Honble YADAV,. J. — The petitioner-Corporation calls in question assessment and imposition of tax amounting to Rs. 22,248/- by the Assistant Collector, Land and Building Tax Department, Sri Ganganagar under Sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Lands & Building Tax Act, 1964 in respect of the land and building situated in District Sri Ganganagar. (2) The factual matrix of the present writ petition lies in short compass. It is alleged in the writ petition by the petitioner that Assistant Collector, Land and Building Tax Department, Sri Ganganagar (respondent No. 2) issued a notice under the provision of the Rajasthan Lands and Buildings Tax Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred as to the Act of 1964) to the properties of the petitioner situated in Sri Ganganagar. The petitioner-Corporation did not file any return but appeared before respondent No. 2 in response to the notice issued by him and urged before him that the land or building of the petitioner-Corporation cannot be assessed under the Act of 1964. Respondent No. 2 did not accept the contention of the petitioner-Corporation and assessed the land and building of the petitioner-Corporation to tax amounting to Rs. 22,248/-.. (3). Aggrieved by the order issued by the Assistant Collector, Land & Building Tax Department, Sri Ganganagar (respondent No. 2) dated 22.12.81, the petitioner-Corporation filed an appeal before the Deputy Director (Appellate Authority), Land and Building Tax, Jodhpur where the appeal was registered as Appeal No. 1 of 1983 and the same was allowed vide Annx. 1 to the writ petition. (4). Aggrieved against the order passed by the Deputy Director (Appellate Authority), Land and Building Tax, Jodhpur (respondent No. 3), the Assistant Collector, Land and Building Tax Department, Sri Ganganagar (respondent No. 2), filed a revision petition under Sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Lands and Buildings Tax Act, 1964 before the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer (respondent No. 4). The Board of Revenue set aside the order passed by the Deputy Director (Appellate Authority), Land and Building Tax, Jodhpur vide Annx. 2 to the writ petition. (5). The petitioner-Corporation is seeking relief for quashing the impugned order Annx. 2 to the writ petition passed by respondent No. 4 and also prayed for declaration that the petitioner- Corporation is entitled to get exemption from such imposition of tax as contemplated under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964. (6). 2 to the writ petition. (5). The petitioner-Corporation is seeking relief for quashing the impugned order Annx. 2 to the writ petition passed by respondent No. 4 and also prayed for declaration that the petitioner- Corporation is entitled to get exemption from such imposition of tax as contemplated under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964. (6). After service of notices upon the respondents, they have filed a return to the writ petition and have stated that it is irrelevant to say that the petitioner-Corporation is a State withing the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. According to the answering-respondents, the exemption under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964 has been granted only to the Land and Buildings owned or administered by the State Government or the Central Government or the Local Authority. Since the petitioner-Corporation does not fall within the meaning of the afore-mentioned three categories, therefore, it is wholly irrelevant to claim exemption from payment of tax merely on the ground that the petitioner-Corporation falls within the definition of State as contemplated under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. (7). I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. H.N. Calla and learned Additional Advocate General Mr. L.S. Udawat at length and have critically gone through the material available on record. (8). The main thrust of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. H.N. Calla in the instant writ petition are; firstly, the petitioner-Corporation is entitled to get exemption under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964 as it falls within the definition of the State as contemplated under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India; secondly, the petitioner-Corporation being Statutory Corporation created under Sec. 3 of the Ware-Housing Corporation Act, 1962, therefore, they are entitled to get the benefit as contemplated under Art. 285(1) of the Constitution of India ; and lastly, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Corporation is entitled to get exemption within the meaning of Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964. (9). Mr. L.S. Udawat, learned Additional Advocate General refuted the aforesaid arguments and contended that even if the petitioner-Corporation falls within the definition of the State or other authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India, the Corporation is not entitled to get the benefit of tax exemption imposed under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964. (10). (9). Mr. L.S. Udawat, learned Additional Advocate General refuted the aforesaid arguments and contended that even if the petitioner-Corporation falls within the definition of the State or other authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India, the Corporation is not entitled to get the benefit of tax exemption imposed under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964. (10). In reply to the second argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner, learned Addl. Advocate General urged before me that the property in dispute is owned and administered by the petitioner-Corporation, which is created under Sec. 3 of the Ware-Housing Act, 1962 and as such, it has a corporate personality of its own, therefore, the property upon which, the tax has been imposed it cannot be said to be a property of the Government of India. According to him, the provisions of Art. 285(1) of the Constitution of India are not attracted in the present case. (11). Lastly, Mr. L.S. Udawat, learned Additional Advocate General strenuously argued before me that the exemptions from taxation granted by the State Legislature under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964 may be strictly construed and it may not be extended beyond the express requirements of the language used in the aforesaid Section. (12). I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised at the Bar. In my humble