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1995 DIGILAW 1296 (ALL)

SALIMUL RAHMAN v. AZIZUL RAHMAN

1995-12-11

G.S.N.TRIPATHI

body1995
G. S. N. TRIPATHI, J. This is an appeal by the defendants against the judgment and decree dated 28-2-78 passed by the Civil Judge, Kanpur in Civil Appeal No. 426/74, Azizul Rahman v. Salimul Rahman & another, whereby the 1st appellate court has allowed the plaintiffs appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiff for all the reliefs claimed. This appeal itself arose out of judgment and order dated 13-4-74 passed by the the VIth Addl. Munsif, Kanpur (City) in C. S. No. 1939 of 1969 Azizul Rahman v. Salimul Rahman, who dismissed the suit of the plaintiff with costs giving rise to the present appeal. 2. Plaintiff Azizul Rahman filed A O. S. No. 1939 of 1969 in the court of Munsif City, Kanpur for a decree of possession of an accommodation detailed at the foot of the plaint, a decree for damages for Rs. 52, mense profit @ 10 per month and so on. He has alleged that he is the owner of house No. 545/1, Faithfulganj, Kanpur as detailed at the foot of the plaint. Originally Abdulla alias Habib Ullah was the owner of the said house. He was the father of the plaintiff. He sold it to the plaintiff by means of a sale deed dated 24-11-62 and gave possession to him and since then he is the owner and in possession of the house. The defendants have no right, title or interest in the disputed property. The defendants are relations of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 is the son of defendant No. 2, who is widow of Alimul Rehman, the brother of the plaintiff. The defendants are residing and are in oc cupation of the Khapraila Dalan and open roof of the first floor of the said house as plaintiffs licensee. Plaintiff has revoked the licence of the defendants by notice dated 9-9-68, which was served upon the defendants on or about 15-9-68. The defendants did not vacate the accommodation. Therefore, damages @ Rs. 5 per month an amount on which the same can be let out from the date of revocation of licence i. e. 9-9-68 till the date of actual possession has been claimed, apart from recurring damages at the same rate. 3. The defence mainly is that admittedly, Abdulla was the owner of the house in dispute. He had orally gifted the disputed portion in favour of the defendants in 1945. 3. The defence mainly is that admittedly, Abdulla was the owner of the house in dispute. He had orally gifted the disputed portion in favour of the defendants in 1945. By virtue of that oral gift, the defendants are in possession ever since as owners. The theory of licensee is false. In the alternative the defendants have also acquired rights by way of adverse possession. The sale-deed, allegedly relied upon by the plaintiff is a fictitious document. The executant was ill for a pretty long time before the execution of the said sale-deed. He had lost mental capacity to deter mine good and bad. Adequate consideration had not passed. The claim for damages is misconceived. 4. The learned Munsif framed the following issues : (1) Whether the suit is undervalued and the court-fee paid is insufficient? (2) Whether this court has got no jurisdiction to try this suit? (3) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the house in suit? (4) Whether Abdullah alias Habibullah executed the sale-deed in favour of the plaitniff for consideration? (5) Whether the defendants were licencees and the licence has been revoked? (6) Whether Abdullah made any gift in favour of the defendants predecessor of 1/2 interest and defendants are in possession in their own rights? (7) Whether the defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession? (8) Whether the suit is barred by time? (9) Whether the defendants are liable to pay the damages at the rate of Rs. 5 per month? (10) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? The learned Munsif found issues No. 1, 2, 6, and 8 in affirmative. Other issues were found in negative. The suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 5. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff filed the Civil Appeal No. 426 of 94. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned Civil Judge, by virtue of the impugned order and judgment, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiff. Hence this Second Appeal. 