JUDGMENT : M.C. Agarwal, J. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by a tenant whose defence in a suit for ejectment has been struck off under the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the CPC as amended in the State of Uttar Pradesh. 2. I have heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Counsel for the Respondents. 3. The Respondent No. 3 filed a suit No. 95 of 1991 in the Court of Judge Small Causes, Allahabad for the ejectment of the Petitioner and recovery of arrears of rent. Rule 5 of Order XV of the CPC provides as below: 5. Striking off defence on failure to deposit admitted rent, etc.-(1) in any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the Defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with Interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of Its accrual, and in the event of any default in making, the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2), strike off his defence. Explanation 1.-The expression 'first hearing' means the date for filing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 2.-The expression 'entire amount admitted by him to be due' means the entire gross amount, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation, calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after taking no other deduction except the taxes, if any. Explanation 2.-The expression 'entire amount admitted by him to be due' means the entire gross amount, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation, calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after taking no other deduction except the taxes, if any. paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account and the amount, if any, paid to the lessor acknowledged by the lessor in writing signed by him and the amount, if any, deposited in any Court u/s 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972. Explanation 3.-(1) The expression 'monthly amount due' means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account. (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the Court may consider any representation made by the Defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days, of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in Sub-section (1) as the case may be. 4. On the first date of hearing, i.e., 12.9.1991, the tenant deposited a sum of Rs. 300 in the Court being the rent admitted by him to be due for the period April. 1991 to August, 1991. He was required to deposit the same with Interest that amounted to Rs. 3.50 paise. The Petitioner's case is that since he was advised to deposit Rs. 300 only, he deposited the same. Further deposits were made by the Petitioner as below: Sl. No. Date of deposit Amount Period of deposit 1. 1.11.1991 180 Sept. 1991 to Nov. 1991 2. 28.2.1991 180 Dec. 1991 to Feb. 1992 3. 22.5.1992 180 March 1992 to May 1992 4. 29.8.1992 180 June 1992 to Aug. 1992 5. 31.12.1992 180 Sept. 1992 to Nov. 1992 6. 27.2.1993 180 Dec. 1992 to Feb. 1993 7. 14.5.1993 180 March 1993 to May, 1993 8. 27.8.1993 180 June 1993 to Aug. 1993 9. 10.11.1993 180 Sept. 1993 to Nov. 1993 10. 22.4.1994 180 Dec. 1993 to Feb. 1994 11. 20.5.1994 180 March 1994 to May 1994 12. 24.8.1994 180 June 1994 to Aug. 1994 13. 23.11.1994 180 Sept. 1994 to Nov. 1994 14. 1993 7. 14.5.1993 180 March 1993 to May, 1993 8. 27.8.1993 180 June 1993 to Aug. 1993 9. 10.11.1993 180 Sept. 1993 to Nov. 1993 10. 22.4.1994 180 Dec. 1993 to Feb. 1994 11. 20.5.1994 180 March 1994 to May 1994 12. 24.8.1994 180 June 1994 to Aug. 1994 13. 23.11.1994 180 Sept. 1994 to Nov. 1994 14. 21.2.1995 180 Dec. 1994 to Feb. 1995 15. 1.3.1995 125 Towards Interest of all delayed deposits. 16. 7.3.1995 120 March 1995 to April 1995 5. The Petitioner's case is that when he was advised that he was required to deposit the interest also, he deposited Rs. 125 towards interest as mentioned at serial No. 15 in respect of all the delayed deposits. The landlord-Respondent moved an application on 20th April, 1992 praying that the tenant had not complied with the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the CPC and, therefore, his defence may be struck off. The copy of the said application is Annexure-5 to the writ petition in which the landlord has stated that the Defendant is intentionally not complying with the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 CPC and has not deposited the sum due much less within time and as such his defence is liable to be struck off. The tenant filed an objection contending that he has been regularly depositing the rent. The application remained pending for more than 10 months and was taken up for hearing on 16.11.1994 and by an order passed on the same date, the defence was struck off because the amounts were not deposited within a week from the date of its accrual. The tenant preferred a revision petition before the District Judge, which came up for decision before the Addl. District Judge. (Special Judge) and the learned appellate Judge agreeing with the lower court dismissed the revision petition. A perusal of the details of deposits mentioned above which are not disputed would show that the Petitioner had substantially complied with the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The default was only to the extent that he did not deposit Rs. 3.50 paise towards interest and the deposits made subsequently were in respect of some months not made within a week of the accrual of rent. The default was only to the extent that he did not deposit Rs. 3.50 paise towards interest and the deposits made subsequently were in respect of some months not made within a week of the accrual of rent. The chart given above would show that the tenant was depositing rent quarterly instead of monthly and the rent of some of the months was deposited in time and of others even before the date of accrual. For example in the first deposit made on 1.11.1991, rent for October 1991 was paid in time and that of November 1991 was paid even before the accrual. in this manner in all the deposits, rent of at least one month was paid before it had fallen due. 6. In Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal 1981 ARC 463, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5, CPC are discretionary and the Court has power