opinion, in the present writ petition, interpretation of the provisions of Article 12, Article 285 of the Constitution of India and Section 6(a) of the Act of 1964 are attracted. In view of the arguments raised at the Bar I think it proper to formulate the following questions in order to appreciate the arguments advanced at the Bar with circumspection : — (i) WHETHER the petitioner-Corporation is entitled to get exemption under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964 merely because it falls within the definition of State or other authority as contemplated under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India? (ii) WHETHER the property owned and administered by the petitioner-Corporation, which is a statutory Corporation created under Sec. 3 of the Ware-Housing Corporation Act, 1962 has a corporate personality of its own and such property owned and administered by the petitioner-Corporation can be said to be the property of the Government of India within the meaning of Art. 285(1) of the Constitution of India? (iii) WHETHER the petitioner-Corporation is entitled to get exemption as contemplated under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964? (13). It would be expedient to discuss the aforesaid questions formulated by me in seriatim in order to appreciate the rival contentions raised at the Bar. (14). WHETHER THE PETITIONER-CORPORATION IS ENTITLED TO GET EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 6(a) OF THE ACT OF 1964 MERELY BECAUSE IT FALLS WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF THE STATE OR OTHER AUTHORITY AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA :- (i) Before discussing the first question formulated by me, it would be expedient to quote Art. 12 of the Constitution of India in extenso :— "Art. 12. In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, "the State" includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India." In my humble opinion, the present Article gives an extended meaning to the word the State wherever they occur in Part HI of the Constitution, which deals with fundamental rights. Unless the context otherwise requires the State will include not only the Executive and Legislative organs of the Union and the State but also local bodies, such as Municipal Authorities as well as other authorities, which include the instrumentalities or agencies of the State or Bodies or institutions which discharge public functions of a Governmental character. In my considered opinion, the definition of the State given under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India is only applicable for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution meaning thereby the instrumentalities or agencies the State are also subject to all constitutional limitations as enshrined under Part-Ill of the Constitution. Thus, wherever the instrumentalities or agencies of the State are found guilty of violating any provisions of Part III of the Constitution, & writ petition can be entertained and writ can be issued against such instrumentalities or agencies of the State similarly as issued against the State. But for the aforesaid reasons, every instrumentality of the Government is not necessarily a Government Department. (ii) My attention was invited by the learned counsel for the petitioner towards the provisions of Sections 3,4,5,6,7,9,10,14,26,27,31,31A,35,40,41 and 42 of the Ware- Housing Corporation Act, 1962. But for the aforesaid reasons, every instrumentality of the Government is not necessarily a Government Department. (ii) My attention was invited by the learned counsel for the petitioner towards the provisions of Sections 3,4,5,6,7,9,10,14,26,27,31,31A,35,40,41 and 42 of the Ware- Housing Corporation Act, 1962. A bare look at these various provisions of the Ware-Housing Corporation Act will make it clear that it is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provision of the Act to acquire, hold and dispose of the property and may by its name sue and be sued. It can acquire, hold and dispose of any property for the purposes of its business. (iii) After close scrutiny of the aforesaid Sections, there can be no two opinions about the fact that the petitioner-Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government of India within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India after applying the tests as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases of Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal and others (1), Sukh Dev Singh v. Bhagat Ram (2), R.D. Shetty vs. International Air- port Aurhority (3), Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardhi (4), Som Parakash Rekhi v. Union of India (5), P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India (6), Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojonath Gangoli (7) and Takraj Vasandhi Alias K.L. Basandhi v. Union of India (8). (iv) It is true that a similar question arose before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna v. The National Council of Educational Research & Training and others (9), where after taking note of the earlier decisions referred in the preceding paragraphs, their Lordships ruled in paragraph 3 of the aforesaid decision as follows : — Art. 12 should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression "State". A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. It must not be lost sight of that in the modern concept of Welfare State, independent institution, corporation and agency are generally subject to State control. The State control does not render such bodies as "State" under Art. 12. The State control, however vast the pervasive, is not determinative. It must not be lost sight of that in the modern concept of Welfare State, independent institution, corporation and agency are generally subject to State control. The State control does not render such bodies as "State" under Art. 12. The State control, however vast the pervasive, is not determinative. The financial contribution by the State is also not conclusive. The combination of State aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is "State". If the Government operates behind a corporate veil, carrying out governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance, there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as "State" within the meaning of Art, 12 of the Constitution." (v) In order to determine as to whether the petitioner- Corporation falls within the definition of the State, I have to examine the question in the light of the recent decision given by their