H. L. GOKHALE, J. ( 1 ) ). The applicants in Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 are working as clerks on vacant and permanent posts. They all belong to various scheduled tribes and they were appointed on posts which were meant for scheduled tribes candidates in the establishment under the District Judge of Sabarkantha at Himmatnagar the opponent herein. The applicants were allotted to work in two courts of Civil Judges (Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate (First Class) both situated at Himmatnagar. They were so working from 26th August 1992 and were drawing pay in the pay scale of Rs. 950 Their names had been recommended by the employment exchange on the query from the office of the District Judge in that behalf and on their passing the necessary typing test and interview they had been appointed in those posts. ( 2 ) ). The opponent-District Judge decided to discharge them from their services with effect from 13-6-1994 (before office hours ). A combined office order dated 30-5-1994 was issued to that effect. The said order of termination was issued on account of transfer of the said two Judges outside the district and since there was no appointment of any other Judge in their place. The applicants filed Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994 to challenge the said order of termination. Various contentions were raised therein. the principal one amongst them being that since they belong to scheduled tribes before the termination of their services was effected it was necessary to examine whether the quota of scheduled tribes candidates in any way go affected because of their termination and they relied upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in R. K. Prajapati v. State of Gujarat reported in 1992 (2) GLR 1422 . The petition came to be considered by a learned single Judge of this Court who passed the following order on 9-6-1994. Rule. Ad interim relief in terms of para 7 (B)- 2 the prayer Clause 7 (B) sought the stay the operation implementation and execution of termination order dated 30-5-1994 which was to be effective from 13-6-1994. The petition came to be considered by a learned single Judge of this Court who passed the following order on 9-6-1994. Rule. Ad interim relief in terms of para 7 (B)- 2 the prayer Clause 7 (B) sought the stay the operation implementation and execution of termination order dated 30-5-1994 which was to be effective from 13-6-1994. The aforesaid order was obtained without serving a copy thereof on the opponents and by requesting the learned Judge to pass an ex parte interim order inasmuch as there was urgency and urgent order was necessary to protect the petitioners which according to the petitioners was prima facie justified in the facts of the case. ( 3 ) ). The order of this court was served on the opponent on 10th June 1994 along with a copy of the petition. The opponent accepted the said order and the applicants continued to work in pursuance thereto. Strange enough on 21-12-1994 the applicants were served with an office order issued on the same day signed by the opponent informing them that the opponent had filed a civil application in Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994 for vacating the stay therein. The order further stated that the opponentlearned Judge had been informed by the Government Solicitor that the said civil application had been filed on 25th October 1994 after serving a copy thereof upon the petitioners advocate and since the same was not decided within fourteen days of filing the same the stay or injunction granted by the High Court earlier automatically stood vacated. The applicants therefore rushed to this Court and filed Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 on 26 and prayed for a declaration that the opponent-Judges order dated 21-12-1994 is unauthorised and in violation of High Courts earlier ad interim order dated 9-6-1994 in Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994. The applicants also prayed for restoration of the status quo ante by prayer Clause 6 (B ). No reply has been filed by the learned District Judge to the civil application though an affidavit-in-reply has been filed to the main Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994 which is affirmed by one B. R. Valand clerk of the court. ( 4 ) ). No reply has been filed by the learned District Judge to the civil application though an affidavit-in-reply has been filed to the main Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994 which is affirmed by one B. R. Valand clerk of the court. ( 4 ) ). The civil application filed by the learned District Judge though affirmed on 20-10-1994 and though copy thereof was served on the clerk of the applicants Advocate on the same day the same has been filed on 20-1-1995 and given No. 91 of 1995. The said civil application as stated above seeks to vacate the adinterim ex parte order dated 9 passed in Special Civil APplication No. 7565 of 1994. The main submission therein is that the transfer of the two learned Civil Judges (Junior Division) has led of closure of the two courts and the strength of the sanctioned staff has been reduced on that account necessitating the termination of services of the concerned employees. The application therefore seeks to vacate the ad interim ex parte order. ( 5 ) ). As stated above thought the civil application of the learned District Judge is filed on 20 the same has been affirmed on 20-10-1994 and a copy was given to the clerk of the petitioners advocate on 25-10-1994. It is the action based on this civil application which has led to the termination of the applicants from their services vide office order dated; 21-12-1994 and to the Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 which is filed on 26-12-94. Mr. A. R. Dave learned Government Solicitor appearing for the learned District Judge emphasised that under Article 226 sub-Clause (3) once an ex parte nd interim relief is obtained against a respondent the Is respondent is given a right to make an application to the High Court to get the stay order vacated and if the High Court does not dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the day on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of the application is so furnished (to the party or to the Counsel of the party in whose favour the order is made) the interim order on the expiry of that period stands vacated. It is material to note the relevant article in this behalf which reads as follows: 