JUDGMENT 1. - These three appeals arise out of the common judgment dated 16-11-94, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, by which the three writ petitions filed by the petition-appellant were dismissed. These appeals raise a common question of facts and law and they are, therefore being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Appellant M/s. Udaipur Distillery and Co., Udaipur, is a private undertaking, which is engaged in the business of manufacturing of High-standard Rectified Spirit more than 88% V.V., i.e., 168 Degree and, also, Indian-Made Foreign Liquor (for short, `the I.M.F.L.'). During the period between 1-2-82 to 5-7- 82, the appellant, under the authorised Permit and Passes, in D.B.Civil Special Appeal No. 793 of 1994 (S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 752 of 1984), dispatched under Bond the High-standard Rectified Spirit in Road-tankers to M/s. Sona Distillery, Alwar, but M/s. Sora Distillery, Alwar received lesser quantity of the High-standard Spirit than the quantity of rectified spirit alleged to have been sent to it by the petitioner-appellant. In D.B.Civil Special Appeal No. 822 of 1984 (S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 182 of 1984), during the period between 9-4-82 to 18-2-83, the appellant-petitioner exported I.M.F.L. out-side the State as well as within the State under the Bond from its Distillery. The I.M.F.L. exported by the petitioner-appellant to the dealers out-side the State was received lesser in quantity than the liquor alleged to have been sent by the appellant-petitioner. Similarly, in D.B.Civil Special Appeal No. 821 of 1994 (S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 3535 of 1984) during the year 1983-84, the appellant-petitioner exported I.M.FL. out-side the State as well as within the State under the Bond from its Distillery and the I.M.F.L. exported by the petitioner-appellant to the dealers out-side the State was received lesser in quantity than the liquor alleged to have been sent by the appellant-petitioner. out-side the State as well as within the State under the Bond from its Distillery and the I.M.F.L. exported by the petitioner-appellant to the dealers out-side the State was received lesser in quantity than the liquor alleged to have been sent by the appellant-petitioner. The appellant even acknowledged the Loss in Transit of the rectified spirit/I.M.F.L. exported under the Bond for the aforesaid petitions and claimed it as the Transit Wastage and did not pay any excise duty on the alleged transit wastage on the alleged rectified spirit as well as on the I.M.F.L. In D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 793 of 1994, the alleged transit wastage of rectified spirit was 1154.130 L.P.Litres; in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 822 Appeal No. 822 of 1994 the alleged transit wastage was 390.399 L.P. Litres and in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 821 of 1994, the alleged transit wastage was of 557.815 L.P. Litres. The Excise Authorities did not agree with the claim of the appellant-petitioner that the excise duty is not payable on Transit Wastage and, therefore, issued notices in the aforesaid three cases to the appellant-petitioner why the excise duty may not be charged on these alleged transit losses. The petitioner-appellant filed replies to these notices issued to it and claimed that on the transit wastage of the rectified spirit/I.M.F.L., no excise duty can be charged. Number of other grounds were, also, raised in the replies to the notices submitted by the appellant-petitioner. The District Excise Officer, Udaipur, was not satisfied with the replies submitted by the appellant-petitioner and, therefore, he raised a demand of excise duty against the appellant-petitioner on the alleged transit wastages. A demand of Rs. 54,252.57p. was raised in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 793 of 1994; Rs. 26,217.30p. in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 821 of 1994 and Rs. 12,49,750/- in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 822 of 1994. The petitioner-appellant, after receipt of the Demand received by it, instead of preferring appeals before the Excise Commissioner under Section 9-A of the Rajasthan Excise Act, challenged the Demands by way of filing the aforesaid three writ petitions. The writ petitions, filed by the petitioner, were contested by the respondents. 12,49,750/- in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 822 of 1994. The petitioner-appellant, after receipt of the Demand received by it, instead of preferring appeals before the Excise Commissioner under Section 9-A of the Rajasthan Excise Act, challenged the Demands by way of filing the aforesaid three writ petitions. The writ petitions, filed by the petitioner, were contested by the respondents. As all the aforesaid three writ petitions raised a common question of law between the same parties, therefore, the learned Single Judge, by his common judgment dated 16-11-94, decided all the three writ petitions and dismissed the same. While dismissing the aforesaid three writ petitions, the learned Single Judge observed that the petitioner has utilised, consumed or sold the material in the State of Rajasthan itself, for which it is under the statutory obligation to pay excise duty because the requisite quantity of liquor alleged to have been despatched by the petitioner-appellant never reached the destination. It is against this common judgment dated 16-11-94, passed by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid three writ petitions, by which the writ petitions filed by the petitioner-appellant were dismissed, that the appellant has preferred these three Special Appeals. