Judgment : The decree holder and auction purchaser in O.S. No.839 of 1978, on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Tirukoilur, are the revision petitioners. 2. The respondent in this case is the official receiver. The matter arises in execution receiver. The matter arises in execution wherein the respondent filed E. A. No.1103 of 1984 in E.P. No.429 of 1980 in the said suit, for setting aside the sale. 3. The relevant facts are as follows: The first petitioner herein filed O.S. No.438 of 1978 on 20.6.1978. The suit was filed for recovery of money. One Ayyan Padayachi had borrowed certain amount from the first petitioner herein for family expenses. The suit was filed after the death of the borrower, and the defendants in the suit were his legal representatives, namely, sons and daughters. One of the sons was Pavadai Padayachi. 4. The suit was decreed on 210. 1979, allowing the first petitioner herein to realise the amount from out of the estate of the deceased in the hands of his legal representatives. 5. In execution of the decree, the first petitioner filed E.P. No.429 of 1980 on 18. 1980. The properties belonging to the original borrower were attached. The attachment was effected on 2. 1981 and the properties were directed to be sold. The proclamation was settled on 21. 1982 and the properties were sold on 28. 1982, as per order for sale on 7. 1982. In the meanwhile one of the legal representatives of the original borrower, namely, Pavadai Padayachi filed LP. on 27. 1982. A Receiver was appointed on 7.9,1982 and notice was directed to be issued to the creditors on 9. 1982. 6. The respondent herein, on the basis of his appointment as ad interim receiver, filed the present application for setting aside the sale on the ground that the properties are vested in him under the Provincial Insolvency Act. Since the properties are vested in him for the benefit of all the creditors, according to him, the sale held on 28. 1982 is not valid. 7. The second petitioner herein was the court auction purchaser. 8. Both the petitioners filed objections to the petition filed by the respondents. According to them, the sale was held properly. Since the properties are vested in him for the benefit of all the creditors, according to him, the sale held on 28. 1982 is not valid. 7. The second petitioner herein was the court auction purchaser. 8. Both the petitioners filed objections to the petition filed by the respondents. According to them, the sale was held properly. It is also contended that since the property was sold for antecedent debt of the father of the insolvent, the property inherited by the insolvent will also be subject to the liability, According to them, the said liability amounts to a charge and hence any vesting will be subject to the charge, it is further contended that apart from the insolvent, there are other legal heirs who are also defendants in the suit, and, as against them, the sale is valid, and if at all the sale is to be set aside, it can only be in respect of that share of the insolvent in the estate. It was further contended by them that even though the LP. was filed on 27. 1983, for the receiver to take action, the relevant date to be taken into account is the date of admission of the Insolvency Petition under Sec.51 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The admission was only subsequent to the date of sale (28. 1982) and hence the receiver cannot have any right to pray for setting aside the sale, as, on that date the property did not belong to the insolvent. 9. The executing court, as per order dated 112. 1984, allowed the application of the respondent, and the sale was held to be bad. The executing court was of the view that under Sec.28(7) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the vesting takes place when the insolvency petition was filed, i.e., on 28,7.1982 the property is vested in the Receiver. Taking that view. the sale was set aside. The petitioners filed C.M.A. No. 118 of 1986 before the District Court, Cuddalore. The lower appellate court also confirmed the decision of the executing court. It is against these decisions, the Revision petitioners have filed this civil revision petition. 10. The first question to be considered is, whether the contention of the petitioners that the property is subject to a charge or lien, is correct. 11. The decree is passed under Sec.52 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is against these decisions, the Revision petitioners have filed this civil revision petition. 10. The first question to be considered is, whether the contention of the petitioners that the property is subject to a charge or lien, is correct. 11. The decree is passed under Sec.52 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sec.52,C.P.C. provides that ‘where a decree is passed against a party as the legal representative of a deceased person, and the decree is for the payment of money out of the property of the deceased, it may be executed by the attachment of any such property. A mere reading of the section makes it clear that the petitioners are not entitled to any charge. It provides for attachment and sale, for enforcing the decree. 