Ajodbya Rajbhar v. State of West Bengal — 1995 DIGILAW 129 (CAL)

JUDGMENT Umesh Chandra Banerjee, J. The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except, according to the procedure established by law is the main thrust of submission in the matter under consideration. 2. Before adverting to the rival contentions be it noted here that the Law Court exists for remedying the wrong so as to do complete justice to a person who seeks justice and in the event of failure to make the same available to the seeker of justice the Law Court will fade away into insignificance resulting in total break down of the society-A situation which cannot be said to be permissible on the wake of 21st century. Law Court exists for the society and ought always to rise up to the occasion as and when situation so warrants, 3. It is at this juncture that certain factual details ought to be adverted to in order, however, to appreciate the contentions raised in the matter. 4. The petitioner was sent up for trial to answer a charge under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code before P. Dutta, Sessions Judge, Howrah, in Sessions Trial No. XVI of 79 arising out of Malipanchghara P.S. Case No.6 dated 8th April, 1979. The learned Sessions Judge, Howrah, by a judgment and order dated 23rd April, 1979 convicted the petitioner under s. 302 Indian Penal Code and passed a sentence of life imprisonment. The records depict that against the order of conviction and sentence the petitioner preferred an appeal before this Court and the same was admitted and registered as Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 1979. The above-noted Criminal Appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 1979 was heard by this Court and by its order dated 21st November, 1980, upon altering the conviction from s. 302 IPC to s. 304(ii) IPC reduced the sentence to 7 (seven) years, rigorous imprisonment. 5. The factual score depicts further that 7 (seven) years period of imprisonment, in terms of the order of this Court, expired on 22nd April, 1986 but as the facts depict the petitioner was not released on that date. It is this non-release of the petitioner after the finality of the order which has been very strongly argued by Mr. 5. The factual score depicts further that 7 (seven) years period of imprisonment, in terms of the order of this Court, expired on 22nd April, 1986 but as the facts depict the petitioner was not released on that date. It is this non-release of the petitioner after the finality of the order which has been very strongly argued by Mr. Bagchi, appearing in support of the petitioner, to be wholly unauthorised and illegal and violative of the fundamental rights as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 6. Before dealing with the matter any further, one redeeming feature on the factual score ought to be noted at this juncture viz., that even after the expiry of the seven year period the petitioner continued to remain in jail and having had no other alternative, a Habeas Corpus Petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner, being Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 2801 of 1993 before a Division Bench of this Court presided over by Khastgir, J. (as she then was). In the order itself the Bench observed: .. .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. In asmuch as Ayodhya Rajbhar is in custody since 23rd April, 1979 his period of imprisonment as per prison rule has expired on 22.4.86, Strange enough, even after the expiry of 7 years term of imprisonment the said Ayodhya Rajbhar has not been released and is still in custody at Dum Dum Central Jail. The notice of this application has been served upon the learned Public Prosecutor. This Court has specially fixed the matter on 14.6.93 to enable the learned Advocate for the State to obtain necessary instruction in the matter and also directed production of the record of the appeal. Unfortunately learned Advocate appearing for the State has not been able to obtain necessary information and/or instruction from the proper authorities. Under those circumstances, this Court is of the view that the petitioner is entitled to an order as prayed for. The State has not filed any affidavit-in-opposition controverting the facts as stated in the affidavit on behalf of such detenu. Under those circumstances this Court passes an order as prayed for and directs the Superintendent, Dum Dum Central Jail to release the detenu forthwith. The State has not filed any affidavit-in-opposition controverting the facts as stated in the affidavit on behalf of such detenu. Under those circumstances this Court passes an order as prayed for and directs the Superintendent, Dum Dum Central Jail to release the detenu forthwith. This order will not prevent the detenu from taking such steps in the form of monetary compensation for such wrongful confinement of the detenu if so entitled in accordance with law. .. .. .. .. .." 7. The fact, therefore, remains that the Appellate Bench has come to a definite finding that the confinement of the petitioner was wrongful and the finding has assumed the character of finality. 