D. P. S. CHAUHAN, J. ( 1 ) JUDGMENT in this appeal will also govern F. A. No. 36/85. Smt. Kajala Devi by means of the writ petition being M. P. No. 771/92 approached this Court against the order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer, Income-tax Range Raipur in exercise of power under Rule 11 of the Rules in Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961. The writ petition, as per the statement of the learned counsel for the appellant, was admitted and was pending in this Court, consequent upon coming into force the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, the said petition was dismissed as having become abated. The order of this Court is dated 23-3-1979 an extract of which is quoted below:"the petitioner's claim to certain houses, which were attached for recovery of arrears of income-tax against one Parasaram Gupta, was disallowed by the Tax Recovery Officer. The petitioner's remedy lay in filing a suit under sub-rule (6) of Rule 11. The petition is not maintainable under Art. 226 of the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. The petition abates under Section 58 of the said Act. The petition is accordingly dismissed. " ( 2 ) THEREAFTER the petitioner Smt. Kajala Devi approached the civil court by means of 'civil Suit No. 2-A/82 (Smt. Kajala Devi v. Union of India ). The Second Additional District Judge, Raigarh vide his Judgment and order dated 1-2-1985 dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation. The relevant portion of the Judgment dealing with the question of limitation is extracted below: ( 3 ) HEARD Shri A. D. Deoras, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri V. K. Tankha, the learned counsel for the Union of India. ( 4 ) THE facts in this case have only peripheral relevance. The controversy involved in this appeal is in a circumscribed limit whether the Court was right in dismissing the suit as barred by time. The Court below has stated that so far as the period relating to the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court is concerned, that period cannot be accounted for towards the limitation for the reasons that the matter was not filed in a wrong court, not possessed of the jurisdiction but was filed before the Court which was competent to hear the petition. ( 5 ) THIS is no question of consideration of provisions of Indian Limitation Act so far as the requirement of the Constitution is concerned. It has relevance only when a party comes to take an advantage under Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel of the appellant placed reliance on the provisions of Section 38 (3) of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) 1976 which is extracted below:-"38 (3) No petition for the redress of any injury referred to in sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (1) shall be entertained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force. "the learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on Section 58 (2) Proviso, which is extracted below:-"58 (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), every pending petition before a High Court which would not have been admitted by the High Court under the provisions of Art. 226 as substituted by Section 38 is such petition had been made after the appointed day, shall abate and any interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner) made on, or in any proceedings relating to, such petition shall stand vacated:provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect the right of the petitioner to seek relief under other law for the time being in force in respect of the matters to which such petition relates and in computing the period of limitation, if any, for seeking such relief, the period during which the proceedings relating to such petition were pending in the High Court, shall be excluded. "special emphasis is laid by the learned counsel for the appellant on the Proviso. The proviso says that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect the right of the petitioner to seek relief under any other law for the time being in force in respect of the matters to which such petition relates and in computing the period of limitation, if any for seeking such relief, the period during which the proceedings relating to such petition were pending in the High Court shall be excluded. ( 7 ) A question arose regarding the scope of the proviso as the proviso is not an exception to what is provided in the main clause and in effect is something which is not provided in the main clause. In exceptional circumstances a deviation can be availed and that deviation can be availed when the Proviso can be treated as a substantial clause in itself. So is the position in the present case. The person whose rights are effected because of his petition, after having been admitted by the High Court, is abated, then the said person cannot, in the interest of justice, be left remediless. ( 8 ) IN this connection the learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on a Supreme Court decision reported in U. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Ismail, AIR 1991 SC 1099 . ( 9 ) IT is a settled proposition of law that when by an amendment or by statutory amendment if any right of any person is taken away, then that person cannot remain remediless. Some forum has to be provided for him for seeking reliefs as the justice is primarily done to see that everybody should have a remedy available to seek his relief, and any such attempt to deprive or to give such interpretation especially to deprive a person from getting justice, should be curbed. ( 10 ) THERE is no other point having been argued. ( 11 ) THE case of S. P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 386 also touches this aspect of the matter and the relevant passage is extracted below;"para 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It must, therefore, be read as implict in this constitutional amendment that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 permissible under it must not leave avoid but it must set up another effective institutional mechanism or and vest the power of judicial review in it. "though the matter refers to different aspect of the matter, but also considers the question involved in the present appeals. ( 12 ) IN view of the above, both the appeals viz. "though the matter refers to different aspect of the matter, but also considers the question involved in the present appeals. ( 12 ) IN view of the above, both the appeals viz. , First Appeal No. 35 of 1985 and also First Appeal No. 36 of 1985 (Shriniwas Gupta v. Union of India) are allowed and the impugned orders dated 1-2-1985 passed by the Second Addl. District Judge, Raigarh in Civil Suit No. 2-/82 and Civil Suit No. 3-A/82 are set aside and the trial Court is directed to register the suit and to hear the suit on merits without indulging into the controversy of limitation. No orders as to costs. Order accordingly. .