12. This question also come for consideration in Gade Lakshme Narasimham Panthulu and others v. Pillalmari Jaganadha Row Pantulu and others. A.I.R. 1916 Mad. 645. In that decision the Bench held that the decree holder is not getting any charge or lien, and there is no question of any priority for them in insolvency proceedings. In that decision, their Lordships held thus: “Where after the passing but before the execution of a decree for realisation of the debts of a deceased debtor from his estate in the hands of his heirs the heirs become insolvent, the deceased’s estate like other assets of the insolvent vest in the Official Receiver and is immune from execution proceedings under Sec. 16(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act and the creditor must prove his debt like other unsecured creditors.” The learned counsel for the petitioners was not in a position to distinguish the above law, declared by this Court, and hence the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is repelled, 13. The second contention that is raised is that apart from the insolvent, there are other legal heirs against whom, a decree has been passed. Only Pavadai Padayachi was declared insolvent, and if at all there is a vesting, the vesting will be in respect of the share of Pavadai Padayachi. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, there are five legal heirs and they have inherited the properties as tenants in common. If so, only the one-fifth share of the insolvent can vest in the Receiver. The setting aside of the sale in full by the courts below was, therefore, incorrect. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, there are five legal heirs and they have inherited the properties as tenants in common. If so, only the one-fifth share of the insolvent can vest in the Receiver. The setting aside of the sale in full by the courts below was, therefore, incorrect. The learned counsel for the Official Receiver did not dispute the said point. If so, the sale can be set aside only in respect of the insolvent’s share in the property. The orders of the courts below therefore require modification, in case I find that even in respect of the insolvent’s share, the sale is liable to be set aside. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioners has a further contention that even though the insolvency petition was filed on 27. 1982, the power of the receiver to pray for setting aside the sale will arise only when the property vests in him. According to the learned counsel, the receiver was appointed only after the insolvency petition was admitted and taken to file. According to them, the Receiver was appointed only on 9. 1982, and even before that, the sale has taken place. If so, on the date when the sale took place, there was no property belonging to the insolvent which could vest in the Receiver. The question that has to be considered is, whether the property vests on the date of presentation of the petition or only on the date of admission of the petition. 15. The relevant sections under the Provincial Insolvency Act are, Secs.158 and 28. Sec.18 deals with procedure for admission of petitions. It reads that the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with regard to admission of plaint shall, so far as it is applicable, be followed in the case of Insolvency petitions. Sec.28 deals with effect of an order of adjudication. The relevant portion of Sec.28 is Sub-sec.(7). It read thus: "An order of adjudication shall relate back to and take effect from the date of presentation of the petition on which it is made." Sec.51 deals with the effect of insolvency on antecedent transactions. Sec.28 deals with effect of an order of adjudication. The relevant portion of Sec.28 is Sub-sec.(7). It read thus: "An order of adjudication shall relate back to and take effect from the date of presentation of the petition on which it is made." Sec.51 deals with the effect of insolvency on antecedent transactions. Sub-sec.(1)of Sec.51 read thus: "Where execution of a decree is issued against the property of a debtor, no person shall be entitled to the benefit of the execution against the Receiver except in respect of the assets realised in the course of execution by sale or otherwise before the date of admission of the petition. " [Italics supplied] Dealing with these provisions, an argument was taken that the presentation of petition and admission of petition are different, and only after the insolvency petition is taken into file, the court takes cognizance of the proceedings. Only thereafter the question of vesting of the property in the Receiver shall take place. For the said purpose, Sec.20 of the Provincial Insolvency Act was also brought to my notice. Ad-interim Receiver is also appointed when an insolvency petition is admitted to file. In this case, the Receiver was appointed on 9. 1982 and notice was received by the creditors on 9. 1982. 16. In Jooluri Guruvayya v. Official Receiver. A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 575. a learned Judge of this Court followed an earlier judgment of the Lahore High Court in Charanjit Singh v. Sandar Mohammed, A.I.R. 1935 Lah, 690. The learned Judge of this Court held that ‘the Official Receiver’s title to the insolvent’s property does not extend to the assets realised in the course of execution levied against the property before the date of the admission of the insolvency petition. His Lordships took note of the provisions in Sec.28 (7) of the Provincial Insolvency Act and also the effect of Sec.51 of the Act. Taking these sections together the learned Judge said that any assets realised between the date of petition and the date of admission will not vest in the Receiver. Dealing with that point, the learned Judge held as follows: "No direct decision of this Court dealing with this point has been brought to my notice and it has to be decided with reference to the relevant provisions of the Act. Dealing with that point, the learned Judge held as follows: "No direct decision of this Court dealing with this point has been brought to my notice and it has to be decided with reference to the relevant provisions of the Act. It is true that there are no words Sec.28(7) making the operation of that provision subject to the other provisions of the Act, but the Official Receiver’s title to the property of the insolvent as on date of the presentation of the insolvency petition rests on the combined operation of the provisions of Sec.28(2) and (7), and Sub-sec.