S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. Feeling aggrieved by an order of release in the proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) passed by the Prescribed Authority which order had been affirmed in appeal, the petitioner-tenant has now approached this Court seeking redress praying for the quashing of the said orders. 2. I have beard Sri A. N. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Janardan Sahai, learned counsel representing, the contesting respondents. 3. The facts shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case lie in a narrow compass. The respondents No. 3 to 7 filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, the eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the portion of the building in dispute in her tenancy asserting that the said premises was genuinely and bona fidely required for satisfying their needs which had grown with the passage of time. It was asserted that all the five appli cants resided in a room which was so small that even two cots could not be placed in it. It was alleged that there was no latrine and pipe on the ground floor for their use. It was further alleged that applicant No. 2 was of a marriageable age and was to be married soon. The applicant No. 4 was a student and required a separate room for studies. Similarly applicant No. 5 also required separate accommodation. It was asserted that the accommoda tion in possession of the applicant was too short for them and their need to occupy the portion in question on the first floor for their residence was not only bona fide and genuine but pressing also. It was also asserted that the opposite party tenant could very well settle at Bharwari which was not far away from the City. In support of the assertions made in the application seeking release the affidavit of Mst. Maqboolan Bibi, the respondent No. 3 was filed. The petitioner-tenant did not file any reply in the case as contem plated under Rule 15 of the Rules framed under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. However, she filed a counter-affidavit in reply to the affidavit filed by Mst. Maqboolan. The assertions made in the aforesaid counter-affidavit were controverted by Mst. Maqboolan Bibi by tiling a rejoinder affidavit. 4. The petitioner-tenant did not file any reply in the case as contem plated under Rule 15 of the Rules framed under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. However, she filed a counter-affidavit in reply to the affidavit filed by Mst. Maqboolan. The assertions made in the aforesaid counter-affidavit were controverted by Mst. Maqboolan Bibi by tiling a rejoinder affidavit. 4. The Prescribed Authority vide its judgment and order dated 30-4-83 granted release of the accommodation in dispute holding that the need for the said premises was bonafide, genuine and pressing. On the question of relative hardships the Prescribed Authority was of the view that since no reply had been filed by the tenant as contemplated under Rule 15 of the Rules which reply has to contain the pleadings it could be legitimately inferred that the tenant had no case on this aspect as in the absence of requisite pleadings, affidavit evidence filed by the tenant in the shape of a counter- affidavit was liable to be ignored. 5. The order of the Prescribed Authority was challenged by the tenant in appeal. The appellate authority endorsed the view of the Prescribed Authority. The appellate authority further affirmed the finding on the question of the need for release bona fide, genuine and pressing, considering the report of the Commissioner and noticing that the tenant had not even suggested in her affidavit that the necessity of the landlord was not pressing and genuine or that the landlords have any other accommodation where they could shift. On the question of relative hardships the appellate authority recorded a finding that the hardship likely to be suffered by the landlord in the event of the dismissal of the release application would be greater as compared to the hardships likely to be suffered by the tenant. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended that the respondent-authorities have manifestly erred in ignoring the affidavit evidence tendered by the petitioner in the shape of the counter-affidavit on the sole ground that it could not be looked into in the absence of any pleadings. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended that the respondent-authorities have manifestly erred in ignoring the affidavit evidence tendered by the petitioner in the shape of the counter-affidavit on the sole ground that it could not be looked into in the absence of any pleadings. The contention raised in this regard is that there is no provision under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder which may require the filing of a written statement as contemplated under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and in this view of the matter the counter-affidavit filed by the petitioner ought to have been treated as containing not only the pleadings but also the evidence which could not be ignored in the manner as done by the respondent authorities. 7. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents however, has urged that the reply contemplated under, Rule 15 (1) of the Rules framed in exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Section 34 of the Act has to be put at par with a written statement which has to contain the pleadings of the tenant in the same manner as the pleadings of the landlord seeking release are required to be contained in the application for the purpose. The contention raised is that in the facts and circumstances of the case the view taken by the respondent-authorities on the question does not suffer from any error much less manifest error of law and further that on the findings recoded no justifiable ground is made out for interference by this Court while exercising its equity jurisdiction. 8. I have given my anxious thought to the rival contentions and perused the record. 9. The provisions contained in Section 34 (1) of the Act stipulate apart from other matters that the prescribed authority shall for the purpose of holding any enquiry under the said Act will have the same powers as are vested in the, civil Court under Civil Procedure Code, 1908 when trying a suit in respect of receiving evidence on affidavits, requiring the discovery and production of documents and any other matter which may be prescribed. 