8. Apart from the observation as noted above, is it permissible in a civilized society that a person being convicted by a Court of Law and having served the sentence would still be kept behind the bars and the close ones of the accused shall have to move an application before the Court under the provision of law for his release-Is it an automatic process or a further proceeding is to be initiated in order to derive the benefit of the judgment of the Appellate Court-In my view, 'it is a matter of great shame that the judicial orders would not be implemented so as to give relief to an accused in terms of the order-The order of the Appellate Court have been rendered to be a farsical show in the matter under consideration: How on earth and for what reason the detenu would be confined till such time a further specific order is passed, for the release of the detenu after serving the sentence? There appears to be no answer to the same. 9. Admittedly on the factual score of the matter under consideration, the petitioner was not released until after the order passed in the Heheas Corpus application. Be it recorded that the learned Sessions Judge's judgment imposing life imprisonment under s. 302 IPC was passed on 23rd April, 1979 which was modified by the High Court to seven years imprisonment and the seven years imprisonment was to expire on 22nd April, 1986-Thus, from the year 1986 till 1993 the petitioner was kept in wrongful confinement as has been found by the Division Bench of this Court as notc:d above. Ts it a justifiable conduct? Ts it a justifiable conduct? Before however, dealing with the issue as posed, let us now consider the Rules of this Court. 10. Chapter II of the Rules of the Appellate Side of this Court read with Form No. 10 (Criminal) Appendix II as prescribed in the Rules unmistakably depict the intent of the framers of the Rules of the Appellate Side that the order of the Appellate Court in the matter of confirmation, modification or setting aside of the order under appeal ought to be sent down to the Lower Court with utmost expedition and even without waiting for the judgment to be signed by both the Judges. Rule 107 of the Criminal Rules and Orders of this Court as prescribed under the Calcutta High Court Criminal (Subordinate Courts Rule, 1985) provides that when a sentence is modified on appeal, the appellate Court shall prepare a fresh warrant upon cancellation of the original warrant of commitment in Form No. 55 in accordance with the terms of the order passed, and shall send the same direct to the Officer-in-Charge of the Jail in which the appellant is confined: 11. For congeniences sake Rule 107 is set out here-in-below: "R. 107(l) When a sentence is set aside, the appellate court shall prepare a warrant of release in Form No. (P) 56 and shall send the same direct to the Officer-in-Charge of the Jail in which the appellant is confined. (2) When a sentence is modified on appeal the appellate court shall prepare a fresh warrant in Form (P) 55 in accordance with the terms of the order passed, and shall send the same direct to the Officer-in-Charge of the Jail in which the appellant is confined. (3) The appellate court shall at the same time when the release warrant or fresh warrant is issued, recalled and cancel the original warrant of commitment which shall be attached to the record of the original court and returned it to therewith. (4) When the release warrant or the fresh warrant is returned with an endorsement of execution, the appellate court shall forward it to the Court from the decision of which the appeal is preferred, to be attached to the original record." 12. Form 55 of the Criminal Rules and Orders is also of some importance and is set out here-in-below: FORM No. (P) 55. Form 55 of the Criminal Rules and Orders is also of some importance and is set out here-in-below: FORM No. (P) 55. Warrant for use by Appellate Court when a Sentence is modified on Appeal. (Section 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code) In the Court of the.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. To THE OFFICER-TN-CHARGE OF THE JAIL at .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. WHEREAS.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. son of.. .. .. .. in the district of.. .. .. .. .. .. .. was convicted by .. .. .. .. .. Magistrate of.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. of the offence of .. .. .. .. .. .. .. and was sentenced on the.. .. .. .. .. .. .. day of 19.. .. to.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..; which conviction and sentence have been modified on appeal by this Court, and in lieu thereof the said.. ., .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. has been convicted of the offence of.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..and sentenced on the.. .. .. .. .. .. day of .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .19.. . .to.. .. .. .. .. .. This is to authorise and require you the said Superintendent to receive the said.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. into your custody .. .. .. .. .. .. in the said Jail, together with this warrant, and carry the aforesaid sentence into execution according to law, and this is further to authorise and require you to return to this Court the original warrant of commitment in lieu whereof this warrant is issued. Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this.. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. day of . .. .. .. .. ..19 . Sessions Judge or Magistrate." 13. It, therefore. Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this.. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. day of . .. .. .. .. ..19 . Sessions Judge or Magistrate." 