M. S. PARIKH, J. ( 1 ) THE respondents are original plaintiffs and the petitioner is original defendant, in so far as the suit proceeding is concerned. The defendant has brought under challenge the decree for eviction passed by the learned Joint civil Judge (Jr. Division), Navsari on 31st January, 1979 in Civil Suit No. 227 of 1977, confirmed by the learned District Judge, Valsad at Navsari in Regular civil Appeal No. 35 of 1979 on 27th April 1981. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFFS filed Regular Civil Suit No. 227 of 1977 for obtaining possession of the suit premises inter alia on the ground that defendant had failed to pay arrears of rent agreed to be paid @ Rs. 80. 00 per month from 1-7-1969 and that defendant did not comply with notice dated 20th August, 1976. The defendants case has been that Rs. 80. 00 was not the "agreed rent". According to her, suit premises came to be let out at the rate of Rs. 30. 00 per month. The defendant also gave reply dated 18th September, 1976; that is to say within one month from the date of receipt of the notice and raised dispute both with regard to the contractual rent as well as standard rent. Defendant also filed an application for fixation of the standard rent in the Court of learned Civil Judge (JD) at Navsari; being standard Rent Application No. 187 of 1976. The proceedings of this standard rent application intervened the date of the suit notice and the date of the suit which was filed by the plaintiffs. The said standard rent application came to be disposed of as per the order below Exh. 28 and that may be reproduced here :- order below Exh. 28 read, the application. Heard learned Advocate Shri B. N. Desai for applicant and learned Advocate Shri K. P. Desai for opponent. Opponent is also present. Applicant does not wish to proceed further with this application and she wants to withdraw the application as opponents have taken and raised various other contentions and it is, therefore, not advisable for her to proceed further with the present application and she wants to withdraw the present application keeping her right to dispute standard rent intact. There are judicial decisions and settled position of law. There are judicial decisions and settled position of law. The standard rent unless decided on merits cannot operate as res - judicata and opponents have not filed any suit on applicant. The opponent pressed for costs. Learned Advocate Shri K. P. Desai has endorsed that he presses for costs and when application is withdrawn at the late stage when it is ripe for hearing, costs have got to be imposed to otherside. Hence I pass the following order :- order the application is allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to raise standard rent dispute as it is not decided either on merits or by compromise. The present application to stand disposed off. Applicant do pay costs of the application to opponent fixed at Rs. 60. 00 and applicant to bear her own costs. ( 3 ) THE trial Court decreed the suit holding that the dispute of standard rent raised by the defendant was not bona fide as the defendant had withdrawn the standard rent application without fully complying with the order of the interim rent passed in the said application. In view of the trial Court, the case fell under sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and in the alternative it also fell under Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the said Act inasmuch as the defendant did not deposit, during the pendency of the suit, the amount of arrears of rent regularly either @ Rs. 50. 00 per month being the interim rent or @ rs. 60/- p. m. being the contractual rent. This aspect of the case shall be dealt with a little more elaborately while respective submissions are considered. The fact remains that the trial Court passed the decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs both under Secs. 12 (3) (a) as well as 12 (3) (b) of the Act. ( 4 ) THE defendant carried the matter before the Appellate Court as aforestated and the Appellate Court decided the question of standard rent in favour of the plaintiff holding that Rs. 80. 00 per month would be the standard rent and that defendant was a tenant in arrears of rent for a period of six months on the date of the notice and that she neglected to pay rent within 1 month from date of the notice. 80. 00 per month would be the standard rent and that defendant was a tenant in arrears of rent for a period of six months on the date of the notice and that she neglected to pay rent within 1 month from date of the notice. Appellate Court accordingly confirmed the decree for eviction dismissing the defendants appeal. That is how the defendant is before this Court by way of this Revision Application under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging house Rates Control Act, 1947 [for Short "the Rent Act"]. ( 5 ) THE question that falls for consideration by this Court is whether the defendant rendered herself liable to be evicted from the suit premises by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act ? It is an admitted position that the liability to pay taxes was that of the defendant - tenant, and therefore, it has necessarily to be found that Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act would in no case be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Besides, it is also an admitted position that within 1 month from the date of notice, the defendant did raise a dispute not only of standard rent but also with regard to what was the contractual rent. The defendant contended right from the very beginning that the monthly rent agreed to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises was Rs. 30. 