G. S. N. TRIPATHI, J. This appeal has been filed by the defendants against the judgment and decree dated 3. 9. 76 passed by IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Saharanpur in Civil Appeal No. 270 of 75 of the same district, whereby the appeal of the defendant was dismissed. That appeal arose out of judgment in O. S. No. 173 of 1971 of the Court of Civil Judge, Saharanpur. The suit was decreed by the judgment and decree dated 9. 8. 75 passed by the Civil Judge, Saharanpur as aforesaid. The suit of the plaintiff for specific perfor mance of contract was decreed. 2. Dulecha, respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) filed O. S. No. 173/71 before the Civil Judge, Saharanpur. He has alleged that defendant No. 1 Khila, was the owner of the disputed property. He agreed to sell the same of the plaintiff on 6. 4. 71 for a sum of Rs. 12,000 out of which, Rs. 7,000/- was paid by him in cash as an earnest money. A portion of the disputed property was Sirdari, for which bhumidhar certificates had to be obtained with a month and thereafter the sale-deed was to be executed after paying the remaining sale consideration of Rs. 5,000. The plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the compromise. At the time of the execution of the agreement deed itself, possession was transferred to the plaintiff. But the defendant No. 1 was not ready to perform his part of the compromise. Not only this, he surreptitiously and illegally transferred the property to the defendant No. 2, who is Bhabhi of defendant No. 1. This sale deed Is totally fictitious without any consideration. Moreover, defendant No. 2 had knowledge of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff throughout. Now the defendants are not ready to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the suit was filed for specific perfor mance of the contract. 3. As usual, the defendant No. 1 in his written statement denied the ex ecution of the agreement deed in favour of the plaintiff and also receipt of any consideration from him. Further, he alleged that he transferred the property for Rs. 13,000 to the defendant No. 2, who is a bona fide purchaser. The plaintiff was never handed over possession. The suit is mala fide and frivolous. 4. Further, he alleged that he transferred the property for Rs. 13,000 to the defendant No. 2, who is a bona fide purchaser. The plaintiff was never handed over possession. The suit is mala fide and frivolous. 4. The defendant No. 2 in her separate written statement, apart from taking pleas taken by the defendant No. 1, has taken a specific plea that she is bona fide purchaser for value in good faith without notice and after the sale deed in her favour, she is in possession. 5. The learned Civil Judge framed the following issues: (1) Whether the defendant No. 1 agreed to sell the land in suit and executed the impugned agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff as alleged? (2) Whether the plaintiff advanced Rs. 7000 towards part consideration of the proposed sale to the defendant No. 1 as alleged? (3) Whether the plaintiff has been willing and prepared to perform his part of the contract? (4) Whether the plaintiff or defendant No. 2 is in possession of the land in suit? (5) Whether the defendant No. 2 is bona fide purchaser for valuable considera tion without notice of the impugned agreement? (6) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 6. He found issues 1, 2 and 3 in affirmative. Issue No. 4 was left un decided. Issue No. 5 was found in negative. The suit of the plaintiff was decreed in toto. 7. Feeling aggrieved against that judgment and decree, the defendant filed, a civil appeal No. 270/75, which was heard and decided by IIIrd. Addl. Distl. Judge, Saharanpur on 3. 9. 76. He dismissed the appeal and upheld the findings recorded by the learned trial court. 8. Feeling aggrieved, defendant No. 2 has filed this appeal. 9. I have heard Sri S. U. Khan and Sri H. M. B. Sinha learned Counsel for the appellant and learned Counsel for the respondents respectively at great stretch and perused the record. I find that there is absolutely no force in this appeal and it deserves to be dismissed. 10. Feeling aggrieved, defendant No. 2 has filed this appeal. 9. I have heard Sri S. U. Khan and Sri H. M. B. Sinha learned Counsel for the appellant and learned Counsel for the respondents respectively at great stretch and perused the record. I find that there is absolutely no force in this appeal and it deserves to be dismissed. 10. The only substantial question of law, which may be said to be raised in this case is that defendant No. 2 is a bona fide purchaser for value, without knowledge of the agreement and as such, the sale deed is valid and it is not in any way affected by the agreement in favour of the plaintiff. Al though it is mixed question of law and fact, I proceed to decide it as it is. 11. The burden of proving that defendant No. 2 is a bona fide purchaser for value in good faith was on the defendant No. 2. It is admitted now that the parties belong to the same family. Defendant No. 1 Bhoti Devi is the wife of Bharat Singh. Khila, defendant No. 1 is the brother of Amar Singh and Bharat Singh. This fact is not disputed. The learned trial court, while con sidering issue No. 5 took into consideration this family position. He has ob served as follows : "from the testimony of plaintiff it bears out that Smt. Bheti is the wife of Bharat Singh a real brother of defendant Khila. Thus all the three parties to the suit belong to the same family. This relationship is a circumstance in favour of the fact that impugned agreement was in the knowledge of Smt. Bhoti before she obtained the subsequent sale deed and not against it. " This observation is based on natural conduct and behaviour in the family. It is suite apparent that when the plaintiff obtained an agreement deed from defendant No. 1 it would not remain a secret, in the family. The defendant No. 1 was equally related to both plaintiff and defendant No. 2. Therefore, there was no reason that he would conceal this fact from the defendant No. 2. It is suite apparent that when the plaintiff obtained an agreement deed from defendant No. 1 it would not remain a secret, in the family. The defendant No. 1 was equally related to both plaintiff and defendant No. 2. Therefore, there was no reason that he would conceal this fact from the defendant No. 2. Even the learned 1st appellate court has taken this fact into consideration that being family members, the plaintiff would not have concealed, rather readily revealed, this fact that he had obtained an agreement deed in respect of the disputed property from defendant No. 1. So, it cannot be said that the consideration which weighed with both the courts below was far off the track. 