JUDGMENT Narayan Roy, J. - This Civil Revision Application is directed against the order dated 8-4-1992, passed by the 1st Munsif, Begusarai, in Execution Case no. 26/85 / 17/19 by which the learned Execution Munsif has been pleased to allow the objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') raised by the opposite parties - judgment debtors and directed them to adduce evidence in support of their contention. 2. This case has a chequered history. It appears that the petitioners had filed Title Suit no. 136 of 1981 in the court of Munsif, Begusarai for fixing his seniority as the Permanent Time Keeper with effect from 1-5-1963. The suit on contest was decreed holding that the petitioner is entitled to have his seniority from 1-5-1963, the date of his joining as the Time Keeper, as permanent basis, and, accordingly, he is entitled to get all consequential benefits accruing to him on the basis of his seniority. After the suit was decreed the petitioner filed execution case for executing the decree. 3. In the meantime, the judgment debtors, i.e., opposite parties, filed title appeal in the court of District Judge against the judgment and decree passed in the suit aforesaid. The title appeal was dismissed and consequently thereof, the judgment debtors-opposite parties filed a second appeal in this Court. The second appeal, however, was allowed, against which the petitioner went to the Supreme Court of India and filed Special Leave Petition no. 5032 of 1987. The Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition aforesaid set aside the judgment passed in the second appeal and remitted back to the High Court and ultimately the second appeal was finally dismissed on 9-11-1990, against which Special Leave Petition no. 4249 of 1991 was filed by the judgment-debtors (opposite parties) in the Supreme Court, which was also dismissed on 21-3-1991. 4. After dismissal of the Special Leave Petition no. 4249 of 1991, the judgment debtors-opposite parties appeared before the Executing Court and prayed for time and the time was granted. However, the judgment-debtors went on lingering the matter and ultimately a contempt petition, being M.J.C. No. 529 of 1991 was filed in this Court by the petitioner wherein upon issuance of notice the judgment debtors-opposite parties, appeared. 4249 of 1991, the judgment debtors-opposite parties appeared before the Executing Court and prayed for time and the time was granted. However, the judgment-debtors went on lingering the matter and ultimately a contempt petition, being M.J.C. No. 529 of 1991 was filed in this Court by the petitioner wherein upon issuance of notice the judgment debtors-opposite parties, appeared. In the contempt proceeding this Court convicted the opposite parties and the opposite parties preferred miscellaneous appeal in this Court, being Misc. Appeal no. 294 of 1991, against the order of conviction and the said miscellaneous appeal is pending' for final hearing and the operation of the order of conviction has been stayed. 5. However, as it appears from the records of the case that in the execution case pending before the Execution Munsif, the judgment debtors (opposite parties) filed a petition under section 47 of the Code for determining the question of jurisdiction of the Court. The petition under section 47 of the Code was heared by the learned Executing Court and after hearing the counsels for the parties, the learned Executing Court allowed the petition under section 47 of the Code and directed the opposite parties to adduce evidence, giving rise to this Civil Revision Application. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that in view of the cheque red history of the case and in view of the orders passed by this Court as well as by the Apex Court in the Special Leave Petition affirming the decree passed by the trial court in the suit, it was not open to the judgment-debtors to question the validity of the decree in the Executing Court on the ground of jurisdiction. It has further been submitted that once the decree has been upheld upto the Supreme Court it was not incumbent upon the learned Executing Court to allow the objection filed on behalf of the judgment debtors under section 47 of the Code and the act of the Executing Court thus amounts to contempt of this Court's order as well as the order of the Supreme Court. 7. The learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the opposite parties, however, contended that even if the decree passed in the Title Suit has been confirmed upto the Supreme Court, the judgment debtors (opposite parties) are entitled under law to file their objection under Section 47 of the Code. 7. The learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the opposite parties, however, contended that even if the decree passed in the Title Suit has been confirmed upto the Supreme Court, the judgment debtors (opposite parties) are entitled under law to file their objection under Section 47 of the Code. It has further been contended on behalf of the opposite parties that the court cannot be shut down from taking evidence in the execution case and the Executing Court has exercised a jurisdiction vested in it legally and properly. Therefore, it has been urged that the order impugned deserves no intererence under revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Lastly, it has also been contended on behalf of the opposite parties that during the pendency of the contempt petition in the High Court, the opposite parties reckoned the plaintiff's seniority from 1-6-1993 and he was also promoted to the post of Grade-'A' Officer with effect from 26-8-1989, and, therefore, the petition under section 47 of the Code was filed in the Executing Court to decide the question of jurisdiction of the Court and the scope and extent of the execution of the decree. 8. In this case, after hearing the learned counsels for the parties and after careful examination of the facts of the case, the question for determination arises as to whether the decree passed in the suit, since has been affirmed upto the Supreme Court, the petition under section 47 of the Code questioning the jurisdiction of the Court can be entertained by the Executing Court. 9. In this case I have already noticed above that the decree passed in Title Suit no. 136 of 1991 has been affirmed by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court. While dismissing the second appeal preferred by the judgment debtors, this Court observed as follows :- "Since this litigation has continued for a long period from 1981, and is between a low-paid employee and the employer, namely, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., I think that, in the interest of justice, the appellants should be directed to immediately comply with the judgment and decree passed by the trial court as affirmed by the lower appellate court ... " The Supreme Court has also expressed its concern with regard to the chequered history of the case and has observed while dismissing the Special Leave Petition No. 4249 of 1991 as follows :- "We are surprised that a public enterprise like Indian Oil Corporation have indulged in this fruitless litigation." 10. Apart from the anxities expressed by this Court as well as the Supreme Court about the non-implementation of the decree passed in the title suit aforesaid, it appears that the opposite parties have been convicted for committing contempt of this Court's order in not implementing the decree. This is a different matter that the order of conviction is under challenge in the miscellaneous appeal in this Court, but the question remains that repeatedly this Court directed the opposite parties to implement' the decree passed in the suit. Thus the decree passed in the suit has been affirmed and to me it appears that the opposite parties were duty bound to implement the decree as it is in the background of the directions passed by this Court as well as the observations made by the Supreme Court. 11. In view of the finding of this Court as well as the observations made by the Supreme Court it appears to me that substantially the High Court and the Supreme Court have directed the opposite parties to implement the decree and the Executing Court was duty bound to execute the same and, in my opinion, no scope was left for the Executing Court to entertain the objection under section 47 of the Code and the Executing Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of jurisdiction. In the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi vrs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others (A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 1975) it has been held that where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the question raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the Executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. 12. 12. For the reasons recorded aforementioned, I hold that the learned Executing Court has gravely erred in entertaining the objections raised on behalf of the opposite parties under section 47 of the Code and the order impugned cannot sustain in law. 13. In the result this application is allowed, the impugned order dated 8-4-1992 is set aside and the Executing Court is directed to execute the decree forthwith. 14. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the opposite parties are directed to pay a cost of Rs. 1,000/- (one thousand) to the petitioner.