13. It, therefore. appears that in the event of• modification of sentence by the Appellate Court it is incumbent on the part of the Court to prepare a fresh warrant in Form (P) 55 in accordance with the terms of the order passed and send the same directly to the Officer-in-Charge of Jail. The rules and the prescribed form though, longish in nature had to be adverted to in order to ascertain the true purport of the same which, however, unmistakably depict the urgency of the situation. The investigation of Writ Court in a matter like the present one, pertains to the issue as to whether there is any compliance of the Rules as ' prescribed? Before, however, proceeding to answer the issue it would be convenient to note at this juncture, the counter-affidavit filed by the Registrar, Appellate Side of this Court. The Registrar, in his counter-affidavit affirmed on 13th January, 1995 stated in paragraph 4 as follows: "4. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. It will appear from the records that pursuant to an order as passed in the instant case the Deputy Registrar (Writ), High Court, Calcutta, wrote a letter bearing No. 1491 MD dated 17th September, 1994 enclosing thereto a copy of the order dated 16th September, 1994 and also an order dated 8th September, 1994 to the District & Sessions Judge, Howrah in order to ascertain the actual position in respect of the matter in issue. The District & Sessions Judge, Howrah while replying to the said letter categorically stated that the Judgment as passed in Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 1979 had been received by his office on 27th January, 1981 and on search of the relevant register as well as relevant• register of letters it was found that in response to the letter No. (Illegible) dated 20th March, 1989 a copy of the judgment was sent to the convict Ajodhya Rajbhar the petitioner herein vide letter No. 889-Cr. dated 5th June, 1989 as per the petition of the convict through Jail Superintendent, Dum Dum Central Jail," 24-Parganas. dated 5th June, 1989 as per the petition of the convict through Jail Superintendent, Dum Dum Central Jail," 24-Parganas. The District & Sessions Judge, Howrah also mentioned in his letter that he took over the charge of the said office on 1st December, 1992. It is, therefore, stated that the office of the Hon'ble Court duly forwarded a copy of the judgment as passed in the said Criminal Appeal along with the letter under Memo No. 15039 dated 20.1.1981 in due time and the same was also duly received by the office of the District & Sessions Judge, Howrah on 27.1.1981." 14. The above statement of the Registrar clearly depict that the order as passed by the Appellate Court in the above-noted Criminal Appeal was sent to the District & Sessions Judge, Howrah on 20th January, 1981 but the counter-affidavit is delightfully silent as regards the steps taken thereafter and it is only in March, 1989 copy of the judgment was said to have been sent to the petitioner herein under the cover of letter dated 5th June, 1989. But what about the modified Jail Warrant-Has it been sent to the Jail Authority-The affidavit of the Registrar is delightfully silent on that score. Does that indicate an application of mind-in my view, the answer cannot but be in the negative. It is a requirement of law that a fresh warrant shall have to be sent to the Jail Authority and the Registrar files an affidavit in the matter but omits to state anything about the fresh warrant-Does it be-'speaks of application of mind-I repeat, the answer is in the negative. As regards the copy of judgment being made available to the detenu in 1989, the submission of Mr. Ghosh appearing for the High Court, on the basis of the counter-affidavit as above, is definite to the effect that the Appellate Court "Judgment was sent to the detenu as early as 1989 as such the petitioner could have taken steps for his release in 1989 itself and such" detention after 1989 has been self-imposed and cannot be termed to be illegal in any way whatsoever. The submission of Mr. Ghosh at the first blush is undoubtedly attractive but on a closer scrutiny of admitted facts. The submission of Mr. Ghosh at the first blush is undoubtedly attractive but on a closer scrutiny of admitted facts. the same does not stand to acceptance more so by reason of the counter affidavit of Shri Kali Sadhan Samajdar as more fully detailed here-in-below, suffice it record here that after the expiry of nine years from the date of the Appellate Court Judgment, the detenu was provided with the judgment of the Trial Court and not of the Appellate Court. Is it a very fair dealing of the situation-A person langushing in jail wants a copy of the judgment eight years after the Appellate Court Judgment, and in return he gets the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge-The conduct seems to be utterly' callous and totally oblivion of the whole situation. Neglect and dereliction seem to be the only criterion in the matter of discharge of duty of the Judicial Officers. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the petitioner was not set free until the order in the Habeas Corpus petition on 14th June, 1993. So more than 7 (seven) years period has elapsed during which the petitioner was in unauthorised and illegal detention. The rules and the form prescribed depict the requirement of communication to the Jail Superintendent who in turn has a liability to send the original warrant to the High Court. The affidavit of the Registrar is however, silent on this score: obviously there is no return from the District & Sessions Judge neither anyone in the Registry bothered about the same-A situation which is wholly unwarranted more so by reason of the fact that the liberty of a citizen is involved in the matter in issue. Dereliction of duty ought to be taken note of specially in a matter like this and in my view, the writ Court ought to rise up to the occasion and pass such order or orders so as to avoid any recurrence of the same at any furture point of time. 15. The other significant aspect of the matter as appears from the counter affidavit of the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side ought also to be noted at this juncture. The Registrar in paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit has stated: "11. 