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner that (i) there is no provision under the Act, the Rules or the Bye-laws for the levy and charge of the excise duty on the rectified spirit and I.M.F.L. wasted during transit and in the absence of any specific provision under the Act or the Rules for the levy or charge of the excise duty, the excise duty cannot be recovered under the regulatory or residuary powers and the demands raised by the respondents are, therefore, without jurisdiction, illegal and malafide; (ii) though the Rajasthan Stock-taking and Wastage of Liquor Rules, 1959 (for short. the rules, 1959') are not applicable in the present case but even if they are applicable even then no recovery can be made from the appellant-petitioner unless before demand being raised, the enquiry under rule 5(5) of the Rules, 1959 is made and a finding is given by the District Excise Officer that the wastages were due to negligence and fault on the part of the appellant-petitioner and even as per the Notification issued under Section 17 of the Act by the State Government, the liability of the appellant-petitioner for the damages or loss can be fixed only if the same is caused by the mistake, fraud or negligence of the petitioner-appellant and in the present case neither any enquiry under rule 5(5) of the Rules has been made nor any finding has been given by the District Excise Officer that it was only on account of the mistake, fraud or negligence on the part of the appellant-petitioner that the wastage/losses occurred during the transit and as such the demands raised by the respondents against the appellant-petitioner for the charge of the excise duty are wholly illegal; (iii) while despatching the consignment, the export duty has already been charged and it is for the importing State to recover the excise duty on the I.M.F.L., received in the importing State and no further recovery in the form of excise duty can be made by the exporting State on the wastages occurred during the transit: (iv) the deeming provision that the liquor, which is lost in transit, has been consumed in the exporting State, is not applicable in the present case; and (v) the orders passed by the respondents raising the Demands against the appellant-petitioner have been passed without application of mind and without giving proper opportunity of hearing to the appellant-petitioner and the principles of natural justice have been flouted as such the Demands raised by the respondents, therefore, deserve to be quashed and set-aside. The learned Additional Advocate General as well as the learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand, have supported the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the Demands raised by the respondents. The learned Additional Advocate General as well as the learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand, have supported the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the Demands raised by the respondents. It is contended by the learned Additional Advocate General as well as the learned counsel for the respondents that the appellant-petitioner is bound by the conditions of the Licence, which are statutory and have a binding force and the appellant-petitioner cannot resile from these contractual obligations. It is further contended by them that no Notification is necessary for the charging of the excise duty over the liquor wasted in the transit and the excise duty can be charged on the transit wastage as per the rules as the spirit/I.M.F.L. both are excisable articles. 4. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 5. The first contention, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner is that there is no provision under the Act, the Rules or the Bye-laws for the levy or charge of the excise duty on the spirit/I.M.F.L. wasted in transit and the respondents are effecting the recoveries under the regulatory and residuary power: which they cannot be permitted to do. It is further contended that the Excise duty or tax cannot be imposed unless the statute specifically authorises the imposition of the same and the basis of the statutory powers conferred by the Statute cannot be transgressed by the Rules-making Authority as the Rules-making Authority has no plenary powers and it has to act within the powers granted to it by the Act. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance over : Bimal Chandra Banerjee v. the State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 517 ; Synthetics and Chemicals Limited and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1990) 1 SCC 109 ; Bhatinda Improvement Trust v. Balwant Singh and others, (1991) 4 SCC 368 ; M/s. Gujchem Distillers India Ltd. v. the State of Gujarat and others, (1992) 2 SCC 399 ; Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharad Kumar Jayanti Kumar Pasawallia and others, (1992) 2 SCC 285 and M/s. Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd., Lucknow v. the State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 Allahabad 198 . It is not necessary to embellish this judgment with several authorities cited before us by the learned counsel for the appellant because they all are of the view that no tax, fee or excise duty can be levied by the State Government or any other delegated authority in the absence of specific authorisation by the Act. Unless the statute, under which the subordinate legislation is made, authorises the imposition of the tax/duty no tax duty can be imposed by any Rules, Bye-laws or any other regulation because the delegated authority has no plenary powers and it has to act within the limits and powers granted to it. It will. not be proper in the exercise of fiscal powers to apply the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary powers when there is no express provision for the same. The delegated authority has no implied authority to impose tax, fee or excise duty and its powers to levy tax and excise duty are controlled by the Act itself.Now, it has to be seen : whether any Rules or Bye-laws have been made by the Excise Commissioner in the present matters under Section 42 of the Act or by the State Government under Section 41 of the Act for the imposition of the excise duty relating to transit wastage and whether at all it is necessary to frame Rules or the Bye-laws or to issue any Notification for the charge or to issue any Notification for the charge of the excise duty on the transit wastage. The wastage of liquor during the transit is not a separate excisable article on which separate Rules charging the excise duty are to be framed. When an excisable article is transported from the distillery to other places or exported to other state(s) from the Distillery, it attracts the levy of excise duty. If in the Rules some provisions have been made for the loss in transit or in the manufacture then the distiller or the exporter is entitled for the transit loss to the extent for which the provision has been made in the Rules and if there is no such provision then the appellant-petitioner will have to pay excise duty on the whole wastage of excisable article at the rates the liquor is chargeable under the Act or the Rules. No specific Rules for charging the excise duty in the case of wastage in transit is necessary and the excise duty is payable at the rate chargeable on the excisable articles. It is for the Government, if it thinks fit, to allow some margin for wastage occurred during the manufacture or transportation and if some limit for such wastage is provided under the Rules then beyond that permissible limit and if no limit has been provided then for the whole wastage, if any, the State has a right to levy the excise duty on such wastage. In the present case, no margin has been made for the wastage occurred during the transit and, therefore, the State Government has a right to levy and charge the duty on the wastage of rectified spirit/Indian-made Foreign Liquor which has not been accounted-for by the appellant. The I.M.F.L. manufactured by the appellant-petitioner and exported to other States, if that would not have been exported out-side the State and would have been consumed in the State itself, the appellant-petitioner would have been liable to pay excise duty on whole of the I.M.F.L. exported by it. The appellant is, therefore, liable to pay excise duty on the alleged transit loss as the State cannot be deprived of the excise duty which it would have otherwise derived if the I.M.F.L., exported by the appellant, wasted in transit would have been used in the State. The excise duty is levied on the manufacture of excisable article and not on its sale. In case of export of I.M.F.L., to other State the levy of excise duty is deferred and is charged by the importing State and, therefore, in the garb of the transit loss the excise revenue of the State cannot be affected because the importing State can charge the excise duty on actual quantity of I.M.F.L. received by it and, therefore, the exporting State is entitled for the charge of the excise-duty on the I.M.F.L. wasted during the transit. The I.M.F.L. exported by the appellant-petitioner and claimed to have wasted in transit, can be taxed and excise duty can be levied on it as if it has not been wasted, as the alleged wastage in the transit did not result in the export. The I.M.F.L. exported by the appellant-petitioner and claimed to have wasted in transit, can be taxed and excise duty can be levied on it as if it has not been wasted, as the alleged wastage in the transit did not result in the export. The State had, therefore, a reason to believe that the same has been used or disposed of otherwise than by export and, therefore, it can impose the excise duty on it. The Supreme Court in : M/s. Mohan Meakin Breweries Limited v. Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Chandigarh and others, (1976) 3 SCC 421 , in which the appellant was a manufacturer of foreign liquor and had the bonded ware-house in Chandigarh, part of the bulk liquor came from Uttar Pradesh and there was a wastage of liquor in transit beyond the limit prescribed. The excise duty was charged by the Excise officer on the excess transit loss of liquor and the same was challenged. While repelling the contention, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Supreme Court, held as under : "In the present case the liquor for which permits were obtained by the appellant was admittedly in existence and was meant for human consumption and did leave the appellant's distilleries in Uttar Pradesh for being transported to its warehouse in Chandigarh at its own risk and responsibility. It is, also, not denied on behalf of the appellant that a portion of the liquor which exceeded the permissible limit of wastage did not reach the appellant's warehouse and was not found therein and the shortage remained unaccounted for. It is thus evident that the duty is not sought to be charged on an excisable article which was not in existence, as contended on behalf of the appellant but is sought to be charged on liquor which was actually manufactured and left Uttar Pradesh but was found short beyond the permissible limit and no reasonable explanation was tendered by the appellant in respect thereof. There is accordingly no merit or substance in the second contention advanced on behalf of the appellant as well." In view of the judgment in Meakin Breweries Limited (supra), which was reiterated in : the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Delhi Cloth and others, (1991) 1 SCC 421 , it is, thus, clear that the excise duty can be charged on the liquor wasted in transit beyond the permissible limit. When the excise duty can be charged on the excess transit wastage where the permissible quantity of wastage is provided then in a case where no exemption is provided to the transit wastage, the excise duty can be charged on the total transit wastage as the same is not exempted.The appellant-petitioner was granted licence under the Rajasthan Excise Rules. Condition No. 23 of the Licence, which is binding in nature, provides that the licence shall have to pay duty on the wastage of I.M.F.L. as per the Rules. The contract entered into by the appellant-petitioner with the respondents is a statutory contract and while accepting the licence it started manufacturing process, installed the distillery, started the business under the licence with full knowledge of the Terms and Conditions attached to the Licence and, now, it cannot be permitted to wriggle-out from the contractual obligations arising out of the conditions of the licence which were accepted by the appellant-petitioner. Equitable Jurisdiction vested in the Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be used to facilitate the avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred by the petitioner-appellant while taking the Licence etc. The State Government is, therefore, entitled to realise the excise duty on the wastage of I.M.F.L. during the transit as per the terms of the contract. (See : The State of Haryana and others v. Lal Chand and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1326 ). 6. The next contention, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner is that no enquiry, as is required under rule 5(5) of the Rules, 1959 or under the Notification, was conducted by the respondents before raising the Demands that the wastage/losses in transit occurred only on account of the mistake, negligence or fraud on the part of the petitioner-appellant as no enquiry in this respect was made and unless the enquiry is made, the petitioner-appellant cannot be held liable for this transit wastage and no recovery of excise duty on this count can be made. The Rules of 1959 are not applicable in the present case and, therefore, no enquiry, as is required under rule 5(5) of the Rules, 1959, was necessary. The Rules of 1959 are not applicable in the present case and, therefore, no enquiry, as is required under rule 5(5) of the Rules, 1959, was necessary. It was the responsibility and contractual obligation of the appellant-petitioner to make payment of the excise duty on the alleged transit wastage of the liquor because the result of claimed wastage in transit is that of liquor in question, which was alleged to have been exported, has not been exported and, therefore, the State cannot be deprived of its legal right and the wastage of liquor has to be taxed as if no wastage took place. The contention, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, is, therefore, devoid of any force. 