B. M. MITRA, J. ( 1 ) -THE present revisional application is directed against order No. 4 dated 3rd February, 1995 passed by the learned Judge, 9th Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta in T. S. No. 289 of 1995. The said revisional application is taken up for hearing on contest. In the meantime there are applications filed by some of the parties for vacating the interim order. This Court does not think it necessary to deal with the same as it proposes to dispose of the main matter and whatever will be result in the main matter the other application will abide by the result of the same. Before commencement of hearing six sets of applications for addition of parties have been filed by the respective Unions representing the bank employees of different banks and the said applications for addition of parties were allowed on consent as it was felt that as the matter is concerning the interest of all the banking associations proposed to be added they should be heard for effective adjudication of the controversy. ( 2 ) THE impugned order which is the subject matter of challenge in the present revisional application is one of refusal to entertain application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is necessary to refer to the brief background of the facts of the case. After filing of the connected suit a petition under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was pressed for hearing for selfsame and/or analogous purpose of injunction and by an order dated 1. 2. 95 notice was issued on the said petition. But the prayer for interim order of injunction was refused. Then the subsequent application under section 151 of the Code of Civil procedure saw the light of the day and it was sought to be suggested that during the period of interregnum intervening by a day namely on 2. 2. 95 certain developments have taken place which warrants reconsideration and further necessitate passing of an interim order of injunction. In the connected petition on which the said prayer is made is for an order of temporary injunction restraining the defendant opposite party No. 1 and his agents from taking any resolution and/or arriving at any settlement on 6. 2. 95 or any subsequent date thereto. In the connected petition on which the said prayer is made is for an order of temporary injunction restraining the defendant opposite party No. 1 and his agents from taking any resolution and/or arriving at any settlement on 6. 2. 95 or any subsequent date thereto. By the earlier petition of injunction under order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure the plaintiff petitioner prayed for an order of temporary injunction restraining the same defendant opposite party and his agents and office bearers from carrying on any further negotiations from taking any resolution or arriving any settlement reaching the workmen in the banking industry to the exclusion of Indian Nationalised Bank Employees Congress. While considering the present petition on which the prayer for injunction was made, this Court looked into the prayers of the plaint of the connected suit being T. S. No. 289 of 1995. It has been elucidated from all the parties appearing at the time of hearing that the defendant opposite party No. 1 is a conglomeration of a body of persons having no juristic entity. This Court was made to ponder that if it is the admitted position that the defendant opposite party No. 1 does not have any juristic entity then whether a relief can be sought for against the same. A person in law can only be added in the category of parties within the held of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and unless a party is considered to be a person in law, it does not satisfy the test of pre-requisite ingredients of locus standi of a party to figure in a suit. ( 3 ) MR. Hirak Mitra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of one of the parties, while answering to the said query made by the Court has referred to a decision in the case of Indian Bank Association and Another vs. Calcutta Transport Operators Co-operative Service Society Ltd. , and Another, reported in AIR 1981 Cal. 393 where the selfsame body namely, Indian Bank Association which is figuring as defendant opposite party No. 1 herein was not regarded as a juristic entity as not being registered under any of the statutory provisions and, therefore, the suit as framed has been held to be non-maintainable. 393 where the selfsame body namely, Indian Bank Association which is figuring as defendant opposite party No. 1 herein was not regarded as a juristic entity as not being registered under any of the statutory provisions and, therefore, the suit as framed has been held to be non-maintainable. ( 4 ) THIS Court is also in agreement with the observation made by the Division Bench of this Court in the reported decision noted above and it has no reason to differ or to hold a different view from the view expressed by the Division Bench of this High Court. In the backdrop of the same, the prayers of the connected plaint of the suit were looked into and it appeared that there was no nexus to between prayer (a) and prayer (b) of the plaint and by no stretch of imagination prayer (b) of the plaint can be construed to be consequential to prayer (a) and as such prayer (b) of the plaint is independent. Such prayer (b) of the plaint being an independent prayer and the relief being sought for against defendant opposite party No. 1 which is not a juristic body nor the same having any registration under any statute the prayer (b) seems to be laconic one in nature. The lis as framed in terms of prayer (b) is not actionable and the same must have bearing on the question of prima facie case while dealing with a prayer for injunction. A reference may be made in this contest to a reported decision in the case of Reserve Bank of India vs. A. K. Sen. In the wake of the same further question arose for scrutiny and it was sought to be submitted that in absence of any consequential prayer flowing from prayer (a) of the plaint the said prayer is hit by the mischief of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. ( 5 ) AS it has been stated earlier that another question which arose for scrutiny as to whether anything happened on the intervening day namely, 2. 2. 95 which is the only day left in between 1. 2. 95 and 3. 2. 95. ( 5 ) AS it has been stated earlier that another question which arose for scrutiny as to whether anything happened on the intervening day namely, 2. 2. 95 which is the only day left in between 1. 2. 95 and 3. 2. 95. There is no categorical averment in the body of the petition under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to emergent situation happening on the intervening period of a lone day and as such there cannot be any fresh cause of action for an interim prayer after the same was not entertained by the court below on 1. 2. 95. The party aggrieved might have moved up against the said order of refusal, but it not having done so wanted to fall back upon section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is well-known that section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure can only be resorted to when there is no other alternative remedy but in presence of another alternative efficacious remedy already there cannot be allowed to take refuge under the shelter of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. S. Pal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1, has drawn the attention of the Court from the petition under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and he has particularly mentioned paragraph 33 thereof where the petitioner has pleaded about his knowledge that on 6. 