00 per month and she had tendered rent accordingly by sending money orders even prior to the date of the notice. She further contended that the suit premises consisted of a cattle shed when it was let-out. There were no walls, doors and windows in the suit premises. She spent about Rs. 5,000. 00 with the consent of the plaintiffs. She has been paying the taxes and the electric burning charges. According to her, pursuant to the order passed by the Court in Standard rent Application, her dispute with regard to the standard rent was alive and that her dispute with regard to the contractual rent was in any case alive. The net result of such facts asserted by the defendant is that the case could never have been said to have been falling within the ambit of Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act. The net result of such facts asserted by the defendant is that the case could never have been said to have been falling within the ambit of Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act. The finding of the learned trial Judge that the order of withdrawal of the Standard Rent application with liberty to file fresh application was without jurisdiction and nullity, is quite contrary to law and for that purpose, reference may be made to Rules 10, 11 and 16 of the rules made under the Rent Act. The rules are styled - The Bombay rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Rules, 1948. Rules 10 and 11 are contained in Chapter V regarding procedure to be followed by the Court of Civil judge (Junior Division and Senior Division) in suits, proceedings, etc. and by the district Court in appeals. Rule 10 prescribes procedure to be followed in particular type of suits triable by a Court of Small Causes under the Provincial Small Causes courts Act, 1887 and the procedure to be followed is as far as may the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 11 prescribes similar procedure to be followed in case of Miscellaneous applications including Standard Rent applications. Chapter III is captioned general and contains the only Rule 16 which says that in deciding any question relating to procedure not specifically provided for by the rules the Court is to be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is clear on plain reading of these rules that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure would apply to the proceedings of the standard rent applications as far as may be with necessary modifications. There is nothing contrary in the Rent Act or the aforesaid rules to say that the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not apply to the application for fixation of the standard rent. That being the position of law, it was quite within the jurisdiction of the Court dealing with the standard rent application to allow withdrawal of the standard rent with liberty to file fresh application. That being the position of law, it was quite within the jurisdiction of the Court dealing with the standard rent application to allow withdrawal of the standard rent with liberty to file fresh application. However, in substance, nothing turns on the finding of the learned trial Judge that the order of withdrawal with liberty to file fresh application was nullity, for it is settled law under the Rent Act which is a special statute that unless the standard rent was fixed by the Court constituted under the Rent Act, the dispute could not be said to have been resolved. If necessary, reference may be made to a decision of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Devkaran Nenshi Tanna v. Manharlal nenshi, reported in AIR 1994 SC 2747 , para 7 whereof may be quoted :"the question then is whether the tenant can make successive applications for fixation of the standard rent. It is true, as rightly contended by Sri Verma, that once a standard rent has been determined by the Court, after applying its mind to all the facts and circumstances after adjudicating the dispute, under Sec. 11 (1) (a) or permitted increases, then unless that order is reversed or set aside by the appropriate appellate Court or the revisional Court or on appeal by this Court, parties are bound by the adjudication of the standard rent and to make payment thereafter. But in a case where adjudication was merely passed on a compromise between the parties, the question emerges whether the tenant is precluded to invoke the defence under Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. This point is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in Prithvichand Ramchand Sablok v. S. V. Shinde, 1993 (3) SCR 271 at 277 : (1993 AIR SCW 2223 - 2229 ). " ( 6 ) IT is thus clear that the case clearly falls within the ambit of the provisions contained in Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act and the finding of the Courts below to the contrary holding that the case falls within the four corners of Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act and that the dispute of the standard rent raised by the defendant was not bona fide and therefore, she was liable to be evicted from the suit premises, is erroneous in law. ( 7 ) IT is in connection with the application of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act also that the Courts below have fallen into error. It may first be seen how the matter has been looked into by the Courts below. The trial Court relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Mistry Premjibhai Vithaldas v. Ganeshbhai Keshavji, reported in AIR 1977, SC 1707 has concluded that the withdrawal of the Standard rent Application would amount to unconditional withdrawal, and therefore, it can be reasonably inferred that the application which was filed by the defendant was not a bona fide application at all. According to the trial Court withdrawal application for standard rent would indicate that there was no real dispute of the standard rent or permitted increase, and