JUDGMENT : R. B. Mehrotra, J. has been filed by the plaintiff-appellants challenging the order of the Additional Civil Judge, Bulandshahr, dated 10-9-1977 allowing the defendant's appeal and dismissing the plaintiff's suit for cancellation of a sale-deed dated, 6-5-1965 registered on 10-5-1965 executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendant. 2. Second Appeal No. 364 of 1982 has also been filed by the plaintiff-appellants wherein the plaintiff- appellants have challenged an order passed by the Civil Judge, Bulandshahr confirming the order of the Munsif directing restitution of possession to the defendant in pursuance of the order of the Civil Judge, dated 10-7-1977. It is not disputed that the plaintiffs were put in possession. in pursuance of the judgment and decree passed by Illrd Additional Munsif, Bulandshahr in Original 'suit No. 518 of 1968 filed by the plaintiffs for decreeing the suit for cancellation of the sale-deed, dated 6-5-1965 registered on 10-5-1965 executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendant. The decision in Second Appeal No. 3913 of 1978 will depend on the decision. in Second Appeal No. 364 of 1982, as such, both the appeals are to be heard and- decided together. It is also agreed between the parties the aforesaid Second Appeal may be heard' and decided together. Second Appeal No. 3913 of 1978 is a leading case in the present matter. The same is being dealt with at the forefront. 3. The necessary facts for the decision of the aforesaid Second Appeal are as under: 4. Reyaz Ahmad alias Raj Ahmad and others filed an original suit No. 518 of 1978 in the Court of Munsif Bulandshahr against the defendant respondent for cancellation 6f the sale-deed, dated 6-5-1965 registered on 10-5-1965 executed by REYAZ Ahmad and others in favour of the defendant for a consideration of Rs. 4000 only towards the prices of agricultural land measuring 5 Bigha 19 Biswa and 12 Biswansi. The plaintiffs filed the suit for cancellation of the sale-deed stating in the plaint that the plaintiffs and defendant are residents of same village. Plaintiffs were in active confidence of the defendant and were illiterate persons. Plaintiff No. 1 has put his signatures only in Urdu and plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 do not know reading or writing at all and had put in their thumb-impression. Plaintiffs were in active confidence of the defendant and were illiterate persons. Plaintiff No. 1 has put his signatures only in Urdu and plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 do not know reading or writing at all and had put in their thumb-impression. The submission of the plaintiff is that all the three plaintiffs were is need of money, they asked the defendant to advance a loan of Rs. 1,400 to which the defendant agreed to pay only on an execution of a mortgage deed with possession of the agricultural land of the mortgage their land and handover possession of the land for three years and defendant took advantage of the illiteracy of the plaintiffs and got executed a registered sale-deed instead of mortgage deed by defrauding the plaintiffs and paid only Rs. 1400 before the. Registrar, no other amount was paid. It was falsely mentioned in the sale-deed that Rs. 2,500 has been received earlier by the plaintiff. It was also stated in the plaint that value of the land was Rs. 30,000 and the defendant got it mentioned as Rs. 4,000 in the sale-deed. According to the plaintiffs this is a circumstance also to be taken into consideration for establishing a fraud on the defendant. The plaintiffs case is that they mortgaged the land only for a period of three years and after a lapse of a period of three years the possession of the land was transferred back to the plaintiffs and plaintiffs requested the defendant to execute the document for ' re-transferring the land, but the defendant refused to execute the said document. Consequent thereto the plaintiffs came to know that the defendant has got executed the sale-deed in his favour instead of mortgage deed. The' plaintiffs sought cancellation of the sale-deed on following grounds : (1) Plaintiffs never wanted to sell the land nor they were in a position to sell the land. (2) The land is of value of Rs. 30,000 and they could not have imagined of selling at Rs. 4,000. (3) The plaintiffs never received a sum of Rs. 2,500 r as has been alleged in the sale-deed. The plaintiffs only received Rs. 1,400 before the Registrar. The plaintiffs never understood the contents of the sale- deed and were only told that the mortgage deed for three years have been got executed by them. 4,000. (3) The plaintiffs never received a sum of Rs. 2,500 r as has been alleged in the sale-deed. The plaintiffs only received Rs. 1,400 before the Registrar. The plaintiffs never understood the contents of the sale- deed and were only told that the mortgage deed for three years have been got executed by them. (4) The plaintiffs signed the document without listening the contents thereof and without understanding the contents thereof. (5) The plaintiffs were in active confidence of the defendant as they were in need of money. (6) For the aforesaid reasons the sale-deed got executed by the defendant is void and ineffective. The suit was contested by the defendant denying the aforesaid allegations. The trial court on the pleading of the parties framed issues. Only issue No. 1 -is relevant for the decision of the present appeal (1) Whether the sale-deed in suit is liable to be cancelled as alleged in para 7 of the plaint ? The trial Court on a detailed consideration of the evidence of the parties recorded a finding : (i) that the sale-deed executed during the period when the consolidation operations were going on, the plaintiffs were under influence of the defendant and were indebted as well. They had come to know of the sale-deed only three years after the sale-deed was written and not mortgaged deed; (ii) that it is admitted to the defendant that the land in question was irrigated by the Government tube- well ; (iii) the exhibit A-l, which is sale-deed, was witnessed by Bihari Lal' and Lala Ram. Bihari Lal is brother-in- law of the defendant and Lala Ram was father-in-law of the defendant which shows that the plaintiffs had no intention of selling the land fn question, as no independent witness witnessed the said document ; (iv) that it is established from the record that the land was sold out for inadequate consideration but that in itself is not circumstance on the basis of which a conclusion can be drawn that fraud was played by the purchaser, that is only one of the circumstances to be taken, into consideration. 