D. K. SETH, J. This application has been filed by one Sri Kailash Singh, in the above writ petition for recalling the order dated 11-1-1993, by which the present Writ Petition No. 394 of 1993 stood disposed of. 2. The petitioners case, inter alia was that by fraudulent method the petitioner has got his fathers name interpolated in respect of fifty bigha of land in the khata as mentioned in para 2 of the affidavit filed in support of this application. Where for all the villagers submitted an application on 22-6-1992. Upon the said application the District Magistrate had called for a report of inquity from the Sub- Divisional Officer, Ballia, who submitted his report on 28-8-1992. Annexure-2 to the writ petition. By an order dated 1-9-1992 (Annexure 3 to this affidavit) the Deputy Director of Consolidation recorded an order that those entries were forge by one of the members of Chakbandi Committee, namely Vijai Bahadur, who was brother of Samarjit Singh, and ac cordingly he had recommended for dissolution of the Consolidation committee under Section 3 (kha)0-10 (2), of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and dissolved the Committee. Thereupon the Chief Revenue Officer by his order dated 16. 10. 1992 directed the forge entries to be cancelled and restored to the original record, which is Annexure-4 to the affidavit. The District Magistrate, Ballia, by his order dated 28-9-1992, Annexure-5 to the affidavit, directed the Deputy Director of Consolidation to maintain the record in accordance with law and to make inquiry as to who has done foregery. By an order dated 16-10-1992 the Chief Revenue Officer, Ballia expunged the name of the father of Samarjit Singh. 3. The petitioner had lodged a caveat and notice whereof were served to the said Sarmjit Singh. The return of the caveat contained endorsement of member of his family. Despite such fact the said Samarjit Singh moved the above writ petition without making the petitioner party therein. Neither the other persons on whose instance the entire exercise was undertaken were made party to the said writ petition. The said Samarjit Singh got the said writ petition disposed of by an order dated 11-1-1993 after having affirmed the af fidavit on 23-12-1992. It is this order which has been sought to be recalled by means of present petition. 4. The said Samarjit Singh got the said writ petition disposed of by an order dated 11-1-1993 after having affirmed the af fidavit on 23-12-1992. It is this order which has been sought to be recalled by means of present petition. 4. Drawing may attention to the said order dated 11-1-1993 learned Counsel points out that implementation of the orders dated 28-8-1992 and 16-10-1992 were stayed. Therefore he contends that the order, which was passed at the instance of the petitioner and others was stayed, by reason whereof their rights have been affected, they were therefore proper parties. The said Samarjit Singh did not make the petitioner and other persons parties properly with a view to fraudulently mislead this Court and steal a march over the petitioner and those other persons, despite lodging caveat by the petitioner. Therefore in the fact and circumstances of the case the said order dated 11-1-1993 should be recalled. 5. Learned Counsel for the writ petitioner had filed counter affidavit to the said application and contended, inter alia, that the petitioner not being a party to the writ petition, cannot maintain the present application. The court becomes functus officio, once the writ petition is disposed of. The said order cannot be recalled by a stranger to the proceedings. 6. While hearing the said application Sri Srivastava Learned Counsel ap pearing in support of the application refers to the merit of the case, as pleaded in the writ petition and contended that in the facts and circumstances arising out of the situation it is highly desirable that the present petition should be entertained and appropriate orders should be passed. On the other hand Sri Rajesh Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner contends and refers to the facts pleaded in the writ petition and submits that the present petitioner has no locus standi and also submits on the question of merit. He further contended that the order dated 11-1-1993 is perfectly valid and proper and does not call for recalling, in the facts and cir cumstances of the case. He also refers to Section 9 of the said U. P. Con solidation of Holdings Act and submits that the present petitioner has a remedy before the Consolidation Officer before whom he can file his objec tion. He also refers to Section 9 of the said U. P. Con solidation of Holdings Act and submits that the present petitioner has a remedy before the Consolidation Officer before whom he can file his objec tion. By virtue of stay of the operation of the order dated 28-8-1992 and 16-10-1992 the petitioners right has not been jeopardised, neither the petitioner has suffered any prejudice. 7. In view of the aforesaid facts it appears to me that the facts pleaded in the writ petition is required to be gone into for arriving at a correct decision. Both the Counsel did not object to such hearing. 8. So far as the statement contained in para-1 of the present petition where the petitioner has also asserted about the lodging of caveat, has not been categorically denied by the writ petitioner while dealing with the said statement in para 7 of the counter-affidavit to this present petition. Though he has stated, "that the statement made in the said paragraph are wholly in correct and denied. . . . . . . . . nor caveat has been sent to the petitioner. " But he has not specifically denied that the return was endorsed by the member of his family. The respondents further contended that no relief was asked for against the petitioner. Such statement cannot be accepted since it was at the instance of the petitioner and others. The orders dated 28-8-1992 and 16-10-1992 were passed. 