Judgment :- Both the revision petitions arise from a suit, O.S.No.2 of 1988 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Cherthala. It was a suit for specify performance which was decreed on 19-12-1992. The defendant-judgment debtor is the revision-petitioner in both the revisions. The plaintiff-decree-holder is the respondent. C,R.P.No.2423 of 1994 is against an order in E.A.No.310 of 1993 in EP. No.114/93 in O.S.No.2 of 1988 allowing the petition for extension of time for payment of the balance consideration as per the decree. C.R.P.No.284 of 1995 is against the order in I.A.No.587 of 1993 in O.S.No.2 of 1988 refusing to rescind the contract. I. A.No.587 of 1993 was filed by the defendant judgment debtor for rescinding the contract on the trial side after the decree whereas E.A.No.310/93 was filed by plaintiff-decree holder on the execution side for extension of time. The above two petitions were disposed of by the court below as per a common order dated 2-9-1994. 2. The functional portion of toe decree in O.S.No.2 of 1988 filed by the plaintiff, dated 19-12-1992 reads thus: "Defendant is directed to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the scheduled property for a sum of Rs.75,000/- at plaintiff s cost after receiving balance sale consideration of Rs.25,000/-. The document is to be executed within a period of one month from this date. If the defendant fails to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the scheduled property as is directed above plaintiff can get executed the document in his favour through court, by depositing a balance sale consideration of Rs. 25,000/- in court. Plaintiff has to deposit balance sale consideration in court within a period of three months from this date in court if a document is to be executed through court in respect of the suit property." 3. The first and foremost point brought forward by Mr. V. N. Swaminathan, learned counsel for the defendant is that the balance sale consideration was not remitted by the plaintiff within the period specified in the decree and it was only after the receipt of the notice issued by him rescinding the contract the plaintiff filed the petition for extension of the period for payment of balance consideration as per the decree. Since the defendant has already exercised his right to rescind the contract, the petition for extension of time is not maintainable, so argues the counsel. It is no doubt true that the defendant has issued the notice to the plaintiff rescinding the contract before filing the petition for extension of time. As per the terms of the decree, the period for remitting the balance sale consideration by the plaintiff was expired on 19-3-1993. There is no dispute that the balance consideration was, however, deposited on 7-7-1993 by the plaintiff and on 17-7-1993 he filed E.A.No.310/93 for extension of period for payment of the balance consideration. It is also not in dispute that the notice issued by the defendant rescinding the contract was received by the plaintiff on 22-6-1993. It is thus an admitted case mat the plaintiff has applied for extension of time for payment of the balance consideration only after the receipt of the notice rescinding the contract. 4. The question now requires to ruminates is whether the petition for extension of time for payment of balance consideration by plaintiff is incompetent when the notice of rescinding the contract is received by him. It is apposite to mention here that the defendant has filed the petition for rescinding the contract under S.28 of the Specific Relief Act after the decree and the plaintiff has filed the petition for extension of time under S.148 of the Code of Civil Procedure in execution of the decree. However, both petitions are in the same court. Therefore, it cannot possibly be argued that the court below has no jurisdiction to deal with the petition for extension of time filed by the plaintiff. Sub-section (1) of S.28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 enables the decree-holder to move the court for extension of time. Likewise the judgment-debtor can under this provision apply to the court which passed the decree for rescission of contract for sale in case the decree-holder does not pay the purchase money within the time allowed. S.28 however does not contemplate the issue of a notice to the decree-holder before filing an application for rescission of contract. The court will order rescission of contract when an application is made to it. The issue of a notice proposing to rescind the contract is not a sine qua non stipulated under the Section. S.28 however does not contemplate the issue of a notice to the decree-holder before filing an application for rescission of contract. The court will order rescission of contract when an application is made to it. The issue of a notice proposing to rescind the contract is not a sine qua non stipulated under the Section. It cannot thence be said that the petition for extension of time by the decree-holder is in any way devoid of proficiency. 