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Allahabad High Court · body

1995 DIGILAW 1199 (ALL)

COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT T G C HINDU SCHOOL AND J S HINDU INTER COLLEGE AMROHA MORADABAD v. DY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION MORADABAD

1995-11-23

S.R.SINGH

body1995
S. R. SINGH, J. Tej Ram George Coronation Hindu School (Abbreviated as t G. C. Hindu School) and Jagdish Saran Hindu Intermediate College (In short j. S. H. Intermediate College) Amroha, District Moradabad are the Institutions duly recognised under the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (in short the Act ). The affairs of the two Institutions aforestated are managed by a Managing Committee constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Scheme of Administration approved under Sec tion 16-A of the Act. An order contained in the letter dated 4-9-199s (Annexure-5 to the counter affidavit) thereby recognising the Managing Com mittee which claimed its advent to election held 13-8-1995 in the meeting of the General Committee and consequential attestation of specimen signatures of Sri Radhey Raman Gupta, as its Manager by the District Inspector of Schools, are the subject-matter of impugnment, the quashing of which is sought by means of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. Lokendra Mohan, petitioner No. 2, it brooks on dispute, was the President of the Managing Committee the term of which admittedly expired in 1983 with its office bearers in harness to manage the affairs of the Institu tion by virtue of the provisions contained in the approved scheme of Adminis tration. It is not disputed that the General Committee in its meeting held on 21-7-1995, resolved to hold its meeting on 13-8-1995 for the purposes of elect ing the Managing Committee of the two Institutions. The case of the peti tioner is that the meeting of the General Committee slated for 13- 8-1995 was postponed by the President on 12-8-1995 and all concerned were notified of the postponement and further that due to postponement, no election was held on 13-8-1995, The case of the third respondent on the other hand is that the meeting of the General Committee materialised as scheduled on 13-8-1995 and since the President of the outgoing Committee of Management had absented himself in that meeting, one Sri Jagmohan Saran Gupta was unanimously elected as President for the purposes of the meeting of the General Body held on 13-8-1995. Sri Saran, according to the third respondent, passed the mantle to Sri V. P. Mathur Up-Prabandhak/up-Mantri of the outgoing Committee of Management to conduct the meeting dated 13-8-1995 and record its pro ceedings. Sri Saran, according to the third respondent, passed the mantle to Sri V. P. Mathur Up-Prabandhak/up-Mantri of the outgoing Committee of Management to conduct the meeting dated 13-8-1995 and record its pro ceedings. In the said meeting of the General Committee, Sri Vishan Swarup Tandon was unanimously elected as President and Sri R. R. Gupta as Secre tary/manager while Sri V. P. Mathur as Up Mantri/up Prabandhab of the Committee of Management. Sri Rajendra Saran Mathur was unanimously elected as Vice President and similarly, election for the post of Treasurer and seven members of the Committee of Management was also held unanimously in the said meeting of the General Committee held on 13-8- 1995. 3. On the basis of the election held on 13-8-1995, the respondent claimed recognition from the District Inspector of Schools vide letters dated 14-8-1995 and 16-8-1995. The District Inspector of Schools by his letter dated 26-8-1995, posed certain queries in consequence of the information given to him by Sri Lukendra Mohan, President of the outgoing Committee of Management with regard to postponement of the said meeting of the General Committee, and upon receipt of the information and upon consideration of the petitioners letter dated 16-8-1995, the District Inspector of Schools passed the impugned order dated 4-9-1995, according recognition to the Committee of Management which according to the third respondent, came into being as a result of the election held on 13-8-1995. 4. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties who have exchanged the affidavits at the motion hearing stage itself. The first question that looms for consideration/determination is whether the President of the Committee of Management wag studded with the power to postpone the meet ing of the General Body/committee that was properly and duly convened pursuant to the decision arrived at by the General Committee in its meeting held on 21-7-1995. Relying upon paragraph 15 (l) (b) of the Scheme of Administration, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners urged that the power "to approve dates for holding meetings and postpone or adjourn them" indwelt the President. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand canvassed that paragraph 15 (l) (b) is not intended to apply to the meetings of the General Committee, which according to him, is governed by the Rules and Regulations of the Society. 5. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand canvassed that paragraph 15 (l) (b) is not intended to apply to the meetings of the General Committee, which according to him, is governed by the Rules and Regulations of the Society. 5. The District Inspector of Schools, it would be evident from the impugned order, has held that the president was bereft of the power to post pone the meeting already convened for 13-8-1995, as in its opinion, such a power of postponement could be exercised only by the Returning officer (Peethaseen Adhikari) Sri V, P. Mathur. The District Inspector of Schools has held that the President and Manager of the outgoing Committee of Manage ment, who were working as office bearers, had no discretion with them to pass any resolution on their own. According to the District Inspector of Schools, postponement of the election meeting could have been undertaken in the meeting of the General Committee on proper and valid ground and post ponement of the election meeting, according to the District Inspector of Schools was contrary to the wishes of the members of the General Committee. 