9. The facts disclosed clearly indicates that the petitioner and other per sons whose land were affected by the alleged interpolation and at whose in stance the same was corrected are not only necessary but are proper parties. The stay of implementation of the said two orders dated 28-8-1992 and 16-10-1992 materially affects the rights of the petitioner and those other persons. It was incumbent upon the writ petitioner, in the facts and circumstances of the case to implead the petitioner and those other persons as parties to the writ petition. The situation emerging from the present facts and circumstances of the case indicates that the writ petitioner had purported to steal a march over the petitioner despite lodging of caveat which was endorsed by the members of the writ petitioners family. Rules 5, Chapter XXII of Allahabad High Court Rules postulate as soon as caveat is lodged the Caveator is entitled to a notice. Rules 5, Chapter XXII of Allahabad High Court Rules postulate as soon as caveat is lodged the Caveator is entitled to a notice. Only in order to avoid the effect of lodging caveat the petitioner he deliverately omitted to make the petitioner and other persons, parties to the proceedings. 10. Such a situation clearly pre-supposes that the writ petitioner was not acting bona fide. He has sought to invoke writ jurisdiction which is an equi table relief, seeking equity, while coming un-clean hands, which disentitles him to such relief. 11. Whether orders dated 28-8-1992 and 16-10-1992 are valid or not, is not necessary to be gone into at his stage. The merit of the writ petition can not be decided now unless the order dated 11-1-1993 is recalled. 1, therefore, refrain myself from making any observation with regard to the merit of the said orders dated 28-8-1992 and 16-10-1992. 12. Now the question arises, as to whether the petitioner can maintain this petition for recalling the order dated 11-1-1992 despite his being a stranger to the proceedings. Sri Rajesh Kumar, learned Counsel for the writ petitioner relies on the judgment in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahmdutt Sharma, AIR 1987 SC 943 , and contends that once the writ peti tion is disposed of the court becomes functus-officio but the said case, in my opinion, cannot be applied, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Inasmuch as in the said writ petition the order of dismissal was challenged and the writ petition was finally disposed of on 10-8-1994. The said proceed ing was sought to be revived for the purposes of challenged, a notice to show cause issued on 29-1-1986, namely after two years. Therefore, Hon. Supreme Court had held "no Misc. application could be filed in the writ petition to revive the proceeding in respect of subsequent events after two years. If the respondents was aggrieved by the notice dated 29-1-1986 he could have filed separate petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of notice as it provided separate cause of action to him. The respondents was not entitled to assail the validity of the notice before the court by means of Misc. Application in the writ petition which had already been decided. The respondents was not entitled to assail the validity of the notice before the court by means of Misc. Application in the writ petition which had already been decided. " It was, therefore observed in the said judgment that "the High Court had not jurisdic tion to entertain the application as no proceedings were pending before it. The High Court committed error in entertaining the respondents application which was founded on a separate cause of action. When the proceedings stand terminated by final disposal of writ petition it is not open to the court to re open the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause of action. If this principle is not followed there would be confusion and chaos and the finality of proceedings would cease to have any meaning. " 13. In the present case no subsequent events have been challenged. The case made out by the petitioner herein does not provide for any fresh cause of action. On the other hand their existing right has been taken away without impleading them as a party to the proceeding. 14. Therefore in the above circumstances the petitioner shall suffer the consequence of the order which could not have been passed in their absence and the writ petitioner would have got his writ petition allowed taking ad vantage of his own wrong. This will amount to allow a premium to a person seaking to invoke equity jurisdiction after having come with unclean hands and attempted to fraudulently and deliberately mislead the court and steal the order against the petitioner despite caveat being lodged through a claver manoeuvre added with the fact that the orders dated 28-8-1992 and 16-10-1992 were required to be passed because of another claver manoeuvre on the part of the writ petitioner in other forum. If such a situation is allowed to stand the people belonging to the class of the writ petitioner would be encouraged. The courts cannot be idle on looker and powerless to undo a wrong and in justice which the court had unknowingly done, being misled by the writ petitioner. The hands of justice cannot be tied up by technicalities. The pro cedures are handmaids of justice. Justice cannot be imprisoned by formalities and technicalities. The courts cannot be idle on looker and powerless to undo a wrong and in justice which the court had unknowingly done, being misled by the writ petitioner. The hands of justice cannot be tied up by technicalities. The pro cedures are handmaids of justice. Justice cannot be imprisoned by formalities and technicalities. If required the court has to break through the technicalities, if the circumstances so demand to undo injustice brought into being by the ccjurt itself on account of its being mislead by some persons. 