226 Where any party against whom an interim order whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner is made on or in any proceedings relating to a petition under Clause (1) without (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea For such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the Counsel of such party the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two week from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished whichever is later or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of the interim order shall on the expiry of that period or as the case may be the expiry of the said next day stand vacated. ( 6 ) ). Mr. Dave submitted that admittedly an ex parte interim order had been obtained against the learned District Judge. It cannot be disputed he asserted that the copies of the civil application of the learned District Judge were furnished to the advocates clerk of the petitioners on 25 He pointed out that the application has been lodged on 24-10 1994 with Stamp No. 26164 of 1994 and a note had been filed on 95-10-1994 seeking to place the application before the court on 25-10-1994. The application is however numbered on 20-1-1995 as application No. 91 of 1995. Mr. Dave therefore submits that once the applications lodged in the office of the court and copy thereof was served on the original petitioner through his Advocate on 25-10-1994 along wit a note dated 24 that the matter be placed for hearing on 25-10-1994 the period of two weeks contemplated in the Article 226 (3) will start running. Mr. Dave therefore submits that once the applications lodged in the office of the court and copy thereof was served on the original petitioner through his Advocate on 25-10-1994 along wit a note dated 24 that the matter be placed for hearing on 25-10-1994 the period of two weeks contemplated in the Article 226 (3) will start running. He therefore submitted that if before the expiry of two weeks from 25-10-1994 if the interim ex parte order was not confirmed is will be construed as having been vacated. As against that Mr. Gupta learned Advocate appearing for the main petitioners submitted that it is no use merely lodging the application in the Court Registry and serving the same on the advocates clerk of the petitioners. Such an application will have to be moved before the Honourable Judge drawing his attention that the aggrieved party wants the interim ex parte order to be vacated and it is only in the event of the said application not lacing decided within two weeks therafter that the fiction contemplated in Article 226 (3) will come into play. Mr. Gupta also submitted that inasmuch as the High Court was expected to dispose of the application within two weeks it was also expected that the aggrieved party also must move expeditiously and preferably within a similar period of limitation. In the instant case the ad interim ex parte order was served on the respondent District Judge on 10-6-1994. The said order was being acted upon and much later that is on 24-10-1994 that the learned District Judge has lodged her civil application to vacate the said order that is nearly after tour months from the date of service of the interim ex parte Order 7 Mr. Dave the learned Government Solicitor appearing for the learned District Judge pressed into service two judgments of Calcutta High Court and Rajasthan High Court both of single Judges. In Krishnkumar v. Reserve Bank of India reported in AIR 1991 Calcutta 272 a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has held the provisions of Article 226 (3) to be mandatory and if the application for vacation is not disposed of within the specified period the original ex parte interim order shall automatically stand vacated. In Krishnkumar v. Reserve Bank of India reported in AIR 1991 Calcutta 272 a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has held the provisions of Article 226 (3) to be mandatory and if the application for vacation is not disposed of within the specified period the original ex parte interim order shall automatically stand vacated. The learned single Judge has referred to the provisions of the Order XXXIX (Rule 3a) of the Code of Civil Procedure in support to emphasise the mandatory character of the provisins of Article 226 (3 ). The learned Judge observed in paragraph 8 as follows: ( 7 ) ). WHEN a statutory provision not only directs a thing to be done in a specified period but at the same time provides for the inevitable consequence of non compliance with the direction the direction must be held to be obligatory and not merely directory. The learned Judge has further held in paragraph 12 in the same judgment that although after such an eventuality the interim relief will stated vacated nothing shall prevent the Court to grant an interim order afresh after hearing the parties on the application for vacation or otherwise if the Court finds sufficient grounds to make such fresh order. The learned Judge has also relied upon an earlier judgment of a single Judge of Rajasthan High Court reported in AIR 1981 Raj. 65 (Gheesalal v. State of Rajasthan ). In that matter the learned single Judge of Rajasthan High Court had held that where an application for vacating was not listed within the specified period on account of mistake of the office the party could not be made to suffer. The learned Judge further held that after the party obtaining original order is served with the notice of the other side it is for that party to take active steps to get the matter listed in the Court within the period specified. ( 8 ) ). As far as the proposition laid down by the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court is concerned there is no reason to depart therefrom. However in my understanding the learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has not taken into consideration one aspect namely that the interpretation that he was accepting will lead to a judicial order being vacated by an administrative inaction. In my view such an interpretation cannot be contemplated. However in my understanding the learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has not taken into consideration one aspect namely that the interpretation that he was accepting will lead to a judicial order being vacated by an administrative inaction. In my view such an interpretation cannot be contemplated. When Article 226 (3) specifically requires an aggrieved party to make an application to the High Court for the vacation of such an order