6. Having devoted my thoughtful considerations to the submissions made at the bar, I am of the considered view that the word "meetings" occurring in clause (b) of paragraph 15 (1) of the Scheme of Administration, is not restricted only to meetings of the Managing Committee. The powers of President to approve the dates for holding meetings and to postpone or adjourn tham, can be exercised as much in relation to meetings of the General Committee as they can be exercised in relation to meetings of the Managing Committee. There is nothing in the Rules and Regulations of the Society which may restrict the powers vested in the president by virtue of clause 15 (1) (b) of the Scheme to meetings of the Managing Committee alone. Paragraph S of the Rules and Regulations of the society, provides that for the management of the Institutions, there shall be formed two committees (a) the General Committee and (b) the Managing Committee. The General Committee according to paragraph 6 (a) of the Rules consists of every person who con tributes towards the current funds of the School a subscription of not less than eight Annas a month or Rs. The General Committee according to paragraph 6 (a) of the Rules consists of every person who con tributes towards the current funds of the School a subscription of not less than eight Annas a month or Rs. 6 a year or gives a donation of Rs 200 towards the permanent funds of the Schools and the Managing Committee, according to Rule 7 (a) consists of 11 elected members excluding those defined in paragraph 6 (b) and 6 (c) and the Head Master or the Principal. It is the General Body which is vested with the power to elect a President, a Vice-President, a Secretary and a Joint Secretary besides 11 members of the Manag ing Committee from the list prepared under paragraph 6 (a ). The General Committee according to paragraph 24 of the Rules and Regulations of the society is called/summoned from time to time for any of the purposes prescrib ed in the rules to be done/accomplished by the General Committee or for some other purposes which the Managing Committee may consider necessary to lay before it on a requisition made in writing by not less than l/3rd members of the General Committee to the Chairmain at such time and place as may be fixed by the latter. There is nothing in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the Rules and Regulations of the Society reliance on which was placed by the Counsel for the respondents which may inhibit the exercise of powers by the president to postpone a meeting of the General Committee convened pursuant to a decision taken by the General Committee. 7. Para 30 of the Rules and Regulations speaks of adjournment on account of want of quorum, it does not apply to postponement of a meeting. "adjournment of a meeting and postponement of a meeting are not the same thing. To postpone means to hold back to a latter time ; to defer (Webster 3rd New International Dictionary)" and adjournment of a meeting denotes that the meeting is suspended and therefore, assumes that the pro ceedings have once commenced. Postponement, on the other hand, is used to indicate that the commencement of a meeting is itself deferred (See Company Meetings-Law and Procedure by B. K. Sen Gupta p. 92 ). Postponement, on the other hand, is used to indicate that the commencement of a meeting is itself deferred (See Company Meetings-Law and Procedure by B. K. Sen Gupta p. 92 ). A general meeting may, in my opinion, be postponed or cancelled in exercise of the powers by the President under paragraph 15 (i) (b) of the Scheme of Administration for just and valid reasons, in Raj Pal Singh v. State of U. P. , (1968) I CLJ 22 Allahabad High Court has held that Board of Directors has the power to postpone or cancel a duly convened meeting even without express power in that behalf in the articles provided that the power is exercised bona fide and for proper reasons, 8. In the instant case, the Distt. Inspector of Schools has held that the former President and former Manager of the Institution had no power to postpone the election, not with reference to any provisions contained in either the Scheme of Administration or the Rules and Regulations of the Society, hut on the ground that such a power is vested in the Returning officer. The reasoning assigned by the District Inspector of Schools is fallacious in the sense that no Returning Officer was appointed by the General Committee in its meeting held on 21-7-1995 and Sri V. P. Mathur the so-called Returning officer was actually appointed by Sri Vishan Swarup Tandon on 13-8-1995 to conduct the meeting dated 13-8- 1995and record its minutes. The said meeting was postponed by the president on 12-8-1995 upto which date there was no Returning Officer. The District Inspector of Schools was, therefore, not justified in his reasoning "kiyonki Chunav Sampanna Karane Ka Adhikar Peethaseen Adbikari Mein Sannahit Ho Jata Hai. " assigned to underpin his conclusion that the President and the Manager had no jurisdiction to postpone the meeting. The said reasoning proceeds from an erroneous assumption that the Returning officer had been appointed before 12-8-1995 to conduct the elec tion meeting dated 13-8-1995. 9. It is true that the meeting of General Committee properly convened for the purposes of election of Committee of Management could not be arbitra rily postponed but the District Inspector of Schools in this connection, seems to have presumed that the postponement was arbitrary. 