6. At the time of admission of appeal, substantial questions of law had not been formulated. But the learned counsel Sri M. A Qadir has been allowed to for mulate the same as follows : (1 ). The appellate court has erred in law in disbelieving the witnesses of defen dants regarding the execution of gift-deed on the basis of contradiction, which was fully trivial and immaterial. (2 ). But the learned counsel Sri M. A Qadir has been allowed to for mulate the same as follows : (1 ). The appellate court has erred in law in disbelieving the witnesses of defen dants regarding the execution of gift-deed on the basis of contradiction, which was fully trivial and immaterial. (2 ). The trial court has recorded a specific finding of fact on consideration of evidence that the plaintiff has failed to establish the execution of the sale deed by Abdullah and that no consideration had passed to Abdullah as consideration of the sale-deed. These findings have not been set aside by the learned appellate court. (3) The appellate court has accepted the sale-deed without considering any evidence on the record of the plaintiff in a very cryptic manner. (4) Even if the appellate court was justified in holding the plaintiff to be true owner, in that event it was incumbent upon the trial Court to decide the issue of adverse possession. He has omitted to do so. (5) The appellate Court has not considered any evidence in respect of creation or revocation of licence except making a casual observation while concluding the judgment. (6) The burden of proof initially lie on the shoulders of the plaintiff. But the appellate Court has clearly shifted the entire burden of proof on the shoulders of defendants. (7) There is no finding by the appellate court as to what was the fee or rent agreed between the parties regarding the licence. But merely in the operative por tion of the decree, he has assessed it at the rate of Rs. 5 per month. 7. I have heard Sri MA. Qadir, learned counsel for the defendant appellants and Sri Iqbal Ahmad, learned counsel for the respondent and also gone through the record. I find that there is absolutely no force in this appeal and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. The parameter of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 100, C. P. C. is very limited. Ordinary questions of law, even if wrongly decided, do not give juris diction to the High Court to interfere. Only substantial questions of law are avail able for interference by this Court. Secondly re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court is not permissible under Section 100, C. P. C. Even wrong conclusions on the basis of evidence on record, will not entitle this Court to interfere. Only substantial questions of law are avail able for interference by this Court. Secondly re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court is not permissible under Section 100, C. P. C. Even wrong conclusions on the basis of evidence on record, will not entitle this Court to interfere. Nextly, when two views are equally possible, and one view has been taken into consideration and accepted, it may not agree with the same, even then the High Court interfere. How ever, I shall cursorily see if any of the points raised by the learned counsel has been made out. 9. There are two points which need to be decided in this case. One is the alleged oral gift-deed of 1945, as alleged in the written statement in paragraph 13 and the second is the execution of the sale deed by Abdullah @ Habibulah on 24-11-62 in favour of the plaintiff. 10. The theory of gift-deed of 1945, as alleged in paragraph 13 came very late. Before the filing of the suit the plaitniff gave a notice to the defendants Exhibit11 on 9-9-68. A reply to that notice was sent on 24-9-68 by a counsel. Even in that notice, the time of alleged gift-deed had not been mentioned. It has been simply said that for over 20 years the defendants are in possession. Whey this time and date had been concealed, is a mystery yet to be resolved. 11. Secondly, the witnesses examined to prove the oral gift have been dealt with by the learned 1st appellate court in great detail. The first witness examined on the point of oral gift is Inayat Rasool. While dealing with his evidence at page 5 of the Judgment, the learned 1st appellate court has come to the conclusion that this witness is not a witness of fact that the gift was made in his presence. He could not remember the year when Abdullah gave his statement before him. He could not remember the season, month and time when the said statement was made by Ab dullah. He himself was not present at the time of alleged gift. So his evidence was merely a hearsay. He was not sure about the time when Abdullah died. He went to the limit of absurdity and said that Abdullah died before the death of his son Alimul Rahman, whose heirs are the defendants. He himself was not present at the time of alleged gift. So his evidence was merely a hearsay. He was not sure about the time when Abdullah died. He went to the limit of absurdity and said that Abdullah died before the death of his son Alimul Rahman, whose heirs are the defendants. Whereas the admitted case is that Abdullah died before his father. The learned lower court has concluded that in these circumstances, the statement of this witness is not reliable. 