JUDGMENT Basudev Panigrahi: This is a revision application filed by the defendant against the order dated 25.6.86 passed on an application under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 along with an application of the O.P./plaintiffs. 2. O.P./plaintiffs filed a suit for eviction against the present revisionist in T.S. No. 239 of 79. During the pendency of the said suit, petitioner appears to have filed an application u/s. 151 CPC along with an application u/s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for acceptance of rent having not been deposited in time. Learned trial court, while rejecting the application of the petitioner, accepted another application filed u/s. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act by the plaintiff/O.P. apposite party filed a caveat through the learned Counsel Mr. Ram Chandra Das who also filed an affidavit-in-opposition. But at the time of hearing neither the O.P. nor his learned Counsel took part in the hearing learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the belated payment of rent by the petitioner was neither deliberate nor intentional but due to certain unavoidable circumstances petitioner offered to pay rent at a belated stage. Though the petitioner could not pay rent in time, but it was not being intentional, the learned Trial Court should not have taken a pedantic approach while rejecting the said application. It is, further, mentioned that there was belated payment of rent and such default may amount to a default in technical sense rather than the real sense. Since it is inconsequential in nature, learned Munsif should have taken a lenient view while considering the application of the petitioner filed u/s. 151 CPC. 3. In support of the said contention, reliance has been placed on the judgment reported in AIR 1987 SC 1010 in the case of B. P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. vs. Birendra Kumar Bhowmik. The contention of the learned counsel gets full strength from the aforesaid decision. A further reliance has also been placed on a decision reported in 1987 (2) CLJ 297 in the case of Krishna Gopal Ghosal vs. Mihir Baran Nandy & Ors. From the ratio of the above decisions a trite position has emerged that the court had jurisdiction to condone the delay or extend the time for deposit or payment of sums specified in sub-so (1) of s. 17 of the Act. From the ratio of the above decisions a trite position has emerged that the court had jurisdiction to condone the delay or extend the time for deposit or payment of sums specified in sub-so (1) of s. 17 of the Act. The Court should also look to the reality of the situation under which the defendant/tenant could not tender the rent. The poverty and financial stringency may be sometimes the grounds for which the tenant could not have paid the rent. In course of hearing it is further highlighted that the defendant has stated the grounds for which he could not make deposit of rent in time. On a close reading of the impugned order it appears that the learned trial court has not examined the grounds stated by the defendant on merit but simply disposed of the application on the ground that there was a statutory default in payment of rent. Even when there was such statutory default, but when the grounds are sufficient for such non-payment of rent, the court should have taken into consideration all these grounds and allowed the application filed u/s. 151 CPC read with S. 17(1) of the Act. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has laid stress on the grounds stated in the application filed u/s. 17(3) of the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act and urged that the grounds are vague, and therefore, the court should have rejected the application u/s. 17(3) of the Act. In support of his contention he relied on an unreported decision of the Division Bench of this court in C.O. 2911 of 1984 dated 4th March, 1985. While praying for striking off the defence under s.17(3) of the Act it is necessary for the plaintiff to state the grounds of default and from which day the defendant failed to pay the rent. While praying for striking off the defence under s.17(3) of the Act it is necessary for the plaintiff to state the grounds of default and from which day the defendant failed to pay the rent. However, I am not expressing any opinion on the application filed by the plaintiff/O.P. Since the trial court has not considered the grounds for condonation of delay for belated payment of rent, I vacate the impugned order dated 25th June, 1986, remit the matter to the learned trial court to rehear the application filed by the petitioner u/s. 151 CPC read with s. 5 of the Limitation Act and if necessary, the parties are at liberty to adduce the evidence to that effect as to why the defendant committed such default in not depositing the rent within time. If the petitioner satisfies the court regarding the grounds under which he could not make deposite in time, the court may dispose of his application in accordance with Jaw. On the contrary, if it is found that there was no genuine ground for such default, the court may consider about the merits of the application filed by the O.P. plaintiff u/s. 17(3) of the Act. 5. In the result, this revisional application succeeds. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Revisional application succeeds.