10. 10. The provisions contained in Section 34 (6) of the Act provide that the affidavits to be filed in any proceeding under the Act shall be made in the same manner and conform to the same requirements as affidavits filed under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and may be verified by any officer or other person appointed by the High Court under clause (b) or by an officer appointed by any other court under clause (c) of Section 139 of the said Code. 11. The provisions contained in Section 34 (8) of the Act provide that for the purpose of any proceeding under the Act and for purposes connected therewith the said authorities shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedure principles of proof, rules of limitation and guiding principles as may be prescribed. 12. Rule 15 of the rules framed under the Act provides as under: "15. Application for release of buildings under occupation of tenant.- [section 21 (1)] - (1) Every application for release under Sec tion 21 (1) shall specify the ground or grounds on which the tenant is sought to be evicted. (2) The application or its reply shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed under Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. If there are more than one landlords, the application shall be signed by all the co-landlords. (3) Every application referred to in sub-rule (1) shall, as far as possible, be decided within two months from the date of its presentation. It may be noticed that the provisions contained in rule 15 (1) of the rules indicated hereinbefore require that every application for release under Sec tion 21 (1) shall specify the grounds on which the tenant is sought to be evicted. The implicit emphasis on pleadings is obvious in the aforesaid provision. The provisions contained in Rule 15 (2) of the Rules refer to the application envisaged under Rule 15 (1) as well as its reply. The legislative intent appears to be that both the application and reply must contain the pleadings or State material facts. The application and its reply are required to be signed and verified in the manner prescribed under Order VI Rules 14 and 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order VI Rule 14 provides as follows: "14. The legislative intent appears to be that both the application and reply must contain the pleadings or State material facts. The application and its reply are required to be signed and verified in the manner prescribed under Order VI Rules 14 and 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order VI Rule 14 provides as follows: "14. Pleading to be signed.- Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any): Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other goods cause, unable to sign the pleadings, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf. " The provisions contained in Order VI, Rule 15 provides as follows: 15. Verification of pleadings.- (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being m force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. (2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. (3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed. " It may be usefully noticed that both the provisions as contained in Order VI, Rules 14 and 15 refer to the pleadings of the parties. It is, therefore, apparent that the application for release or its reply which is required to be signed and verified in the manner prescribed under Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 must contain the pleadings of the parties and not evidence. It may further be noticed that the provisions contained in Section 34 (1) (b) of the Act specifically authorise the authorities under the Act to receive evidence on affidavits. It may further be noticed that the provisions contained in Section 34 (1) (b) of the Act specifically authorise the authorities under the Act to receive evidence on affidavits. A distinction appears to have been maintained, therefore, not only under the provisions of the Act but also under the rules framed thereunder in respect of an application contemplated under Section 21 of the Act or its reply and the affidavits which may consti tute evidence in support of such an application or its reply. Considering the aforesaid provisions it seems to me that parties in a proceeding under Sec tion 21 of the Act are required to set out all the material facts clearly on the basis whereof the relief is sought or is opposed and the authorities under the Act have to decide the question which arises for determination in the case on such pleadings. The emphasis is on the questions which arise in the case for determination taking into account the pleadings of the parties in regard to material facts. If material facts are omitted, a party should not be allowed to raise a contention on a particular point event if some materials are available in the evidence. If on the other hand material facts have boon pleaded but full particulars have not been given the parties may be permitted to raise the points on the basis of the evidence unless the opposite party is thereby mate rially prejudiced. The first obviously relates to a question of jurisdiction and the second to one of the procedure. 13. It is settled law that though liberal consideration to the pleadings is to be given so as to allow any question to be raised and discussed covered thereunder yet a relief cannot be granted or refused on the basis of the facts and documents neither stated nor referred to in the pleadings relied upon. It was observed by the Privy Council in the case of Saddik Mohammed Shah v. Mst. Saran and others, reported in AIR 1930 PC 57 (1) that where a claim has never been made no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward. A decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. A decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. It should, however, not be lost sight of that consideration of form cannot override the legitimate consideration of substance. If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication and the parties know that said plea was involved in that event the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satis factorily proved by evidence. 