5. The decree-holder in this case has filed E.P.No.114/93 for execution of the decree for specific performance of contract of sale in the court which passed the decree and in that proceeding he has also filed E.A.No.310/93 for extension of time for payment of the balance consideration as provided in the decree. That petition was filed under S.148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which authorises the court for enlargement of time. S.148 provides that where any period is fixed or granted by the court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Cede, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. The counsel maintains that inasmuch as the application has been admittedly filed under S.148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot be treated as one under S.28 of the Specific Relief Act in which case the extension of time allowed in favour of the decree-holder cannot be said to be proper. It is pointed out that in case the decree-holder seeks to invoke the power of the court for enabling him to get the time extended for payment he should have invoked the provisions contained in S.28 of the Specific Relief Act and not S.148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Whether the petition for extension filed by the decree-holder falls either under S.28 of the Specific Relief Act or under S.148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, what is required to be surveyed is the substance of the petition and not the form in which it is laid. What the decree-holder supplicated for, in sum and substance is the extension of the period fixed for payment of the balance sale consideration. What the decree-holder supplicated for, in sum and substance is the extension of the period fixed for payment of the balance sale consideration. This relief can be moulded either under S.28 of the Specific Relief Act or under S.148 C.P.C. by the court which passed the decree or the executing court as the case may be. "(T)he court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the decree even after the decree has been passed", so held by Mathew, J. in Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. (In voluntary liquidation) v. Haridas Mundhra and others (AIR 1972 SC 1826). It is pointed out that the court which passed the decree alone had jurisdiction to entertain a petition under S.28. However, this contention is not available now in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara (1994 (1) KLT 453 SC). There the Supreme Court said: "An application for extension of time for payment of balance consideration may be filed even in the court of first instance or in the appellate court in the same suit as the decree of the trial court stands merged with that of the appellate court which decree is under execution." It further said: "But when an application has been made in the court in which the original suit was filed and the execution is being proceeded with, then certainly an application under S.28 is maintainable in the same court." It could be seen from the facts of the present case that the court which passed the decree and the court where the petition for the execution of the decree has been presented are turned out to be the one and the same court. 6. Lastly it was urged that the decree-holder had not made out 'sufficient cause' for enlargement of time for making deposit of the amount. As noticed, the decree-holder has filed me petition for extension of time under S.148 of the C.P.C. The power under S.148 C.P.C. can be invoked by the court'in its discretion' whereas under S.28 of the Specific Relief Act the purchaser shall pay the purchase money within "such further period as the court may allow". In both the cases the grant of extension of time by the court is not automatic or perfunctory. In both the cases the grant of extension of time by the court is not automatic or perfunctory. The discretion conferred on court under the above provisions is no doubt capacious but it can be wielded only when the decree-holder has made out a 'sufficient cause'. "The power given to court under S.148 is discretionary and is given for the purpose of securing (lie ends of justice in case of necessity". (See Jdgdhayan v.' Babu Ram and others (AIR 1983 SC 57). In order to meet the ends of justice in a given case the court can work out its power under S.148 of the C.P.C. or S.28 of the Specific Relief Act and extend the period fixed for the payment of balance consideration. But if such extension is not substantiated by 'sufficient cause' the exercise of discretion may be wrong us or improper. Here I am reminded of the decision in K. CM. Lid. v. R. Padmanabha Pitted (1957 KLT 1175 FB) where the Full Bench of this court, while dealing with extension of time for the deposit of deficit court fee, observed: "We would like to draw the attention of the courts that in (lie matter of granting time, courts will have to apply their mind and exercise judicial discretion after satisfying themselves about the reasons for the non-payment of court fees at the proper time and not grant time as a matter of routine or automatically. No doubt, the discretion must be exercised judicially and not capriciously or arbitrarily." The case of the decree-holder is that even though he was coincident of the decree passed on 19-12-1992 the terms thereof were unavailable. It is revealed that the decree was signed only oil 25-2-1993. The decree holder had applied for a copy of the decree on 1-1-]993 and it