N. N. MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) BY way of this Special Civil Application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners seek direction to quash and set aside the orders dated 22-2-1984 and 30-9-1994 passed by the District Judge, Vadodara below Exhibits 135 and 161 respectively in Miscellaneous Application No. 21 of 1977. ( 2 ) THE facts culled out various documents filed with the present Special Civil application are as follows : the Gujarat State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as gsfc) applied to the District Judge, Vadodara under Sec. 31 of the State Financial corporation Act, 1951 (for short the Act of 1951) for recovery of Rs. 9,81,190. 24 by sale of movable and immovable properties pledged, mortgaged and hypothecated by the petitioners to secure repayment of the amount of Rs. 7,76,000. 00 advanced by the GSFC. Paras 9 and 10 of the claim application, are extracted as follows :"9. The opponents have committed breach of the aforesaid agreement by committing defaults in repayment of loan and also in payment of interest thereon on due dates. Therefore, the applicant Corporation is entitled to recover the entire outstanding loan amount of Rs. 7,66,000. 00 with interest at 11% per annum from the opponents as stated in the statement of account. 10. The particulars of amount due from the opponents are as under: rs. 7,66,000. 00 Outstanding loan (Principal amount) rs. 2,08,556. 49 Interest due upto 24-12-1976 with penalty. Rs. 6,633. 76 Committment and bank charges rs. 9,81,190. 245 (sic) Total ( 3 ) THE learned District Judge, by order dated 15-2-1982 ordered that an amount of Rs. 9,81,190. 24 be recovered by selling properties of the opponents shown in the Schedule attached to the application. By the said order, one Mr. R. K. Purohit and Kum. A. P. Shah were also appointed as Commissioners to execute the sale to realise the amount and deposit the same in the Court. It is stated that the said amount of Rs. 9,81,190. 24 was deposited on 23-2-1983, and filed an application for recording satisfaction of the order (Application Exhibit 128.) below the said application Exh. 128, the learned District Judge, Vadodara passed order dated 5-3-1983 as follows :"the opposite had deposited the full amount ordered. The contention is raised about interest by applicant. Pending question of interest, further proceedings are stayed till further orders. 128, the learned District Judge, Vadodara passed order dated 5-3-1983 as follows :"the opposite had deposited the full amount ordered. The contention is raised about interest by applicant. Pending question of interest, further proceedings are stayed till further orders. "therefore, it appears that inspite of the fact that the amount was deposited, the question of interest remained alive. The GSFC submitted an application Exh. 133 dated 19-3-1983 seeking direction to order the opponents to pay the applicant interest at the rate of 11% till realisation of the balance amount with running interest at the rate of 11% with costs till realisation. In the alternative, it was prayed that the court may modify the order dated 15-2-1982 adding the words "with interest at the rate of 11% per annum with costs and a figure of Rs. 9,81,190. 24, and before the words "be recovered by sale" occurring in the final order passed on 15-2-1982. Below this application, the learned District Judge passed the following order :"the judgment and order (Exh. 108 dated 15-2-1982 passed by this Court stands corrected to the extent that the following words shall be added after the words and figures "the amount of Rs. 9,81,190. 24, viz. , with future interest on Rs. 7,66,000. 00 at the rate of 11% per annum from 24-12-1976 onwards till realisation. " ( 4 ) THEREFORE, by order dated 22-2-1984, the correction was made in the order dated 15-2-1982 by way of modification adding the figure amount of Rs. 9,81,190. 24 with future interest on Rs. 7,66,000. 00 at the rate of 11% per annum from 24-12-1976 onwards till realisation. This order was confirmed by the judgment of this Court (Coram : K. R. Vyas, J.) dated 15-7-1991, in C. R. A. No. 1040 of 1984. It may be stated that it was specifically noted by this Court that there is no dispute nor any contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the Corporation is not entitled to recover the future interest at the rate of 11% per annum on the said amount. Hence, the order dated 15-2-1982, stood amended to the effect that the amount of rs. 9,81,190. 24 with future interest on Rs. 7,66,000. 00 at the rate of 11% per annum from 26-12-1976 onwards till realisation be recovered. Hence, the order dated 15-2-1982, stood amended to the effect that the amount of rs. 9,81,190. 24 with future interest on Rs. 7,66,000. 00 at the rate of 11% per annum from 26-12-1976 onwards till realisation be recovered. At the first instance, after the learned District Judge passed the order dated 22-2-1984, there remained no controversy with respect to payment of interest on Rs. 7,66,000. 00 at the rate of 11% per annum from 24-12-1976 onwards till realisation. Secondly, even if it was, it concluded fianlly, with the confirmation of the order of the District Judge, by High court order dated 15-7-1991. ( 5 ) IT may be recalled that Mr. R. K. Purohit and Kum. A. P. Shah Clerk of the Court were appointed Court Commissioner to execute the sale and realise the amount. As Mr. Purohit had retired and Kum. A. P. Shah was transferred on 20-7-1994, the GSFC submitted an application Exh. 161 seeking following direction :"1. That two new Commissioners be appointed. The applicant suggests the name of Senior Clerk Shri Ambubhai Ravishankar Bhatt and Shri K. P. Contractor, advocate, to be appointed as the Commissioners to proceed with sales of the properties of the opponents. "this application was opposed by the petitioners on various grounds. It was contended that the attachment is lifted as the principal and the interest as per order below Exh. 109 is fully paid. This contention was rejected by the learned District Judge saying that as per the order below Exh. 109, the applicant was entitled to recover an amount of Rs. 9,81,190. 