15. In the case of Suraj Deo v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1982 All 23 , it was held that the stranger would not be precluded on the ground of locus standi to initiate proceeding for setting aside ex-parte decree which was against the provision of law and was the result of collusion and fraud practiced by the plaintiff and the defendants. In para 14 of the said judgment it has been held, "no doubt the observations made in the above case support the conten tion raised on behalf of the contesting opposite parties. To my mind, the ob servations made by the learned Member are too wide and they cannot be ac cepted as laying down quite correct law. There may be case where a third person can bring correct facts to the notice of the courts concerned and the courts concerned will be fully justified in acting upon the information received and in exercising powers under Section 151, C. P. C. In the present case I think that the petitioner was fully justified in bringing correct facts to the notice of the trial court which rightly proceeded on the information received and has rightly set aside the ex parte decree in favour of the contesting opposite par ties. " 16. It was further held in the said case that "in the present case the petitioner is no doubt stranger to the suits in which decree were passed in favour of the contesting opposite parties but he is very much interested in the subject-matter. If the disputed land is covered into cultivatory fields, the petitioners right of irrigation from the disputed land shall be vitally affected, hence in my opinion the petitioner cannot be characterised as rank stranger. Rather, he could have easementary right in the disputed land on the allega tions made by him. If the disputed land is covered into cultivatory fields, the petitioners right of irrigation from the disputed land shall be vitally affected, hence in my opinion the petitioner cannot be characterised as rank stranger. Rather, he could have easementary right in the disputed land on the allega tions made by him. Thus, in my opinion having some right in the nature of easementary right the petitioner was fully entitled to bring correct facts to the notice of the courts concerned which had passed decrees in favour of the con testing opposite parties without looking to the relevant provisions of law. " 17. It was also held in the said case," It is note worthy that in 1955 Rev. Dec 335 Srinath v. Hardwar Rai a learned Member, Board of Revenue, in Paragraph 2 of his judgment has observed as follows: ". . . . . . . . . . Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure may property be employed by a Court to set aside a decree when that decree has been obtained as a result of fraud practised upon the court. It is a well-settled rule of law that fraud vitiates all proceedings and, therefore, fraud is a matter of such fundamental and serious impor tance that any body may bring it to the notice of the Court. . . . . . . . . . . It is true that the decree was not passed against them out the consideration cannot be over-looked that their interests were affected by the decree since they are land-holders and tenants in possession. In my opinion the view cannot correctly be taken that the relief of Sec tion 151, C. P. C. was barred to the applicants because their only remedy was to file a separate suit. " It was also held that the true tests is that the person applying for restoration of the suit for setting aside the decree should have some interest in the subject-matter of litigation. Even if the petitioner had no locus standi to move application for setting aside of ex parte decree in favour of the contesting opposite parties it cannot be said that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte decree which were against the provisions of law and were the result of collusion and fraud practised by the plaintiff and the defendants in the suit. 18. 18. In the present case the petitioner is interested in subject-matter of the proceeding since in respect of his land name of the petitioners father was inserted through interpolation in the revenue records. It was only maintenance of the record by removing interpolations which was not correction of the record within the meaning of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The inter polation was not mistake or dispute within the meaning of Section 9 of the said Act. Therefore the same could neither be a subject of objection under Section 9 of the said Act nor could be corrected under the said section. Therefore, the order dated 11-1-1993 which directs decision by the Consolida tion Officer after hearing the objection under Section 9 is wholly against the principles of law. The said order has been brought into being by the fraudulent mamoeuvre of the petitioner, for which the court was never ap prised of the law. Therefore, though stranger, technically, the petitioner having brought information before this Court, the court would be failing in its duty, if it does not activate the judicial process in undoing injustice. 19. So far as the question of court becoming functus officio after the writ petition was disposed of, was dealt with in the case of Jamania Cold Storage and Ice Plant (P) Ltd. v. The Director of Horticulture, and Fruits Utilisation, U. P and others, 1992 (2) CRC 1301. 20. In view of the above decisions I am of the view that by reason of the informations brought before the court by the petitioner, the court would fail in its duty in case the order dated 11-1-1993 is not recalled. In the facts and circumstances, of the case the order dated 11-1-1993 is hereby recalled. The application is, therefore, allowed. The writ petition is restored to its original number. List this petition for admission on 7th December, 1995. Application allowed. .