This appeal has been preferred by the appellant under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, against the judgment dated 16.1.92 by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation Dhubri in WC No.7/89. 2. Respondent No. 1, is a driver. He filed a claim case before the Commissioner, Dhubri under the Act, seeking compensation for the injuries suffered by him. The respondentNo.lon28.1.89, was driving the vehicle beafing registration No. ASG 3493, in the capacity of driver and coming from Chapor towards Kokrajhar. The said vehicle's owner was respondent No.2. Respondent No.l met an accident near the Kokrajhar Police Station. Police stopped the car and dragging out the respondent No.l from the vehicle assaulted him in the Chapor Police Station causing grievous injuries as a result of which the right eye of the respondent No. 1 was seriously injured. He was admitted in the Dhubri Civil Hospital on 29.1.89 till 11.3.89 as an indoor patient. On the advice of doctor, he consulted Eye Specialist in Guwahati. 3. RespondenjNo.2 is the registered owner of the vehicle in question, which was insured from 12.2.88 to 11.2.89 vide policy No.31511120101098 (Comprehensive) with the appellant company. 4. Respondent No.2 submitted written statement, but the appellant company did not submit any written statement nor any evidence denying the liability. After examining the witnesses of workman, the learned Commissioner awarded Rs.65,985/- against the appellant insurance company as the insurer of the vehicle in question. 5. For the purpose of preferring the appeal under section 30 of the Act, the appellant had deposited Rs.65,985/- vide cheque No.473059 dated 13.3.92, before the Commissioner, along with an application apprising the intention of preferring appeal before the High Court. 6. Appellant company's ground for appeal inter alia is that, the injury to the eye of the appellant occurred in an incident, not in the accident alleged to be occurred on 28.1.89, which caused in the hand of the police personals. 6. Appellant company's ground for appeal inter alia is that, the injury to the eye of the appellant occurred in an incident, not in the accident alleged to be occurred on 28.1.89, which caused in the hand of the police personals. That there was no nexus between the injuries sustained by the respondent No. 1 at the hands of the police personals and the accident caused to the workman (respondent No. 1) arising out of the cause of employment and that in such cases, the employer, not the insurer is liable to pay compensation, that as per insurance policy condition with the vehicle in question appellant was not liable to indemnify the, respondent No.2, the owner pf the vehicle, as the injury was not due to accident as injuries caused pertaining to the work entrusted to the respondent No.l by-respondent No.2 as his driver. 7. The Act 1923, is a piece of social security legislation, and generally accepted that the various provisions of the Act, ought to be received a liberal interpretation. Since the Act is a welfare legislation, made for the interest of the poor workmen, if any particular provision of the Act is capable of two interpretations, that is more favourable to the person for whose benefit the legislature in its great wisdom has legislate it, should be adopted (relied on the case of Lipton (India) Ltd. vs. BakuJ Chandra Mandal, 1981 Lab. L Cases 1309 (FB) Calcutta). Therefore the doubt, which the appellant has insisted to bring in the mind of the Court, must be resolved in favour of the workmen, in preference to the employer. 8. Further judicial concensus has been reflected, in the case of Sarup singh vs. Mukimd Lai, AIR 1960 Punjab 119, which I respectfully agree and in agreement to the said Hon'ble High Court's view I prefer to quote the same. "In a welfare State which is being progressively industrialised measures like the Workmen's Compensation Act should be construed in a more liberal sense in favour of the workmen so that deserving workmen gets full and speedy benefit and advantage of these beneficent measures. Such liberal interpretation would accomplish the human and beneficial purposes of this legislation, the provisions of which are truly responsive to the social economic needs which have been recognised by our society and by our Constitution. Such liberal interpretation would accomplish the human and beneficial purposes of this legislation, the provisions of which are truly responsive to the social economic needs which have been recognised by our society and by our Constitution. The rights of workmen deserved to be generously treated while applying the statutory provisions because the procedure under this law provides a speeder, simpler, cheaper and more efficient machinery of the determination and payment of compensation to the workmen. Judicial and quasi-judicial officers should therefore not treat matter of procedure so rigidly as to deprive the citizens of the advantages and benefits of this beneficial legislation on technical grounds, it is of the utmost importance that no construction of the provisions relating to procedure should sacrifice the rights of the poor workmen due to technical mistake, omissions, or inaccuracies." To examine the submission of Mr. Barkataky, learned counsel for the appellant, that the injury sustained by the workmen was occurred in an incident, not in an accident, I am constrained to hold that the meaning of the terms 'incident' and 'accident' in the legal parlance can be accepted according to his interpretation. An 'incident', which is unforseen is an accident; both bear the same meaning in its context and be construed in its proper sense in a given situation. What Workmen Compensation Act intends to covey is, what right a workmen expressed in an accidental injury. It is settled law that the term 'accident' means some unexpected and 'unforseen event' or 'unlocked michief. If the injury or death from the point of view of the workmen, who suffers or dies, is unexpected or undesigned on his part, then that injury would be an accident, although it may be brought about heart attack or some other cause to be found, is the condition of the workmen. The term 'accident' as defined in section 3 of the Act includes only such occurrence as, collusion, tripping, overflow, obstacle, fall of roofs etc. but also obvious one, causing injuries. The common favour is, all those cause, in some happening at a definite point of time and capacity resulting from happening. The term 'accident' as defined in section 3 of the Act includes only such occurrence as, collusion, tripping, overflow, obstacle, fall of roofs etc. but also obvious one, causing injuries. The common favour is, all those cause, in some happening at a definite point of time and capacity resulting from happening. This established position of law has been pervaded in a series of decisions and reflected in the cases referred in AIR 1955 NOC 817 Calcutta (DB); in Bhagu Bai's case, AIR 1955 Bombay 105 (DB); in Nath Mai's case, AIR 1955 NOC (Rajasthan) 4038 and AIR 1960 Bombay 387. 11. Admittedly in this case the insurance policy was a comprehensive policy. In view of my above discussion, I hold that the compensation against the respondent No.2, workmen, be borne by the appellant only, under the Act. 12. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.