12. The next witness, who is Bafati, is DW 2. He admitted that Alimul Rah man, father of the defendant No. 1 was his close friend. He said that the gift-deed was about 30 years ago. His statements was recorded on 3-1-74. This way the period does not tally. Apart from it, he did not know anything regarding this family. So, it was difficult to believe that he would have been invited to be present at the time of alleged gift made by Abdullah. The learned lower court after screening his evidence has observed as follows: "as such his statement that he was called by Alimul Rahman at the time of gift, does not appear to be true. As such the statement of this witness was not reliable. " 13. The next witness examined was Smt. Rashidan, defendant No. 2. She is the daughter-in-law of the deceased Abdullah and a vitally interested witness. While discussing the reply to the notice Exhibit 4 supra, the learned lower court has ob served as follows : ". . . . . . . . defendant would have specifically said that the western portion of the house in suit was gifted to Alimul Rahman. Certain portions were alleged to have been gifted in Ext. 4. Those portions were the portions in which defendants are alleged to have been resid ing. " The learned 1st appellate court further held that want of a specific stand in this notice goes to show that the defendants were not sure about the case to be set up by them regarding the oral gift. This way the oral evidence examined by the defendants to prove the oral gift of 1945 has been disbelieved by the learned lower court. It cannot be said that while disbelieving the witnesses, the learned lower court has gone out of the track. This way the oral evidence examined by the defendants to prove the oral gift of 1945 has been disbelieved by the learned lower court. It cannot be said that while disbelieving the witnesses, the learned lower court has gone out of the track. Not only this, in 1945, there was no necessity for making a gift. Abdulla had two sons, namely, the plaintiff and Alimul Rahman. They were the only heirs of Abdulla at that time. Even if Abdulla would not have executed any document or made any gift during his life time, only these two persons would have inherited his entire property. Therefore, there was no need to make oral gift at that time. This is a circumstance which had to be taken into consideration to see that the theory of oral gift set up by the defendants cannot be accepted. 14. Apart from these circumstances, the learned 1st Appellate Court has taken into consideration other circumstances as well. At page 7 of the judgment, the learned 1st Appellate Court has observed as follows: "besides it neither Abdullah applied for the mutation of names pf Alimul Rahman nor Alimul Rahman had himself applied for mutation of his name over half portion. Any other overt act was also not committed by them, through which it could have been presumed that half portion was gifted to Alimul Rahman by Sri Abdullah. Even taxes of the house were not paid by Sri Alimul Rahman in connection of the portion, which could prove the gift of the half portion. " Thus after screening the entire evidence, the learned 1st Appellate Court has come to the conclusion in these words: "in such circumstances, I am of the view that oral gift of the half portion of the house in suit in favour of Alimul Rahman by Abdullah has not been proved. " This way, the finding, while disbelieving the gift of 1945, recorded by the 1st Appellate Court, was passed on the basis of evidence. Now it cannot be challenged in this Court, it may be even wrong. But since it is based on appreciation of evidence. This court has no jurisdiction to interfere in this appeal. 15. Another point is the consideration of the sale-deed executed by Abdullah in 1962 in favour of the plaintiff. Abdullah, admittedly, died 6 years after the execu tion of the sale-deed. But since it is based on appreciation of evidence. This court has no jurisdiction to interfere in this appeal. 15. Another point is the consideration of the sale-deed executed by Abdullah in 1962 in favour of the plaintiff. Abdullah, admittedly, died 6 years after the execu tion of the sale-deed. During his life-time neither the defendants nor Alimul Rah man had even challenged the validity of the same. In the written statement while challenging the sale-deed, it has been simply alleged that Abdullah was suffering from breathing trouble and other illness. His mental condition was not sound. He had no determining capacity of good and bad at that time. All these points have been dealt with by the learned 1st Appellate Court. Since the sale-deed is a registered document, there is a legal presumption regarding the validity of the same. The burden heavily lay on the persons who challenge the same. Therefore, the learned 1st Appellate Court has tried to proceed with this angle which is logi cally tenable. While dealing with the evidence of Bafati again on the point of sale deed, the learned 1st appellate court has observed at page 9 as follows: "witness Bafati alleged that at the time of the death of Abdullah, he was hard of hearing. He was not ill. His mind was out. "abdullah jab marey tab vah bimar nahin theey aur kuch dimag out tha. " So the statement of Bafati was regarding the condition of the deceased at the time of his dath. He does not say that this condition continued form 1962 when the sale-deed itself was executed. 