Jaspal Singh ( 1 ) THE Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financialinstitution Act, 1993 which came into force on 24/06/1993 provides for establishment of Debts Recovery Tribunal to entertain and decide applications from thebanks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks-andfinancial institutions. Every such application is to be accompanied with a feesubject to a maximum of Rs. 1,50,000. 00. The Act further provides that on and fromthe appointed day, the jurisdiction of any Court or other authority in relations tothe matters specified above shall stand ousted. Admittedly, such a Tribunal hasbeen established in New Delhi with effect from 5/07/1994. However, despite allthis,the Punjab National Bank has filed this suit for the recovery of Rs. 1,59,34,131-61 (Rupees one crore fifty nine lacs thirty four thousand one hundred thirty one andpaise sixty only) with pendente-lite and future interest and for sale of mortgagedproperty and has paid thereon a Court fee of Rs. 1,50,000. 00 although admittedly asper the Court Fees Act the advalorem Court fees works out to Rs. 1,57,528 / - leavingthus a deficiency of Rs. 7,528/. ( 2 ) WHY this suit has been instituted in the Court and not before the Tribunalthe reason is an order of a Division Bench of 5/07/1994 passed by this Court inc. W. P. 3050 of 1994 staying the "operation of this Act in its applicability to theunion Territory of Delhi". This obviously clears the hurdle with regard to jurisdiction of this Court. However, the question with regard to payment of requisite Courtfees remains. ( 3 ) AS already noticed above, the maximum fee prescribed under the Act is Rs. 1,50,000. 00. Had there been no order of stay regarding the operation of the Act, thebank would have been obliged to pay only that much amount as fee on theapplication. It is now required to pay Rs. 7,528. 00 more as Court fees under thecourt Fees Act. 1,50,000. 00. Had there been no order of stay regarding the operation of the Act, thebank would have been obliged to pay only that much amount as fee on theapplication. It is now required to pay Rs. 7,528. 00 more as Court fees under thecourt Fees Act. The Bank says that since it has been compelled, on account of thestay order, to institute the suit in this Court and not before the Tribunal, and as incase of vacation of the stay order or dismissal of the writ petition, the suit will goto the Tribunal, it should be exempted from paying Court fees over and above themaximum prescribed under the Act or in any case, the payment of the requisitecourt fees should be deferred at least till the matter pending before the Divisionbench is finally disposed of. It is this prayer which has led to this order. ( 4 ) IN support of the prayer it was submitted by the learned Counsel for thebank that in view of the facts of the case the bank deserved to be exempted frompaying the Court fee over and above Rs. 1,50,000. 00 and that, in any case, the Courtwas bound under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure to extend timeeven if it was not inclined to exempt payment of the remaining part of the Court fee. However, he did not feel it necessary to cite any authority in support or against. ( 5 ) SECTION 4 of the Court Fees Act enacts that no documents shall be receivedin any proceeding unless proper Court fee as provided in the Schedules to the Acthad been paid thereon. Under this section, a plaint. Memorandum of Appeal, etc. ,which is not stamped or insufficiently stamped will be non est. In this context:lause (e) of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure may also be noticed. It says that the plaint shall be rejected-where the relief claimed is properly valued,but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff onbeing required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time tobe fixed by the Court, fails to do so. ( 6 ) IS the Court bound to grant some time to make up the deficiency beforerejection of the plaint? There seems to be difference of opinion on this. Whereasjudgments such as Venkanna v. Achutaramanna, AIR 1938 Mad. ( 6 ) IS the Court bound to grant some time to make up the deficiency beforerejection of the plaint? There seems to be difference of opinion on this. Whereasjudgments such as Venkanna v. Achutaramanna, AIR 1938 Mad. 542 ; Apparao v. Bhagubai, AIR 1949 Nag. 263; Hussain v. Ambika AIR 1937 Oudh 414; Jagatram v. Kha rati, AIR 1937 Lahore 392; Tulsiram v. Keshri, AIR 1962 Pat. 189 hold this view,the Bombay High Court in Chandrakant Vasudev Lotlikar v. Vaman Mahadevlotlikar, AIR 1989 Bombay 17 has struck a different note. It says that time can beextended only when a cause of exceptional nature is shown and grave injustice willbe caused to the plaintiff if extension is not granted and that "except in those cases,there is no discretion left to the Court to grant extension of time to pay the deficientcourt-fee. " ( 7 ) TO me, one thing is certain and it is that it is not Order 7 Rule 11 but Section149 which enables a Court to grant extension and that no party can demand as alegal right, grant of time under the said Order. Any such approach wouldobviously come into conflict with Section 149. l have also no manner of doubt thatthis section gives discretion either to grant time or to refuse time according to thecircumstances of the case. In support I seek to draw force from the Full Benchdecision of the Lahore High Court in Jagat Ram v. Nisar Kharaiti Ram, AIR 1938lahore 361. ( 8 ) SECTION 149 empowers the Court to grant time for extension of time formaking good the deficiency "in its discretion". And, how should the words "in itsdiscretion" be construed? On this too the High Courts have not followed a uniformpractice. The judgment from the Bombay High Court REFERRED TO to above, forexample, seems to Advocate a strict construction of the provision. Reference in thisconnection may also be made to Brijbhukhan v. Tola Ram, AIR 1929 All 75 and