7. The next contention, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner is that while despatching the consignment the excise duty had already been adjusted at the point and the importing State has recovered the excise duty on the liquor imported in the State and no further recovery can be made by the exporting State. As per rule 23(2; o- the Rules, it is the liability of the importer to pay excise duty on the transit loss and the appellant-petitioner, who is an exporter in the present case, is not liable for payment of any excise duty on the transit wastage. The contention, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant on this point is, also, devoid of any force. While exporting the I.M.F.L. manufactured by the appellant-petitioner, only the export duty has been charged from the petitioner and the excise duty has been charged by the importing State on the quantity actually received by the importer in that State. The importing State has charged the excise-duty on the quantity of the liquor actually received by it and not on the whole quantity of the liquor which was exported by the appellant-petitioner and some of which wasted in the transit. The exporting State, i.e., the State of Rajasthan, is, therefore, entitled for the charge of the excise duty on the short-supply of the liquor by the appellant to the importers : whether due to loss of liquor in transit or otherwise, and the excise revenue of the exporting State cannot be affected. The appellant-petitioner, as per Clause 23 of the Licence, has to pay the excise duty on the wastage of I.M.F.L. in transit as per the Rules. The appellant-petitioner, as per Clause 23 of the Licence, has to pay the excise duty on the wastage of I.M.F.L. in transit as per the Rules. Sub-rule (2) of rule 23 of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, which made the importer liable to pay duty on the transit loss is applicable only in the case of imports inbound made in the State of Rajasthan and not in the cases where the I.M.FL. has been exported. Rules 20 to 23 of the Rules deal with the import of excisable articles in the State and, therefore, this rule is not applicable in the present case because these are the cases of exports and not of imports. 8. The next contention, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, is that the deeming clause is not applicable in the present cases and, therefore, the learned Single Judge was not justified in holding that the short-supply of the I.M.F.L. to the importers in the other States shall be deemed as the 'quantity of liquor which has been consumed in the State'. It is an admitted fact that a large quantity of the liquor, alleged to have been despatched by the appellant from its distillery and the full quantity of the rectified spirit/I.M.F.L. did not reach the destination and the shortage remained unaccounted for. Of course, the consignment was loaded in the presence of the Excise Officer of the Exporting State and was received by the importers in the presence of the Excise Officers of the importing State and it was under the lock and key put by the Excise Authorities but it is, also, an admitted fact that the full quantity of the I.M.F.L. and rectified spirit did not reach the destination and there was the aforesaid alleged transit wastage. The shortage of liquor received at the destination claimed to have been wasted in transit and to that extent the i.M.F, did not result in export and the State, therefore, has reasons to presume that the same has been used or disposed of otherwise than by export in the exporting State itself and, therefore, the State can impose the excise duty and if this quantity would not have been exported and has been consumed locally, the State would have derived excise duty on this. The wastage, therefore, can be taxed in the present case as if no wastage resulted. The wastage, therefore, can be taxed in the present case as if no wastage resulted. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, right in drawing the presumption that the unaccounted rectified spirit and the I.M.F.L., have been consumed in the State and, therefore, the appellant-petitioner is liable to pay the excise duty on the unaccounted rectified spirit and the I.M.F.L. The contention, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, is, therefore, devoid of any force. 9. The next contention, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, is that the Demands in all the three aforesaid cases, have been raised by the District Excise Officer without application of mind and without following the principles of natural justice as neither any prior enquiry was made in these cases nor were the notices given to the appellant-petitioner and even the replies filed by the appellant-petitioner were not considered by the respondents. The appellant-petitioner, in these three case, acknowledged the transit losses/wastages and claimed exemption of the excise duty on these transit losses. The notices were given to the appellant by the District Excise Officer : why the excise duty may not be charged on these alleged transit losses and the details of the transaction, on which the excise duty were proposed to be charged, were given in the notices. The appellant-petitioner filed replies to all the three notices and it was only after giving proper opportunities of hearing to the appellant that the orders raising the Demands were passed by the District Excise Officer in the 'aforesaid three cases. The orders, passed and issued by the respondents, cannot be said to be passed without application of mind nor can it be said that the same were passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the appellant. The orders were passed on the basis of the transit wastages which were acknowledged by the appellant-petitioner. The contention, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, is, therefore, devoid of any force. 