12. Another evidence is the statement of the plaintiff himself that Smt. Bhoti enquired of him whether he wanted to purchase the property in ques tion and he replied her in affirmative. On this point he has been cross-ex amined at length. But he has remained unscathed. Therefore, if the learned lower court believed this part of the statement of the plaintiff, there is noth ing unnatural in it. 13. Another fact is that the plaintiff has stated clearly that Phahal Singh, s/o Bhoti was also present on that occasion. So he too knew that there was an agreement deed in favour of the plaintiff executed by defendant No. 1. The learned lower court has observed that the plaintiff made this statement on 15. 10. 73 in the court whereas, the defendants evidence was recorded on 20. 8. 74. In pursuance, the defendants did not produce Phaal Singh to deny the aforesaid facts. I find that this is also a consideration, which is based on evidence. There is nothing unnatural in it in accepting this logic of the learned lower court. 14. Another fact, which has been noted by learned 1st appellate court is that this is an incident of a very small village. In the year 1973, a sale deed was going to be executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff, for which he had received a consideration of Rs. 7,000 at the time of the execu tion of the agreement deed. This news will spread like a wild fire and every Tom Dick and Herry in the village, worth the name, would automatically know about it. 7,000 at the time of the execu tion of the agreement deed. This news will spread like a wild fire and every Tom Dick and Herry in the village, worth the name, would automatically know about it. This is not an episode of a city where a neighbour does not know the name of the other neighbour, although they reside together in the same Mohalla. Hence the consideration which weighed with the learned lower court was quite reasonable and thus he found that the defendant No. 2 had a knowledge about the factum of the execution of the agreement deed in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant No. 1. 15. When the matter went in appeal, the learned 1st appellate court also considered this point. He also took a note of the fact that both the parties are members of the same family and reside in the same village. All of them had a common gher. Under these circumstances,. it was quite natural for the plaintiff to have revealed this fact that he had obtained the agreement deed in respect of the disputed property from defendant No. 1. Regarding the conveying of the fact by the plaintiff himself to defendant No. 2 about the agreement deed, the statement of the plaintiff has been believed by the 1st appellate court also and a categorical finding has been recorded by the 1st appellate court in these words: "i am thus of the view that Smt. Bhoti Devi had notice of the agreement of sale and the plea raised by her to the contrary must repelled. " I find this conclusion is based on evidence and circumstances. It has to be dittoed. I accordingly, held that defendant No. 2 had knowledge of the existing agreement in favour of the plaintiff, executed by defendant No. 1 and despite this knowledge he purchased the disputed land. 16. Another leg of the argument was that defendant No. 2 had not pur chased the property after payment of consideration. Strangely enough, the sale deed was in respect of the disputed property for a motely sum of Rs. 13,000. In 1973 it meant a lot. But not even a single paisa was paid at the cash counter. Everything is said to have been paid in advance. This is a very suspi cious circumstances by its very nature. 17. Strangely enough, the sale deed was in respect of the disputed property for a motely sum of Rs. 13,000. In 1973 it meant a lot. But not even a single paisa was paid at the cash counter. Everything is said to have been paid in advance. This is a very suspi cious circumstances by its very nature. 17. Both the courts below have dealt with this point that the defendant No. 2 was not financially sound and is in a position to arrange said sum of Rs. 13,000. I have already held that the conclusions of both the courts below are based on evidence and circumstance. I do not agree with Mr. Khan that this is all conjectures and surmises which are basic facts in the conclusions of the learned lower court. This way, I agree with the learned lower courts view that defendant No. 2 had not paid any consideration to defendant No. 1 for the alleged sale deed in his favour. This way, defendant No. 2 is neither a purchaser for value nor a person who had taken the sale deed bonafidely and without notice. 18. The jurisdiction of the High Court in appeal under Section 100, C. P. C. is very limited. Unless a substantial question of law is involved, the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the matter at all. Secondly, even erroneous findings of fact, after taking into consideration evidence on the record, will not entitle this Court to interfere in the observations and con clusions of the learned lower court. Thirdly, where two views are equally pos sible and one view has been reversed, the High Court will not interfere, even if it does not concur with the view point. 19. This way I find that when a conclusive findings of fact has been recorded by both the courts below, that defendant No. 2 is not a purchaser for value in good faith without notice, it is difficult to say that that there is anything wrong in this conclusion. Thus the point raised by Mr. Khan has no substance. It is accordingly rejected. 20. The appeal has no force. It is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. .