(2) excepts from its operation the other provisions of the Act including Sec.51. It is therefore quite clear that the Official Receiver’s title to the property of the insolvent does not extend to the assets realised in the course of execution levied against the property of the insolvent before the date of the admission of the insolvency petition. To hold otherwise would be to nullify the provisions of Sec.51. The Lahore High Court has taken the same view in Charanjit Singh v. Sandar Mohammed. A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 690." 17. In Charanjit Singh v. Sandar Mohammed. A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 690. relied on by the learned Judge, the facts are more or less similar to the one on hand. In that case, an insolvency petition was filed on 112. 1932 and the date was fixed for examination of the petitioner for the purpose of admission on 112. 1932. In between those dates, certain amounts were realised from the insolvent. After the petition was admitted, the receiver filed an application to bring that amount towards the estate of the insolvent. The said claim of the Receiver was repelled by the learned Judge. Dealing with that claim, His Lordship held thus: "I do not agree with the view of the District Judge that though the petition for insolvency was admitted on 17th December, 1932, the date of admission must relate back to the date of presentation, and that in law 14th December must be regarded as the date of admission. The words "Presentation of petition" and "presentation of plaint" have been used in various sections of the Provincial Insol vency Act and the Civil Procedure Code. The words "admission of the plaint", "admission of the petition" have been used in other provisions of the two Acts referred to above. The words "Presentation of petition" and "presentation of plaint" have been used in various sections of the Provincial Insol vency Act and the Civil Procedure Code. The words "admission of the plaint", "admission of the petition" have been used in other provisions of the two Acts referred to above. There seems to be no warrant for the proposition that once a petition is admitted, the date of admission is admitted, the date of admission must relate back to date of the presentation of the petition. So far as the order of adjudication is concerned, it relates back and takes effect from the date of the presentation of the petition, on which it is made. This however takes place in pursuance of a specific provision of law contained in Sub-sec.(7), Sec.28, Provincial Insolvency Act. In the absence of a provision to this effect either in the Provincial Insolvency Act or in the Civil Procedure Code, it cannot be said that the date of admission must be taken to be the date of the presentation of the petition. It was held in 130 I.C. 559 (1) that Sec.51, Provincial Insolvency Act, did not deprive the creditors of the fruits of their decrees in respect of moneys which were brought into court between the date of the presentation of petition for insolvency and the date of its admission. Sec.51 of the said Act refers to the date of admission and not to that of the presentation of the petition. I therefore hold that in the present case 17th December, 1932 must be taken to be the date of the admission of the petition for insolvency." 18. As stated earlier, Sec.18 deals with admission of the insolvency application. It says that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code will apply as far as possible. Under 0.4, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a procedure for registering a suit is contemplated. It says: "The court shall cause the particulars of every suit to be entered in a book to be kept for the purpose and called the register of civil suits. Such entries shall be numbered in every year according to the order in which the plaint’s are admitted." So normally, when a suit is entered in a Register, it must be deemed to have been admitted. Such entries shall be numbered in every year according to the order in which the plaint’s are admitted." So normally, when a suit is entered in a Register, it must be deemed to have been admitted. 0.7, Rule 9, C.P.C. also say that the plaintiff shall endorse on the plaint, or annex thereto, a list of the documents (if any) which he has produced along with it and, if the plaint is admitted, shall present, within such time as may be fixed by the court or extend by it from time to time, as many copies on plain paper of the plaint as there are defendants...... According to the procedure of the Civil Procedure Code, Sec.21 of the Provincial Insolvency Act provides that at the time of making an order admitting the petition on a subsequent time before the adjudication, the court may order the debtor to give reasonable security for his appearance. Taking all these provisions together, it can be seen that an insolvency application is taken cognizance of by the court only when it is admitted. 19. In Ramanathan Chettiar v. Subramanian Chettiar and another, A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 248, a Bench of this Court held that when an interim receiver is appointed, it can be taken that the insolvency petition is taken to file. In that case, the petition was filed on 7. 1922 and the interim receiver appointed on 7. 1922. The question in that case was, whether a sale which has taken place subsequent to 7. 1922 is valid. There Lordships held that since receiver is appointed on 7. 1992, which date must be taken as the admission of the insolvency petition, the sale was invalid. 