16. Similarly Smt. Rashidan has also alleged that at the time of death of Abdullah, he was hard of hearing. His mind was upset. She is postically silent about the state of mind and physique of Abdullah at the time of execution of the sale-deed. Further, while discussing the evidence of Smt. Rashidan, the learned 1st Ap pellate Court as observed in the words of Smt. Rashidan, which are as follows : "jab Habibullah marey, unko sunai lam deta tha. dimag bhee kuchh kharab tha, ankho sey bhee kam dikhai deta tha, Pahchan Nahen Patey Thee, Marney Ke Karib 1 Sal Pahley Se Unki Yah Halat Thee. dimag bhee kuchh kharab tha, ankho sey bhee kam dikhai deta tha, Pahchan Nahen Patey Thee, Marney Ke Karib 1 Sal Pahley Se Unki Yah Halat Thee. " Therefore, taking every letter of the statement as sacrosanct it can not be said that when Abdullah executed the sale-deed in 1962, at that time too he was suffering from deformity of his body and mind further the learned 1st Appellate Court has observed at page 10 in these words: "in this way, it is clear that Smt. Rashidan herself has admitted that the mental condi tion of Abdullah was in working order and he was not mad. Moreover she has not alleged that Abdullah was ill. Bafati himself has admitted that Abdullah was not ill. Besides it, Smt. Rashidan has alleged that condition as alleged by her, was prevalent since one year before his death, while the witness Inayat Rasool has alleged that this condi tion was prevalent for 3 years from before the death of Sri Abdullah". This way the entire evidence goes to prove that the mental and physical condition of Abdullah deteriorated prior to death only 2-3 years back. But it does not go back to 1962 when the sale-deed was executed. 17. As against it, the evidence led by the plaintiff has been relied upon after giving cogent reasons by the learned 1st Appellate Court. 18. As observed earlier, the burden to prove the sale-deed was entirely upon the defendants. That burden has not been discharged. So the oral statement of the plaintiff coupled with the legal presumption in his favour was sufficient to prove that the sale-deed in his favour was a valid document and it could not be brushed aside. This way the finding of both the major issued of gift as well as sale- deed recorded by the 1st Appellate Court, are based on evidence and circumstances on the record. There is no reason to differ from the conclusions drawn by the learned 1st Appellate Court. 19. The questions of mesne profit, damages etc. are of very insignificant nature. Damages @ 5 per month alone has been claimed. This is not a statutory amount for the portions in occupation of the defendants. Mesne profit @ 5 p. m. could not be said to be exhorbitant and abnormal. It is only based on estimation and no objection can be taken on this ground. 20. are of very insignificant nature. Damages @ 5 per month alone has been claimed. This is not a statutory amount for the portions in occupation of the defendants. Mesne profit @ 5 p. m. could not be said to be exhorbitant and abnormal. It is only based on estimation and no objection can be taken on this ground. 20. Regarding the licensee, I find that when the plaintiff admits that the defen dants were not trespassers from the very beginning and the defendants claim title in their favour, which they have failed to prove, the only status which could be as sumed of the defendants was that of licensees. 21. Oral request by the plaintiff to the defendants to vacate the house was sufficient to constitute revocation and thereafter filing the suit additionally suffi ciently proved that the licence of the defendants has been revoked. So no objection against the findings of the learned appellate court on this point can be taken. 22. All the question formulated by the learned counsel Sri M. A. Qadeer are factual in nature. 23. In the result, the appeal has no force and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. 24. Lastly, the learned counsel, Sri Qadeer states that 6 months time may be given to the defendants to hand over actual and physical possession of the disputed. house to the plaintiff. He further states that he will file a duly signed undertake given by his client to vacate the house. 25. I think 6 months time if fair and reasonable for the defendants to vacate the premises. Accordingly, 6 months time is granted to the defendants to hand over actual and physical possession of the house in dispute to the plaintiff, failing which they shall be evicted according to law. As and when an undertaking as aforesaid is filed either in the executing court or this Court, that shall be accepted and 6 months time shall not be computed from the date of filing of the undertaking before the court concerned but from today. Appeal dismissed. .