that application will have to be construed as to be made to the learned Judge taking up the assignment. A tiling or lodging of such an application in the Registry cannot be construed as making an application to the High Court This is because it is the High Court which is supposed to dispose of the application within the period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date in which the copy of the application is so furnished to the other side whichever is later. The disposal is also permitted to be done on a day next to the day on which the High Court is closed. When the Article speaks of the High Court disposing of the application it will have to be construed as disposing the application on merits and hence that is the responsibility of the learned Judge taking up the assignment. That responsibility will start from the day the application for vacation is made to the learned Judge. An interim ex parte order passed by the learned Judge will otherwise stand vacated even before the matter coming up before the learned Judge which is what has happened in the present case. For these reasons I am unable to accept the view of the learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court expressed in paragraph 10 of his judgment that it is for the original petitioner to take active steps once the application is served on him. The original petitioner is of course expected to take active steps to have the application heard at the earliest but that responsibility will stare after the application is made to the learned Judge and not merely on lodging the application in the office of the Court and serving the same on the Counsel of the original petitioner. The original petitioner is of course expected to take active steps to have the application heard at the earliest but that responsibility will stare after the application is made to the learned Judge and not merely on lodging the application in the office of the Court and serving the same on the Counsel of the original petitioner. In my respectful understanding the words makes an application to the High Court for vacation have not been properly considered by the learned Judge who decided the matter in the Rajasthan High Court. ( 9 ) ). The learned Advocate of the applicants supported his submission by the approach which the courts are expected to take with respect to Section 21) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 The said Section reads as follows: 20 Limitation for action for contempt No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. This section provides that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt (either on its own motion or otherwise) after the expiry of the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in State of Maharashtra v. J. V. Patel reported in LXXVIII B. L. R. 116 has held that under Section 20 read with Section 10 (2) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 the date on which the matter is placed before the Division Bench of the High Court and on which date the rule is granted is the date when contempt proceedings can be said to he initiated in the Court. A reference by the subordinate court or the administrative order of the Administrative Judge of this court cannot therefore be said to be the beginning of Contempt proceedings. A similar view is taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Cooperative Housing Society Nagarvel Ahmedabad and Others reported in AIR 1980 Guj. 194 . A reference by the subordinate court or the administrative order of the Administrative Judge of this court cannot therefore be said to be the beginning of Contempt proceedings. A similar view is taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Cooperative Housing Society Nagarvel Ahmedabad and Others reported in AIR 1980 Guj. 194 . In that matter the court held as follows : if an application for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 is filed within a period of one year from the date of alleged commission of contempt but the courts has passed no order therein before the expiry of one year from the said date such application automatically fails and the jurisdiction of the Courts is barred because the court did not apply its mind to the complaint or information within a period of one year. The said view is taken following the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1974 SC 2255 . (Borad Kanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikkrushna Mishra ). ( 10 ) ). In my view a similar approach will be required to be taken in the present case. It will have to be held that the application will have to be made to the learned Judge the learned Judge will be expected to apply his mind and then only the period of limitation can be said to have started. I am conscious that the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are in a different context. However in the instant case under this Article certain rights are given and consequences are also provided. The consequences are to vacate a judicial interim order on account of the application for vacation thereof not being decided within two weeks. Such consequences cannot be said to be flowing from mere lodging of an application and service thereof on the Counsel for the petitioner and computing a period of two weeks thereafter. Such making of an application will have to be read as making it to the learned Judge concerned. ( 11 ) ). The submission of Mr. Gupta that for invoking this provision the aggrieved party also should move expeditiously is well taken. Such making of an application will have to be read as making it to the learned Judge concerned. ( 11 ) ). The submission of Mr. Gupta that for invoking this provision the aggrieved party also should move expeditiously is well taken. If the High Court is expected to decide an application for vacation within two weeks it is implied that the party concerned is very much aggrieved and it will not be improper to read that such a party ought to rush to the court expeditiously and preferably within two weeks of receipt of the order. In a case where a party approaches the High Court beyond this period the High Court may still entertain the application if circumstances are explained. However the Article cannot be read to mean a right to a respondent to move the High Court any time when the party feels like moving. ( 12 ) ). IN the view that I am taking it will be expected of such an aggrieved party to move the High Court expeditiously and preferably within two weeks from the receipt of the