therefore, there being no dispute of standard rent in the eye of law and the arrears being for more than six months on the date of the suit notice, the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act would apply. As stated above, there is two-fold falacy in the reasoning of the trial Court; firstly, the trial Court has overlooked the fact that the rent could not be said to be payable monthly in as much as admittedly the tenant was liable to pay the taxes, secondly, there was not only the dispute of standard rent but there was also a dispute in respect of contractual rent in existence as contemplated by the provisions of Sec. 12 of the Rent Act. There is thus clear non-application of mind to the admitted facts, for coming to the conclusion that the dispute was not bona fide. The facts clearly indicate that the defendant did send money orders @ Rs. 30 per month prior to the date of the suit notice and the money orders coupons are produced at Exh. 31 to 44. If there was no genuineness in the assertion of the facts by the defendants, she could not have sent money orders @ Rs. 30 per month even before the issuance of the suit notice by the plaintiff. Then there is a reply to the suit notice given within one month from the date of receipt of the notice and in that reply, the dispute both with regard to the contractual as well as standard rent has been raised. 30 per month even before the issuance of the suit notice by the plaintiff. Then there is a reply to the suit notice given within one month from the date of receipt of the notice and in that reply, the dispute both with regard to the contractual as well as standard rent has been raised. It is quite interesting to note that the plaintiff did not initiate any action for eviction during the pendency of the standard rent application which was filed by the defendant. It is undoubtedly true that the order for interim rent was passed in that application and accordingly, by 6th December, 1982, the defendant was required to deposit or pay arrears of rent @ Rs. 50. 00 per month being the interim rent fixed by the trial Court judge in the standard rent application. But then, within the short time, viz. , within 15 days, defendant deposited Rs. 3,000. 00 in the Court and this fact is not in dispute. Thereafter on 16th February, 1977, defendant deposited Rs. 1,250. 00 in that application. The same is followed by the deposit of Rs. 50. 00 each on 14-3-1977, and 20-4-1977. The final deposit is of Rs. 100. 00 made on 12th July, 1977. In all, rs. 4,450/- were deposited before the suit came to be filed. The plaintiffs have withdrawn the amount deposited by the defendant, therefore, the suit notice by which the defendant was called upon to pay the arrears from 1-7-1969 was in part complied with and there has been a grievance made on behalf of the defendant that the cause of action as admitted by the suit notice stood exhausted atleast in part. What is important to notice from these facts is that the plaintiffs conveniently waited for filing the suit till the time the defendant had withdrawn the standard rent application with liberty to file fresh application. Under the circumstances, application of the decision rendered in the case of Mistry Premjibhai Vithaldas (supra) was absolutely uncalled for. The other decisions in Ganpat Ladha v. Shashikant Vishnu Shinde, reported in AIR 1978 SC 955 and Mrinalini B. Shah and Anr. Under the circumstances, application of the decision rendered in the case of Mistry Premjibhai Vithaldas (supra) was absolutely uncalled for. The other decisions in Ganpat Ladha v. Shashikant Vishnu Shinde, reported in AIR 1978 SC 955 and Mrinalini B. Shah and Anr. v. Bapalal Mohanlal shah, reported in (1978) XIX GLR 1090 could hardly have been applied bearing in mind the important fact that the dispute of contractual rent as well as standard rent was quite alive and was resolved only when the trial Court delivered the judgment. There was no question of applying the principle revolving round the word "reguarly" discussed in the last mentioned two decisions. It is not in dispute that soon after the decision of the trial Court, defendant had deposited all the arrears of rent and mesne profits as per standard rent fixed by the trial Court as also the cost of the suit. This will be evident from the statement which has been filed by the defendant in this revision application supported by the certified copies of deposits made by defendant in the trial Court. It is in this connection that a reference needs to be made to the decision of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Vora Abbasbhai v. Haji gulamnabi, reported in (1964) V GLR 55. This Court had an occasion to deal with the said decision in the case of Trikamlal Manilal Shah v. Musamiya Imam Haiderbux razvi, reported in 1992 (1) GLH 390 : [ 1992 (2) GLR 1014 ] in following terms :-"10. With regard to Sec. 12 (1) the Supreme Court inter alia held that protection from eviction is claimable by the tenant so long as he pays or he is ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent and permitted increases. With regard to Sec. 12 (3) (b) it has been held that to bring his claim within that provision, the tenant must pay or tender the standard rent and permitted increases on or before the first day of hearing, or on or before such other date as Court may fix and also pays cost of the suit as may be directed by the Court. Following observations in para 10 are required to be reproduced with emphasis to be supplied for the purpose of noticing certain classified situations :- "but in the practical working of clause (3) (b) some difficulty may arise. Following observations in para 10 are required to be reproduced with emphasis to be supplied for the purpose of noticing certain classified situations :- "but in the