Judgment 1. The petitioners have filed the present application for quashing the order, dated 14-7-1994 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Hazaribagh, in Mandu P. S. Case No. 226 of 1993 (Trial No. 292/94) whereby application filed by the petitioners for their discharge for the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code has been rejected. 2. The present application is the second attempt made by the petitioners. They had earlier come to this Court in Cr. Writ Jurisdiction case No. 535 of 1993 (R) which was dismissed on 25-1-1994 with observation to take the points at the appropriate stage in the Court below. Thereafter, the petitioners at the time of framing of the charge filed an application on the basis of the allegation no case of cheating is made out, which has been rejected by the learned Magistrate, as stated above. 3. The prosecution allegation is that while the officer-in-charge of Kuju outpost was on patrolling duty and on 18-8-1993 at about 9-30 p.m. received information from the local people that a truck is being loaded in the cement factory i.e. M/s. Rishi Cement Company of the petitioner No. 4. The police party intercepted the truck when it was coming out of the main gate of the factory and the driver of the truck informed that 300 bags of cement have been loaded in the factory for its weighment in the weighbridge and thereafter necessary paper will be prepared. On verification it was found that on each bag there was mentioned as A.C.C. Portland slag cement 50 Kgs. net June, 1993 Chibassa. Thus, the informant suspected that the company is engaged in selling its products by falsely using the trade mark of the A.C.C. Cement and as such cheating the public at large. On the basis of the written report lodged by the officer-incharge of Kuju out post a Mandu P.S. case No. 226/93 was instituted. The police officer after investigation submitted charge-sheet. Thereafter, the cognizance was taken and the application for discharge was rejected, as stated above. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners in this case has raised two points. On the basis of the written report lodged by the officer-incharge of Kuju out post a Mandu P.S. case No. 226/93 was instituted. The police officer after investigation submitted charge-sheet. Thereafter, the cognizance was taken and the application for discharge was rejected, as stated above. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners in this case has raised two points. Firstly, that the learned Magistrate while rejecting the petition has not stated the reasons for coming to the conclusion that a prima facie case is made out and secondly, that as there is allegation of applying false trade marks and trade description the prosecution under the Penal Code is not permissible and the aggrieved party has right to file a case under the provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. In support of the second submission he relied upon a judgment of the Karnataka High Court reported in 1993 Cr LJ page 232Syed Kaleem v. M/s Mysore Lakshmi Beedi Works and another. 5. So far the first point is concerned now law is well settled that it is not required that the Magistrate at the stage of framing charge should pass a detailed order in other words he should hold mini trial before holding the trial as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is useful to quote the law laid dowu by the Apex Court in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Cr. Rev. No. 138 of 1994 (R). Bijja and others, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1962, at paragraph 7 of the judgment, which rule as follows : "Again in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Knmar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 ; AIR 1980 SC 52 this court observed in paragraph 18 of the judgment as under: "The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Sections 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence". 6. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence". 6. From the above discussions, it seems well settled that at the Sections 227-228 stage the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may for this limited purpose shift that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to commonsense or the broad probabilities of the case". 7. Thus, at this stage even a very strong suspicion founded upon the materials before the Magistrate showing the prima facie existence of the factual ingredient constituting the offence alleged is sufficiet to frame charge. 8. In this case, according to the allegations and facts found, it is clear that the petitioners-company is not engaged in manufacturing of A.C.C. Cement, the bags mentioning the mark of the A.C.C. Cement Chaibassa, was found coming from the factory of the petitioners and no satisfactory documents were produced during the investigation to show that any such purchase of A.C.C. Cement was ever made by the factory. These circumstances, in my view prima facie show ingredients of offence of cheating or at least attempt to cheat the public. 9. So far the second submission is that as the offence under the Trade and Merchandise Mark Act, 1958, is made out no prosecution would continue for the offence of cheating in concerned, the same is also devoid of any substance. The attempt on the part of the petitioners to cheat the public by applying false trade mark and trade description constitute an offence of cheating as well as the offence under the provision of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. This apart nothing has been brought to my notice that a specific complaint of a particular person is required for the prosecution of the offence of the Trade and Merchandise Maks Act, 1958. This apart nothing has been brought to my notice that a specific complaint of a particular person is required for the prosecution of the offence of the Trade and Merchandise Maks Act, 1958. Only Section 89 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 shows that a complaint with regard to offence under Section 81, 82 or 83 has to be filed by the Registrar or any office authorised by him. There is such requirement with regard to filing of complaint regarding offences of falsely applying the trade mark (See AIR 1984 SC 5 Vishwa Mitter v. O. P. Poddar and others). I find unable to agree with the direction rendered in the case of Sayed Kaleem (supra). 10. Accordingly, there is no merit in this application and the same is dismissed.