15. The other significant aspect of the matter as appears from the counter affidavit of the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side ought also to be noted at this juncture. The Registrar in paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit has stated: "11. I do not admit that there has been no delay in the presentation of this application or that the application has been made bona fide as submitted in paragraph 20 of the said application. I may submit that when the petitioner was quite aware of the period of conviction in terms of the judgment and/or order dated 21st November, 1980 as passed in the said Criminal case the petitioner ought to have taken appropriate steps immediately after expiry of the period of conviction. There is no statement in the petition that the petitioner was not aware of the period of conviction." 16. The statement, as above, therefore, foists the liability on the accused in the matter of release of the accused from the jail custody and I record my concurrence with the submission of Mr. Bagchi that is absurd to suggest that an accused can have any independent source of being aware of reduction of his sentence and he With such a knowledge would languish in jail for more than 7 (seven) years 'out of fun' only. 17. The counter-affidavit from Sri Kali Sadhan Samajdar, being the Registrar of Civil Courts Howrah seems to be much more significant. The statement in Paragraphs 7(a), 7(b) and 7(c) ought to be noted in exten so in order to appreciate the contentions of the respondent in the matter. The deponent stated: "7(a) That with reference to the statements made in paragraph Nos. 7- and 8 of the writ petition this deponent does not admit the same. Since no jail warrant of the convicted petitioner having being returned back showing release of the convict petitioner is available in the record of this case it cannot be said if the jail warrant was at all returned back after release. This deponent is also not in a position to say if the jail authorities kept the writ petitioner in detention in any other case or if he was serving sentence in more than one case. This deponent cannot, therefore, say if the petitioner was in detention without any formal order of custody. This deponent is also not in a position to say if the jail authorities kept the writ petitioner in detention in any other case or if he was serving sentence in more than one case. This deponent cannot, therefore, say if the petitioner was in detention without any formal order of custody. 7(b) That this deponent states that the order of the Honourable High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 1979 dated 21st November, 1980 was received in the office of the Sessions Judge, Howrah on 24.1.1981 and Sessions Trial Register also shows that the result of the appeal was noted therein. 7(c) That it further appears from the order sheet of the Trial Case record that a copy of the Trial Court's judgment was sent to the petitioner on his request through the Superintendent of Dum Dum Central Jail on 5.6.1989. But the said order sheet does not show that the copy of the judgment of the Honourable High Court in appeal was put up before the Sessions Judge, Howrah. There is also no note therein that initial jail warrant after trial was received (though actually issued since the convict was in jail) after trial or revised jail warrant after getting the order of the Honourable Appellate Court was issued in terms of Ss. 386 and 388 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Form No. 41 of Schedule II of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Sessions Trial Register also does not show issue of any revised jail warrant after receipt of the order of the Honourable Appellate Court. Since the copy of the judgment in appeal received from the Honourable High Court is not traceable it cannot be also said if the same was at all shown to the Sessions Judge and if his orders were taken thereon upon the copy of the judgment itself. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .." 18. In this context the affidavit of Sri Dipak Kr. Chowdhury, being the Superintendent of the Dum Dum Central Jail and a party respondent in this writ application ought also to be noted. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .." 18. In this context the affidavit of Sri Dipak Kr. Chowdhury, being the Superintendent of the Dum Dum Central Jail and a party respondent in this writ application ought also to be noted. The principal defence of the deponent as raised in the counter-affidavit 'is, to the effect that since a modified jail order in respect of the writ petitioner, being the accused in the criminal case, as noted above was not sent to the jail Authority question of release of the petitioner at any point of time earlier than the period as recorded in the jail order, does not and cannot arise. It is, however, pertinent to note that the records of the jail authority admittedly, depict that by Memo. No. 889 Cr. dated 5th June, 1989 the learned Sessions Judge, Howrah, forwarded a copy of the judgment in connection with S.T. Case No. XVI of January, 1979 to the convict Ajodhya Rajbhar, to the Superintendent, Dum Dum Central Jail and which was subsequently