5. On the aforesaid basis, the trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs and cancelled. the sale-deed (Exhibit A-l), dated 5-5-1955, registered on 10-5-1965. 6. Aggrieved thereby the defendant filed Civil Appeal No. 29. of 1974. 5. On the aforesaid basis, the trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs and cancelled. the sale-deed (Exhibit A-l), dated 5-5-1955, registered on 10-5-1965. 6. Aggrieved thereby the defendant filed Civil Appeal No. 29. of 1974. Additional Civil Judge, Bulandshahr has allowed the appeal and has dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs with costs. Aggrieved thereby the plaintiffs have filed the present second appeal, challenging the order of the lower appellate court. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants Sri R. H. Zaidi and learned counsel for the respondent, Sri R. K. Mishr'a, holding brief of Sri N. K. Srivastava and Neeraj Agarwal. 10. The substantial question of law which arises for consideration in the present appeal is, whether in the circumstances of the case the burden shifted on the defendants to prove that transaction was bona fide ? 11. The appellate court has started with' assumption that since the sold out land belongs to the plaintiffs who were of Lohar community, it must be presumed that the land must be of inferior quality. This presumption is absolutely baseless and is not founded on any evidence worth the name for any such presumption can be made in law. Thereafter the appellate court has taken into consideration oral testimony of one Chhotey Lal, P. W4 for relying on his evidence that 13-1/2 Bighas of land were sold for Rs. 1,000 in the year 1959. Another document relied upon by the appellate court is Exhibit A-4 Which is again of the year 1959. The appellate court refers to Exhibit A-5, a sale-deed for an area of 10 Bighas 3 Biswa, land sold by Natthi in favour of Bhagwati Giri on 6-7-1962 and Exhibit A-6, a sale-deed dated 4-1- 1965 sold by Chhattar Giri for an area of 3 Bighas 7 Biswa for Rs. 1,000 and Exhibit A-7, dated 6-7-1975 where 2 Bighas 12 Biswa and 5 Biswansi have been sold for Rs. 500. These documents are not available on the record as may have been. withdrawn -from the record by the defendant. 1,000 and Exhibit A-7, dated 6-7-1975 where 2 Bighas 12 Biswa and 5 Biswansi have been sold for Rs. 500. These documents are not available on the record as may have been. withdrawn -from the record by the defendant. It is not clear from the judgment as to whether these documents had any relevance for the purposes of determining the estimated value of the land and whether exemplers relied upon by, the appellate court were of the land situated near the land in dispute or ' not, is not clear from the judgment itself neither it is mentioned in the judgment the lands were of same village and of same quality. 12. Then turning on the plaintiffs' document wherein 5 Bigha land has been sold for Rs. J. 5,000 the appellate court jumped on the conclusion that 5 Bigha of land has been sold for Rs. 15,000 i.e., four years back i.e., in the year 1965 when the alleged sale-deed was executed. The estimated value of the land could not have been said to be so low as to come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were defrauded by the defendant. This assumption is again based on irrelevant consideration, as no evidence has been referred to by the lower appellate court for' jumping to the said conclusion as to on what basis the appellate court draw inference that 6 Bigha,. 19 Biswa and 12 Biswansi land could have been sold only on a meager amount of Rs. 4,000. The appellate court has also not reversed the finding of the trial court believing the plaintiff's testimony that the land was of the value worth Rs. 30,000. The conclusion drawn by the appellate court that looking into circumstances, particularly the requirement of the plaintiff for taking money, the value on the land cannot be said to be inadequate, is based on no evidence. At least it is not demonstrated from the judgment of the lower appellate court. 13. The appellate court has also dealt at length on the question of possession of the land in dispute in favour of the defendant for the period the plaintiffs' themselves admitted that the- possession was transferred to the defendants, as the plaintiff believed that the land is being mortgaged for securing the loan which they took from the defendants. 13. The appellate court has also dealt at length on the question of possession of the land in dispute in favour of the defendant for the period the plaintiffs' themselves admitted that the- possession was transferred to the defendants, as the plaintiff believed that the land is being mortgaged for securing the loan which they took from the defendants. The only circumstances stressed upon by the lower appellate court that the plaintiff has failed to prove-that the possession of the land was taken back is also wholly irrelevant for the purpose of determining the issues involved in the suit. Assuming that the plaintiff has wrongly stated that the possession of the land was taken back, this itself cannot nullify the conclusion of the trial court that the defendants have defended the plaintiff and have got executed a sale-deed instead of mortgage deed as agreed between the parties. The lower appellate court has itself recorded a finding that possession is wholly irrelevant for the purposes or deciding the controversy over the property. 