Judgment : D. C. Srivastava, J. 1. This revision under Section 25 of the Provincials of Small Cause Courts Act has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 2.11.95 of Sri Subhash Chandra, IX Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad through which landlord's suit for eviction of the tenant from the disputed accommodation and for recovery of arrears of rent, mesne profits etc. was decreed. 2. THE brief facts are that Flat No. 306 on the second floor of Sector 37, Arun Bihar, Noida, district Ghaziabad is owned by the plaintiff-opposite party. It was let out to the defendant revisionist on a monthly rent of Rs. 3001 per month on 1.3.93. Tenancy used to be for 11 months, which was extended from time to time. THE first rent-note was executed on 28th February, 1993. It was averred that the tenant fell in arrears of rent because the cheque for Rs. 9,000 issued on 1.3.93 was dishonoured. It was also alleged that damage was caused by the tenant to the disputed accommodation. THE tenancy was, therefore, terminated by a notice dated 12.7.93, which was personally served on the tenant on 16.7.93. In spite of service of notice neither the rent was paid nor the tenanted portion was vacated by the tenant, hence the suit for eviction etc. was filed. It was averred that the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 are not applicable to the premises because the building was completed in April, 1985. Suit was filed on 17.8.93. The tenant contested the suit on several grounds. She denied to have received notice of eviction. She pleaded that the building was governed by U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The validity of notice was challenged. The allegation regarding causing damage to the accommodation was denied. Payment of rent upto August, 1993 was alleged. It was further alleged that no receipt for payment of rent was issued. The rent was also deposited in the court below. 3. THE learned lower court concluded that the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 are not applicable to the premises and that the notice was served and that it was valid notice. On arrears also the finding was in favour of the landlord. With these findings the suit was decreed. It is, therefore, this revision. 4. 3. THE learned lower court concluded that the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 are not applicable to the premises and that the notice was served and that it was valid notice. On arrears also the finding was in favour of the landlord. With these findings the suit was decreed. It is, therefore, this revision. 4. THE learned counsel for the parties were heard and with their consent this revision is being disposed of finally at admission stage. Only three points were urged from the side of the revisionist. The first was that the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 are applicable to the premises. The second was that the notice was not served on the tenant-revisionist, hence the decree for eviction is bad in law. The last was that in the alternative the tenant is entitled to relief against forfeiture under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. ; 5. FROM the side of the revisionist it was argued that since this court is exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the findings of the court below on two issues regarding applicability of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and the service of notice, cannot be re-opened inasmuch as these are concluded findings of fact. In my view these concluded findings of fact can be seen in such revision. If the same are found perverse. However, the question whether notice was served or not, in the circumstances of the case, is not a pure question of fact. It is a mixed question of law and fact. It has to be seen in what manner the notice was tendered and served. The second question in this connection would be what presumption can be drawn on the endorsement of the postal authorities regarding service of notice. In this way the question of sen-ice of notice by drawing presumption becomes a mixed question of law and' fact and it can be looked into in such revision. The question of applicability of provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is also a mixed question or law and fact. It has to be determined in accordance with the guidelines of Section 2 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 as to what will be the date of construction or completion of building. The question of applicability of provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is also a mixed question or law and fact. It has to be determined in accordance with the guidelines of Section 2 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 as to what will be the date of construction or completion of building. Consequently I propose to enter into the above findings in this jurisdiction. 6. COMING to the first point as to when the building was completed, there is a finding recorded by the trial Court that U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is not applicable. This finding is based upon appraisal of oral evidence that the building was completed in April, 1985. The building was handed over to the landlord after its completion and the tenant-revisionist is the first occupant. Judicial notice was taken by the learned lower court that the buildings in NOIDA are recently constructed because this area itself came into existence recently. If judicial notice was taken, it cannot be said that the finding has been recorded on speculative basis. Besides this, evidence of PW 1, S. S. Kapoor has also been considered by the learned lower court. There is no evidence from the side of the tenant that the building was completed prior to 1985. It was argued that the tenant could not produce any evidence that the building was constructed before 1985. If this is so, then the evidence of the plaintiff-landlord also cannot be rejected on mere surmises. The finding recorded by the lower appellate court that the building was completed in year 1985, therefore, cannot be said to be perverse. Since the suit was filed on 17.8.93, the building did not complete ten years period and as such it is not covered under the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Another aspect to be considered in this connection is the rate of rent. Admittedly the rate of rent is Rs. 30001 per month. U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was amended and the amending Act received the assent of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh on 15.2.95 and the same was published in the Gazetted on 17.2.95. A provision has been inserted in Section 2 of the previous Act to the following effect: "the following clauses shall be inserted, namely, (g) any building, whose monthly rent exceeds two thousand rupees. " 7. A provision has been inserted in Section 2 of the previous Act to the following effect: "the following clauses shall be inserted, namely, (g) any building, whose monthly rent exceeds two thousand rupees. " 7. IT is, therefore, clear that the building, whose monthly rent exceeds Rs. 2,000 per month, will not be covered under the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Since the amending Act came into force with effect from 17.2.95 and the suit was decided on 2.11.1995, the learned lower court committed no error in holding that the building is not governed by U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 8. COMING to the second point, namely service of notice, it is the case of the landlord that the notice was sent at correct address through registered post and also through certificate of posting and the acknowledgement due Form was returned with the signature of the tenant-revisionist. On this evidence plea of personal service of notice was raised by the landlord. But the tenant in her written statement simply denied the service of notice and did not allege that her signature on the acknowledgement Form was forged. Bare denial by the tenant that the acknowledgement Form does not bear her signature, is not sufficient to rebut the presumption relating to service of notice. Several cases were cited from both the sides. In most of the cases notices were returned by the postal authorities with endorsement of refusal. Seeing all the facts in these cases, it was found that the notices were sent on correct address of the addressee. The postal endorsement of refusal was taken into consideration and presumption was drawn about service of notice. However, this presumption is rebuttable. But in all the cases cited by the parties, it was laid down that mere denial of the tenant or the addressee is not sufficient rebuttal, namely that the addressee was not available on the date of tender of notice or was out of station. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gujrat Electricity Board and another v. Atmaram Sungomal Posham, AIR 1980 SC 1433, held that where a party challenging the factum of service of letter under registered cover failed to place any material before the court to show that the endorsement made by the postal authorites regarding refusal was wrong and incorrect, it was no rebuttal of presumption. It was further held that the party failed to discharge the burden to rebut the presumption of service of notice. It was further held that in such case the service was complete and mere denial made by the party in the circumstances of the case cannot be sufficient to rebut the presumption relating to service of notice sent under registered cover. Same view was taken by this court in Lal Mohammad v. End Additional District Judge, 1993 (1) ARC 55. Consensus of judicial opinion in such cases of this Court as enumerated in Ram Rati v. Fakira, AIR 1988 All 75 , is also to the same effect that mere denial of the addressee is not enough to rebut the presumption. Unless the evidence of the tenant is worthy of reliance, the presumption cannot be rebutted. 9. IN the case before me it. is admitted that the notice was sent at the correct address to the tenant and it was returned with acknowledgment bearing the signature of the tenant. IN absence of the allegation and proof of forgery, presumption of personal service becomes more strong and there is no reason to dislodge the presumption on bare denial of the tenant. The learned lower court in the instant case has also compared the signature of the tenant with her signature on the other acknowledgment Form through which summons were served in the court below. On comparison it came to the conclusion that the two signatures were identical. Such comparison of signatures by the court below is not illegal and no expert opinion was needed on the point. 10. I do not find force in the contention that unless the signature was admitted on the earlier acknowledgement, it could not be compared with the signature on the acknowledgment through which notice was served. The summonses were also sent for service through process-server and the tenant had no courage to deny her signature on the summons served by the process-server. On the other hand she evasively replied that she did not know whether summons bears her signature or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma, 1990 (2) ARC 542, again laid down that where the denial of its tender and endorsement of denial on registered envelope is made, presumption of service depends on facts of each case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma, 1990 (2) ARC 542, again laid down that where the denial of its tender and endorsement of denial on registered envelope is made, presumption of service depends on facts of each case. There is no hard and fast rule on this aspect of the case. In this case also there was bare denial by the tenant, and it was observed that if the testimony of the tenant itself is not inherently unreliable, the position may be different, it is always a question of fact in each case whether there was sufficient evidence from the tenant to discharge the initial burden. Bare denial in this case, therefore, is not found to be sufficient rebuttal of the presumption. 11. THE bona fide of the landlord cannot be doubted because simultaneously the notice was also sent through certificate of posting. THE observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao, v. E. V. alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil and others, AIR 1994 SC 678 cannot be easily applied in this case because it cannot be said that it is easy to procure the certificate of posting. Such observation could be applied in the case where there was no attempt by the landlord to send notice by registered post. 12. IN the case reported in 1990 (2) A. R. C. 387 also the Hon'ble Supreme Court took he same view that bare denial of the tenant is not sufficient. However, if there is nothing to disbelieve the statement of the tenant, then it would be sufficient rebuttal of the presumption of service of such letter or notice sent to him by registered post. In the case before me there is only bare denial of the tenant and the plea of forgery sought to be raised at the time of argument here, was neither raised in the written statement nor there is any evidence to this effect. Consequently it is difficult to believe that the landlord got forged signature of the tenant of the Acknowledgement Form. There was thus no error in the finding of the lower court that the notice was served personally on the tenant. 13. Consequently it is difficult to believe that the landlord got forged signature of the tenant of the Acknowledgement Form. There was thus no error in the finding of the lower court that the notice was served personally on the tenant. 13. IF the building was not covered by U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and the notice was served through which the tenancy was terminated and since no invalidity in the notice was argued in this revision nor any invalidity was found therein, the suit for eviction etc. was rightly decreed. 14. IT was argued that the benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act may be given to the tenant and the relief against forfeiture may be granted. However, there is no evidence on record to show that the requisite compliance of Section 114 of the T. P. Act has been made by the tenant by depositing rent, interest and cost of the suit and security. As such this benefit also cannot be granted to the tenant. Secondly the relief of forfeiture cannot be granted because it was not a case of forfeiture of tenancy. On the other hand the lease was a fixed period of 11 months and after the expiry of that period, the lease stood terminated on notice as contemplated in the lease-deed. 15. NO other point was pressed before me. The last point argued was that some time may be allowed to the tenant to vacate the premises in dispute. The request appears to be reasonable, but one year's time seems to be unreasonable. The" revision is, therefore liable to be dismissed. 16. THE revision is dismissed with costs. THE revisionist is allowed four months time from today to vacate the premises on the condition that she will pay the decretal amount upto date and also mesne profits at the awarded rate regularly on third day of each English month during the period of four months. Revision dismissed.