9. It is true that the meeting of General Committee properly convened for the purposes of election of Committee of Management could not be arbitra rily postponed but the District Inspector of Schools in this connection, seems to have presumed that the postponement was arbitrary. Such an opinion was formed without adverting to the grounds and circumstances on which the postponement was ordered as mentioned in the letter dated 16-8-1995. The fact that the election of the Committee of Management had not been held since 1980 may be a relevant circumstance suggesting that the office bearers did not want to hold the election and that the meeting of the General Committee fixed for 13-8-1995 was arbitrarily postponed. The District Inspector of Schools ought to have adverted himself to grounds of postponement contain ed in the letter dated 16-8-1995 before coming to a conclusion one way or the other on the question as to whether the meeting of the General Commit tee was arbitrarily postponed. 10. The other reason given by the District Inspector of Schools to lend support to the impugned order that "chunav Asthagan Ki Kaiyawahi Aam Sabha Ki Baithak Me Poorna Auchitya Evam Karan Darshate Hue Kami Chahiye Thee Parantu Purva Adhikshak Evam Purva Prabandhak Apni Sweksha Se Hi Chunav Asthagan Ki Baat kihai Jo Chunav Me Bhag Lene Vale Manniya Sadasyon Ki Bhavanaon Ke Paratikool Hai. " is again fallacious in that it proceeds on an erroneous assumption that the President had no power to postpone the meeting slated for 13-8-1995. As signified above, the President had the power to postpone the meeting of General Committee and the District Inspector of Schools did not advert to the justification propounded in the letter dated 16-8-1995 for postponement and was, therefore, not justified in holding that postponement was arbitrary. As signified above, the President had the power to postpone the meeting of General Committee and the District Inspector of Schools did not advert to the justification propounded in the letter dated 16-8-1995 for postponement and was, therefore, not justified in holding that postponement was arbitrary. Had the District Inspector of Schools adverted himself to the contents of the letter dated 16-8-1995 and found the grounds given therein for postponement as non-existent or trivial or insufficient or improper this Court would not have ventured upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the conclusion one way or the other arrived at by the District inspector of Schools but in the instant case, the error committed by the District Inspector of Schools goes deep and pervades the decision-making process itself in that the District Inspector of Schools has assumed something which was chimerical and has failed to apply his mind to the relevant things and rather wandered off into irrelevant and non-existent assumptions. In my opinion, therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable. 11. The second question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner it that the District Inspector of Schools had no jurisdiction to recognise the Committee of Management in view of Section 16-A (7) of the Act, According to him, the petitioners letter dated 16-8-J 995 gave rise to "a dispute with respect to the "management of the Institution, within the meaning of Section 16-A (7) of the Act. The Counsel for the respondents submitted that Section 16-A (7) would be attracted only if there were two rival Committees of Manage ment. There is no dispute that the term of the outgoing Committee of Management had already expired and the affairs of the Institutions were being managed by the office-bearers by virtue of the provisions contained in the Scheme of Administration, True, no parallel Managing Committee was set up by the petitioners but the expression "dispute with respect to the Management of an Institution", in my opinion, is of a wide connotation and includes within its ambit a dispute challenging the very existence of the Com mittee of Management which is seeking approval and recognition. 12. I harbour grave doubts about the correctness of the view that in order to attract Section 16-A (7), there should be two parallel managing com mittees expressed in certain decisions reliance on which was placed for the respondent. 12. I harbour grave doubts about the correctness of the view that in order to attract Section 16-A (7), there should be two parallel managing com mittees expressed in certain decisions reliance on which was placed for the respondent. In the instant case, the office beaters of the out-going Managing Committee being indubitably entitled to manage the affairs of the Institutions until they are replaced by duly elected office bearers could legitimately resist any claim for recognition put forth by a group by whatever name called of rank trespassers having no semblance of title to manage the Institutions and such a dispute, if raised, would be characteristic of a dispute within the meaning of "dispute with respect to management of an Institution" under Section 16-A (7 ). But in view of my conclusion On the first point, I do not consider it necessary to pursue this matter any further and/or refer it to a Full Bench to test the correctness of the Division Bench decisions relied on for the respondents. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 4-9-1995 is quashed. The District Inspector of Schools is directed to take decision in the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. Needless to say that in case, it is adjudged that the grounds for postponement of meeting are warrantable, the District Inspector of Schools shall himself fix the date for the election of the Committee of Management and also appoint a Returning Officer who shall hold the election within a time frame fixed by the District Inspector of Schools. If however, it is found that the grounds for postponement of the meeting were arbitrary and the postponement of meeting wears the taint of mala fide, the District Inspector of Schools would be at liberty to pass such orders as may commend to him fit and proper regarding the constitution of the Committee of Management on the basis of the meeting held on 13-8-1995 under the President ship of Sri Jagmohan Satan. Petition allowed .