14. On the question of receiving Rs. 2,500 before executing the deed the appellate court solely relied on the document wherein it has been stated that Rs. 2,500 has been received earlier by' the transferors. The appellate court has placed reliance on Section 60 of the Registration Act for presuming that contents of the documents are correct. In this connection the trial court has believed the statement of the plaintiff stating that he never received Rs. 2,500 at any point of time before execution of the document. The1 crucial circumstance which the appellate court failed to take into consideration is that there is no documentary evidence worth the name for establishing that any such amount, as alleged by the defendants, as paid to the plaintiff, at earlier point of time. Neither any receipt executed by the plaintiff nor any entry any where in the record of the defendants for such payment has been proved. This is against normal human conduct that a creditor will advance money to the borrower without any receipt or any entry in the Accounts. Books. The presumption under Section 60 of the Registration Act is rebuttable in law. The presumption under Section 60 of the Registration Act is not a conclusive presumption. The presumption stands rebutted by the denial of the plaintiffs' statement. Books. The presumption under Section 60 of the Registration Act is rebuttable in law. The presumption under Section 60 of the Registration Act is not a conclusive presumption. The presumption stands rebutted by the denial of the plaintiffs' statement. The trial court has also believed the plaintiffs' witnesses for recording a finding that only Rs. 1,400 were paid to the plaintiff. The appellate court has not even referred 10 those, statements which were relied upon by the trial court for arriving' at a finding that the defendants did not pay. Rs. 2,500, as endorsed in the disputed document. The appellate court has drawn inference against the plaintiff for not examining Reyaz Ahmad one of the plaintiffs who has signed the alleged document. Likewise the appellate court has held that the trial court erred in, discrediting the documents on the basis that it was witnessed by only two close relations of the defendants. On both the aforesaid counts, the finding of the appellate court suffers from wrong approach and correct perspective. 15. The plaintiffs' statement that they were illiterate persons, was not effectively disputed by the defence and merely on a ground that one of the plaintiffs who was able to sign, was not produced in witness box, no presumption of literacy could have' been drawn against the plaintiffs. Likewise, the defendants failed to explain as to why no independent witness attested the alleged document. On both the counts, the trial court has been given cogent reasons for discrediting the document and the appellate court by a bald reasoning has upset the finding of the trail court. The entire approach of the appellate court is that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the document was executed by him under undue influence of the defendants as referred to and relied upon in Section 15 of the Contract Act and the finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he executed document under undue influence of the defendants is vitiated in law. 16. In the aforesaid background the question of law which requires consideration in the present matter is that if an illiterate person executes a I sale-deed in favour of a person is the burden of proving good faith is on' the defendants. 17. The finding recorded by the trial court that the plaintiffs were illiterate persons have not been upset by the appellate court. 17. The finding recorded by the trial court that the plaintiffs were illiterate persons have not been upset by the appellate court. The defendants have also not put forward any evidence on the basis of which it I can be staled that the plaintiffs were literate persons. 18. Under Section 60 of the Registration Act the correctness of the facts mentioned in the registered document is attached and once the document is proved in accordance with law, it is to, be presumed that the contents of the documents are correct. On the basis of the aforesaid principles it is settled that the executor of the documents is supposed to have executed the document after understanding the same, as a detailed procedure is provided for registration of the document wherein the Registration Officer is under a duty to explain the contents of the documents to be executed and verifies signatures only after ascertaining that the executor has signed the document after folly understanding the same. 19. However, right, from the. days of Privy-Council as far back as in the year 1925 exceptions have been carved out to the aforesaid general rule. 20. In Farid-un-Nisa v. Mukhtar Ahmad, 52 Ind App 342 at p 350: AIR 1925 PC 204 at p 209 and in subsequent' series of decisions the Privycouncil have given a special protection to Pardanashin ladies of India in view of social conditions of the times, as the Privy Council observed that they are presumed to have an imperfect knowledge of the word, as, by the Pardah system they are practically excluded from social intercourse and communion with the outside world. in the aforesaid background Lord Sumer observed as under : "in this it has only given