practical working of clause (3) (b) some difficulty may arise. Where there is no dispute as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases, but rent is not payable by the month, or the rent is not in arrears for six months, by paying or tendering in Court, the standard rent and the permitted increases and continuing to pay it till the suit is finally decided the protection granted by the clause is made effective. Where there is a dispute as to the standard rent, the tenant would not be in a position to pay or tender the standard rent, on the first date of hearing, and fixing of another date by the Court for payment or tender would be ineffectual until the standard rent is fixed. The Court would in such a case on the application of the tenant, take up the first instance, and having fixed the standard rent, call upon the tenant to pay or tender such standard rent so fixed, on or before the date specified, and continues to pay or tender it regularly till the suit is finally decided, he qualifies for the protection of clause (3) (b ). If in an appeal filed against the decree, the standard rent is enhanced, the appeal Court may fix a date for payment of the difference, and if on or before that date the difference is paid, the requirement of Sec. 12 (3) (b) would be complied with. " (Emphasis for classification of certain situation supplied ). The Supreme Court held that Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act requires the tenant to pay the standard rent and not interim rent and the expression standard rent may not be equated with interim rent. It is observed : "the Legislature has prescribed conditions on which the tenant may qualify for protection of his occupation, and one of the important conditions is the readiness and willingness to pay the standard rent and permitted increases, which may be proved by obtaining an order of the Court fixing the rate of standard rent and complying therewith or by complying with the Explanation to Sec. 12 or otherwise. " in that case, the Supreme Court held that the claim made by the defendant fell within the terms of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act and that the District Court was apparently in error in assuming that by tendering in Court rent at the rate specified in the order dated February 14, 1957, the requirement of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the payment of standard rent was satisfied. It was observed that the amount deposited pursuant to the order of the Court was not less than the amount fixed by the trial Court. However, the defendant did not continue to pay rent regularly till the suit was finally decided. But, it was held, the Court should have before disposing of the appeal fixed a date for payment of the difference between the standard rent due and the amount actually deposited in the Court. This can be seen from what has been ruled in para 14 of the citation. " ( 8 ) IN Harnamsingh Lalsingh v. Gangaram Itchharam, reported in (1968) IX glr 323, this Court following the principles laid down in Vora Abbasbhais case observed that where there is a dispute with regard to the standard rent, the tenant would not be in a position to pay or tender the standard rent, on the first date of hearing, and therefore, fixing another date by the Court for payment or tender would be ineffective until the standard rent is fixed. ( 9 ) IN another decision rendered by this Court in the case of Nanji Pancha v. Daulal Naraindas, reported in (1970) XI GLR 285, Division Bench of this Court has also expressed the same principles referred to in the case of Vora Abbasbhai (supra) holding that where there is a dispute as to the standard rent, the tenant would not be able to pay or tender the standard rent on the first date of hearing and fixing another date by the Court for payment or tender would be ineffectual until the standard rent is fixed. The statement placed on record by the learned advocate Mr. P. V. Hathi for defendant (petitioner) clearly indicates that before filing of an appeal and soon after the date of decision of the trial Court, all the arrears of rent and the mesne profit as well as cost of the suit came to be deposited by the defendant in the Court. P. V. Hathi for defendant (petitioner) clearly indicates that before filing of an appeal and soon after the date of decision of the trial Court, all the arrears of rent and the mesne profit as well as cost of the suit came to be deposited by the defendant in the Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx ( 10 ) FINALLY, it should be noted with utmost care that there was also a dispute with regard to the contractual rent from the very inception and the Courts below have not stated that the said dispute was not bona fide. ( 11 ) THE net result of what has been said hereinabove is that both the Courts below have committed an error of law apparent on the face of the facts of the present case in passing the decree for eviction either under the provision of Sec. 12 (3) (a) or Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act. The decree for possession passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the appellate Court, therefore, shall have to be quashed and set aside. Mr. Hathi, the learned Advocate for the petitioner (defendant) has fairly conceded that the finding with regard to standard rent is the finding of fact and it would not be possible to bring home any contrary submission bearing in mind the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act. ( 12 ) IN the result, this revision is allowed. The judgment and decree for eviction passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the appellate Court, as stated above, would stand set aside. Plaintiffs suit for possession is dismissed. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. .