Lordships in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna (supra), in which all earlier decisions of the Apex Court have been taken into account. (vi) In the present case, the share-holder of the petitioner- Corporation are the Central Government and other financial Institutions prescribed under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 4 of the Ware-Housing Corporation Act, 1962. The Central Government is authorised under the said Act to appoint six Directors, the Managing Director, the Chariman and the Vice Chairman. The Central Government is also empowered to remove the Directors. The Finance, Accounts and Audit is controlled by the Central Government under the Central Ware-Housing Corporation Act, 1962 and by the State Government in the case of the State Ware Housing Corporation. The Government has power to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and it is the Government, which can dissolve the Management of the Corporation. The shares of the Corporation, are guaranteed by the Government as to the re-payment of principal and payment of the Annual Dividend. The Corporation exists for the larger good of the Nation, inasmuch as, agriculture produce and other notified commodities other than agriculture produce are stored scientifically adequately, so that, public distribution system can be maintained and sustained keeping in view the quantity and quality of the goods. The Corporation exists for the larger good of the Nation, inasmuch as, agriculture produce and other notified commodities other than agriculture produce are stored scientifically adequately, so that, public distribution system can be maintained and sustained keeping in view the quantity and quality of the goods. The shares of the Corporation are not transferable except with the leave of the Central Government or the Financing Institutions. The Corporation gets its fund from the Central Government after due * appropriation made by the Parliament in this behalf and that fund will be maintained by the Corporation. The averments made in paragraph 1 of the writ petition are not denied by the answering-respondents and in reply to the averments made in paragraph 1 of the writ petition, the answering-respondents have stated in their reply that the facts stated in paragraph 1 with regard to the establishment of the Central Ware Housing Corporation and its functions are not disputed. (vii) In view of the facts and circumstances stated above, after applying the test laid down by the Apex Court in Chander Mohan Khannas case (supra), I am of the opinion that the combination of Central aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the petitioner-Corporation and rendering of an important public service by the petitioner-Corporation being obligatory functions of the Central Government leads towards an irresistable conclusion that the petitioner-Corporation falls within the definition of the State. (viii) After holding that the petitioner-Corporation falls within the definition of the State as contemplated under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India, I am further of the opinion that it is subject to all constitutional limitations as contemplated under Part III of the Constitution. The petitioner-Corporation being the State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India is amenable for writ jurisdiction and a writ can be issued against it for any act or omission of the mandatory provisions enshrined under Part-Ill of the Constitution. For the reasons stated above, the petitioner-Corporation can not be permitted to claim exemption from payment of tax under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964 merely because it falls within the extend meaning of word the State or other Authorities for the purposes of Part-III of the Constitution. (15). For the reasons stated above, the petitioner-Corporation can not be permitted to claim exemption from payment of tax under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964 merely because it falls within the extend meaning of word the State or other Authorities for the purposes of Part-III of the Constitution. (15). WHETHER THE PROPERTY OWNED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE PETITIONER-CORPORATION, WHICH IS A STATUTORY CORPORATION CREATED UNDER SECTION 3 OF THE WARE HOUSING CORPORATION ACT, 1962 HAS A CORPORATE PERSONALITY OF ITS OWN AND SUCH PROPERTY OWNED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE PETITIONER-CORPORATION CAN BE SAID TO BE THE PROPERTY OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 285(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. (i) The system of double Government set up by our general Constitution requires, for its smooth working the immunity of the property of one Government from taxation by another. Art. 285 of the Constitution of India deals with immunity of the property of the Union from the State taxation. In order to appreciate the present controversy, it would be expedient to quote Art. 285 of the Constitution of India for ready reference: — "Art. 285. Exemption of property of the Union from the State taxation: — (1) The property of the Union shall, save in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, be exempt from all taxes imposed by a State or by any other authority within a State. (2) Nothing in clause (1), shall, until Parliament by law otherwise provides, prevent any authority within a State from leving any tax on any property of the Union to which such property was immediately before the commencement of this Constitution liable or treated as liable, so long as that tax continues to be levied in that State." (ii) A close scrutiny of Art. 285(1) of the Constitution of India reveals that the property owned by a Government Company or a Statutory Corporation, which has a corporate personality of its own, cannot be said to be property of the Union and as such liable to State or Municipal taxation. (iii) The aforesaid question about the interpretation of Art. 285(1) of the Constitution of India came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Western Coal-fields Limited v. Special Area Development Authority Korba and another (10), in which Honble Chandrachud C.J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court ruled in paragraph 20 as follows :- "The third contention of the Attorney General flows from the provisions of Art. 285(1) of the Constitution which says that the property of the Union shall, save in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide be exempt from all taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a