confirmed by Shri A. K. Bhunia, the learned Sessions Judge, Howrah, by his letter No. 1487-Sr. dated, Howrah 25.8.1990 addressed to the Superintendent, Dum Dum Central Jail. The letter, noted above, is of some consideration and as such, is quoted here-in-below: "OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, HOWRAH VERN ACULAR DEP AR TMENT. From: Shri A. K. Bhunia, Sessions Judge, Howrah. No. 1487-Cr. Dated, Howrah, the 25.8.1990. To: The Superintendent, Dum Dum Central Jail, Dum Dum, Calcutta-28. Sub: Submission of proposal for premature release under 14 years release rules of life convict No. 2098/A Ajodhya Rajbhar son of Nidane Rajbhar @ Nehora of Village & P.O. Ghusuri, P.S., M.P. Ghora, Dist. Howrah convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life u/s. 302 IPC by Sri P. Dutta, learned Sessions Judge, Howrah on 23.4.1979 in c/w case No. ST No. XVI of January, 1979. With reference to his office Memo. No. 7458/R. B. dated 18.8.90 on the above subject, he is hereby informed that the copy of judgment in connection with S.T. Case No. XVI of January, 1979 has already been sent to the convict Ajodhya Rajbhar through the Superintendent, Dum Dum Central Jail vide this office Memo. No. 889-Cr. dated 5.6.89, as it appears from the S.T. Register. This is for his information. No. 889-Cr. dated 5.6.89, as it appears from the S.T. Register. This is for his information. Sessions Judge, Howrah." Sd/ - A. K. B'hunia 19. It appears from the letter, as above, in particular the subject of the letter that as late as 25th August, 1990 the Sessions Judge was not in the know of the modification of the sentence passed by the appellate court-Be it recorded here that in terms of order of the appellate court the petitioner was to be released on 22nd April, 1986: Admittedly, no modified jail order was issued from the High Court on the contrary as appears from the letter, noted above, that there was not a clue as regards the sentence to be served to the petitioner and even in August, 1990 there was no knowledge of such a modification of the sentence and as a matter of fact deliberations are, on in regard to the premature release under 14 years Release Rules of life convicts: Whose fault it is: It is not for this Court to assess or to. foist individual responsibilities, but the fact remains that an order was passed in favour of a person by the appellate court modifying the sentence to 7 (seven) years and which was to expire on 22.4.86 but the person was not released till 17th June, 1993 by reason of lack of communication to the jail authority from the Court It this fair: Is it reasonable: Does it go in accordance with the known principles of law or does it depict utter and absolute negligence in the matter of discharge of duties by Law Courts working under the direction of the High Court? The High Court registry is also not absolved from its responsibilities by reason of the fact that the Registrar's office was completely in oblivion in regard to the issuance of a modified Jail Order or the non-return of the service report from learned Session Judge. 20. On the basis of the facts as above, confinement of the petitioner for a period of about 7 (seven) years cannot by any stretch be termed to be lawful confinement having due sanction of law. Article 21 of the Constitution lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life; or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Article 21 of the Constitution lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life; or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. The Supreme Court as early: as 1950 in A. K. Gopalan's case (AIR 1950 SC 277) in no uncertain terms took the view that the word liberty is qualified by the word personal and it means and implies liberty of the physical body-Freedom from arrest and detention from false imprisonment or wrongful confinement. Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court applied a wider interpretation of the words personal liberty in Kharag Singh vs. State of U.P. ( AIR 1963 SC 1295 ) and in Maneka Gandhi's case ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) but there is no divergence of opinion that a detenu can be subject to only' such restriction of his personal liberty as authorised by or under the law and any imposition of any unauthorised restriction violates the provision of Article 21 of the Constitution. 21. On the state of facts, therefore, it appears that there was an illegal detention and unauthorised confinement of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench of this Court has come to a definite finding that the detention has been wrongful and express liberty was given to take necessary step or steps as the petitioner may deem it expedient. On the basis of that particular finding, question of further investigation of facts does not arise but this longish factual recapitulation has been effected by reason of specific submission of the parties and judicial ethics and decorum prompted this Court to deal with the same. 22. The fact remains however, that the petitioner was released only 17th June. 1993 pursuant to an order passed by the Division Bench as noted here-in-before-But what next: Would the Law Court be a mere passive spectator and allow this utter negligence on the part of law Courts to be perpetrated on to a citizen when there is definitely a violation under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in the case of Nilabati Behera vs. State of Orissa [ 1993 (2) SCC 746 ] lays down the guideline. In Paragraph 16 of the Report the Supreme Court observed: "16. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The Supreme Court in the case of Nilabati Behera vs. State of Orissa [ 1993 (2) SCC 746 ] lays down the guideline. In Paragraph 16 of the Report the Supreme Court observed: "16. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and 'indefeasible right of citizen. The purpose of Public Law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting 'compensation' in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the Public Law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private Jaw but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of 'monetary amends' under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of exemplary damages awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23. The law therefore, is well settled to this effect that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has the jurisdiction and the authority of law to allow compensation for wrongful violation of the rights conferred on to the -citizens under the Constitution. 24. In this context the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhuwneshwar Singh vs. Union of India [(1993) 4 sec 327) seems to be rather' apposite. 25. The Supreme Court referring to its earlier decision in. 24. In this context the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhuwneshwar Singh vs. Union of India [(1993) 4 sec 327) seems to be rather' apposite. 25. The Supreme Court referring to its earlier decision in. the case of Nilabati Behera' vs. State of Orissa, observed in Paragraph 7 of the Report as follows : "17. This Court' as also the High Court under Article 226 have the power of judicial review, in respect of proceedings of Court Martial as well as the proceedings subsequent thereto, even though to a limited extent, and can in appropriate cases grant relief, where there has been denial of the fundamental rights of the citizen or if the proceedings before the Court-Martial suffer from a jurisdictional defect or any other substantive error of law apparent on the face of the record (See S. N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India-Constitution Blench). Having found that the appellant was in illegal detention from June 29, 1989 to July 25, 1989, in our opinion it would be appropriate to award him adequate compensation for violation of his fundamental right of personal liberty as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and we accordingly direct that the appellant shall be entitled to a sum of Rs. 30,000/- as compensation for his illegal pre-trial detention and we make an order accordingly." 26. Be it noted that in the case of Bhuwneshwar Singh and award of compensation of Rs. 1,000/-by the High Court for illegal detention of the appellant for about a month or so, has been found to be grossly inadequate and hopelessly unimaginative. On the factual score in Bhuwneswar Singh's case (supra) it appears that the appellant was illegally detained from 29th June, 1989 to 25th July, 1989 on that background the Supreme Court observed that the High Court was expected to take a more realistic view of the deprivation of the personal liberty of the appellant, rather than indulge only in a lip service,; by awarding him a paltry sum of Rs. 1,000/ as compensation. If quantum of monetary compensation as granted by the Supreme Court be any guide. then in that event the compensation ought to be in the region of about Rs. 25 lacs but the prayer of the petitioner, however, has under-scored on the count of the quantum of compensation and the petitioner, as a matter of fact, has prayed only Rs. If quantum of monetary compensation as granted by the Supreme Court be any guide. then in that event the compensation ought to be in the region of about Rs. 25 lacs but the prayer of the petitioner, however, has under-scored on the count of the quantum of compensation and the petitioner, as a matter of fact, has prayed only Rs. 5 lacs as and by way of monetary compensation for such illegal detention. 27. Mr. Ghosh, however, faintly suggested on two further counts, viz., the Advocate's failure to communicate the order and take necessary steps for the release of the petitioner from jail custody and secondly, the jail authority cannot also absolve their liability in the matter of confinement of the petitioner unauthorisedly. Turning attention on the 2nd count first Mr. Mondal, appearing for the Jail Authority contended that without a modified jail warrant or a fresh jail warrant question of release of the petitioner at any point of time earlier than what is mentioned in the jail warrant issued at the time of entry into the jail, does not and cannot arise. The authorisation of the: petitioner's confinement in jail emanates from the warrant or jail order and unless a fresh jail order is sent, the Jail Authority is not authorised to release the convict at any earlier point of time. Mr. Mondal contended that any contra action on the part of the Jail Authority would be totally illegal. In any event, Mr. Mondal contended that at no point of time there was even any intimation of such a change of sentence in so far as the petitioner is concerned. Jail authorities, it was contended have no independent source of knowledge as regards the change of sentence in appeal, unless the same is communicated by the Sessions Judge or the High Court. The Rules noted above specifically foist the obligation on to the Law Courts to communicate the order of the Appellate Court on to the Jail Authorities and in the event of non-communication of the same, question of imputing any knowledge on to the Jail Authorities does not and cannot arise. The Jail Authority has no independent source of knowledge and the knowledge is derivative from the Law Courts. Jail Authorities are creatures of statute and they ought to act in terms therewith and not dehors the same. The Jail Authority has no independent source of knowledge and the knowledge is derivative from the Law Courts. Jail Authorities are creatures of statute and they ought to act in terms therewith and not dehors the same. No obligation is prescribed so far as the Jail Authorities are concerned. It is only on the information from the Law Courts that the Jail Authorities act. In the premises, question of foisting any responsibility on to the Jail Authorities does not and cannot arise and I record my .concurrence with the submissions of Mr. Mondal on this count. 