notice of the application for vacation. Such a party will make an application to the learned Judge drawing his attention that the vacation is sought under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution. The learned Judge will be expected no make a note in that behalf whereafter the period of two weeks will start running and if the original petitioner does not get the application decided within two weeks it can be said that he will be doing so as is own peril. It is possible that in a case such an application may not be decided within fourteen days in which case the dicta of the learned single judge of Calcutta High Court will apply namely that the learned Judge concerned may extend the interim relief having heard the parties by extending the interim relief for further period. However if that is not done the interim order will expire. Mr. Gupta submitted that taking up the matter for hearing within two weeks will suffice since in a give case it may not be possible to decide it within two weeks. That is very much likely. That is why the court will be expected to extend the interim relief after forming a prima facie opinion after hearing both parties within two weeks. That is very much likely. That is why the court will be expected to extend the interim relief after forming a prima facie opinion after hearing both parties within two weeks. That is within the power of the court as stated in para 12 of the Calcutta judgment. In the absence of such an extension however the interim order will stand vacated at the end of two weeks. ( 13 ) ). IN the present case it is an admitted position that the civil application of the learned District Judge is made after four months after receipt of the interim order. The ex parte interim order was being acted in the meanwhile and after the expiry of two weeks after lodging of the application the original petitioner were informed that the interim ex parte order stood vacated which communication was made dehors any order by the High Court and without the matter coming up for hearing before the court. In my view therefore the declaration which is sought in Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 is fully justified and the order of the learned District Judge dated 21-12-1994 will have to be held as and in vacation of the High Courts earlier interim order dated 9-6-1994 passed in Special Civil Application No 7565 of 1994. The applicants will therefore be entitled to the said declaration and consequently a mandatory order as prayed for in prayer Clause 6 (B) that the employees concerned be restored to status quo ante which existed prior to the office order dated 21 issued by the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge is expected to comply with this order by the end of this month and see to it that the employees concerned are allowed to resume on duty on 1st March 1995. The employees will also he entitled to the wages from the date of their discontinuation until they are allowed to join Be said wages will he paid to them along with the salary for the month of March when the same is paid at the end of March 1995 ( 14 ) ). Consequently Civil Application No 3052 of 1944 is allowed Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent ( 15 ) ). Consequently Civil Application No 3052 of 1944 is allowed Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent ( 15 ) ). The effect of the District Judge communication dated 21-12-1994 which is under challenge in Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 was that although the Civil Application No. 91 of 1995 filed by the District Judge was pending in the Registry of this Court the District Judge had communicated the applicants that since the civil application of the District Judge was not decided in two weeks the ex parte interim order obtained by the applicants in Special Civil Application 7565 of 1994 stood vacated. Thus the District Judge had herself allowed Civil Application No. 91 of 1095 in an indirect way. Thai cannot be done. The Application No. 91 of 1995 cannot he said to be allowed in this fashion inasmuch as it was never moved before a earned Judge taking the assignment and It was quite belated. The Application No. 91 of 1995 will therefore have to be heard on the submissions contained therein on merits. The application is therefore. directed to be placed along with Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994 to be heard on merits for considering either the confirmation or vacation of the ad interim order. ( 16 ) ). Similar are the facts in Special Civil Application No. 7814 of 1994. The petitioner herein is a handicapped person appointed on a clerical post. Apprehending his termination on account of non-availability of the two Judges in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Himmatnagar he filed Special Civil Application No. 7814 of 1994 and obtained an ad interim relief against the notice of termination dated 30-5-1994 on 9-6-1994. The notice was to be effective on 13 After the ad interim injunction was granted a civil application was filed by the learned District Judge in similar fashion as in the other case being Civil Application 90 of 1945. The said civil application was affirmed on 11-11- 1994 and served on the petitioners advocate of 17 but filed on 20- 1-1995. In the matter also the petitioner was informed by the learned District Judge by her order dated 21-12-94 pointing out that since the said civil application was not decided within two weeks the interim order stood vacated. The petitioner filed Civil Application No. 3054 of 1944 being aggrieved by the said order. In the matter also the petitioner was informed by the learned District Judge by her order dated 21-12-94 pointing out that since the said civil application was not decided within two weeks the interim order stood vacated. The petitioner filed Civil Application No. 3054 of 1944 being aggrieved by the said order. Civil Application No. 90 of 1995 was never placed before any Judge for his orders any time before the learned District Judge communicating the petitioner that the interim injunction stood vacated. Hence for the reasons narrated in the earlier part of this judgment Civil Application No. 3054 of 1994 is allowed and Civil Application No. 90 of 1995 is adjourned for hearing along with the main matter that is Special Civil Application No. 7814 of 1994. ( 17 ) ). MR. Dave applies for stay of the order that I have passed in both these matters. This order will stand stayed for two weeks from today. .