the special development, which Indian social usages make necessary, to the general rules of English law, which protect persons, whose disabilities make them dependent upon or subject them to the influence of others, even though nothing in the nature of deception or coercion may have occurred. This is part of the law elating to personal capacity to make binding transfers or settlements of property of any kind. " The learned Lord also points put: "of course fraud, duress and actual undue influence are separate matters. " 21. The said decision has been followed in several subsequent decisions by the Privy Council itself. This is part of the law elating to personal capacity to make binding transfers or settlements of property of any kind. " The learned Lord also points put: "of course fraud, duress and actual undue influence are separate matters. " 21. The said decision has been followed in several subsequent decisions by the Privy Council itself. In Hemchandra v. Suradhani Debya, AIR 1940 PC p. 134, reiterating the aforesaid view, the Privy Council observed as under : "the burden of proof shall always rest upon the person who seeks to sustain a transaction entered into with a Pardanashin lady to establish that the said document was executed by her after clearly understanding the nature of the transaction. It should be established that it was not only her physical act but also her mental act. The burden can be discharged not only by proving that the document was explained to her and that she understood it but, also by other evidence, direct and circumstantial. " 22. In Farid-un-Nisa case (supra), the Privy Council made it clear that mere declaration by the settlor subsequently made that she had not understood what she was doing is not in itself conclusive but the entire circumstances will have to be taken into consideration for considering the question as to whether she had executed the document after understanding the same. The relevant 'extract from the decision is quoted below : "'the mere declaration by the settlor, subsequently made, that she had not understood what she was doing, obviously is not in itself conclusive. It must be a question whether, having regard to the proved personality of the settlor, the nature of the settlement, the circumstances under which it was executed, and the whole history of the parties, it is reasonably established that the deed executed was the free and intelligent, act of the settlor or not. If the answer is in the affirmative those relying on the deed have discharged the onus which rests upon them. " 23. In Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jang Bahadur Rai and others, AIR 1963 SC page 1203. If the answer is in the affirmative those relying on the deed have discharged the onus which rests upon them. " 23. In Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jang Bahadur Rai and others, AIR 1963 SC page 1203. the Hon'ble Supreme Court not only put seal of approval on the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council but in effect followed the aforesaid documents taken from Pardahnashin women the court has to ascertain that the party executing them has been a free agent and duly informed of what she was about to do. The reason for the rule is that the ordinary presumption that a person understands the document to which he has affixed his name does not apply in the case of a Pardanashin women. . The burden of proof shall always rest upon the person who seeks to sustain transaction entered into with a Pardanashin lady to establish that the said document was entered into by her after clearly understanding the nature of the transaction. 24. In Parasnath Rai v. Tileshra Kuar, 1965 ALJ page 1080 the principles enunciated by the Privy Council and adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for Pardartashin ladies were further extended by the illustrious Judge of this Court (Justice Gangeshwar Prasad) to all illiterate women of the country. The relevant passage from the aforesaid decision is being reproduced below : "obviously it is not by reason of the Pardah itself that the law throws its protection round a Pardanashin lady but by reason of those disabilities which a life of seclusion lived by a Pardanashin lady gives rise to, and which are consequently presumed to exist in the case of such a lady. But the disabilities which make the protection necessary may arise from other causes as well. Old age, infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, mental deficiency, inexperience and dependence upon others, may by themselves create disabilities that may tender the protection equally necessary. If, therefore, it is proved that a woman, although she is not a Pardanashin lady, suffers from the disabilities to which a Pardanashin lady is presumed to be subject, the validity and the binding nature of a deed executed by her have to be judged in the light of those very principles which are applied to a deed by a Pardanashin lady. " 25. " 25. The ratio of the aforesaid two decisions in essence is that it is neither Pardah system nor illiteracy which in itself changes the nature of burden of proof and carves out an exception in favour of persons suffering from disability that in such cases the burden rests oh the person in whose favour the document is executed'. In the aforesaid background, the question which calls for consideration in the present case, is as to whether in cases where an illiterate person belonging to lower strata of the society who is admittedly indebted to the vendees, the burden of proof shifts on vendees, if the' executor comes forward with a case that he executed the document being in active confidence -of the vendees without understanding the same. Essentially the question is whether the principles enunciated in Kharbuja Kuer's case (supra) and