was received* by him on 29-5-1993. By the time the period fixed for payment of the balance consideration had expired. However, the decree-holder could not deposit the amount eo imtanti after the receipt of the copy of the decree due to paucity of funds. His case is that even though he made strenuous attempts for arranging the funds he could deposit the entire balance consideration only on 7-7-1993. It was after making the deposit the decree-holder has filed the execution petition as well as the petition for enlargement of time. His case is that even though he made strenuous attempts for arranging the funds he could deposit the entire balance consideration only on 7-7-1993. It was after making the deposit the decree-holder has filed the execution petition as well as the petition for enlargement of time. The above factual background is sufficiently authenticated by the affidavit filed by the decree-holder in support of the petition for extension of time. 7. Mr.E. Subramoni, learned counsel for the decree-holder while galvanizing this arguments placed poignant reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Kalpana Saraswathi v. P.S.S. Somasundaram Chettiar (AIR 1980 SC 512). That was a case falling within the precinct of S.28 of the Specific Relief Act. The counsel highlights that the extension of the period for payment of decree amount was allowed even at the stage of the appeal before the Supreme Court. The facts and circumstances involved in that case fully exculpate the extension for payment ordered by the Supreme Court. What I could behold in that case is that the appellant therein had made out a 'sufficient cause' for extending the period for deposit. The Supreme Court remarked: "It is perfectly open to the court in control of a suit for specific performance to extend the time for deposit, and this court may do so even now to enable the plaintiff to get the advantage of the agreement to sell in her favour..." 8. However, it is pointed out that it was after the termination of the period fixed in the decree the said petition for extension was filed. Of course, it is true, but that will not disentitle the decree-holder from seeking extension of period if 'sufficient cause' is made out. "S.148 of the Code, in terms allows extension of time, even if the original period fixed has expired, so held by the Supreme Court m Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das (AIR 1961 SC 882). An order extending time for payment though passed after the expiry of the time fixed, could operate from the date on which the time fixed expired. An order extending time for payment though passed after the expiry of the time fixed, could operate from the date on which the time fixed expired. This decision was relied on in Subramanian Cherttiar v. Krishnaveni Amma (1964 KLT 622) 'and this court firmly expressed: "Therefore, it will be seen that the Supreme Court has categorically laid down that notwithstanding the fact that time may have been fixed in the original order of a court, the court, when its jurisdiction is invoked under Ss.148 and 149, either before or after the expiry of the time, has got ample jurisdiction, if a proper case is made out, to extend or enlarge the period granted". 9. The judgment-debtor further projects a plea that the decree-holder was never ready and willing to pay the balance consideration and in such a situation the discretionary powers available under S.28 shall not be exercised in his favour. When the decree-holder came to know of the terms of the decree, he took immediate gaits to arrange the funds to deposit in compliance of the decree. The entire balance consideration was deposited on 7-7-1993 and it was only thereafter that he had filed the petition for extension of time. As against the emergence of this factual situation in favour of the decree-holder no substantiation is forthcoming from the judgment-debtor to give credence to his plea. It cannot be contradicted that there was some delay in making deposit of the amount and this was found to be due to sufficient cause. However, this shortcoming had been compensated by the court below by dictating the decree-holder to pay a costs of Rs. 1,000/- to the judgment-debtor. It is submitted at the bar that this cost had already been deposited in the court below and the final verdict from this court is awaited to pursue follow up action. It is in that bearing the discretionary power under S.28 has been exercised in this case by the court below. 10. In the aforesaid premise, I am strongly persuaded to take the view that 'sufficient cause' has been made out by the decree-holder to get the extension of time for deposit of the balance consideration in pursuance of the decree. The court below has exercised the power conferred on it in a proper and equitable manner in favour of the decree-holder. Consequently, the claim for rescission of contract was disallowed. The court below has exercised the power conferred on it in a proper and equitable manner in favour of the decree-holder. Consequently, the claim for rescission of contract was disallowed. In the result, the orders impugned in these revision petitions do not call for any interference by this court. The Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. No costs.