2. 95 a negotiating committee will participate in the meeting proposed to be held at Bombay in the office of the Indian Bank Association when the final agreement will be signed. According to Mr. Pal, the impending danger which was being apprehended by the petitioner was very much ventilated in the earlier petition and no fresh cause can be made in the subsequent petition under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to facts taking place on 3. 2. 95 necessitating intervening of the Court. Mr. Pal has also further referred to paragraph 12 of the connected petition under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in the said context he has drawn the attention of the Court with regard to paragraph 39 of the petition under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and according to Mr. Mr. Pal has also further referred to paragraph 12 of the connected petition under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in the said context he has drawn the attention of the Court with regard to paragraph 39 of the petition under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and according to Mr. Pal paragraph 12 of the connected petition is the reproduction of paragraph 39 of the original application under order 39 rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure almost on dotted line. According to Mr. Pal there has been no elucidation of new facts in the connected petition on which the impugned order was passed warranting interference of the Court. Mr. B. R. Bhattacharya, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of another added party, has laid stress on section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act by submitting that settlement and awards are binding only on the parties to the agreement and to nobody else. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, if the petitioner is not a party to the agreement where settlement is arrived at it shall not be binding on the parties and as such the petitioner cannot ventilate its case as person aggrieved clamouring for an order of interim nature during the pendency of the suit. It has been further highlighted in this context by Mr. Pal appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 that one of the proposed added parties represented by Mr. M. P. Banerjee has already invoked jurisdiction of the industrial forum and the same matter came to this Court even up to the appellate stage arising from writ jurisdiction. The Presiding Judge delivering the judgment here was also a party in the judgment of the Division Bench dealing with an appeal and from that it appears that the parent body with whom the petitioner is affiliated has already invoked the jurisdiction of the industrial forum. As such, the question may arise as to whether mischief flowing from section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure will be required to be attracted in the present case. Apart from manifold substantial questions of maintainability of the connected petitions which are being forcefully raised it appears that the petitioner has failed to make out any prima facie case in aid of an interim order because of the happening of the contingent event on 2. 2. 95. Apart from manifold substantial questions of maintainability of the connected petitions which are being forcefully raised it appears that the petitioner has failed to make out any prima facie case in aid of an interim order because of the happening of the contingent event on 2. 2. 95. If the lingering shadow of the order passed on 1. 2. 95 is cast on the subsequent date, then there can be no occasion for the learned Judge to exercise his discretion on 3. 2. 95 under a separate nomenclature of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 151 of the Code cannot come in aid of the petitioner when there is an alternative remedy against the order dated 1. 2. 95. As such, this Court feels that the learned Judge could not have exercised his discretion by passing any interim order in suppression of the order dated 1. 2. 95. Mr. Asok Kumar Banerjee, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has, however, stressed emphatically on particular user of the expression contained in the impugned order where the learned Judge has refused to exercise his discretion at that particular stage and according to Mr. Banerjee the same should have been the ground for interference with the said order. It is needless to mention and reiterate that such points of technicalities raised cannot be allowed to prevail and cloud the entire scenario of the spectrum of justice and as such Mr. Banerjee's submission seems to be denuded of any force of whatever nature. Accordingly this Court does not find any reason whatever on the count on which it can interfere with the impugned order and as such the impugned order is allowed to stand. The revisional application thus stands dismissed. The said order will bind the applications for vacating the interim order passed by this Court. In view of the rejection of the revisional application, all interim orders, if there be any, will stand vacated. It is, however, noted that in view of the undertaking recorded by the learned Advocate of the petitioner, he will be required to furnish the certified copy of the order under challenge before the revisional forum. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has prayed for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has prayed for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. But such leave is refused for the reasons as indicated in the earlier portion of the order as this Court feels that the questions involved in this proceeding do not come within the purview of the dimensions of the questions of general law of public importance. The same has been followed by a prayer for stay of operation of the present order. The said prayer was made by the learned Advocate in despair because his client intends to move to the apex Court for Special Leave within the quickest possible time. As it has been represented before this Court that by way of last chance some breathing time should be given to them so that they can have their avenue of redressal before the highest Court of the land and in order to give them an opportunity this order will remain stayed up to 30th April, 1995. This will, however, not create any equity in favour of the revisionist petitioner. The said indulgence is shown to the petitioner after recording their assurance before this Court in the form of an undertaking that they will move to the Supreme Court. This order of stay is only for this limited period. Let certified xerox copies of this order be issued by the learned Registrar of the Appellate Side of this Court within five days from date to all the recorded Advocates appearing on behalf of the parties provided they apply for urgent certified xerox copies of the present order by tomorrow. Application dismissed.