Parasnath Rai's case (supra) can further be extended in appropriate circumstances in favour of such illiterate persons who also belong to socially and educationally backward class and are also economically dependent for their needs on persons in whom they posed confidence by agreeing even to mortgage their land" for taking loan as in the present case. 26. The principles of law cannot be static and with the changing social circumstances of the society, the law must change. The exceptions carved out for Pardanashin ladies by the Privy Council and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mst. Kharbuja Kuer's,. case (supra) are based on the philosophy that the persons in the society who are oppressed and are not in a position to interaction the society freely, are to be treated different class. In Parasnath Rai's case this Court illustrated that these exceptions can also be on the basis of old age, infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, mental inefficiency, inexperience and dependence upon others and all of them or any one of them may create disability that may render protection equally necessary. 27. In appropriate cases this protection can be extended to illiterate persons who are economically dependent, who are socially and educationally backward and who are ignorant of the intricacies of the execution of the registered document. 28. 27. In appropriate cases this protection can be extended to illiterate persons who are economically dependent, who are socially and educationally backward and who are ignorant of the intricacies of the execution of the registered document. 28. The court takes judicial notice of the situation prevailing in the society that despite country having been liberated from the shackles of the' foreign rules as far back as half century, a large number of people of this country are illiterate, ignorant, suffers from many infirmities, inefficient, inexperienced and dependent upon others and in such cases, exception 'carved out in the aforesaid case can also be extended in the facts and circumstances bearing out that the executer of the document can be categorised in vast categories, which have been indicated by this court in Parasnath Rai's case (supra ). 29. In the present case, as discussed above, the approach of the lower court was patently vitiated in law. The lower appellate court erred in placing the burden on the plaintiffs for proving, that the documents executed by them suffers from fraud or misrepresentation, as explained in the decisions, referred to above. In the circumstances of the case, it was not a question whether a fraud was played on the plaintiffs but ' question was whether the plaintiffs executed the document after fully understanding the same the burden of proving that the plaintiffs executed the document after fully understanding -the same was on the defendants. 30. The learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on following decisions and contended that the borrowers cannot be said to be under undue influence of -their creditor merely on the ground that they were taking money from the creditor. There cannot be any presumption that' creditor was in ta, dominating position to influence the borrower : (1) Radhika Prasad Dutta v. Panchaman Chowdhary, AIR 1926 Cal page 455. (2) Mohd. Syed Khan v. Indar Pati Singh and others, AIR 1927 All page 315. 31. Likewise the learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance on a decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Hajra Baid and others v. Jadav Bai reported in AIR 1986 MP page 106 that in the given circumstances, as are in the present case, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that he executed the document under undue influence. Other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents need not to be referred, as they are on the point that a finding of fact cannot be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal. 32. The decisions referred to above regarding dominating position of the borrower and creditor are not relevant as this was not the only circumstance on which the trial court decided the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. 33. In view of the matter that the judgment of the lower appellate court suffers from wrong approach and the lower appellate court has wrongly placed burden on the plaintiffs for proving fraud or misrepresentation, the judgment of the lower appellate court deserves to be set aside and I accordingly set aside the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge, Bulandshahr, dated 10-9-1977, passed in Civil Appeal No. 29 of 1974 and remand back the matter to the lower appellate court for a fresh decision in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. 34. The appeal is allowed. So far as the Second Appeal No. 364 of 1982 is concerned, as "stated earlier, the said appeal was only seeking restitution of possession on the basis of the judgment given in Civil Appeal No. 29 of 1974. Since the said judgment has been set aside, there is no question of allowing restitution of possession on the basis of the aforesaid judgment. Accordingly Second Appeal No. 364 of 1982 is also allowed and the judgment impugned in the aforesaid appeal i.e. the judgment, dated 11-1- 1982 passed in Civil Appeal No. 63 of 1978 and judgment in Misc. Case No. 130 of 1977 are 'set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear costs of both the appeals. 35. Since the matter is old one, the lower appellate-court will decide Civil Appeal No. 3913 of 1978 as far as possible within four months of the receipt of the certified copy of the judgment along with the record of the case. The office is directed to ensure that the record of the court below is despatched along with a copy of the judgment as early as possible. Appeal allowed.