PARITOSH K. MUKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) BY means of present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the continuation of the order of suspension dated September 4, 1995. ( 2 ) SRI S. C. Tewari, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged before me that in view of recent judgment of Honble M. Katju. J. delivered on December 19, 1994, in the case of Jagjeet singh v. State of U. P. and Anr. 1995 (70) FLR 731 (Alld.) the petitioner deserves to be given benefit, and there is no necessity of continuation of suspension order. Further since the petitioner was taken into police custody and was enlarged on bail on August 24, 1995, there is no earthly reason in putting the petitioner under suspension, even after his enlargement. ( 3 ) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the contingency of remaining in police custody for 48 hours of Government servant was in the mind of rule making authority, while framing rules, and it was in this view of the matter that a provision was made for "deemed suspension" during the period a Government servant remains in police custody. ( 4 ) IF a person is taken into custody, it is quite impossible for him to function his official duties. It is because of this reason, that provision of suspension is a must, during the period of his remaining in jail. But when he is enlarged on bail, he should be given duty as during the pendency of criminal trial, keeping him under suspension is against the principle of natural justice. ( 5 ) SRI. K. M. Sahai, learned standing counsel also pointed out that the case of Jagjeet Singh (supra) has already been referred to a larger Bench by Hon. S. P. Srivastava, J and Hon. B. K. Roy, j. ( 6 ) BE that as it may, in the present case since the petitioner has been enlarged on bail, as such, prima facie there appears to be no justification for continuation of the order of suspension till finalisation of the criminal trial, which is bound to take a considerable period of time. 7 Accordingly, the impugned order of suspension dated September 4, 1995 is set aside. 8. 7 Accordingly, the impugned order of suspension dated September 4, 1995 is set aside. 8. However, the respondents are not prevented to pass fresh order of suspension after disposal of the criminal trial if the respondents are of the view that the departmental proceedings should be initiated against the petitioner, in respect of self framed charges. 9. With the aforesaid observations, writ petition is disposed of finally. .