14. In the circumstances indicated hereinabove there could be no justification for treating an affidavit filed by a party which could be accepted only as an evidence as a substitute for a reply contemplated under Rule 15 (2) of the rules framed under the Act which should contain the pleadings in regard to the material facts on which the relief claimed in the application is sought to be opposed. As noticed earlier the scheme underlying the Act and the rules framed thereunder indicates that the pleadings and the evidence in the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act have to be kept apart. In the absence of the requisite pleadings in regard to material facts or in a case of total omission to state a material fact the evidence led in support thereof can be of no significance and cannot be looked into for the purposes of deciding an issue which can arise in a case on the pleadings of the parties filed therein. 15. As pointed out by this Court in its decision in the case of Prem Prakash Gupta v. IInd Additional District Judge, Allahabad, reported in 1993 (1) ARC page 77, the provisions contained in the Act strike a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the great inconvenience and troubles of the tenants on the other. The tenant has to establish that if he is evicted he will suffer greater hardship as compared to landlord and must lead clear evidence to show that in spite of the best efforts he was unable to get another alternative suitable accommodation in the absence whereof the scale of relative hardships may be tilted in favour of the landlord as the inconvenience, or trouble resulting from denial of an order of release in favour of the landlord will far outweigh the prejudice or the inconvenience which may likely to be caused to the tenants. 16. It was further pointed out by this Court in its decision in the case of Subha Rai and another v. VII Additional District Judge, Deoria and others; reported in 1993 (1) ARC page 362, that in the cases where there is inaction on the part of the tenant in searching for an alternative accommodation by seeking allotment or otherwise in spite of coming to know that the building in his tenancy is genuinely required by the landlord for satisfying his bonafide need, the question of relative hardships envisaged under the 4th proviso to Section 21 of the Act deserves to be considered liberally In favour of the landlord specially when the bonafide need for the grant of release sought for is established. It was further observed that while it is true that a proviso embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision and the main part cannot be construed in such a manner so as to render a proviso redundant yet under the scheme of the Act the 4th proviso to Section 21 does not appear to fall within those exceptional cases where this proviso may be said to be part of the substantive provision itself. It would also not be lost sight of fiat proviso cannot be permitted to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provision which, as is apparent from the perusal of Section 21 of the Act, is to ensure the availability of the demised premises to the landlord on his successfully establishing the bona fide requirement of the same for the purposes envisaged in that section. It may be noticed in this connection that where the language of the main enactment is clear and unambiguous a proviso cannot be permitted to have any repurcussion on the interpretation of the main enactment so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. Failure of a tenant to make attempt to find out an alternative accommodation during the pendency of the release ejectment proceedings would certainly be a factor against the tenants case for greater hardship. 17. In its decision in the case of Bega Begam v. Abdul Ahmad Khan, reported in AIR 1979 SC 272 , the Apex Court has observed that while it was no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from a house if decree of eviction had been passed yet such an event by itself could not be a valid ground for refusing a decree for eviction. 18. It may further be noticed that as observed by this Court in its decision in the case of N. S. Datta and others v. VII Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, reported in 1984, ARC page 113, the Court is entitled also to take into account the fact that the tenant has neither alleged not proved to have made effort to have an alternative accommodation and that non-availability of alternative accommodation to the tenant is not in itself an adequate ground to reject the landlord application for release. 19. In its decision in the case of Dr. Munni Lal v. IV Additional District Judge, Etah and others, reported in 1984 (1) ARC 378, this Court had clarified that the fact that nothing is brought on record indicating that the tenant had made any effort during the period of the tenancy of the release application for getting some accommodation allotted in his favour or otherwise or that he had failed in his attempt in this regard is a relevant circumstance while considering the question relating to comparative hardship. Such an inaction on the part of the tenant constitutes an additional circumstance which entitles landlord to have a preference shown to him while striking the just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the likely inconvenience or trouble of the tenant on the other, 20. Such an inaction on the part of the tenant constitutes an additional circumstance which entitles landlord to have a preference shown to him while striking the just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the likely inconvenience or trouble of the tenant on the other, 20. In the facts and circumstances of the present case as brought on record the view taken by the appellate authority cannot be held to be vitiated on account of any such error much less manifest error of law specially taking into consideration, the failure on the part of the tenant-petitioner to file a reply to the application and the total omission to state the material facts in the pleading on the basis whereof the release in question was sought to be opposed. Further taking into consideration the facts and circumstances indicated hereinabove and the implications arising under the ratio of the decisions noticed earlier no justifiable ground appears to have been made out for the intervention of equity. 21. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .