of the unit was coerced to agree in writing that it is acceptable to them that more new cane centres be opened and forced the Additional General Manager to affix his signatures thereon. 16. The learned counsel further submitted that it was on the basis of that document, that new cane centres have been opened and therefore the order impugned is liable to be set aside. 17. This submission made by the learned counsel is also of no help to the petitioner. While making such type of serious allegations, care has not been taken even to implead the person against whom mala fide is alleged. To admit what has been conveyed through this argument, would amount to violate the well recognised rule "audi alteram partem" which means that no one can be condemned unheard. 18. Besides this, even if it is accepted to be a fact, is the writ jurisdiction a remedy therefore ? Certainly not. The Legislature has taken care of such contingencies as alleged. 19. 18. Besides this, even if it is accepted to be a fact, is the writ jurisdiction a remedy therefore ? Certainly not. The Legislature has taken care of such contingencies as alleged. 19. From the discussion aforesaid, in the considered opinion of this Court, the order impugned dated 19. 10. 1995 contained in Annexure-5 does not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference in the writ jurisdiction. 20. The petition is wholly misconceived and is accordingly dismissed in limine without issuing notice to the other side. Petition dismissed. .