S. NARAYAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition in revision is directed against the judgement and order dated 13. 2. 87 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1986 by Shri S. I. Saha, Additional Sessions Judge, 6th Court at Midnapur. The petitioner, being the de-facto complainant in G. R. Case No. 1060/76, is aggrieved by the impugned order for the reason that the appeal was allowed and the accused/o. P No. 2 and 3, namely, Kalyan Dutta and Jagdish Dutta were acquitted of the offences under section 448 and 323 of the I. P. C. Earlier, the accused/o. Ps, having been charged of the offences under sections 448, 323 and 325 of the I. P. C. had been convicted by the trial Court under section 448 and 323 of the I. P. C and were sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 250/-each and, in default, to suffer S. I. for 15 days for the offence under section 448 of the I. P. C. and, further, to pay a fine of Rs. 250/- and, in default, to suffer S. I. for 15 days for the offence under section 323 of the I. P. C. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case as narrated by the petitioner is that he along with his brothers, namely, Taraknath Gayen and Niranjan Gayen purchased half share of the house situate at Patna Bazar, P. S. Katualy, District-Midnapur from one Sanat Kumar Dey by virtue of a registered deed of sale dated 6. 4. 76. The petitioner entered into possession of the said house since the date of the purchase and also kept a gold pressing machine therein. On April 18, 1976 at about 4/4. 30 P. M. when the petitioner was looking after the said machine in a room of the aforesaid house, the accused/o. Ps No. 2 and 3 suddenly entered into the room and asked to remove the said machine there from. The petitioner refused to do so and, thereupon, the accused/o. Ps assaulted him with fist and pushed him out of the room. When the petitioner tried to enter into the room again, one of the accused/o. P. namely, Jagdish Dutta struck him on his left hand with a wooden bar of the door as a result of which the petitioner sustained fracture injury on his left hand. When the petitioner tried to enter into the room again, one of the accused/o. P. namely, Jagdish Dutta struck him on his left hand with a wooden bar of the door as a result of which the petitioner sustained fracture injury on his left hand. ( 3 ) AFTER the occurrence, the petitioner went to the Kotawali Police Station and narrated the incident. The police recorded an entry in the G. D. and advised him to go to the hospital so as to obtain an x-ray report. Subsequently, after a lapse of a week i. e. , on 23. 4. 76 when the petitioner produced an x-ray report of a homeopathy hospital, the police suo moto recorded the F. I. R, investigated into case and, ultimately, submitted a charge sheet. ( 4 ) AT the trial, the charge under section 325 of the I. P. C. failed and the accused Ops were convicted of the offences only under sections 448 and 323 of the I. P. C. as referred to above. The appellate court, however, disagreed with the findings of the trial Court and, accordingly, the appeal was allowed. ( 5 ) THE entire evidence on the record as adduced on behalf of the prosecution was considered by the trial court as also by the appellate court but for two different conclusions. The appellate court arrived at a conclusion that the prosecution has not been able to prove that the accused/o. Ps trespassed into the room of the petitioner or drove him out the said room and also assaulted him as alleged. As per findings of the appellate court, the petitioner had got no actual physical possession over the premises in disputes and, accordingly, there was no occasion for an occurrence as alleged. It was further held by the appellate court that the trial court did not comply with the mandatory provision under section 248 (2) of the Cr. P. C. inasmuch as no opportunity was given to the accused/ops for hearing on the quantum of sentence and further that there was also failure to comply with the provisions under section 361 of the Cr. P. C. ( 6 ) LET me now examine the validity, legality and propriety of the impugned order, passed by the appellate court. P. C. inasmuch as no opportunity was given to the accused/ops for hearing on the quantum of sentence and further that there was also failure to comply with the provisions under section 361 of the Cr. P. C. ( 6 ) LET me now examine the validity, legality and propriety of the impugned order, passed by the appellate court. ( 7 ) FROM the tenor of the case as pleaded and also the evidence adduced on the record it is obvious that there was some dispute with regard to possession of the premises bearing Holding No. 170 situate at Patna Bazar, District-Midnapur where the occurrence is said to have taken place. Admittedly, the house-in-question earlier belonged to two brothers, namely, Provat Bedge and Sanat Hedge in equal shares. The petitioner claimed to have purchased only the half share in the holding from Sanat Bedge through a registered sale deed dated 6. 4. 76 and to have also got possession on 7. 4. 76 i. e. , the next following day after evicting the tenants from one of the rooms. On due consideration of the evidence on the record the appellate court was of the view that the petitioner purchased the undivided share in the suit holding from Sanat Bedge and there were tenants in the said holding at the time of the purchase. The appellate court did not choose to believe the petitioner (P. W. 1) on the point that on the next following date of the purchase i,e. , on 7. 4. 76 he took over possession of a desired portion of the house after evicting the tenants therefrom inasmuch as there was absolutely no evidence of partition between the two brothers, namely, Sanat Bedge and Provat Bedge (i. e. , the vendors ). The appellate court further pointed out the admitted fact on the record that Provat Bedge had filed a pre-emption case against the petitioner and his vendor which went up to this Court (High Court) and that Provat Bedge had won the said pre-emption case. It has been further pointed out that the petitioner had also admitted in his evidence that the accused/ops were in possession of the entire premises for about one and half years. The appellate court, therefore, did not accept the actual physical possession of the petitioner over the disputed premises. It has been further pointed out that the petitioner had also admitted in his evidence that the accused/ops were in possession of the entire premises for about one and half years. The appellate court, therefore, did not accept the actual physical possession of the petitioner over the disputed premises. ( 8 ) ON consideration of the gamut of the controversy, one may abstain from conclusively determine the adverse claim of the parties in the instant criminal proceeding but, most certainly one would lean more towards lending concurrence to the finding of the appellate court. ( 9 ) THE bone of contention between the parties was therefore, the actual possession over the disputed premises. There was dispute between the two sharers of the property which led to a case claiming right of pre-emption. The occurrence as alleged took place only within 12 days of the Purchase when the actual possession could be have had only after evicting the tenants already in possession thereof. These basic facts would certainly lead to an inference that there existed a civil dispute between the parties as to the title and possession over the disputed portion of the house and that being so intricate in nature was not possible to be determined, by way of pretext, in a criminal proceedings. ( 10 ) APART from the factual score, my attention was drawn to the implication of the provision under section 248 (2) of the Cr. P. C. in this case. It was obvious on the record that the trial Court, before passing an order of sentence, did not provide any opportunity to the accused/ops to make submissions as to the quantum of the sentence. The interpretation of the provision of law under section 248 (2) of the Cr. P. C. as given by the Court of Law from time to time leaves no scope of doubt that it is mandatory in nature and the failure to comply the same would invalidate the order of sentence. This aspect of the case has received due consideration of the appellate court and I have no reason to disagree with the above proposition. ( 11 ) FURTHERMORE, the appellate court has also very rightly pointed out the non compliance of the mandatory provision of section 360 and 361 of the Cr. P. C. by the trial Court. This aspect of the case has received due consideration of the appellate court and I have no reason to disagree with the above proposition. ( 11 ) FURTHERMORE, the appellate court has also very rightly pointed out the non compliance of the mandatory provision of section 360 and 361 of the Cr. P. C. by the trial Court. While passing an order of sentence for the offence under section 448 and 323 of the I. P. C. , the trial Court, unfortunately, appears to have not taken due care of the above provision and that would be certainly taken as error of law. This, however, becomes more or less academic for the present case inasmuch as the order of conviction in itself could not be sustained. In the result, this revisional petition must fail and accordingly, it is dismissed. Petition dismissed.