24 but the said order was corrected vide order passed below Exh. 135 and as per the order below Exh. 128 dated 5-3-1983 Court has clearly specified"pending question of interest further proceedings are stayed till further order. "the learned Judge also rejected the contention with respect to the calculation of interest. The Court also left it open to the Court Commissioner to calculate the interest occurring till realisation as per the order passed below Exh. 135. The learned District judge, by order dated 14-10-1994 allowed the application to appoint Shri Ambubhai r. Bhatt, Sr. Clerk and Shri K. P. Contractor, Advocate to proceed with sales of the properties of the opponents shown in the Schedule attached with the main application and to realise the amount of Rs. 24,63,936. 24 and deposit the same in the Court. The learned District judge, by order dated 14-10-1994 allowed the application to appoint Shri Ambubhai r. Bhatt, Sr. Clerk and Shri K. P. Contractor, Advocate to proceed with sales of the properties of the opponents shown in the Schedule attached with the main application and to realise the amount of Rs. 24,63,936. 24 and deposit the same in the Court. The operative portion of the order reads as under :"it is hereby ordered that Shri Ambubhai R. Bhatt, Head Clerk of this Court and shri Vasudev R. Gandhi, Sr. Clerk of this Court are appointed as Court Commisioners to proceed with the sales of the properties of the opponents shown in the Schedule attached with the main application and to realise the amount of Rs. 24,63,836. 24 and deposit the same in the Court. It is further ordered that both the Court Commissioners shall calculate the interest accruing due till realisation as per the order passed below Exh. 135 and if any objection is raised with respect to the same before them, they will decide the said objection to the satisfaction of both the parties. " ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate General appearing for the petitioners contended that the order passed below Exh. 161 is not simply an order of appointment of Court commissioner, but by back door, GSFC wants to recover the amount, which is not claimed even in the main claim petition filed under Sec. 31 of the Act of 1951. ( 7 ) MR. V. B. Patel, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Caveator GSFC has raised preliminary objection with respect to the maintainability of the present petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. He further contends that by way of this petition, the petitioners seek to open the chapter which has been closed by acceptance of the application of the GSFC under Sec. 31 by the order of the learned District Judge dated 15-2-1982 against which the appeal was filed by the petitioners before the Division Bench of this Court, which was rejected by order dated 17-8-1982 and further the petitioners SLP was also rejected by order of the Apex Court dated 2-11-1982. Thereafter, the modification was made by order of the learned District Judge dated 22-2-1984 passed below Exh. 135 against which the Revision was filed before this Court which was also rejected by order dated 15-2-1991. Thereafter, the modification was made by order of the learned District Judge dated 22-2-1984 passed below Exh. 135 against which the Revision was filed before this Court which was also rejected by order dated 15-2-1991. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel for the Caveator relies on decision in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, reported in AIR 1984 SC 38 . In the said case, the petitioner dissatisfied of the order passed by the Subordinate Judge filed a petition before the High Court of Delhi under Art. 227 of the Constitution and raised the contention that there was fraud perpetrated by the decree-holder in bringing the property in dispute to sale although threre was full satisfaction of the decree by the surety before his death. The apex Court expressed that the High Court instead of dismissing the petition in limine under Art. 227 of the Constitution as not maintainable declined to interfere with the impugned order on merit. The Court thus observed that the petition under Art. 227 was wholly misconceived, as appeal lay from the order. It was further observed that even if no appeal lay, the petitioner had remedy of filing Revision before the High Court under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court ruled that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge under art. 227 of the Constitution as a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227 of the constitution. The apex Court further observed as follows :"the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Art. 227 of the constitution is limited to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of the authority, and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In this case, was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apperent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Art. 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision. " ( 9 ) ON the other hand, learned Advocate General contends that existence of alternative remedy by way of Revision does not completely bar exercise of power under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. He places reliance on AIR 1958 SC 86 (State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh), AIR 1968 SC 13 (Collector of Customs v. A. S. Bava), AIR 1971 SC 102 (Tayabali v. Ahsan and Co.), AIR 1990 Bom. and AIR 1991 Cal 120 (Bimal Sohoo, Secretary Basudebpur Girls High School v. Gavri Rani Pahari ). ( 10 ) IN the case of Collector of Customs, Cochin v. A. S. Bava, reported in AIR 1968 SC 13 , while rejecting the contention of the Collector of Customs and Central excise that the petitioner was having an alternative remedy under Sec. 129 of the customs Act, 1962, the Court held that existence of remedy by way of Revision does not