28. Turning attention on to the other count namely omission on the part of the Learned Advocate to take appropriate steps in the matter, Mr. Bagchi contended that the Law Court ought to act in accordance with the prescribed rules and regulations and any omission on the part of the Law Court to communicate the modified sentence to the Jail Authority or failure to issue the modified jail warrant cannot be attributed to the Lawyer appearing in the matter. Mr. B1agchi: contended that as a matter of fact, upon the modification of sentence communication and issuance of a modified jail warrant ought to be an automatic process and if someone does not discharge his duties in terms of the provisions of law, question of attributing the omission on to somebody else does not arise. It we analyse the situation a little bit more carefully it appears that in the usual course of events the lawyer argued the matter before the Appellate Court and was able to pursued the Court to modify the sentence from one of life imprisonment to 7 years and thereafter the duty of the lawyer ends: At no subsequent stage Lawyers can be held responsible for any omission for the 'issuance of a jail order-the Lawyer is not to pursue the issuance of the jail warrant nor there exists any obligation on his part to do so, Since, it would otherwise be an automatic process. Mr. Bagchi in his usual fairness, however, submitted that in the event of an order of acquittal by the Appellate Court, a practice has grown -in this High Court for the Lawyer to see that the order is communicated to the Jail Authorities forthwith but this only, however, is restricted to the cases of acquittal but not otherwise. Mr. Bagchi in his usual fairness, however, submitted that in the event of an order of acquittal by the Appellate Court, a practice has grown -in this High Court for the Lawyer to see that the order is communicated to the Jail Authorities forthwith but this only, however, is restricted to the cases of acquittal but not otherwise. In the facts of the matter under consideration Mr. Bagchi contended that the accused had to undergo imprisonment for a further period of 3 years more and within these 3 years it was reasonably expected that in the normal course of events that the order of the Appellate Court would be communicated to the Jail Authority along with the modified jail warrant. I find sufficient justification in the contention of Mr. Bagchi, more so in the facts of the matter under consideration that the accused had to undergo a further imprisonment for a substantial period of time and -it is well-nigh 'impossible for the concerned Advocate to imagine that the appropriate jail warrant in lieu of the existing jail warrant for life 'imprisonment would not be 'issued: How could a Lawyer conceive of such situation that the High Court or the Sessions Judge would not be discharging the duties as prescribed by law: Law does not enjoin any such obligation and in that perspective can it be said to be an obligation of the Lawyer to chase the matter with the department and see that a modified jail warrant is issued when the accused is to undergo a further period of imprisonment and as such, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Ghosh in this regard. Lawyer, therefore, cannot be said to be in any fault. 29. Having due regard to the factual matrix of the matter under consideration question of there being any contributory negligence either on the part of the Jail Authority or on the part of the concerned Lawyer does not and cannot arise. The responsibility was that of the Law Courts for the illegal detention of the writ petitioner herein. As noted above, the petitioner is entitled to be compensated for such illegal detention and the law is well-settled by this Court as more fully detailed above. 30. Considering the above, and considering the factual score, question of payment' of compensation by any agency other than the High Court does not and cannot arise. 31. As noted above, the petitioner is entitled to be compensated for such illegal detention and the law is well-settled by this Court as more fully detailed above. 30. Considering the above, and considering the factual score, question of payment' of compensation by any agency other than the High Court does not and cannot arise. 31. In that view of the matter, the High Court is directed to make monetary amends for the wrong done due to breach of public duty of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizens and such monetary amends and compensation is assessed at Rs. 5 lacs and the High Court is directed to make payment of the same within a period of eight weeks from the date hereof. 32. The petitioner is also entitled to the cost of this application assessed at Rs. 2,500.00 to be paid by the High Court to the petitioner. Application allowed.