State. Sec. 127A(2) of the M.P. Municipalities Act and S. 136 of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act also provide that the property tax shall not be leviable, inter alia, on "buildings and lands owned by or vesting in the Union Government". Relying on these provisions, it is contended by the Attorney General that since the appellant Companies are wholly owned by the Government of India, the lands and buildings owned by the companies cannot be subjected to property tax. The short answer to this contention is that even though the entire share capitals of the appellant companies themselves are owned by the Government of India. The Companies, which are incorporated under the Companies Act, have a corporate personality of their own distinct from that of the Government of India. The lands and buildings are vested in and owned by the companies, the Government of India only owns the share capital. In Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 3 SCR 530 , 555 = ( AIR 1970 SC 564 at page 584) (The Banks nationalisation case) it was held: — "A company registered under the Companies Act a a legal person, separate and distinct from its individual members. Property of the Company is not the property of the share-holders. A share- holder has merely an interest in the Company arising under its Articles of Association, measured by a sum of money for the purpose of liability and by a share in the profit." (iii) In paragraph 21-A, their Lordships of the Supreme Court after critical examination of its earlier decision in the case of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Income-tax Officer (11) puts the matter beyond all doubt. In that case, the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation claimed exemption from taxation under Art. 289 of the Constitution, by which, the property and income of a State is exempted from Union taxation. In that case, while rejecting the Corporations claim held that though it was wholly controlled by the State Government it had a separate entity and its income was not the income of the State Government. Honble Gajendragadkar, C.J., while speaking for the Court, referred with approval to the judgment of Lord Denning in Tamlin v. Hansaford (12), in which the learned Judge observed: — "In the eye of law, the Corporation is its own master and is answerable as fully as any other person or corporation. It is not the Crown and has none of the immunities or privileges of the Crown. Its servants are not civil servants and its property is not Crown property. It is as much bound by Acts of Parliament as any other subject of the King. It is of-course a public authority and its purposes, no doubt are public purposes out it is not Government department nor do its powers fall within the province of Government." (iv) From the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that so far as the property in dispute is concerned, it is the property of the petitioner-Corporation and will not be the property of the Central Government within the meaning of Art. 285(1) of the Constitution of India. In the same manner, as the employees of the petitioner-Corporation will not become the employees of the Central Government as ruled by the Apex Court in Sukhdev Singhs case (supra). In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly ruled that the employees of the Corporation i.e. Life Insurance Corporation do not become the employees of the Union Government. A reference may be made to paragraph 67 of the judgment of Honble A.N. Ray, C.J., speaking for the Court, wherein it has been held that Rules and Regulations framed by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation and the Industrial Finance Corporation have the force of law. The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions. The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions. By way of abundant caution, the Apex Court ruled that these employees are not servants of the Union or the State. These statutory bodies are "authorities" within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. Honble K.K. Methew, J. in his supporting judgment in paragraph 112, held ; "I do not think there is any basis for the apprehension expressed that by holding that these public corporations are State within the meaning of Art. 12, the employees of these corporations would become government servants." (v) The aforesaid discussion leads towards an irresistible conclusion that the petitioner-Corporation is not entitled to get tax exemption under Art. 285(1) of the Constitution of India, as claimed by it, in as much as the property owned and administered by the petitioner-Corporation which has a corporate personality of its own cannot be said to be the property of the Union. (16). WHETHER THE PETITIONER-CORPORATION IS ENTITLED : TO GET EXEMPTION AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SEC. 6(a) OF THE ACT OF 1964 :- (i) The Act of 1964 as amended by Amending Act No. 15 of 1973 and Amending Act No. 18 of 1973 has been enacted under Entry No. 49 of the State List of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, therefore, the aforesaid enactment under which the tax has been imposed upon the petitioner-Corporation, is undoubtedly within the legislative competence of the State Legislature, which is to be strictly construed as urged by the learned Additional Advocate General Mr. L.S. Udawat. (ii) The Act of 1964 applies to all lands and buildings situated within the Municipal limits including the industrial establishment except those enumerated under Sec. 6 of the Act of 1964 and such properties notified to be specifically exempted from payment of tax under Sec. 21 of the Act of 1964, which provides that the State Government or such other authorities or officers authorised by the State Government in this behalf may, if they considers necessary in the public interest by notification in the official Gazette exempt, reduce or remit prospectively or retrospectively, the tax payable in respect of any class of lands and buildings by any class of persons. Under Sub-sec. Under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 21, the Government of Rajasthan or its authority or its officer referred to in sub-sec. (1) may at any time cancel or modify any order issued under sub-sec. (1) and upon such cancellation the tax shall be payable in respect of the lands or buildings with effect from time when such cancellation is made provided that, no such cancellation shall be made unless the party likely to be affected by such cancellation has a reasonable opportunity to