bar jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In the said case, the Court found that the Collector had no jurisdiction to demand the deposit of duty. In Tayabali v. Ahsan and Co. , reported in AIR 1971 SC 102 , on the facts of the case, the Apex Court held that the High Court had the power and authority to interfere with the petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution as the authority failed to exercise the jurisdiction. Reference may also be made to the decision in the case of K. K. Shrivastava v. B. K. Jain and Ors. , reported in AIR 1977 SC 1703 , wherein the apex Court held that where there in an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, the Court should keep its hands off. Reference may also be made to the decision in the case of K. K. Shrivastava v. B. K. Jain and Ors. , reported in AIR 1977 SC 1703 , wherein the apex Court held that where there in an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy, the Court should keep its hands off. In the case of Manek Custodji v. Sarafazali Mirza, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2446 , the Court found that there was a legal remedy available under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code by way of an appeal against the decree of the Civil court and as such held that that the remedy was not only adequate but more comprehensive than the one under Art. 227 of the Constitution. The Court further observed as follows :"it is true that despite the existence of an alternative legal remedy, the High Court may interfere in favour of an applicant under Art. 227 of the Constitution but this was certainly not one of such extra-ordinary cases. It was not proper for the High court to entertain an application under Art. 227 against a decree passed by a subordinate Court when the procedural law allows an appeal against it and that appeal lay to the High Court itself. " ( 11 ) I agree with the learned Advocate General that existence of alternative remedy is not a complete bar of exercise of powers of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution, but this being the extra-ordinary jurisdiction, it should be invoked sparingly and ordinarily refuse to exercise this power, if some adequate remedy is available. As a matter of fact, the Court will exercise the power in case of abuse of jurisdiction or exercise of excess of jurisdiction. ( 12 ) CONSIDERING the facts of the case, I am not inclined to exercise powers of this Court under Arts. 226 or 227 of the Constitution. In this petition, the grievance articulated by the petitioner is that the learned District Judge exceeded the jurisdiction in directing the Court Commissioner to realise the amount of Rs. 24,63,936. 24. From the narration of the facts it is apparent that the said amount pertains to interest and that issue has been settled by the order of the District Judge dated 22-2-1984 and the said order has been confirmed in Revision by the order of this Court dated 15-7-1991. 24,63,936. 24. From the narration of the facts it is apparent that the said amount pertains to interest and that issue has been settled by the order of the District Judge dated 22-2-1984 and the said order has been confirmed in Revision by the order of this Court dated 15-7-1991. On reading the orders dated 15-2-1982, 22-2-1984 and the order dated 14-10-1994 together, it becomes clear that the learned District judge, by the impugned order, has only reiterated the main order dated 15-2-1982 directing the Court Commissioner to realise the amount by way of sale as modified by order dated 22-2-1984. The order was reiterated as the Court Commissioners were substituted. Therefore, in the garb of challenge of the impugned order under art. 227 of the Constituion, the petitioners, by cleverly articulating the grievance as aforesaid, has made an attempt to reopen the issue of interest. It is further significant to notice that in the present Special Civil Application, the petitioners have sought direction to quash the order dated 22-2-1984 which has been confirmed by the order of this Court dated 15-7-1991. In my opinion, the petitioner has made deliberate attempt to abuse the powers of this Court under Art. 227 of the constitution of India. ( 13 ) AT this stage, Mr. V. S. Kotwal, learned Counsel submitted that the contention with respect to limitation may also be dealt with. The case was argued by the learned Advocate General and he did not argue the point with respect to limitation. No other point has been raised by the learned Advocate General before me. ( 14 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in this Special Civil application and is rejected accordingly with cost which is assessed as rs. 10,000/ -. Out of the said amount of cost of Rs. 10,000. 00, Rs. 5,000. 00 shall be deposited in the Legal Aid Fund of the High Court of Gujarat and the remaining rs. 5,000/- with the Advocates Welfare Fund of the Gujarat Bar Council. One month time is allowed to pay the cost. ( 15 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners prays that the order of the learned district Judge with respect to auction of the property attached be stayed for 3 months. This prayer is objected by the learned Counsel appearing for the Caveator GSFC. One month time is allowed to pay the cost. ( 15 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners prays that the order of the learned district Judge with respect to auction of the property attached be stayed for 3 months. This prayer is objected by the learned Counsel appearing for the Caveator GSFC. It may be stated that the modified order of attachment was passed as back as on 22-2-1984. The revision against the said order was rejected by order dated 15-7-1991. I am rejecting this petition in limine as not maintainable. ( 16 ) IN view of the matter, such a prayer cannot be entertained and is accordingly refused. The learned Counsel further prays that the order imposing the cost be stayed for a period of one month. I find no good reason to grant this prayer and is accordingly rejected. .