20. In K.Sambasiva Ayyar and others v. Official Receiver, (1941)2 M.L.J. 918 : A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 88, a learned Judge of this Court also took note of the difference in the wording of "presentation of the insolvency petition" and "admission of the petition". But under the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Judge held that on the date of the presentation of the petition itself, the process of admission of the petition was over. Taking that view, the learned Judge held that the subsequent realisation of the amount from the estate can be claimed by the Official Receiver. 21. But under the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Judge held that on the date of the presentation of the petition itself, the process of admission of the petition was over. Taking that view, the learned Judge held that the subsequent realisation of the amount from the estate can be claimed by the Official Receiver. 21. In view of the above decisions, the property will vest in the receiver, only when the insolvency application is admitted. If that be so, on the date when the Receiver was appointed, namely on 9. 1982, there is no property belonging to the judgment debtor which has already been sold on 28. 1982. 22. In the connection, Sec.52 of the Provincial Insolvency Act also has some relevance. It reads thus: "52. Duties of Court executing decree as to property taken in execution: Where execution of a decree has issued against any property of a debtor which is salable in execution and before the sale thereof notice is given to the court executing the decree that an insolvency petition by or against the debtor has been admitted, the court shall, on application, direct the property, if in possession of the court, to be delivered to the receiver, but the costs of the suit in which the decree was made end of the execution shall be a first charge on the property so delivered, and the receiver may sell the property or an adequate part thereof for the purpose of satisfying the charge." 23. Before a receiver could seek to set aside a sale or direct that the property belonging to the judgment- debtor, be delivered to the receiver, two conditions, have to be satisfied. First is, that notice must be given to the executing court regarding the admission of the petition of insolvency by or against the judgment- debtor. The second is, that there should be an application before the executing court for delivery of such property to the receiver. Considering these questions, in C.Ponnudurai, Official Receiver, Chingleput v. K.A. Kumaraswamy Mudaliar and others. (1971)2 M.L.J. 252 , this Court held that an executing court while executing a decree passed against the insolvent need not stay its hands merely on the admission of an insolvency petition. Considering these questions, in C.Ponnudurai, Official Receiver, Chingleput v. K.A. Kumaraswamy Mudaliar and others. (1971)2 M.L.J. 252 , this Court held that an executing court while executing a decree passed against the insolvent need not stay its hands merely on the admission of an insolvency petition. It is true that according to Sec.28(7) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, once an order of adjudication is made, it relates back to the date of filing of the petition, but that will not have the effect of nullifying the judicial orders made in execution of the decree against the judgment- debtor. Sec.52 of the Act deals with a situation where a petition for execution of a decree was issued against the property of a debtor and there had been a receiver appointed by the insolvency court, and as a result of which the property is vested in him. Sec.52 of the Act will have no application when a Receiver has not been appointed when a receiver has not been appointed in respect of the property of the insolvent. In this case, no receiver of the insolvent. In this case, no receiver was appointed on the date when the property was sold. Even though the fact of confirmation sale was subsequent, it relates back to the date of sale on 28. 1982. So, on the date when the Receiver was appointed, there is no property belonging to the insolvent and the receiver cannot make an application either to set aside the sale or to return the ‘property to him after, having the sale set aside. It was not an asset of the insolvent. 24. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent relied on the decision reported in D.S.Marvadi v. M.T.Shimpi. A.I.R. 1959 Bom.. 10. That decision has no application to the facts of this case. There, the property was purchased after the insolvency petition was admitted to file. That decision to a certain extent, goes against the interest of the respondent, for, that also makes a distinction between the presentation of the petition’ and ‘admission of the insolvency petition. ‘In view of the fact that the sale was subsequent to the date of admission of the petition, the learned Judge of that court held that the receiver is competent to file the petition to set aside the sale and get the property for the benefit of all the creditors. 25. ‘In view of the fact that the sale was subsequent to the date of admission of the petition, the learned Judge of that court held that the receiver is competent to file the petition to set aside the sale and get the property for the benefit of all the creditors. 25. In view of the above position of law, I set aside the judgments of the courts below allow this re vision petition. The applications filed by the receiver for setting aside the sale is dismissed. I hold that the sale held in this case on 29. 1982 is valid, and that there are no grounds for setting aside the sale. The civil revision petition is allowed with no order as to costs.