make his representation. (17) Now, I propose to take up the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner-Corporation is a local authority within the meaning of Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964 and as such, entitled to exemption from payment of tax under the aforesaid Act, on lands and buildings owned by it. Local Authority has not been defined anywhere in the Act of 1964 but it is defined under Sec. 32(43) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955. According to which, the definition of local authority means a Municipal Board, Committee, Corporation or Council, a District Board, Zila Parishad, Panchayat Samiti, a Panchayat or other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by Government with the control or management of municipal or local fund. (17A). In my humble opinion, the definition of local authority given under the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 is exhaustive and it does not include the petitioner-Corporation within its ambit. The first part expressly specifies the Municipal Board, Committee, Corporation or Council, a District Board, a Zila Parishad, a Panchayat Samiti, which indicates the nature of local authorities who are charged with the duties to look after the civic amenities of the people of the State. It further indicates to the effect that constitution of such local authority must be a democratic institution where members constituting the local authority must be elected by the people of the State of Rajasthan whose affairs are to be looked after by such local authority, whereas the second part "other authority" used under Sec. 32(43) is generic in nature, therefore, other authority will be treated to be covered within the definition only if such other authority is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government of Rajasthan with the control or management of a municipal or local fund. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner-Corporation cannot be taken to be a local authority within the definition of Sec. 32(43) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, inasmuch as, the Government of Rajasthan has not legally entitled to it or entrusted to it with the control or management of its municipal or local fund. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner-Corporation falls within the definition of local authority given under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964 is fallacious and is not acceptable. (18). A parimateria provisions in Sec. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, where identical definition of local authority came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. R.C. Jain (13), where Honble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Court ruled in para 2 of the aforesaid decision, which is quoted below in extenso : — "Let us, therefore, concentrate and confine our attention and enquiry to the definition of Local Authority in Section 3 (31) of the General Clauses Act. A proper and careful scrutiny of the language of Section 3 (31) suggests that an authority, in order to be a local Authority, must be of like nature and character as a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners, possessing, therefore, many, if not all, of the distinctive attributes and characteristics of a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners, but, possessing one essential feature, namely, that it is legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control and management of a municipal or local fund. What then are the distinctive attributes and characteristics, all or many of which a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners shares with any other local authority ? First, the authorities must have separate legal existence as Corporate bodies. They must not be mere Governmental agencies but must be legally independent entities. Next, they must function in a defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, be elected by inhabitants of the area. Next, they must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide for themselves questions of policy affecting the area administered by them. Next, they must function in a defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, be elected by inhabitants of the area. Next, they must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide for themselves questions of policy affecting the area administered by them. The autonomy may not be complete and the degree of the dependence may vary considerably but, an appreciable measure of autonomy there must be. Next, they must be entrusted to Statute with such Governmental functions and duties as are usually entrusted to municipal bodies such as those connected with providing amenities to the inhabitants of the locality like health and education services, water and sewerage, town planning and development, roads, markets, transportation, social welfare services etc. etc. Broadly we may say that they may be entrusted with the performance of civic duties and functions which would otherwise be Governmental duties and functions. Finally, they must have the power to raise funds for the furtherance of their activities and fulfilment of their projects by levying taxes, rates, charges or fees. This may be in addition to moneys provided by Government or obtained by borrowing or otherwise. What is essential is that control or management of the fund must vest in the authority." (19). Applying the aforesaid tests in the present case, the petitioner-Corporation does not fall within the definition of Local Authority as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in as much the managing body of the petitioner-Corporation is neither an elected by the people of Rajasthan nor charged with civic duties like health, education services, water and sewerage, town planning and developments, Road, Markets, Transportation, Social Welfare activities etc. The petitioner-Corporation has not been entrusted by the State Government of Rajasthan with the control or management of a municipal or local fund. The petitioner-Corporation has not been given power by the State Government of Rajasthan to levy taxes, cess or fees in furtherance of its activities, therefore, in my considered opinion, it does not fall within the definition of local authority as contemplated under Sec. 6(a) of the Act of 1964 and a contention contrary to it is not acceptable to me. (20). As a result of the afore-mentioned discussion the instant writ petition lacks merit and it is ; hereby dismissed with costs which is assessed to be Rs. 2500/-.