10. In D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 793 of 1994, an additional ground has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the State of Rajasthan has no power or jurisdiction to levy excise duty on the rectified spirit which is unfit for human consumption. 10. In D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 793 of 1994, an additional ground has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the State of Rajasthan has no power or jurisdiction to levy excise duty on the rectified spirit which is unfit for human consumption. Entry No. 51 of the List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India, authorises the State Government to levy excise duty on the liquor which is fit for human consumption only. The imposition of excise duty on rectified spirit is,therefore, without jurisdiction. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner has placed reliance over : Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Trichur and others v. the State of Kerala and others, AIR 1981 SC 1863 ; Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. etc. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1990 SC 1927 ; The State of Rajasthan v. Mahalaxmi Paints Industries, Ajmer (D.B.Civil Special Appeal No. 116 of 1979-decided on 21.3.1986) and M/s. Hindustan Copper Limited v. the State of Rajasthan and others, 1989 (1) RLR 632 . We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the judgment on which reliance has been placed. It is not necessary to refer all these decisions mentioned above because the Point of Law, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, stands decided by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of : Synthetics & Chemicals Limited v. the State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 1927 , wherein it has been observed as under : "On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions and practice, we are clearly of the opinion that in respect of industrial alcohol the States are not authorised to impose the impost they have purported to do. In that view of the matter, the contentions of the petitioners must succeed and such impositions and imposts must go as being invalid in law so far as industrial alcohol is concerned. We make it clear that this will not affect any impost so far as potable alcohol as commonly understood is concerned. It will also not affect any imposition of levy on industrial alcohol fee where there are circumstances to establish that there was quid pro quo for the fee sought to be imposed. We make it clear that this will not affect any impost so far as potable alcohol as commonly understood is concerned. It will also not affect any imposition of levy on industrial alcohol fee where there are circumstances to establish that there was quid pro quo for the fee sought to be imposed. This will not affect any regulating measure as such.' "We must, however, observe that these imposts and levies have been imposed by virtue of the decision of this Court in : Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd.'s case ( AIR 1980 SC 614 ). The States as well as the petitioners and manufacturers have adjusted their rights and their position on that basis except in the case of State of Tamil Nadu. In that view of the matter, it would be necessary to state that these provisions are declared to be illegal prospectively. In other words, the respondents States are restrained from enforcing the said levy any further but the respondents will not be liable for any refund and the tax already collected and paid will not be refunded. We prospectively declare these imposts to be illegal and invalid, but do not affect any realisations already made." A similar controversy : whether the tax can be levied on the rectified spirit by the State Government, also, came-up for consideration before this Court in : M/s. Geeta Enterprises and another v. The State of Rajasthan and others (D.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 6033 of 1992-decided on 20-5-1993) . In that case the levy of the excise duty on the industrial alcohol was declared illegal in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in : Synthetics and Chemicals Limited v. the State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 1927 and the State was restrained from enforcing the levy of the excise duty and counter-vailing duty on the product produced after the period w.e.f. 25-10-89, but it was held that the petitioner will not be liable for any refund of the octroi duty or counter-vailing duty which had already been recovered from him or has become recoverable prior to 25-10-89. In the present case, the excise duty charged from the petitioner-appellant relates to the period earlier than 25-10-89 and, therefore, the Demands, raised by the District Excise officer, Udaipur, for the levy of the excise duty on the rectified spirit, were in accordance with law and are recoverable from it. 11. In the present case, the excise duty charged from the petitioner-appellant relates to the period earlier than 25-10-89 and, therefore, the Demands, raised by the District Excise officer, Udaipur, for the levy of the excise duty on the rectified spirit, were in accordance with law and are recoverable from it. 11. In the result, we do not find any merit in these three Special Appeals and the same are, therefore, dismissed.Special Appeals Dismissed. *******