Srikrishna v. Saraswati, AIR 1950 All. 499 . In the same refrain is the judgment of thepatna High Court, in Ram Sahay Ramv. Lakshmi Narain Singh, AIR 1917 Patna 26. Chamier C. J. with whom Mullick J. agreed, observed: "in my opinion. Sec. 149 should not be construed in such a way as to nullify theexpress provisions of Sec. 4, Court Fees Act. 499 . In the same refrain is the judgment of thepatna High Court, in Ram Sahay Ramv. Lakshmi Narain Singh, AIR 1917 Patna 26. Chamier C. J. with whom Mullick J. agreed, observed: "in my opinion. Sec. 149 should not be construed in such a way as to nullify theexpress provisions of Sec. 4, Court Fees Act. When the amount of the Court-fee payable is open to doubt or the amount of the fee cannot be ascertained bythe Court till the record is received or it appears that the appellant has madean honest attempt to comply with the law, the Court may, properly receive theappeal and allow time for the deficiency, if any, to be made good. In the casesbefore us the appellants have deliberately and to suit their own conveniencepaid on their appeals insufficient Court-fees, in fact they have paid only asmall fraction of the fees which they admit are payable by them. In such casesthe Court is not, in my opinion, bound to receive the appeal and give theappellants time to make good the deficiency. "in Jagat Ram v. Nisarkharaiti Ram, AIR 1938 Lahore 361, the Full Bench ofthe Lahore High Court was inclined to take a liberal view of Section 149. Dalipsingh, J. with whom other Judges agreed observed: "it seems to me that the discretion conferred on the Court by Sec-149, Civilp. C" is normally expected to be exercised in favour of the litigant except incase of contumacy or positive mala fides or reasons of similar kind. Thequestion of bona fides in this connection should be construed in the sense thatthe word is used in the General Clauses Act and not as used in the Limitationact. A thing should be presumed to be done bona fide, if it is done honestlywhether it is done negligently or not for the purposes of judging whether thediscretion under Sec-149 should or should not be exercised in favour of thelitigant. " ( 9 ) SAME question arose before the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court alsoin Wazid Ali v. Isar Bano, AIR 1951 All. 64 , Agarwala J. with whom the four otherjudges agreed, observed: "in my opinion, where an insufficiently stamped document has been received, filed or used in a Court, through mistake or inadvertence, time willordinarily be granted for making good the deficiency. 64 , Agarwala J. with whom the four otherjudges agreed, observed: "in my opinion, where an insufficiently stamped document has been received, filed or used in a Court, through mistake or inadvertence, time willordinarily be granted for making good the deficiency. Where the deficiency is discovered at the time of the presentation of aninsufficiently stamped document, no hard and fast rule can be laid down asto the circumstances in which the discretion under Sec. 149 will be exercisedby a Court. Each case will have to be decided upon its own facts. All that canbe laid down is that; (a) where insufficiency in Court-fee is due to a bona fidemistake in calculating the amount payable, or to circumstances beyond thecontrol of the party concerned, e. g. robbery, non-availability of Court-feestamps etc. , the Court will, no doubt, use its discretion in favour of the litigant;and (b) where a litigant is able to pay full Court-fee and yet presents adocument insufficiently stamped either because he expects a compromise inthe case or he wants to await the result of some other litigation, or because henegligently failed to bring sufficient money with him for paying the Court fee,or for any similar reason; or where he is guilty of contumacy or mala fides, e. g. when he wants to harass the other side by continuing a litigation, time will notbe granted. There may be cases lying between those two extremes. But no general rule canbe laid down about them and they will have to be decided according to theirown circumstances. " ( 11 ) IF we look at the facts of the case before me, they would reveal that theplaintiff bank is in the know of the amount of Court fees payable, i. t is obviously ina position to pay that amount, and that it has knowingly and deliberately avoidedpayment of full Court fee hoping to derive pecuniary benefit in the event ofdismissal of the writ petition. I have no manner of doubt that if the words "in itsdiscretion" appearing in Section 149 are interpreted strictly, the plaintiff would notbe entitled to any extension, but then, with respect, I do find myself more inclinedto accept the liberal approach adopted by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court. And, for having once decided to respectfully follow those hallowed footsteps whatclinches the issue is that the whole conduct of the plaintiff bank is open. It hidesnothing. And, for having once decided to respectfully follow those hallowed footsteps whatclinches the issue is that the whole conduct of the plaintiff bank is open. It hidesnothing. It has been compelled, if I may say so, to institute the suit in this Court andexpects it to be ultimately tried by the Tribunal. It is positively thus not a case ofcontumacy or positive malafides nor is it blemished by reasons of a similar kind. But then, at the same time, no exemption from making up the deficiency can begranted. Section 149 invests this Court with no such power. What is permissible isto allow the person, by whom the fee is payable to pay the whole or part, as the casemay be, of such Court fee. ( 12 ) THE plaintiff having instituted the suit in this Court, whether of its ownvolition or out of some compulsion, avoidable or not, the prescribed. Court feesshall have to be paid and the Court would not make it payable contingent upon thehappening of some event in future, near or distant. In short thus I would not allow