S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. This second appeal filed by the defendant is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court wherein the decree passed by the trial court canceling the sale-deed dated 1-4-1971 executed by the mother of the plaintiff during his minority transfer ring agricultural holding bearing Khasara No. 300 having an area of 0. 27 acres had been cancelled. 2. The facts in brief, shorn - of details and necessary for disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass. The plaintiff Navin Chandra had filed the suit giving rise to this appeal through a next friend on 17th July, 1974 alleging himself to be a minor and seeking cancellation of the sale-deed dated 1-4-1971 in respect of plot No. 300 which had been executed by his mother in favour of the defendant. In the plaint the plaintiffs age was disclosed to be 12 years. In the written statement, the plaintiffs age was disclosed to be only 10 years. The fact that on the date of the execution of the sale-deed in question, the plaintiff was a minor was not disputed. The plaintiff had challenged the validity of the sale-deed in question on the ground that the sale-deed had been executed without obtaining the requisite permission from the District Judge as contemplated under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. The aforesaid suit was contested by the present appellant asserting that Jagannath who was shown to be the next friend of the minor plaintiff had no right to file the suit. It was also asserted that the suit was barred by Section 331 of the U. P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act and in any case, the plain tiff should return the sale money and without such payment the sale-deed could not be cancelled. It was also asserted that the suit was barred by Section 331 of the U. P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act and in any case, the plain tiff should return the sale money and without such payment the sale-deed could not be cancelled. The defendant also asserted that since Jagannath, the alleged next friend through whom the plaintiff had filed the suit could be treated as a next friend of the plaintiff on account of his interest being adverse to the plaintiff no decree in favour of the plaintiff could have been passed, it was also asserted that in any event since the plaintiff had attained majority on 24-5-1980 on his own showing the suit could if at all be deemed to have been filed on the said date and since the sale-deed in dispute had been executed on 1-4-1971 and the suit to have been filed on 24-5-1980 it was liable to be dis missed as having become barred by time on that date. 3. The trial court came to the conclusion that the mother of the plain tiff had executed another sale- deed on the same date in respect of plot No. 305 only after obtaining the requisite permission as contemplated under Sec. 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act but the sale-deed in respect of plot No. 300 in dispute had been executed without any such permission and was voidable. The trial court further came to the conclusion that the suit as framed was not barred by time as alleged and the relief sought for could very well be granted by the Civil Court, inasmuch as the revenue entries in respect of the land in dispute stood in favour of the vendor. The plea relating to the lack of jurisdiction on account of the bar of Section 331 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was negatived. The first appellate court endorsed the findings of the trial court and upheld the decree passed by it. 4. I have heard Sri R. N. Bhalla, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri S. O. P. Agarwal, learned counsel representing the contesting respon dents. 5. The first appellate court endorsed the findings of the trial court and upheld the decree passed by it. 4. I have heard Sri R. N. Bhalla, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri S. O. P. Agarwal, learned counsel representing the contesting respon dents. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously contended that Jagannath, the alleged next friend through whom the suit had been filed by the minor plaintiff was not entitled to file the suit as a next friend as his interest was adverse to the minor plaintiff. The contention is that the provisions contained in Order XXXII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code specifically provide that every suit by a minor shall be instituted in his name by a person who in such suit shall be called the next friend of the minor and since in the present case Jagannath could not be treated to be the next friend of the plain tiff on account of his adverse interest the suit was liable to be thrown out on this ground alone and in any case could be deemed to have been filed when the minor attained majority on 24-5-80 and was permitted to conti nue the suit by the court without the next friend in which event the entire period elapsing between 14-7-1977 to 24-5-1980 was liable to be ignored with the result that by the date when the suit was to be deemed to have been filed the bar of limitation having already set in no decree could have been granted in favour of the plaintiff. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the above submissions. 7. The provisions contained under Order XXXII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with procedure only. A decree obtained in favour of a minor even without being represented by the next friend in a suit cannot be treated as a nullity. However, no effectual or a valid decree could be passed against the interest of a minor without his being represented by a proper next friend or a proper guardian. The rule is intended for the benefit of the minor. Even if the next friend is found to be not a proper person, the suit filed in the name of the minor cannot be treated as abortive and an opportunity should normally be given to remove the defect in this regard, if any. The rule is intended for the benefit of the minor. Even if the next friend is found to be not a proper person, the suit filed in the name of the minor cannot be treated as abortive and an opportunity should normally be given to remove the defect in this regard, if any. This course has to be adopted as the minor who is a party to suit is considered to be under the protection of the Court and consequently it is the duty of the court to watch his interest vigilantly and see to it that he is represented by a proper person. It will be useful to notice in this connection that the provisions contained in Order XXXII, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code require that where a suit is instituted by or on behalf of a minor without a next friend, the defendant may apply to have the plaint taken off the file, with the costs to be paid by the pleader or other person by whom it was presented. It is therefore, open to the court after noticing the minority of the plaintiff to suspend all the pro ceedings in the suit until the defect is removed. 8. In the present case what I find is that the suit had been filed by the plaintiff minor on 14-7-1977 and it is not disputed that on the said date, the suit was well within limitation. The fact that the minor has a right of suit after attaining majority does not prevent him from instituting suit daring his minority adopting the procedure established by the law. The plaintiff in the present case had attained the majority on 24-5-1981. The trial court had decreed the suit on 31-8-1981. The decree passed by the trial court is in favour of the plaintiff. In the circumstances, therefore, any defect in the presentation of the suit stood occurred with the attaining of majority by the plaintiff and permitting him to continue the suit. The trial court had decreed the suit on 31-8-1981. The decree passed by the trial court is in favour of the plaintiff. In the circumstances, therefore, any defect in the presentation of the suit stood occurred with the attaining of majority by the plaintiff and permitting him to continue the suit. It seems to me that in the circumstances of the case, in view of what has been indicated hereinbefore, the entire period elapsing between 14-7-1977 and 24-5-1980 could not be ignored and there could be no manner of doubt that when the filing of the suit in the name of the plaintiff minor, the running out of the limitation stood arrested on the date of the filing of the present suit. 9. In the circumstances, on the facts found and established on the record the finding returned by the courts below holding that the suit could not be deemed to be barred by limitation cannot be held to be vitiated in law so as to justify an interference while exercising the jurisdiction contemplated under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. No other ground has been pressed. In view of the conclusion indica ted herein above, this second appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .