JUDGMENT S. P. Srivastava, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed in a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act whereunder up setting the decree passed by the Judge, Small Cause Court the revisional court while allowing the revision and setting aside the trial Court's decree had decreed the plaintiff's suit for the ejectment of the defendant from the premises in dispute and for recovery of pendentelite and future mesne profit at the rate of rent and also recovery of electric and water consumption charges as claimed, the petitioner - tenant has approached this Court seeking redress praying for the quashing of the aforesaid order. 2. I have heard Sri A. K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent. From the materials on record it appears that the plaintiff respondent has purchased the building of which the premises in dispute forms a part on 12-3-1978. Asserting that the defendant was a persistent defaulter in the payment of rent, the plaintiff respondent filed a suit in the month of July 1981 claiming that in spite of the notice, dated 12-10-1980 the tenant had not either paid the arrears of rent nor vacated the house in question. 3. In the plaint, the plaintiff also alleged that the tenanted accommodation consisted of only first floor of the building in question and the defendant tenant was also liable to pay electric and water charges which has not been paid although the liability in respect thereof rested on him. 4. The aforesaid suit was contested by the defendant denying plaint allegations and asserting that the plaintiff No. 1 had received rent till 30-4-79 without any rent receipt on 6-5-1979. It was also asserted subsequent thereto when the monthly rent due was not accepted the same was sent by money order on 3-8-1979 which was refused. Thereafter the same was deposited in the proceedings under Section 30 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Evidence) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The defendant also claimed that besides the first floor the second floor of the building was also under his tenancy. It was further asserted that although the defendant had not been making payment of water charges as the defendant did not use electricity and water was not supplied to him. The defendant also claimed that besides the first floor the second floor of the building was also under his tenancy. It was further asserted that although the defendant had not been making payment of water charges as the defendant did not use electricity and water was not supplied to him. The plaintiff No. 1 Malti Devi had examined her son Ashok Kumar as PW 1 in support of her case. In his deposition, dated 14-1-1982 the PW 1 had stated that the defendant was the tenant in the first floor of the building, the ground floor whereof as well as the second floor of which building was in the possession of the landlord. It has also been stated that the defendant had never paid rent to his mother. 5. The defendant petitioner had examined himself in support of his case. He asserted that he has been paying rent to Malti Devi, plaintiff No. 1 who never issued any receipt. He had further stated that he had paid rent to Malti Devi for the first time on 1-5-1978 for the month of April 1978. He also stated that he had paid rent up to April 1979 to the plaintiff and thereafter it was being deposited in court. He reiterated his claim that the first floor as well as second floor was in his tenancy but he had no written proof in respect thereof. The true copies of the aforesaid statements have been annexed as Annexure 4 and 5 to the writ petition. 6. The trial Court drew an adverse inference against the plaintiff on account of the non-production of Malti Devi as a witness. The trial Court also expressed a view that since the house had been purchased on 12-3-1978 and the suit which had been filed in 1981 without there being any evidence to show that notice for recovery of rent had been issued led to the inference that the rent for the period ending 30-4-1970 had been paid to Malti Devi and the statement of Ashok Kumar was not sufficient for establishing the case of the plaintiff who though was a son of Malti Devi could not be expected to have personal knowledge about the fact of the rent having been paid to Malti Devi or not. In the circumstances, observing that it was incumbent upon him to believe the statement of the defendant and the non- production of the diary in which the defendant claimed the payment of rent, etc. were noted by him was not enough for discarding his statement. The trial Court also held that the admission of the defendant contained in Para 4 of the written statement wherein he had stated in unmistkable terms that the rent till 30-4-1979 had been paid on 6-5-1979 was of no significance. So far as the extent of the tenanted accommodation was concerned the trial Court observed that in support of the plea that only first floor of the building has been let out to the tenant defendant, the trial Court observed that the oral evidence of Ashok Kumar was useless as the tenancy had not been settled in his presence and since the accommodation in dispute had been let out by previous owner Saraswati Devi she ought to have been produced. On the aforesaid findings, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 7. The plaintiff respondent challenged the aforesaid decree by filing a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act. The revisional court was of the view that the findings recorded by the trial Court were based on mere surmises and conjectures, it was held that there was no cogent evidence to hold the alleged payment of arrears of rent to Smt. Malti Devi. It was observed that the onus of proof in regard to the payment of rent was on the defendant tenant who had failed to discharge the same. It was noted that even the defendant had failed to summon Malti Devi as his witness in order to depose about the alleged payment and nothing could turn upon the mere non-production of Smt. Malti Devi in the witness box and the claim of the defendant that he had paid rent without any rent receipt was liable to be discarded. The revisional Court also noticed that the defendant had totally failed to comply within the requirements envisaged under Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure and had not paid any amount of rent which fell due during the pendency of the suit. The revisional Court also found that the defendant-tenant had failed to discharge the burden of proof which rested upon him. The revisional Court also found that the defendant-tenant had failed to discharge the burden of proof which rested upon him. So far as the question of extant of the tenanted accommodation was concerned, on the findings indicated above the revisional court holding that the tenant was a defaulter within the meaning of Section 20 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 decreed the suit for ejectment and also decreed the suit for recovery of other amounts as claimed. 8. The revisional Court has observed that the defendant-petitioner had not complied with the requirement of Order XV, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure and had neither deposited the aforesaid amounts nor had represented to the trial Court for condonation of delay. It appears that having come to the conclusion that the tenant had failed to establish that the rent for the period 1-4-1978 to 30-4-1979 had been actually paid to the landlady as claimed by him, the revisional court had recorded the finding about non-compliance of the requirement of the first part or Order XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. which makes it incumbent for the tenant to deposit at or before the final hearing of the suit the entire amount of rent or compensation for use ana occupation admitted by him to be due in default whereof, in the absence or any order granting extension of time for the purpose or condoning the delay in the deposit the defence of the tenant may not be entertained or may be struck off. The revisional Court, in view of the aforesaid finding decided to Strike off the defence of the tenant which was accordingly struck off. In its decision in the case of Anandi Devi v. Om Prakash, reported in 1987 (Supp.) SCC 527 a converse case had came up for consideration before the Apex Court. In this case the revisional court having found that the tenant was a defaulter had disallowed the prayer for eviction of the tenant even though the requirements contemplated under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. No. 13 of 1972 stood satisfied. The order of the revisional court was upheld by the High Court. In this case the revisional court having found that the tenant was a defaulter had disallowed the prayer for eviction of the tenant even though the requirements contemplated under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. No. 13 of 1972 stood satisfied. The order of the revisional court was upheld by the High Court. However, the Apex Court while considering the implications of the finding regarding default indicated above observed that the learned Additional District Judge has failed to appreciate that the respondent having failed to comply with the requirement of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by not making a deposit of arrears of rent together with interest and costs, the application for striking off the defence ought to have been allowed and thereafter the suit for eviction should have been decreed. The Apex Court thereafter observing that in this view of the matter the judgment and order of the High Court as well as that of the learned District Judge could not be sustained, allowed the appeal and set aside their judgments. 9. In the present case the tenant-petitioner had clearly admitted in Paragraph 4 of written statement that rent up to the period 1-4-1978 to 30-4-1979 had been paid to Malti Devi on 6-5-1979 without any receipt. In his deposition before the trial Court the tenant, however, took up a different stand and stated that the rent for the period 1-4-1978 to 30-4-1979 was paid to Malti Devi every month as and when it fill due but no receipt was issued. This evidence was cotrary to the specific pleading and obviously, therefore, as uo amount of evidence could be looked into in support of a claim which was never made in the pleadings, was liable be ignored. The tenant had further stated that he used to note down the payments made by him in his diary but did not remember as to whether the diary was with him or not. In any case this diary was never produced in court. When confronted with the contents of Paragraph 4 of the written statement he again reiterated that the assertion made in the said paragraph was correct. He in his cross-examination admitted that it was not possible for him to pay the rent for the period 1-4-1978 to 30-4-1979 in a lump sum. 10. When confronted with the contents of Paragraph 4 of the written statement he again reiterated that the assertion made in the said paragraph was correct. He in his cross-examination admitted that it was not possible for him to pay the rent for the period 1-4-1978 to 30-4-1979 in a lump sum. 10. In the above circumstances, the view of the revisional court to the effect that there was no congent evidence to hold the Alleged payment of arrears of rent to Malti Devi and that the said amount was not deposited and not tendered to the landlord in order to avoid the ejectment and the further finding that he was a defaulter within the meaning of Section 20 (2j (a) of the Act does not appear to be vitiated in law. In fact, on the finding on the question of default the necessary consequence as indicated in the decision of the Apex Court referred to hereinbefore was bound to follow and there could be no impediment in granting the decree as prayed for. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that the revisional court could not interfere in the findings recorded by the trial Court and has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Laxmi Kishore and another v. Bar Prasad Shukla, reported in 1981 ARC 545. The petitioner cannot, however, derive any benefit out of same as it has been clearly laid down there that if the revisional court finds that there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that finding and that same will be the case where the finding is based on inadmissible evidence. In such cases it was clarified that the court will be justified in deciding the question of fact itself because the evidence is all one way and no assessment is needed. 11. Such a situation has in fact arisen in the present case in the circum stances indicated above. 12. Considering the facts and circumstances as brought on record no justifiable ground is made out for any interference by this Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.