not to strike off defence even in the absence of a representation by tenant, if on facts and circumstances already existing on record, it finds good reason for not striking off defence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that it must be remembered that an order under Sub-rule (1) striking off the defence is in the nature of a penalty and serious responsibility rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. The Hon'ble. Supreme Court further observed that there is a reserve of discretion vested in the Court entitling it not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circumstances already existing on the record, it finds good reason for not doing so and that the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 did not oblige the Court to strike off the defence in every case of default. The Hon'ble Supreme Court remanded the matter back to this Court for fresh consideration and the matter was decided by this Court in Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal 1982 ALJ 1315. The Hon'ble Supreme Court remanded the matter back to this Court for fresh consideration and the matter was decided by this Court in Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal 1982 ALJ 1315. The chart of deposits as given in the judgment of this Court is as under: Period of Month Deposit was to be made by Deposit was made on 15.12.77 to 14.1.78 22.1.78 4.2.78 15.1.78 to 14.2.78 22.2.78 25.2.78 15.10.78 to 14.11.78 22.11.78 8.12.78 15.8.79 to 14.9.79 22.9.79 1.10.79 15.10.79 to 14.11.79 22.11.79 3.1.80 15.11.79 to 14.12.79 22.12.79 3.1.80 15.12.79 to 14.1.80 22.1.80 10.4.80 15.1.80 to 14.2.80 22.2.80 10.4.80 15.2.80 to 14.3.80 22.3.80 10.4.80 7. This Court upheld the lower Court's decision to strike off the defence and dismissed the tenant's revision petition. The matter again went back to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal 1983 ARC 203 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court reversed the decision of this Court holding that this was not the kind of a case in which the defense of the Appellant-tenant could be struck off. 8. In Bharat Bhushan Misra v. District Judge 1990 ALJ 292, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that delayed deposit of rents for certain months after institution of the suit does not render the defence liable to be struck off particularly when such request was made by the landlord after evidence had been closed and the suit was listed for argument. In Laxmi Narain v. Rama Nand 1994 AWC 1169 , another learned single Judge of this Court held that where the delay in depositing of rent had occurred on account of lack of suitable advice from the Counsel the defence cannot be struck off. 9. The purpose of enacting the provisions of Rule 5 in Order XV was not to give lever to the landlord to get a tenant punished, for insignificant lapses. The purpose was merely to ensure that the dues of the landlord are properly secured and he can get his rent regularly ever though the litigation may continue. 9. The purpose of enacting the provisions of Rule 5 in Order XV was not to give lever to the landlord to get a tenant punished, for insignificant lapses. The purpose was merely to ensure that the dues of the landlord are properly secured and he can get his rent regularly ever though the litigation may continue. The details of the deposits made by the Petitioner, in this case indicate that he has substantially complied with the provisions of the aforesaid rule and when it struck to him that there was a little deficiency and delay, he even deposited the amount of interest though there is no provision in the aforesaid rule for payment of interest on delayed deposits in respect of the rent falling due after the institution of the suit. It is also clear that though the tenant had been depositing the amounts over a number of years, no one, not even the court pointed it out to him that the deposits are not in order. Even the landlord in his application under consideration did not pinpoint the default and wrongly alleged that no deposit has been made. The said application was not taken up for hearing immediately and was allowed to remain pending for about 10 months. Therefore, this was not a case in which the courts 'reserve of discretion' could have been exercised to strike off the defence and it was undoubtedly a case in which the Court should have exercised that 'reserve of discretion' by declining to strike off the defence. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the striking off of defence is of a penal nature. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa, (1969) 2 SCC 627 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation is the result of quasi-criminal proceedings and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the parties obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct, contumacious or dishonest or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will also not be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether a penalty should be imposed for failure to perform statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all relevant circumstance. Penalty will also not be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether a penalty should be imposed for failure to perform statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all relevant circumstance. The circumstances of the present case, as discussed above, show that the tenant Petitioner is not guilty of any dishonest or contumacious conduct. Nor it is shown that he acted deliberately in defiance of law. He has almost fully compiled with the requirements of law and the default was so insignificant and trifling that Judicial discretion required the same to be ignored. 10. For the above reasons, the order striking off the defence of the Petitioner and thereby depriving him an opportunity of contesting the suit on merits is legally erroneous and cannot be sustained. The writ petition is accordingly, allowed and the impugned order dated 16.11.1994 is hereby quashed. The Petitioner will get his costs of this writ petition from Respondent No. 3 which I assess at Rs. 1,500. The cost will be paid to the Petitioner or deposited in the trial court before the suit in question proceeds further.